Dear Readers,

We have been eagerly anticipating the publication of this issue. As overwhelming as the past few years have been, the value of reading history should continue to increase in value for all of us.

When I think about this journal and the collection of stories featured in this issue, I realize that our pieces are all grounded in how place and philosophy can bear upon power, social influence, and sometimes even violence. The essays spotlight architectural, social, and political histories, all of which inform our present. Our authors and their pieces make us engage with the deepest layers of meaning in the fields ranging from the significance of public fountains in the Ottoman Empire to Russian Revolutionary Terrorism in the late nineteenth century. They move us closer to historical answers and, even more importantly, to more difficult questions.

Our remarkable team lies at the heart of why we have been able to delve into and present such granular historical analyses. I want to thank our editors and everyone on staff for helping to create this collection of immersive experiences for you to process and enjoy. I want to especially express my tremendous gratitude to Davi Lennon for her unbelievable dedication to the completion of this edition by spearheading its layout formatting and editing processes.

The Vanderbilt History Department has given us its full backing, and we are grateful for the educational enrichment and perspective the History Faculty brings to our lives and university. This issue represents the continuation of a legacy of historical writing and publication, and we will continue moving into the future by considering our complex and shared past. Thank you for your support. With that in mind, please enjoy the edition.
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The Oppositional Presence: Blackness and Whiteness in the Popular Press during the Austin Murders of the Nineteenth Century
Martha Beliveau (Grinnell College)

Introduction
On December 31, 1884 in Austin, Texas, an unknown assailant brutally murdered Black domestic worker, Mollie Smith. This murder catalyzed a series of attacks and murders of Black men and women employed in white homes. Throughout 1885, the Austin press sensationalized the story, inflating peoples’ fear of the loose murderer and insisting that the perpetrator was an African American man. On December 24, 1885, two prominent white women were brutally killed, which marked a shift in the press coverage of the case. After this final attack, the murders suddenly stopped, and the killer (or killers) were never identified. A New York Times article after the last killings summarized the attacks: thirteen Black women were sexually assaulted and seven murdered, while eight white women were attacked in total, seven of whom were sexually assaulted and three murdered (see appendix for timeline of victims).

In covering the murders, most writers and researchers minimize the racial dynamics of the case. In 2015, journalist Skip Hollandsworth published a book entitled The Midnight Assassin: the Hunt for America’s First Serial Killer, which became a New York Times bestseller. By piecing together the surviving nineteenth century newspapers published at the time of the crime spree, Hollandsworth reconstructed the murders from start to finish, emphasizing the effects of the murders on Austin. In contrast to the approach of this paper, Hollandsworth danced around the topic of race and sexual violence, passively acknowledging the racism of the city and yet seeking to represent Texas as a bastion of liberal ideas of pluralism and peaceful multiculturalism.

The reality of Austin in the post-Reconstruction era was far from that of a post-racial utopia because of the enduring legacy of slavery. Once Texas was admitted into the United States as a slave state, there was a large influx of Deep South plantation owners and slaveholders, thereby increasing the population of both white settlers and Black enslaved people. Between 1850 and the Civil War, enslaved Black people made up roughly half of the population in eastern-central Texas, including the areas around Austin. Any understanding of race in Austin, Texas requires contemplation of “frontier culture,” which created a false myth of meritocracy and freedom, ignoring the history and presence of anti-Black racism exhibited in political and social institutions of the time. In practice, this “frontier culture” translated into some of the harshest and most inhumane treatment of enslaved people, as many recorded histories of formerly enslaved people have suggested. The relationship between enslaved women and slave-owning white men is both racialized and gendered, and the

5. Ibid., 59.
6. Ibid.
historical legacy of slavery’s sexual exploitation and violence fostered norms that affirmed white men’s ownership of Black women’s bodies. At the same time, the “frontier culture” did differ from the rest of the Deep South in one major way: there were few white women in frontier Texas initially, so before the codification of miscegenation laws, many white men married Black or Mexican women. Later into the nineteenth century, however, white women increasingly settled in Texas towns like Austin, and anxiety around protecting white femininity from Black masculinity arose, culminating in the emergence of either negative tropes of Black femininity in popular culture or an erasure of Black women altogether.

Because popular culture media like Hollandsworth’s Midnight Assassin tend to focus on finding the murderer rather than focusing on the victims, few works in the historiography of the Austin murders analyze how the popular press reported and described Black bodies and Black communities. Contrary to a white congratulatory and shallow historical understanding of Black people, feminist theorist bell hooks paraphrases theorist Michael Taussig, saying that, “I, too, am in search of the debris of history.” Adopting bell hooks’ framework, this paper searches for Black Austinites and communities within the mainstream coverage of the largely overlooked and ignored Austin violence, and I attempt to find the “debris of history” in print journalism of 1884 and 1885. In this paper, my intention is to pivot focus away from the murderer and toward the victims, reconstructing and rethinking how newspapers from the time display the Black Austin community. Adapting bell hooks’ theoretical framework of the “oppositional gaze,” I demonstrate how Black Austinites made up an analogous “oppositional presence” in the popular press at the time. I define the oppositional presence as the transgressive existence of Black Austinites despite the white supremacist attempt to erase them out of archives and historiographical importance.

This paper analyzes the power of the popular press’ essentialized racial constructions of blackness and whiteness while insisting on the oppositional presence of Black Austinites in the popular press as a revision to the story itself through the act of existence. Thus, this paper is separated into three sections: representations of blackness, representations of whiteness, and the oppositional presence. In the first section, I discuss how the press largely represented blackness through a veil of whiteness, made up of the language used to describe Black Austinites; the performative nature of race-thinking; and the criminalization and sexualization of Black men that created an anxiety around the Black family and white femininity. In the second section, I discuss how constructions of whiteness posited ideal white masculinity as the protector of white femininity from black masculinity, as exemplified in how white Austinites saw the Austin police as the solution to the murders. Finally, in the third section I argue that the popular press unintentionally or unknowingly published articles featuring an oppositional presence of Black people with its own point of view and that this oppositional presence existed even in a largely white-dominated medium of popular culture: newspapers. Newspapers did not completely erase the point of view and subjectivity of Black Austinites, even while essentialized and racialized constructions of Black and white operated simultaneously.

Representations of Blackness in the Press


7. Ibid., 60.
8. Ibid., 75.
Covering the Austin murders, popular newspapers used terminology to assert blackness as an “other.” One of the most common terms was “colored,” which took on raced and gendered connotations when attached to Black women domestic workers. Most publications, including the *Austin Statesman*, described the women who were murdered as “colored.” In fact, the most common and comprehensive descriptive term of the “typical” victim was “colored” -- a term journalists used to describe victims Irene Cross, Jane Coleman, Mary Ramey, and sometimes Gracie Vance as well (see appendix for timeline of victims). Not only employed when describing individuals, nineteenth century journalists used the descriptor “colored” to reference the group of murdered women as a whole. Newspaper reporters/editors/journalists usually used “colored” as the adjective accompanying the noun “girl,” even though Mary Ramey was the only victim of child-age murdered, implying a condescending view of Black women. The popular press alluded to a racial hierarchy, and the use of “girl” in conjunction with the term “colored” exemplifies the existence of this racial hierarchy. The press referred to women of color as “girl” as a form of subjugation in order to demarcate power differentials. Additionally, only Black women, whom white families often employed in their homes, were referred to as “servants,” because the term reinforces a racial caste system. In the book *Opportunity Denied*, Enobong Hannah Branch describes how white women resisted the title “servant” because the term implied a permanent status of employment, like the term “slave.” Intentionally, white women recognized “servant” to refer to Black domestic workers and not themselves. As the nineteenth century waned, more and more white women moved into other work sectors while domestic service remained one of the few employment opportunities for Black women. Black women, of all ages, were referred to as “servant” in the headlines of the newspapers after each murder. The victim was a “colored servant girl” rather than “hired help,” the title that white domestic workers insisted be used. White women participated in discourse on appropriate labeling in order to signify their position in the social and political hierarchy.

The popular press also constructed blackness as an “other” with its use of the term “mulatto,” popular in Austin because of the influence of Mexican and Spanish racial caste systems. Journalists employed the term “mulatto” to describe victims Mollie Smith, Becky Ramey, and Gracie Vance, as well as a Black man alleged to be the murderer, Beverly Overton. Strangely, journalists used this


13. Ibid., 51.


15. Ibid., 51.

term interchangeably as an adjective and a noun, and when used as a noun, more descriptors accompanied “mulatto.” For example, the Austin Statesman described the first acknowledged victim Mollie Smith as “a light-colored mulatto.” Similarly, Becky Ramey was “a fine looking, bright mulatto woman.” Historically, the term “mulatto” usually indicated people of mixed European and Black ancestry. These rather arbitrary terms illustrate how the popular press’ reporters participated in racialization. The physical spaces in which the victims were found became a highly racialized space that then translated onto a racialized newspaper page. The press’ focus on racial categorization asserted that white Austinites were just people, whereas Black Austinites required another adjective to be understood — a form of othering and dehumanization.

The popular press expressed a concern for the state of the Black family, which they identified as the cause of the murders. After Gracie Vance and her partner Orange Washington were both murdered, the Austin Daily Statesman suggested a reason for the murders, explaining, “One theory is, that it is the work of a secret organization, whose object is to stamp out negro prostitution and compel the race, if they live together, to live in the bonds of matrimony.” This statement blatantly displays the press’ view of the Black family as being both in danger and the source of danger. By blaming the attacks on the supposed “failure” of Black relationships, white people, and the white press specifically, could wring their hands of the violent attacks without actually giving credence to or understanding the racial impact of the murders. As a tool of white supremacy to dismantle and divide, hiding behind a call for the Black family’s revival was a covert operation to establish a racial hierarchy. The same Austin Daily Statesman article calls for the “very respectable negro population...to do all they can to bring to punishment those of their race who are disgracing their good character.” Thus, the newspaper suggests that it is the duty and obligation of the Black community itself to solve the problem of the murders. The Austin Daily Statesman article is an example of racist victim-blaming. Even further, the institution of policing played into the destruction of the black family in this case, as the press targeted their reporting of the murders at Black men. Following the December 24th murders of Eula Phillips and Susan Hancock, two well-to-do white women,


the *New York Times* reported that, “Half a dozen negroes were arrested tonight on mere suspicion.” The popular press cultivated a narrative of the black family in crisis in their efforts to identify a reason for the murders, and they reinforced racial hierarchies in the process.

The narrative of the black family in crisis relied on the sexualization of both Black men and women. This sexualization works alongside the assumed criminality of Black men, a phenomenon that hooks calls the “phallocentric idealization of masculinity,” which sexualizes and vilifies Black men in order to illustrate them as guilty parties, even when they are the victims. For the murder cases, newspapers focused on alleged violence within the relationships of the victims. For example, the *San Antonio Express* included additional underhanded references to Gracie Vance and Orange Washington’s relationship, as one article describes Vance as “his mulatto wife or mistress.” This judgment, concealed as reporting, further sexualizes Black women, especially when paired with the descriptions of the perpetrator as a “fiend of lust” because Vance “showed external evidence of having been violated.”

Even the *Austin Daily Statesman* judgingly referred to Gracie Vance as Orange Washington’s “so-called wife,” insinuating falsity in their relationship. The effect of this sexualization of Black women domestic workers is the undermining of their humanity and therefore the weight of their death, insinuating that these victims played some part in their own death and are thus not worthy of public safety resources or sympathy.

The popular press, especially the *Austin Daily Statesman* and the *San Antonio Express*, published articles further illustrating a performative aspect to racial categorization. On March 13, 1885, a Black woman was attacked on the premises of her employer, and the *Austin Daily Statesman* describes her assailants, according to the woman’s testimony, as “negroes, one of them a yellow man painted black.” In this description, race is a staged performance. The assailant donned blackface presumably to cover up his true appearance in order not to be recognized, but beyond this logistical realization, something more profound lies in this example. The press’ explanation of blackface requires some recognition that skin color is tied to behavior, because the assailant could borrow this identity for the purposes of a specific, violent action.

As much as violence was racialized, newspaper reporting simultaneously gendered violence. The popular press reported that murdered Black domestic worker, Gracie Vance, wore the watch of another Swedish domestic worker whose room had previously been burglarized. The newspaper reporters alleged that Vance’s attacker robbed the

24. Ibid.
Swedish worker, then purposefully put the watch on Vance’s body. Because of this new engagement between a white and Black victim, Vance’s body at the scene of the crime suggests some tenuous relationship to whiteness. If a murderer intentionally placed a white woman’s watch on the body of a Black woman, gender and race were intentionally tied, as well. This act of performance that encompasses re-dressing a body relates to one of the press’ “theories” about the murders: a concern for the Black family, because of the cross-racial sexualization with which the popular press described her body. These examples suggest the popular press took part in constructed racialized behavior and performance.

While dominant historical narratives might insist that the popular press erased Black Austinites, an analysis of the representations of blackness in the popular newspapers at the time suggests that the white press was actually obsessed with blackness through its manufacturing of negative and judgemental understandings of blackness attached to racialized terminology and its constructions of Black masculinity and the Black family. All of these contributing factors of representation amount to a performative representation of race. The popular press itself constructed a racial hierarchy because white publishers had the ability to control the narrative around Black Austinites and the racialization of the murders. Weaponized, racialized constructions casted Black Austinites in gendered roles of Black men as criminals and Black women as victims, both of which erase the actor’s agency and subjectivity. Simultaneously, no study of Black representations is complete without a study of its constructed inverse: whiteness.

**Representations of Whiteness in the Press**

Studying constructions of whiteness is important to a study of the Austin murders because, broadly, whiteness is as much a social and popular culture construction and metaphor as blackness. In order to understand the functioning of an oppositional presence, I must first clarify the construction against which the black presence is oppositional. The popular newspapers’ construction of whiteness held a concern for white women, which coincided with a simultaneous critique of the Austin police force who were derided for insufficiently protecting white women. Notably, the constructions of whiteness in the press regarding the Austin murders had two time periods: before the December 24, 1885 murders of Eula Phillips and Susan Hancock, and after those two murders. Before two white women were murdered, the popular press displayed whiteness as pluralistic, in contrast to the racial hierarchy-induced distance between white reporters and the Black victims. After the murders of the white, upper-class women, whiteness became a campaign to protect the frailty of white womanhood, even as the reports questioned the stability of the white family.

The attitude of the popular press at the time suggested a complicated relationship between class, race, and social status. Notably, one German domestic worker and two white Swedish domestic workers were attacked before upper-class women Eula Phillips and Susan Hancock, and the difference in the reporting on these two victims problematizes an easy racial categorization of the white victims. At the same time, the newspaper descriptions of the German and Swedish women were far more favorable than those of the previous Black victim, Mollie Smith. On March 10, 1885, the *Austin Daily Statesman* reported that “a young German girl” who worked “as a domestic in a family residing on East Hickory street” was attacked in her
room. Additionally, the reporters made certain the distinction that the German girl’s attacker was a white man, while simultaneously contextualizing this attack with reference to the previous attacks “among the colored portion of the community.” The newspaper’s descriptions juxtaposes German nationality and “colored” Austinites. Similarly to the German domestic worker, the popular press described the two Swedish girls, Clara Strand and Christine Martenson, sympathetically through an elongated description of the violent encounter and the mention of them as “two pretty Swede girls.” While the newspapers acknowledged the difference in “status” between Mollie Smith and the Swedish and German victims, the later reports of the deaths of Eula Phillips and Susan Hanock were the first “truly” white casualties. The only difference between the Swedish and German domestic workers and the two later victims, Eula Phillips and Susan Hanock, was their socio-economic status. The press displayed the interaction of race and class, because the popular press did not count these three white victims as purely “white” victims; or at the very least, the popular press did not value domestic workers as much as upper-class white women Austinites.

While ideas of pluralism were important to constructions of blackness in the popular press as previously discussed, a pro-pluralism narrative similarly influenced constructions of whiteness. The popular press published that the white community ought to care about the predominantly Black victims of the Austin violence. After the attack of Black domestic worker Eliza Shelley, the Austin Daily Statesman published a call to increase the reward for information on Shelley’s death, writing “It might not be amiss for the Governor to offer a reward in this case. It does not matter that the victim is an obscure colored woman. Her life was as dear to her, and should have been held as sacred as that of the proudest lady in the land.” However, in the same article that called for the worth of Black lives like Shelley’s, the popular press also decisively situated her as “an obscure colored lady,” the opposite of “the proudest lady in the land.” This example rather blatantly situates Eliza Shelley, the embodiment of blackness, as the antithesis of “proud ladies,” the embodiment of whiteness.

While the popular press put forth a pluralist narrative of Austin, newspapers still assumed black guilt and criminality for the murders. In the fall of 1885, the Austin Daily Statesman crime reporters still assumed the killer to be Black, writing, “Heretofore, these attacks have been made on negro servant girls, with one exception, and as far as could be found out, by negromen. These people are just as much entitled to protection as anybody else, but we have no assurances if these murderers are permitted to go unpunished, that it will not extend to other victims.” Again, the Austin Daily Statesman created somewhat of a contradiction: the newspaper suggested on the one hand that Black

29. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Austin Daily Statesman, “To Your Tents Oh Israel,” September 29, 1885.
domestic workers mattered in their own right, and yet on the other further implied the far worse danger that the next victims could be white women. At this impasse, the Austin Daily Statesman attempted and failed to create a sense of equality that valued Black domestic workers the same as white women. Later in the Austin Daily Statesman article, the writer relented that the people of Austin “will be startled some morning by the announcement that some gentleman's family have been murdered in their beds,” and these deaths would matter more than the lives of Black domestic workers. Also implicit in this fear for white womanhood is a patriarchal idea that “gentlemen” must protect their “gentlewomen” before the perpetrators, prejudicially thought to be Black men, are able to get to them. Even more obviously, the Austin Daily Statesman article invokes race explicitly, lamenting that “there are but frail panes of glass between them [the murderer(s)] and our smooth and fair-skinned wives and daughters.” Perhaps more explicitly than in any other excerpt, the Austin Daily Statesman asserts who matters and who does not—white women matter and Black women only matter to the extent that they predict the demise of white women. In this way, whiteness relied on blackness as much as blackness relied on whiteness. What the newspapers constructed as binary opposites mutually relied on each other for their construction and, effectively, there would be no ideological blackness if there were no ideological whiteness.

By the same token, the popular press’ assumption of the murderer’s race simultaneously impacted constructions of blackness as much as constructions of whiteness. While some popular newspapers saw the actions as those of Black men and the others did not think Black men capable of evading capture this long, white representation of blackness reinforced a racial hierarchy. The press assumed that the murderer(s) must have been Black, as the San Antonio Express published, “The fact that the victims are almost exclusively confined to servant girls of the colored race is adduced as proof that the outrager and murderer belongs to the lower ledge of society. Probably a negro, say all, certainly a man of unorganized intelect and debased nature say others.” However, the Austin Daily Statesman’s analysis of the murders stood in contradiction, albeit on prejudiced terms, “The crime of Sunday can hardly be laid at the door of an ignorant negro. History of outrages upon women by negroes proves this. They rarely ever deliberately murder their victims, and experience shows that nine times out of ten they invariably leave some clue which leads to their identification and arrest.”

While the popular press framed these murders around judgements of blackness and a critique of Black people, the debate over who could possibly be the perpetrator of these murders said more about whiteness than about blackness because the popular press functioned as a white lens. The San Antonio Express assumed that only Black men would have an interest in killing Black women while the Austin Daily Statesman argued that Black men did not possess the intellect to carry out these murders without being caught. Essentially, the reporting of the murders gave the white press an excuse to talk about race, a subject which boiled underneath the surface of Texas.

Much of the news coverage before the two white victims concerned the police force

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35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
in Austin, because the popular press concerned itself with ideas of law and order, a campaign led by prominent white Austinites. Beginning in June 1885, after Black domestic workers Mollie Smith, Eliza Shelly, and Irene Cross had already been murdered, the *Austin Daily Statesman* denounced the lack of resources for police forces in Austin: “The truth is, the number of men is entirely too small. There should be at least one policeman to every 500 inhabitants. This is the portion allowed by city law. Austin has at least 17,000 people, and on that basis would be entitled to thirty-four policemen. We have but little over one-third that many.”

This discontent with the police force came to a head in November 1885, when the *Austin Daily Statesman* published an article urging a change in the police structure in Austin:

> The people of this city are dissatisfied with the present police management, and this department needs a thorough reorganization. If there are good and true men on the force, and I know there are such, they should be retained in service. If there are bad or incompetent men, they should be removed, and their places supplied with competent and worthy men. The people demand, and the good name and welfare of the city demands that there should be a thorough reorganization of the police department, and I earnestly trust that it will be made.

Scholar Katherine Beckett argues that institutional actors – like the press – act as agents of social control that put forth an anti-crime narrative that assert “law and order” policies at the forefront of curbing violent crime. While Beckett analyzes this phenomenon in the United States beginning in the 1950s, this “law and order” rhetoric has roots in the nineteenth century, as the *Austin Daily Statesman* excerpts suggest. The newspapers portrayed the increase in crime as a result of underpolicing rather than connecting any structural issues to the murders targeted at Black domestic workers. The militarization of the police force is a distinctly white response to a problem that is perceived to come from Black men. In short, a white “moral panic” resulted in a dramatic increase in the active police force. For whiteness, an increase in institutionally-sanctioned actors like the police was the only appropriate response to perceived hostility from Black men. Once again, the feedback loop of popular press’ depictions of whiteness influenced blackness, and vice versa.

In December 1885, a major shift in the case occurred when Eula Phillips and Susan Hancock were killed, and the popular press elevated its “law and order” narrative twelvefold. Once the murderers attacked high society white women, the press became even more vigilant about the evil of the attackers and urged the desperate need to correct the violence running rampant in the town. The first headline of the *Austin Daily Statesman* after the attacks on Eula Phillips and Susan Hancock read, “Blood! Blood! Blood! Last Night’s Horrible Butchery. The Demons Have Transferred Their Thirst for Blood to White People.” The news article exaggerated the positionality of the first white victims

40. *Austin Daily Statesman*, “Police Department and Recorder’s Court,” November 11, 1885.
while clearly situating the newspaper’s sympathy with these victims. The Austin Daily Statesman wrote, “The victim of this murderous, diabolical, hellish attack is a white lady, the wife of Mr. M. H. Hancock, an elderly man and a mechanic.”\textsuperscript{43} The newspaper uses three adjectives to clearly state its disapproval of and disgust with the attack of a white woman. And, unsurprisingly, as distressed as the Austin Daily Statesman was at the death of Hancock, the newspaper was even more distressed at the death of Austin socialite Eula Phillips, writing “Terrible as was the murder of Mrs. Hancock, a still more appalling horror awaited the police officers.”\textsuperscript{44} Overall, the popular press humanized these two white victims compared to the Black victims. The press’ word choice and explicit mentioning illustrate more distress at the deaths of upper-class white women rather than the deaths of Black domestic workers. Once again, this shift in popular news coverage assumed a white supremacist racial hierarchy that valued white lives above Black lives.

In the constructions of whiteness after the shift to white victims, journalists of the popular press displayed whiteness with humanizing individuality while the press depicted blackness as a characteristic of a monolithic group. After the deaths of Phillips and Hancock, the newspapers grouped all the Black women victims into one nebulous group yet honored the individuality of the two white women. The newspapers rarely mentioned the names of the Black victims, and when they were mentioned, the popular press described the Black women in a group without the grace of individuality or specific attention found in the mere utterance of a name. After the murders of Eula Phillips and Susan Hancock, the Austin murders became national news, and the New York Times picked up the story, including the context of the Black domestic workers:

Within this year 13 colored women are known to have been outraged, seven of whom were afterward brutally murdered. Eight white women were attacked on the street or in rooms, four outraged, and three murdered. Nearly every one of these crimes bore evidence of having been perpetrated by the same ruffians, and the entire Police Department has been mystified. Over 400 arrests have been made and some of the subjected to very severe examinations, but they would confess nothing.\textsuperscript{45}

As a point of reference, the New York Times figures of dead and attacked women do not appear in any other publication, as even the Austin Statesman never explicitly tallied the numbers of white versus Black victims. Crucially, the New York Times described the Hancock and Phillips murders in detail while largely overlooking the previous murders of women of color. The New York Times, one of the most widely read publications at the time, perpetuated the narratives of black masculine criminality and the simultaneous erasure of black women altogether.

After the shift to white victims, the popular press called for a multi-racial coalition to counteract the violence, another example of how depictions of whiteness relied on self-righteous pluralism. This nineteenth century example is essentially the modern white savior complex in which the white community self-congratulatory only cared about Black lives when doing so was convenient. The Austin Daily Statesman wrote, “The People of Austin, white and colored, were again aroused with indignation at the renewed outrages of the way assassins who continue to defy every attempt to detect them in their hellish

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{45} The New York Times, “Three Murders in One Night.”
outrages in this city.”46 Even further, the newspaper reported then-mayor Robertson’s reaction to the murders—he stated, “White and colored must unite in bringing them to punishment.”47 Not only did this article importantly acknowledge the Black community in Austin, but its sentiment also expressed a rare mention of the Black victims in the case as the dominant trend in the reporting after the white murders was to only cover those murders. While this newspaper article amounts to a narrative of happy Austin pluralism, which clearly had historical implications for the contemporary book Midnight Assassin, boosted whiteness’ self-image at the expense of actually caring for Black lives and the Black community in Austin.

The most pervasive pattern in these constructions of whiteness, however, was that the Phillips and Hancock murders heightened fear for white womanhood, as foreshadowed previously by the concern that murders of Black women would lead to murders of white women. An Austin Daily Statesman article covering a town hall meeting suggested that, “Every man expressed himself not only willing but really to do any and all kind of police duty to protect the lives of women and children.”48 Similarly, the Austin Daily Statesman reiterated a few days after that town meeting the stakes of the present time, explaining, “If Austin cannot protect the women and children within its borders, its able-bodied men had better doff their breeches and don petticoats, and call on their mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters to go to the front and defy the enemy.”49 For the press at this time, womanhood had race and class components—once upper-class white women were targeted, “true” womanhood was under attack, but womanhood was not at stake when working-class Black domestic workers were victims of the attacks. The shift in coverage was largely a shift in concern and the supposed need to display white masculinity as the protector of white femininity. In the history of race in the Western frontier of the United States, including Austin, Texas, the influx of white women to the frontier coincided with “racial bars” for Black men because white masculinity perceived Black masculinity as a threat.50

The popular press continually published narratives of pluralist calls-to-action for and among both white and Black populations, even though these pluralistic narratives coexisted with a dehumanizing and asymmetrical status of whiteness and blackness. The popular press published calls for prominent white Austinites to focus on Austin police capabilities, correlating to a dominant, white “law and order” narrative. While the popular press exists largely as a representation of whiteness because of the authors’ and readers’ racial demographics, it is necessary to read against the grain in analyses of these sources to uncover any sort of oppositional presence of Black Austinites contrary to the dominance of white presence.

The Oppositional Presence

Drawing on the works of Michel Foucault, feminist theorist bell hooks created the idea of the oppositional gaze as a resistance project aimed at locating agency for

46. Austin Daily Statesman, “Midnight Outrages. The People Roused into Indignation. A Large Meeting at the State House in Response to the Mayor’s Call. Addresses by Prominent Gentlemen and a Committee Appointed,” December 26, 1885.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
Black people in America, an idea which is essential to this paper’s reconstruction of an oppositional presence:

Spaces of agency exist for black people, wherein we can both interrogate the gaze of the Other but also look back, and at one another, naming what we see. The “gaze” has been and is a site of resistance for colonized black people globally. Subordinates in relations of power learn experientially that there is a critical gaze, one the “looks” to document, one that is oppositional. In resistance struggle, the power of the dominated to assert agency by claiming and cultivating “awareness” politicizes “looking” relations—one learns to look a certain way in order to resist.51

While hooks used this rhetorical framework to describe how Black Americans developed “critical spectatorship” watching the television, this paper extends her framework to mass media before the invention of film and television – arguably to the most pervasive venue of popular culture in the late nineteenth century: newspapers. Because the black gaze is so tied to spectatorship, a passive, visual action incongruent with the medium of newspapers, this paper refocuses the idea of gaze into an idea of space or presence. Within the newspapers covering the Austin murder cases of 1885, the press had no option but to publish the black presence because Black Austinites were the victims, witnesses, and alleged perpetrators of the crimes. These Black voices comprise the oppositional presence, which this paper defines as the point of view and subjectivity of Black Austinites.

The oppositional presence of Black Austinites occurred in the press through direct quotes and interviews, as well as through the publishing of court testimony. Even within the meso-level, the popular press contains evidence of a community-wide oppositional presence that reasserts the fundamental presence of Black communities in Austin, Texas at the time of the murders. Historian Michelle Mears researched the freedmen communities of Austin during the late nineteenth century, and she lays out the idea of the “agency model,” which focused on the extent to which slaves and freedmen made their own choices, to shape and control their own lives.52 This paper honors the agency model, because the oppositional presence as a framework similarly recenters Black Austinites as active agents rather than passive ones. At the same time, and as will become clear through any analysis of the popular newspaper articles during this time, white Austinites still expressed racist and prejudiced views about Black Austinites, which led to violent action. While recentering Black communities is vital to understanding the Black community’s reactions to the violence of the Austin murders, most of the murders actually took place in the “white” parts of Austin, because most, if not all, of the victims lived in the house of their white employer or in a separate house next to the main house. Therefore, it is important to recognize that most of the Black domestic workers did not live in solely Black communities, like the ones that Mears researched, even while the relatively autonomous freedman communities influenced the internal and external relationship of Black Austinites. Because the scenes of the crimes were in predominantly white neighborhoods, even the sites of the murder offer proof of an oppositional presence in what is considered white-majority parts of Austin.

During the murders, the popular press published instances of the oppositional presence in the form of Black women’s


eyewitness testimony. From the first murdered domestic worker, Mollie Smith, newspapers interviewed other Black Austinites in order to get a picture and understanding of the murders. Only days after Mollie Smith died, the *Austin Daily Statesman* interviewed Nancy Anderson, a Black nurse employed in the same white home. Anderson, according to her paraphrased appraisal of the murder, did not believe that Smith’s partner Walter Smith killed her because the two got along well, even if “the deceased woman possessed a high temper.”53 While *Austin Daily Statesman*’s inclusion of Nancy Anderson’s views may seem routine for the coverage of a murder case, yet for a Black woman to be included so decisively in the narrative is itself a form of oppositional gazing. While hooks largely talked about a discursive black female gaze toward film, her framework similarly applies to newspapers because “looking was also about contestation and confrontation.”54 Anderson contested the press’s insistence on Walter Spencer as Smith’s murderer, while confronting the notion that her voice is irrelevant and unhelpful. This basic premise of black female spectatorship and presence occurred similarly in the Smith case when the Black female partner Rosa Brown of a former ex-partner of Mollie Smith, a Black man named William Brooks, spoke to the press about Brooks’ whereabouts the night of the murder.55 Rosa Brown stated that Brooks, already in jail at the time of her interview, was at a ball until he came home around 2am or 2:30 that morning.56 Like Nancy Anderson, Rosa Brown was a Black woman whose experience and truth was communicated to the press.

The popular press’ inclusion of black women’s testimony was not only limited to the first murder of Mollie Smith. Reporting on the second murdered Black domestic worker, Eliza Shelly, similarly contained interviews with Black Austinites. Horrifically, Shelly’s three children were in the room while she was murdered, and one of her sons spoke to the *Austin Daily Statesman*, which published his direct quote, “A man came in the room and asked me where my mother kept her money. I told him I didn’t know. He told me to cover up my head; if I didn’t he would kill me. The man said he was going to St. Louis the next morning.”57 Then, the *Austin Daily Statesman* reported that the child stated the perpetrator was white man with a white rag over his face.58 By publishing the word of a child gazing at a white man, the child’s testimony exists as his oppositional presence that insinuates that the idea of blackness had its own conception of and opinion of whiteness, as much as whiteness did of blackness.

While the popular press engaged with oppositional presence by directly quoted Black women, they also did so by referencing the Black community in Austin. After the Eliza Shelley murder, the *Austin Daily Statesman* published, “The colored people seem seriously alarmed. One was heard to say that he never expected to leave his house any more at night for fear his wife would be killed.”59 While this wording illustrates the othering of blackness so pertinent at the time of the murders, it also shows that even a

55. *Austin Daily Statesman*, “Still a Mystery. No New Developments in the Pecan Street Horror. A Possible Clue,” January 2, 1885.
56. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
predominantly and fiercely white newspaper like the *Austin Daily Statesman* published evidence of Austin’s Black community’s existence. The *Austin Daily Statesman* almost participated in publishing a black oppositional presence that leaves room for a black perspective on the murders; however, the newspaper fell short because there is no direct quote from a Black community member and the reference to the Black community was a mere two sentences. At the very least, the *Austin Daily Statesman’s* allusion to the Austin Black community exemplified that the white press could not successfully erase black perspectives from the narrative or, eventually, historical archive. Black Austinites existed in and contributed to the town in several ways. Moreover, the white identity itself relied on this construction of a black identity in the press, so such reporting on blackness was required to maintain a racial hierarchical system. In all, however, adopting what Michelle Mears referred to as the agency model framework, the press’ references to Austin’s communities of color successfully illustrates an oppositional presence to the white-dominated Austin at the time.

Even after the murders of Mollie Smith and Eliza Shelley, newspaper reports on the murders of Gracie Vance and Orange Washington similarly exemplified the oppositional presence of Black women during the murders. At the time of the attacks, Gracie Vance and Orange Washington were housing friends Lucinda Boddy and Patsy Gibson. According to the *San Antonio Express*, Lucinda Boddy, who was injured but not killed in the attacks, testified at the inquest a few days after that she knew who attacked them: Doc Woods. The popular press published an account of Boddy’s voice being taken seriously in a court hearing, further illustrating the significance of black Austinites to the functioning of the town. Even more so constructing her own presence, Lucinda Boddy stated her belief that she was hit with a sandbag, and that she briefly conversed with the perpetrator, and whose voice she took to be Doc Woods’. Lucinda Boddy’s testimony was not only published in the *San Antonio Express*, but also in the *Austin Daily Statesman*, which printed Lucinda Boddy’s verbatim testimony at the inquest. Boddy reconstructed her conversation with the perpetrator, whom she alleged to be Doc Woods, and that memory-based presence was printed in the newspaper.

Even white eyewitness testimony alluded to the oppositional presence of the Austin Black community. In the Gracie Vance and Orange Washington case, W. B. Dunham was the white employer on whose land the two lived. In his testimony published in the *Austin Daily Statesman*, Dunham recalled that after he had asked her if she was injured, Lucinda Boddy explained to him, “No, but my folks are all dead, Orange, Gracie, and all.” Despite Lucinda Boddy’s quote being filtered first through W. B. Dunham and then through the *Austin Daily Statesman*, the popular press still published her. This example of the oppositional presence was especially powerful because of its evidence of community. Importantly, Lucinda Boddy used the term “my folks.” The presence of a Black community was alive in that quote. The oppositional presence of black female spectatorship existed to the extent that a landowning white man took heed of a Black domestic worker’s words and reiterated them.

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60. *San Antonio Express*, “The Midnight Lust-Fiend Again at Work—Two More Victims Added to His Long Roll, etc.,” September 28, 1885.
in court. While I do not seek to overstate the agency that this entails, I argue that black people emerge even in the archives created and dominated by white people. While white-dominated archives may seem to erase black people from existence, the Austin murders of the nineteenth century illustrate one example of how black Austinites show up everywhere in the press. Black Austinites were part of the broader community and kept a community of their own, albeit from a socially disempowered position.

While the popular press published white eyewitness testimony, the oppositional presence coexisted simultaneously. In the same *Austin Daily Statesman* article in which W. B. Dunham repeated the words of Lucinda Boddy, both surviving victims of the attacks, the testimonies of both Lucinda Boddy and Patsy Gibson appeared as well. Patsy Gibson testified that Doc Woods had in fact come to Washington and Vance’s house only days before, even though she would not recall much due to her head wounds.63 Lucinda Boddy’s testimony in this edition of the *Austin Daily Statesman* was rather extensive—Boddy reiterated that she allegedly saw and heard Doc Woods at the time of the attacks. Once again, Black Austinites, and specifically Black women, were highlighted through published testimony in the press. By existing in the popular medium of the press, and more specifically by their published words in the press, the oppositional presence that serves as oppositional existence to whiteness, or at the very least comments on their own destiny, embodied what Mears called the agency model of looking at Austin freedman communities.

The popular press’ publishing of Alex Mack’s experience of the Austin city marshal’s brutality offered another instance of the oppositional presence. The city marshalls went to a saloon where Alex Mack was thought to be, asking for his help in identifying two other Black men suspected in the murder case. According to Mack’s testimony given to the *Daily Dispatch* and then republished in the *Austin Daily Statesman*, the police officers put a rope around his neck and proceeded to beat Mack with their feet and fists, trying to get Mack to tell them about the murders.64 When that did not work, the officers jailed Mack for nine days until finally discharging him. According to the *Dispatch*, Alex Mack was “covered with bruises and scars.”65 After printing Mack’s testimony in full, the *Austin Daily Statesman* wrote that it reached out to Marshal Lee for a comment who called the allegations of maltreatment a “malicious falsehood.”66 The Mack case continued to escalate through the *Austin Daily Statesman’s* reports. Mack’s complaints against the Austin city marshalls went to a committee of investigation that was “empowered to investigate the alleged outrages perpetrated upon the colored man, Alex Mack, by the said detectives and city officers.”67 After Alex Mack’s testimony, the officers protested the way the committee was being handled, and the police department’s letter to the committee was published in the *Austin Daily Statesman*.68 This back and forth between the committee and the police department continued over several issues of the *Austin Daily Statesman*, including the police department’s lawyer and City Marshal Lee, the

63. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
Mysteriously and without warning, the Mack case fell out of the newspapers after that, leaving historians questioning how far a challenge to police cruelty and violence could proceed in court and oversight settings in the nineteenth century. For the purposes of constructing an oppositional presence, the Mack case escalated because of Mack’s insistence that his oppositional presence, contrary to whiteness’ violence, entered into the institutional protocol of redress. While this paper is not a study of the systemically racist Austin court and police systems, Alex Mack’s voice in the court systems is evidence that black presence exerted a critical gaze upon white law enforcement brutality. In this way, historians did not have to retroactively imagine the ways that Black Austinites resisted and challenged the racist systems because some of these challenges exist in the archive.

Ironically, the murders offered a point of entry for the Black community to be published in Austin newspapers. For example, the Austin Daily Statesman published a story on the city marshals’ excessive force against a suspect, Alex Mack. In the first published mention of Mack’s arrest, the newspaper mentions that the city marshals “led him to the vicinity of the colored Methodist church.”70 By mentioning a historically black Methodist church, the Austin Daily Statesman published an acknowledgement of a Black community that, according to historian Michelle Mears, found faith profoundly important.71 The oppositional presence accomplished more than just stating who existed and when. Rather, it asserts that popular culture’s focus on white existence leaves out every other historical figure. The Austin murder cases illustrate the multiracial makeup of Austin and how even in a city that did not treat Black lives as similar in worth to white lives, Black Austinites mattered and matter still.

Conclusion

Cycles of popular culture over time have ignored the voices and experiences of women of color, from the Austin Daily Statesman in 1885 to Midnight Assassin in 2016. The press’ essentialized representations of Blackness and whiteness serve to create imaginary, binary categories, and thereafter such categorization implies a hierarchy which subjugates blackness below whiteness in value and worth. Through an analysis of the Austin press’ depictions of Black Austinites during the murders, this paper found that popular newspapers described Black Austinites and the larger Black community as a dangerous, criminal monolith. In contrast, the Austin press’ represented whiteness in terms of white femininity’s virtues. Notably absent from either of these representations was black femininity. These constructions of binary race representations coexisted within newspapers whose editors also displayed black voices as central to understanding the murders, which I refer to as an oppositional presence. From this exercise of critically reading the archive, the extent to which any researcher has to do backflips to find any sort of agency shows the extent to which anti-black racism is embedded in American popular press and the culture created around it. The aforementioned book Midnight Assassin by Skip Hollandsworth underscores that the trend of overlooking and

69. Ibid.

71. Michelle M. Mears, And Grace Will Lead Me Home: African American Freedmen Communities of Austin, Texas 1865-1928 (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2009), 163.
oversimplifying Black women’s experiences still occurs in contemporary publishing and popular culture.

People of color were vital to popular culture, which mirrored their importance as agents that participated in the functioning of a society that consistently undermined their value. While keeping in mind the oppositional presence of Black women in popular newspapers, scholars must not lose sight of hooks’ oppositional gaze as well, especially given that this gaze emphasizes black scholarship and authorship rather than a black presence filtered through a white lens. Future historians must look toward black newspapers and academics because these works most accurately and genuinely recently black voices without the filter of a white lens.

Ultimately, because both whiteness and blackness are socially-constructed inventions used to perpetuate a social and political hierarchy, white supremacy, historians should not analyze one without analyzing the other. In other words, the construction of blackness serves as an “other” upon which white people can elevate themselves. Commonly, this demonization of blackness rhetorically comes in the myth of threatened white women. The protection of white womanhood commonly represented in the press relies on the construction of black masculinity as dangerous and criminal, worthy of suspicion at any time. Because these racial and gendered axes expressed the need for white masculinity to protect white femininity from black masculinity, black femininity was overlooked and occulted. bell hooks was especially aware of this, concerned with the plight of Black women and how their presence was stripped from the record and from acknowledgement. By finding instances in which Black women were prominent in their court testimony and eyewitness accounts, I offer through the Austin murders an example of how Black women cannot be made invisible because they were central to any true understanding of what happened. More broadly, as much as the white press tried to diminish or erase Black women from their sight, doing so is impossible because a vital part of the population will be important, irrespective of white journalists’ own biases.

Future work on these murders must center Black women as both agents and victims of historical events. True crime and academic works must focus on alternative ways of interacting with the archive. While predominantly white storytellers have subconsciously or consciously sought to erase the existence of non-white people, Black women were central to Austin and so they exist in the archive, despite systemic attempts at erasure. Future historians must continue to seek out the oppositional presence, because people of color were not and could never be successfully written out of popular culture.
The Tour de France of Coffee: Parisian, Provincial, and Domestic Café Culture during the Bourbon Restoration, 1815-1830
Kellie Giordano (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)

Introduction: The Café of the Vainest People in the Universe

The cosmopolitan and intellectual atmosphere of Parisian and provincial cafés—sites of consumption, intellectual exchange, and sociability—astonished foreign troops and travelers upon their arrival to France in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815. Following Napoleon’s downfall was the Bourbon Restoration from 1815-1830, the period in which France saw the return of the constitutional monarchy alongside conservative political, social, and economic reforms. A rich wealth of travelogues from the Restoration suggest that coffee was vital for survival in France and to a greater extent than in other European countries. Two British travelers, Archibald Alison and Patrick Fraser Tytler, observed in their 1815 travelogue of France the ways in which cafés were drastically different in France compared to their home:

The French themselves say… that with more money the French could have fought for many years to come. They certainly are the vainest people in the universe; they have often told me, that could Bonaparte have continued his blockade of the Continental trade a few months more, England would have been undone. They sometimes confess, that they would have been rather at a loss for Coffee, Sugar, and Cotton... The want of the first of these articles would annoy any country, but in France they cannot live without it: in England they might.72

When the French borders reopened after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, coffee was ubiquitous among “the vainest people in the universe,”73 and remained so throughout much of the Restoration. Primarily responsible for these reactions was the lift of Napoleon’s 1806 blockade, which formerly restricted the trade of coffee outside of French territory. Upon the termination of these restrictions, the French and much of Europe were reintroduced to the Parisian café, which dates back to the Ancien Régime.74

This essay argues that there was a rejuvenation of French café culture in Paris, the provinces, and in the home during the Bourbon Restoration. This reinvigorated space served as a spectacle for consumption that encouraged the social mixing of classes, occupations, gender, and nationalities. I will focus primarily on accounts that document the activities of various classes and nationalities in and around cafés during the Restoration. I will thus investigate travelogues of France, household literature, maps, and recipes to demonstrate how the Restoration shaped the café initially in France, and by the end of the Restoration, across Europe holistically.

This corpus of this essay is divided into four parts, following a literature review of French café culture from the Ancien Régime, to the Bourbon Restoration. Section one, “French Café Culture from the Ancien Régime

72. Archibald Alison and Patrick Fraser Tytler, Travels in France During the Years 1814-15: Comprising a Residence at Paris, During the Stay of the Allied Armies, and at Aix; at the Period of the Landing of Bonaparte, (Edinburgh: Macredys, Skelly, and Muckersy, 1816), 32-33. 73. Ibid., 32. 74. Ancien Régime is “Old Regime” or the monarchical era prior to the French Revolution of 1789. All French-English translations are my own unless otherwise noted. The original French text is included in the footnote for each respective quotation.
“Napoleon” provides background information on the cultural role of the French café from its genesis to the age of Napoleon. Section two, “Parisia Promenades and the Palais-Royal,” maps out the famous cafés, both in and away from the Palais-Royal. Additionally, this section demonstrates who frequented specific cafés, what they did there, and how and why this culture significantly shaped nineteenth-century French society. Section three, “A Taste of Paris in the Provinces,” explains the relationship between coffee and class across provincial France, albeit in rural and coastal towns. The fourth section, “Drinking Coffee Domestically,” highlights the consumption of coffee in Parisian and provincial homes, and primarily on average, middle-class families under the Restoration. Ranging from public cafés across France to domestic guides on how to brew French coffee, this work encompasses an extensive study of French coffee consumption to argue that the French café was an integral part of French culture in the aftermath of Napoleon’s rule.

**Historiography of French Café Culture**

My work departs from the vibrant body of past historical scholarship on the French café in two ways: I provide new assertions about café culture during the Bourbon Restoration exclusively, and I study the consumption of coffee beyond Paris—in the provinces and in the home—which other French historians have yet to examine during this period. Firstly, I will note the relevance of studying material culture concerning the French café. As Leora Auslander, a cultural historian of consumer, brilliantly argues in her article “Beyond Words,” commodities and physical items bear substantial meaning vital to the historical analysis of consumer trends that words cannot overtly express in texts. While many historians consider written words “the most trustworthy” and “informative” sources, Auslander argues that the tangible and psychological aspects of material culture reconstruct the past in ways that words cannot. Through my analysis of consumer culture in nineteenth-century France and my assertions about the relevance of the café in this broader culture, I seek to contribute to this larger growing body of scholarship on the history of consumption, and the smaller pre-existing literature that concerns consumer culture in France during the Restoration period.

While there are excellent studies on French café during the Ancien Régime, the French café merits further research beyond the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Julia Landweber, contemporary historian of seventeenth-century France, provides a compelling analysis of the origins of French café culture in “This Marvelous Bean: Adopting Coffee into Old Regime French Culture and Diet.” Landweber focuses on the transculturation of the café—the process in which coffee was decidedly “Frenchified” with the addition of milk and sugar—for this Eastern commodity to gain acceptance in Western society. While Landweber eloquently examines the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this conversation can certainly be extended beyond the Ancien Régime.


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café was an environment whose express purpose was for city-dwellers to consume luxury and to spread new philosophies and ideologies. While this concept is certainly valid of the café from the Enlightenment onward, Spray and others have not explored the stark changes brought to the Parisian, nor provincial, café during the Restoration beyond French society’s upper, literate echelons. 8

On the eve of the French Revolution of 1789, the café remained a center for public opinion that fueled sociability and intellectual exchange primarily through the suffusion of literature and theater. With respect to literary exchange, contemporary historian of French political and consumer culture Thierry Rigogne contends in his article “Readers and Reading in Cafés, 1660–1800” that Parisian cafés provided a place to read and formulate public opinion. Between new genres of political literature and increasing literacy rates, the café was a venue that simultaneously promoted the reading and discussion of political concerns, criticisms, and ideas. 79 During this late-Enlightenment period, most of this exchange took place in Parisian cafés. However, as the corpus of my essay demonstrates, political discussion and literary exchange, alongside other social pursuits, remained a central aspect of the café during the Restoration.

Plays performed in Parisian, and especially in provincial cafés also included the illiterate classes into political discussion preceding the French Revolution. As historian of Old Regime France Lauren Clay demonstrates in her book Stagestruck: The Business of Theater in Eighteenth-Century France and Its Colonies, pre-Restoration theaters spread radical ideas and opinions to a broader public domain even than the café. 80 Often, these two bodies still coexisted in the context of the Restoration. As my essay will show, café theater included political themes primarily in the provinces, as many political institutions of the Ancien Régime that diminished during the Revolution returned during the revival of the Bourbon Monarchy.

In scholarship about coffee during the French Revolution itself and the years directly succeeding it, debates about coffee as a luxury or necessity have been a major focus, rather than the café as a spectacle. This controversy questioned if coffee—alongside other “French” commodities, such as sugar and tobacco—was a necessity to survive in France, or if it was a vice that plagued society at large. In “Sans-culottes, sans café, and sans tabac: Shifting Realms of Necessity and Luxury in Eighteenth Century France,” Colin Jones and Rebecca Spang, scholars of early-modern France, decry that coffee was the most-central controversial commodity during the Revolution, and became debated as it over time became open to those not belonging to the upper-classes. 81 The French were undoubtedly involved in these debates during the Revolution, though their significance did not stop in 1789. My essay continues the conversation about the debates and anxieties surrounding coffee consumption during the

Restoration, which shaped the broader culture of the café of the early nineteenth century. Past scholarship on the cultural relevance of the café in the wake of the French Revolution examines the social mixing of classes, and to a lesser extent, people across France holistically. While this topic warrants my study of café culture during the Restoration, French historian Denis Davidson is one of the only people to examine the significance—and debates—of the café from the Revolution to the return of the Bourbon monarchy. In her book, *France after the Revolution*, Davidson shows the degree to which the café played a role in social mixing and in influencing public opinion about morality. Moreover, she investigates café culture in Lyon and Nantes, suggesting that the culture of provincial coffee houses tends to be centered around gambling and trade, rather than a space of spectacle for high fashion and haughty cosmopolitanism. While Davidson effectively draws the parallels between Parisian and provincial cafés during the Restoration, I will further circumscribe Davidson’s analysis to demonstrate the role of the post-Revolutionary café across France to its literary, political, and theatrical importance, though during the Restoration and not the Napoleonic period.

With respect to scholarship on the aftermath of the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, historical analyses of the early-nineteenth century tend to focus on political culture, rather than on consumption. Christine Haynes’ recent book, *Our Friends the Enemies: The Allied Occupation after Napoleon*, offers a different focus than Davidson as she surveys the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of France during this time period. Haynes’ work deems that the Occupation of France after Napoléon (1815-1818) provoked a “regeneration” of French society and cross-cultural consumption, including that of the café. While her work details the atmosphere of the first three years of the Restoration, she nonetheless offers an original approach to post-Napoleonic culture, which sets the stage for my analysis of French café culture within the political landscape of the Restoration.

Section One: French Café Culture from the Ancien Régime to Napoleon

When Turkman Suleiman Aga introduced coffee to the French in 1669, it underwent significant transformation to become an accepted commodity in Western society, due to its Eastern origins. Upon coffee’s arrival in France, it was nearly exclusive to the French elite as a result of transculturation which, as Landweber suggests, was an expensive and extensive process to mask the Arab origins of coffee.

To adapt the commodity to a western palate, the French added milk and sugar and coined the concoction as the *café au lait*, to eliminate the natural bitter taste of coffee and protect the drink’s luxurious status in French consumer culture. With the addition of these French commodities to coffee, the French café was born. Shortly after in 1686, Sicilian Francesco Procopio Cutò founded the first French café as an institution, known today as the *Café Procope*, located in central Paris and became a model for the French café.

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85. Ibid., 201-202
86. Ibid., 194.
While the taste of coffee sought to conceal its Eastern origins, its roots inspired an aesthetic that was à la turque, or fashioned in a Turkish style. Maxine Berg, historian of Eastern material culture and trade, stressed the importance of Eastern imports being à la turque, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ranging from porcelain tea sets to tea tables. These Eastern luxuries played a unique role in “new social practices of dress, display; and dining and drinking rituals associated with porcelain cabinets, taking tea, coffee-house culture, male drinking clubs and family dinner services.”

Consuming coffee publicly, and being able to drink it domestically from à la turque mugs remained a luxury reserved for the upper classes, and became inextricably linked to wealth and the French monarchy.

Preceding the genesis of the French café, coffee and café culture were quickly under the control of Louis XIV’s court. His Minister of Finance, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, decided to restructure trades under the guild system of the Ancien Régime, which utterly controlled the production and consumption of coffee. In 1673, Colbert issued an edict that reformed the French guilds—organizations of those in the same occupation—and monopolized these groups. According to Clare Crowston, modern French historian of consumption, Colbert created this reform to “to further his dual goals of freeing France from foreign imports and expanding the country’s export capacity.”

While mercantilist independence was not achieved until the Napoleonic era, Colbert did succeed in employing many lower-class apprentices through this trade regulation and reorganization. Under these guidelines, which applied to both Paris and the provinces, the increased numbers of cafétiers, distillers and limonadiers were all organized into their respective guilds. By the end of the seventeenth century, the number of guilds expanded from 76 to 90, and the production of these drinks heightened their accessibility during the early eighteenth century.

Alongside financing the regime, the French café acted as a vehicle for new political ideologies during the Enlightenment that undermined absolutism, an ideology which ascribes full autonomy of politics, religion, and culture under one monarch, in this case under Louis XIV. During this period, coffee was closely tied to literature. Spary and Rigogne noted that the immense scholastic exchange distinguished the French café under the Ancien Régime; ranging from playwrights at Procope to poets at other Parisian cafés, such as the Café Laurent, which ultimately provided an environment for the literate to physically and mentally consume. In the cafés, and to a lesser-extent, restaurants, both reading and discussion helped not only to propagate new ideologies and theories, but also to fuel public opinion. Consequently, the French café shaped politics beyond the upper classes. Over time, such conversation grew to include the illiterate classes, and the café spread radical ideas and critiqued absolutist politics.

89. Emma Spary closely traces in Eating the Enlightenment on pages 100-101 the
90. Ibid., 105.
91. Spary., 115-118, Rigogne, 482-484.
It was not by literary exchange alone however that the café brought together much of the French population to debate politics and share philosophies. Alongside political and literary discourse, theatrical performances were often conjoined to the café and mirrored these discussions and public opinion as the Revolution approached. Prior to 1789, the cafés grew to include theatrical performances that also critiqued absolutist society. From the Ancien Régime onwards, “acting troupes” toured the provinces, expanding the theater—and including cafés inside of theaters—as a business beyond Paris by the time of the Revolution.93

Financially, the French Revolution and subsequent wars with the rest of Europe provoked unrest about coffee and sugar domestically and in the Caribbean, which complicated trade and the supply of these commodities. As Spang and Jones have argued, this consumer controversy continued because the French “simply had much more stuff in their possessions that has previously been imagined” and second, that “the simple binary logic of ‘need’ versus ‘desire’ - on which so much thinking about consumption still depends - must be complicated.”94 These desires were exacerbated beyond 1789, with sugar production hampered by the Haitian Revolution from 1791 to 1804 as well as price increases for coffee and sugar due until the eradication of the Napoleonic Blockade in 1814. In this context, as Haynes notes, occupiers and the occupied interacted closely, and exchanged consumer goods, revising “cosmopolitanism,” particularly in the heart of Paris.95 This depended in large part on the café, which now enabled more class mixing than that of the Ancien Régime, as well as its greater affordability to the French themselves.

To understand why popular cafés from the Ancien Régime revived in Paris at the fall of Napoleon, prices and imports of coffee from the late-eighteenth century to the early-Restoration should be analyzed quantitatively:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Price (livres)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1789</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3,125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Coffee Imports and Prices in Paris, 1789 to 1817.

The data provided in Recherches sur les Consommations de Tout Genre de la ville de Paris en 1817: Comparées à ce qu’elles étaient en 1789 suggests that a drastic decrease in price enabled increased consumption in the early years of the Restoration.96 Following the Revolution, the price of coffee dropped significantly, making it accessible to the lower classes. This was because:

The use of coffee is so widespread, that the quantity sold thirty years ago, would not suggest the spread of coffee today. It used to be 2,500,000 livres. We can without fear of being mistaken, double it. The grocers sell nearly five million livres of it, and the others another fourth. Five million livres for the price of forty sols, gives ten million francs.97

95. Haynes, Our Friends the Enemies, 5.
97. Châteauneuf, Recherches sur les Consommations de Tout Genre de la ville de Paris en
The fall of coffee prices, and other goods used to make coffee “French,” undoubtedly aided in reviving the café. With respect to sugar added to coffee and other popular goods, such as lemonades, pastries, ice creams and more, the authors “estimate the quantity of sixty million livres of sugar and brown sugar enters France annually, and according to M. de Humbolt, this is the fertility of the new world... sold by the grocers in semi-wholesale, to the limonadiers, pâtissiers, restaurateurs, etc.”

The trends in imports and prices reflect this assertion,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Price (livres)</th>
<th>Valeurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1789</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>16,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sugar Imports and Prices in Paris, 1789 to 1817

The drastic increase in imports and decrease in sugar prices—as well as the continued production of beet sugar—fueled consumption of coffee and the revival of cafés. This was seen both in Paris and throughout the countryside, where French and foreigners alike frequented these institutions at the onset of the Restoration. Thanks to a greater availability of the commodity, as we shall see in my cultural analysis, cafés blossomed in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.

Section Two: Parisian Promenades and the Palais-Royal

Paris was fundamental to the rejuvenation of French café culture when the Bourbon Monarchy followed Napoleon’s downfall in 1815. During this period, an overwhelming number of cafés situated inside the Palais-Royal—the former royal palace of the French monarchy—and across Parisian promenades more broadly. In addition to its historical political function, the Palais-Royal was also the epicenter of a broader culinary culture for the French elite and home to copious restaurants and coffee houses that stood apart from those abroad. However, as this section will explore, cafés became widespread across almost all of Paris during the Restoration, and over time catered to a lower-class clientele. The Parisian café thus became diversified concerning the classes that occupied them and the activities associated with particular cafés, ranging from singing, and dancing to theater, literature, and even gambling. As such, this section will explore the style, clientele, and the function unique to long-renowned and new Parisian cafés alike that rejuvenated their culture during the Restoration.

Among the numerous Parisian cafés that promoted social exchange during the Restoration, the most luxurious cafés that

1817, 107-108. “On estime à soixante millions de livres la quantité de sucre et de cassonade qui entre annuellement en France, et selon M. de Humbolt, telle est la fertilité du nouveau monde...Vendu par les épiciers en demi-gros, aux limonadiers, pâtissiers, restaurateurs, etc.”

99. Châteauneuf, Recherches sur les Consommations de Tout Genre de la ville de Paris en 1817, 155.
served Parisian high society were located in the Palais-Royal. One traveler to Paris in particular, Antoine Caillot, reflected on the café culture at the Palais-Royal in *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des moeurs et usages des Français*, where coined the term “Françaism,” or societal traits that defined France from the Revolution to the Restoration. His account revealed that the cafés in the Palais-Royal were inseparable from this attitude and argued that during this period:

> The number of cafés has only increased, and the old ones have only added to the magnificence of their decorations.... The Palais-Royal no longer has anything left to desire in this respect... there are now about a dozen, all perfectly decorated and frequented.\(^{100}\)

Not only were the Palais-Royal’s cafés “perfectly decorated and frequented,” as this quotation suggests, but they encompassed a more significant availability of French commodities. Another French traveler, Louis-Marie Prudhomme, claimed in his *Voyage Descriptif et Philosophique de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Paris* that the Palais-Royal became “the meeting of all the merchants and traders,”\(^{101}\) and, I will argue, perpetuated Caillot’s concept of “Françaism.” For the first time since the Napoleonic Wars, the French elite and wealthy foreigners could enjoy café culture and simultaneously purchase from Parisian merchants, such as *limoniers*, *pâtissiers*, and *restaurateurs*, all in the exorbitant cafés in the Palais-Royal.

Unsurprisingly embedded in the rich wealth of travel guides of Paris written during the Restoration, many praised the Palais-Royal for the incomparable splendor of its cafés. Among these cafés, the *Café de Milles Colonnes* was most notorious due to its courtly décor, elite clientele, and extravagant menus that featured luxurious French coffee. From the early moments of the Restoration, the renowned the *Milles Colonnes* became a bucket-list café that wealthy French and foreigners alike longed to visit:

> Figure 1: *La Belle Limonadière ou le Trône des Milles Colonnes*

Between the décor, fashion, and presence of servants at the *Milles Colonnes*, this image suggests the upper classes' lifestyle, which lower classes and foreigners criticized but also sought to emulate. One seasoned immigrant to Paris, the Italian publisher Galignani, described the *Milles Colonnes* in the

\(^{100}\) Antoine Caillot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des moeurs et usages des Français: depuis les plus hautes conditions, jusqu'aux classes inférieures de la société, pendant le règne de Louis XVI, sous le Directoire exécutif, sous Napoléon Bonaparte, et jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris: Dauvin, 1827), 364.

1822 edition of his Paris guide series as follows:

Famous for the elegant and rich manner in which it is fitted up... From the number of columns and mirrors that reflect them, it derives its name. It is certainly very richly decorated, but it is too small for the number of visitors constant and casual. The assemblage of persons at this Café is generally very picturesque, and chiefly in their way well dressed. People from the provinces, and English persons fresh imported, full of curiosity to see the wonders of Paris, are sure to be found at this Café of Cafés.102

Galignani suggests that the Milles Colonnes attended to the upper classes, and this “café of cafés” became a model for other elite cafés at the Palais-Royal, and even second-class cafés.103

Also inside of the Palais-Royal was the exorbitant Café du Foy, regarded for its elegant décor, rare paintings, and most importantly, its historical significance in visual art. In 1856, the French literary magazine publisher Louis Véron reflected on the integral role of this café within the culture of the Restoration period. In his Mémoires d’un Bourgeois de Paris: Comprenant la Fin de l’Empire, la Restauration, la Monarchie de Juillet, la République jusqu’au Rétablissement de l’Empire, Véron deemed the Café du Foy to be:

The first establishment of its kind to open at the Palais-Royal; it had, among other famous regulars, the whole generation of Vernet, Joseph, Carle and Horace paintings... It was from the Café du Foy that Camille Desmoulins left the day before the storming of the Bastille, with a green leaf on his hat, followed by a huge crowd; he called to arms the bourgeois of Paris...104

Véron focuses primarily on the Café du Foy as a renowned site of artistic exchange and its depiction in art from the Revolution onward. This lofty status also rendered the Café du Foy reserved for the upper classes, just as the Milles Colonnes. Nonetheless, these two cafés inspired those of a lower status to visit one of the dozens of cafés that I will term “second-class cafés.”

Some second-class cafés that appeared in other parts of Paris successfully emulated the luxuriousness of the elite cafés, such as Le Café du Turc. Located on the Boulevard du Temple, this café was accessible to those in the lower-classes as well as replicated the fashion of Milles Colonnes. While technically second-class, foreign accounts ascribed a status of luxury to the Turc that they did not to others of this rank. One example includes the British

103. For detailed descriptions of the interior and population of these additional coffeehouses, refer to Galignani’s Paris Guide: Or, Stranger’s Companion through the French Metropolis (Paris: A. and W. Galignani, 1822), xcv.
104. Louis Véron, Mémoires d’un Bourgeois de Paris: Comprenant la Fin de l’Empire, la Restauration, la Monarchie de Juillet, la République jusqu’au Rétablissement de l’Empire, (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1856), 6. “Le café Foy est le premier établissement de ce genre qui s’ouvrit au Palais-Royal; il eut, entre autres habitués célèbres, toute la génération des peintres Vernet, Joseph, Carle et Horace... C’est du café du Foy que la veille de la prise de la Bastille, partit Camille Desmoulins, une feuille verte à son chapeau, et suivi d’une foule immense; il appelait aux armes les bourgeois de Paris.”
Tegg’s Magazine of Knowledge and Amusement, which from a foreign perspective considered the Turc “a leading café in Paris.” Despite the average social rank of customers who frequented this café, it was adorned nonetheless with “magnificent chandeliers; the walls lined with mirrors, collections of vases, busts and ormolu arranged around; the ceiling beautifully carved and gilded.”

Figure 3: Boulevard du Temple, Le Café Turc

The image above captures the detail-oriented exterior of the Café Turc, which was equally as luxurious as that of the Milles Colonnes. Between the intricate architecture and the lavish dress of the people illustrated, the Café Turc resembles the elite status of the Milles Colonnes in regards to its physical façade alongside its social atmosphere, i.e., drinking culture.

There existed another parallel between the Milles Colonnes and the Café Turc on the interior: they were both deemed café chantants or “singing cafés.” In both of these cafés, singing united Parisians, provincials, and foreigners over a cup of coffee. Véron’s account detailed also how elite cafés like the Milles Colonnes transformed into a Café-Théâtre at times, where “the singers would take their places on the stage of the old theater, and since duets and trios were not forbidden, it was easy to perform small lyrical dramas without violating the letter of the law.”

Figure 5: Intérieur d’un Café Chantant, off the Champs-Elysées in 1820

Often, the Restoration characterized the songs performed in the café chantant, primarily in elite cafés with a conservative consumer base. Many of the songs performed in cafés, such as the Milles Colonnes and the Café Turc, championed the return of the monarchy. However, as the lower classes became engaged in Parisian café culture they

l’ancien théâtre, et comme les duos et les trios n’étaient pas interdits, on arrivait aisément à jouer de petits drames lyriques sans contrevénir à la lettre du privilège.”
interrupted these songs that referenced the conservative elements of the Restoration.

In second-class cafés however, songs critiqued the overturn of liberal ideas during the monarchy. Additionally, members of the lower classes would enter elite cafés like the Milles Colonnes to undermine their political opinions. One French naturalist, Jacques-Marc Philippe, described the liberal songs that infiltrated Parisian café culture at the onset of the Restoration in his mémoir, *La France en Convulsion Pendant la Seconde Usurpation de Bounaparte*:

> Fear seizes the mind, construction increases, there is always fear that looting will become widespread, people tremble, shudder. Groups of half-pounding soldiers roam the streets, squares, and docks, shouting horribly. They stop in cafés, sing revolutionary songs. A thousand repeated cries of ‘vow the Emperor, long live Bonaparte, long live Napoleon II, long live Marie-Louise no King, no Bourbons, down with the royalists,’ can be heard from all sides.¹⁰⁸

In addition to physically singing in cafés, popular songs of the period incorporated café culture into the lyrics. One song, *Au Boulevard*, by M. Désaugiers in 1827, described the social and commercial atmosphere of Parisian cafés, such as Café Apollo and the similar Café du Turc:

> Apollo’s cafe is right next door...
> A sort of small salon,
> Where the universe, is manifested,
> In a space three feet wide and two feet long.
> The only promenade worth anything, The only one I’m taken with,
> The only one where I let myself go, where I laugh,
> It’s the Boulevard du Temple in Paris.

> The Café Turc is the garden of graces
> So we come there, after the meal,
> To order coffee, liqueurs or ice creams,
> Or punch, or... what can’t we get there?
> The only promenade worth anything, The only one I’m taken with,
> The only one where I let myself go, where I laugh,
> It’s the Boulevard du Temple in Paris.

¹⁰⁸ Jacques-Marie Philippe, *La France en Convulsion Pendant la Seconde Usurpation de Bounaparte* (Lyon: J.-M. Boursy, 1815) 18. “La crainte s’empare des esprits, la construction augmente, on craind à tout moment que le pillage ne devienne général, on trembler, on frémit. es groups de soldats à demi-ivres, parcourent les rues, les places, les quais, en poussant des cris effroyables. Ils s’arrêtent dans les cafés, chantent des chansons révolutionnaires. Des cris mille foed répétés de *vive l’Empereur, vive Bonaparte, vive Napoléon II, vive Marie-Louise, point de Roi, point de Bourbons, à bas les royalistes, se font entendre des toutes parts.”

¹⁰⁹ M. Désaugiers, *Chansons et Poésies Diverses* (Paris: L’Avocat, 1827),3-4. “La seule où j’m’en donne, où je ris, C’est l’ boul’vard du Temple, à Paris. L’ café d’Apollon nous r’présente Des piè” où, pour doubler l’effet, C’n’est qu’à deux qu’on parle et qu’on chante… La seul’ prom’nade qu’a du prix, La seule dont je suis épris, La seule où j’m’en donne, où je ris.. C’est l’ boul’vard du Temple, à Paris. L’ café d’Apollon est tout contre. Une espèce de p’tit salon, Où l’univers, que l’on y
As the lyrics of Désaugiers’ song suggest, the French café was a “universe” that provided significant gathering, singing, sociability, and most importantly, a vast menu with French delicacies from café-to-café. While the Café du Turc is a scenario in which a café outside of the Palais-Royal attracted a respectable clientele, evidenced by its reputation as a café chantant, this elegant environment was not always emulated successfully.

An example of an inferior “second-class” Parisian café that failed to replicate the respected ambiance of those in the Palais-Royal was the Café Tortoni, situated along the Boulevard des Italiens and catered to a less-wealthy consumer base:

montre, A trois pieds d’ large et deux pieds d’ long. La seul’ prom’nade qu’a du prix, La seule dont je suis épris, La seule où j’m’en donne, où je ris, C’est l’boul’vard du Temple, à Paris… L’ café Turc est l’ jardin des grâces… Aussi vient-on, après le r’pas, Y prend’café, liqueurs ou glaces, Ou punch, ou…

Figure 2: Boulevard des Italiens: Tortoni

The storefront and size suggest a smaller, more simple clientele from this image than that of the grandiose cafés at the Palais-Royal. The people’s outfits also deviate from the French norm of fashioned, courtly culture in the café that, as we have seen, was notorious in elite cafés such as the Milles Colonnes. Additionally, Véron describes a scene where people of the lower classes are noted playing billiards and mingling in the Café Tortoni, which were activities excluded from the upper-class cafés of the Palais-Royal.110

110. Véron, Mémoires d’un Bourgeois de Paris, 16-17.
Geographically, the Parisian café did not have to be in or near the Palais-Royal to flourish during the Restoration. Prudhomme listed several of the hundred popular cafés in Paris during the height of the Restoration, such as *le Café des Étrangers*, *le Café du Commerce*, *le Café Anglais*, and *le Café de l’Europe*, among those that my essay referenced earlier.111 As the map below depicts, these cafés were situated inside of or within proximity to the Palais, as well as in other neighborhoods in Paris.

![Figure 4: Map of Popular Cafés in Paris under the Restoration](image)

During this period, cafés populated across Paris and each possessed qualities that distinguished them from other cafés, such as the *Milles Colonnes*, *Café du Foy*, *Café Tortoni*, and *Café du Turc*. Thanks to the diversity of the Parisian café—in regard to the clientele, décor, and activities—during the Restoration, those not belonging to the elite were able to integrate a café that catered to their circumstances into their lifestyle.

Unsurprisingly, this new accessibility to the café introduced café culture into the daily routines of Parisians from all classes. According to Nathaniel Wheaton’s later travel guide, “they [the French] resort to sip their coffee and other light refreshments, brought from a neighbouring house of entertainment, and *talk*, and laugh. Here, every kind of amusement adapted to the taste of the lower classes, is advancing.”112 A standard day for Parisians included consuming coffee, as Wheaton claimed:

> The habit of the Parisians… is found everywhere, except at home. He breakfasts at a café- takes his luncheon in publick- dines at five at a restauranteur- goes to the Theatre at six- returns to a café after the play, and goes to bed at midnight. The intermediate portions of time appear to be occupied with billiards, dice, and promenades.113

No matter where a café was located in Paris and who could consume and converse there, each café had something different to offer its visitors. Perhaps the necessity or this “habit” of visiting the Parisian café was also most-influential for the non-Parisian visitor, whether they be foreigners or provincials. However, the café was not just a cultural marker and daily ritual of the Restoration in Paris alone. As we shall see in the next section of this essay, the Parisian café was adapted in the French provinces, and a spectacle that foreigners praised in their travel guides to France beyond the metropole.

Section Three: A Taste of Paris in the Provinces

While Paris was undoubtedly the hallmark of café culture during the Bourbon Restoration, the provinces were equally crucial

to shaping France's culture holistically. Indeed, there was overlap between Parisian and provincial cafés, as the activities in cafés, such as acting, singing, and gambling, intersected across France. I will argue, however, that the chief difference between the provincial and Parisian café is that beyond the metropole, many cafés served a lower-class clientele similar to that of the Café Tortoni. This section will thus be dedicated to studying the non-bourgeois social landscape of provincial cafés in smaller French towns, revealed in travelogues from this period.

Many travelers from both France and abroad shed light on the spectacular coffee culture in small towns across the French countryside. In his travelogue of France, one British traveler, M. Reichard, explored provincial café culture in several rural and coastal towns across France. Avallon, a small town in central France, struck Reichard as especially gratifying. Away from the chaos of Paris, Avallon served as a manufacturing region that housed several promenades and stellar coffee-houses that made the region “picturesque.” Paris was thus not the only city whose café culture charmed visitors, and as we shall see, Paris inspired café culture across the country.

As a part of this cultural exchange between the capital and the countryside, many cafés imitated those in Paris. They flourished in towns where trade was easily accessible, namely in the coastal regions of France. Reichard also praised the coastal town of La Rochelle. This town had a rich history of commercial trade, particularly of sugar. Before the Restoration, La Rochelle’s role in the slave trade set the framework for mass trade. Due to its proximity to the sea, exchange was central to the town’s function. The port even included a designated trade board for coffee, alongside other French commodities, such as wine. Two centers in this town included café de la comédie and café militaire, alongside its regarded playhouse. Here, as in many French port cities, the provincial café traditionally acted as a “theater marketplace,” according to Clay, and theatrical performances were “staged and marketed in new ways to help create a sizable provincial audience base.” Paris not only influenced the café, but culture more broadly, with Parisian actors performing in the provinces. During the Restoration, these theaters once again provided an outlet for people to channel their anxieties about France’s social, commercial, and political future. During the Restoration, provincial theaters with cafés expanded to a larger audience.

In other parts of France, politics were discussed over gambling in cafés rather than in plays’ plots. The café provided an environment for more exclusively male political discussion in these areas than in theaters, which even included women. Another traveler, James Cobbett, who visited various towns across the country, noted of Normandy’s cafés, “the trifling amusements of billiards, cards, and dominos, are

118. Ibid., 221-222. See also page 22 in Clay’s *Stagestruck*, for more about the theater in La Rochelle.
everlasting kept alive.” As Sheryl Kroen, demonstrates in her book Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815-1830, the theater continued to grow and unite French people across the classes and the country. Subsequently, the café flourished across France as a whole during the politically and socially rampant time of the Restoration.

Figure 6: Un Café, representing gambling and sociability during the Restoration

As this image illustrates, the quintessential provincial café for James Cobbett served as a meeting place for discussing politics, gambling, and drinking, usually among provincial men.

In the provincial café, there was less mixing of gender than in the Parisian cafés, where the fashion culture of Milles Colonnes and the Café du Foy subsequently involved wealthy women. James Cobbett also mentioned that in Normandy, shop-keeping was often a women’s job, and wives often accompanied their husbands to the cafés of the town. However, in most provinces, while women usually worked in cafés, they rarely inserted themselves into the political and drinking culture there. As Denise Davidson shows, provincial women were involved in the cafés as “servers and owners,” and sometimes as dancers in plays and customers.

Fraternizing among men in the provincial café often revolved around billiards, coffee, and in some cases, alcohol, in these larger provincial towns.

In non-commercial towns, such as Orléans south of Paris, gambling was also vital to the café’s reputation and financial success. One British visitor to Orléans, John Cobbett, recalled in his collection of letters that the town’s café culture flourished and provided an outlet for mingling similar to cafés in Paris. In the Orléans café, John Cobbett regards that in some cases, coffee also served as a currency among its merchants:

My friend, the merchant, wanted to smoke, but it is very properly forbidden in most of the inns, so he invited me to adjourn with him to a café in the Grand Place, where we might quietly smoke our segars, read the papers, and play a game at billiards... they seldom play for money, but for the beer, the coffee, the wine, or the punch that they take, and this is so universal, it pervades all classes so entirely, that on the shutters of the meanest hovel on the roads, you read on one side, “Logis à pied et à cheval,” and on the other you see a pair of queues and billiard balls painted. These places are where the

120 James P. Cobbett, A Ride of Eight Hundred Miles in France (London: C. Clement, 1824) 162.
122. Davidson, 153-154.
drovers and wagoners stop, and where they meet the country people.\textsuperscript{123}

From this letter, we can see how in less-wealthy towns like Orléans, coffee carried a similar weight to official forms of payment. As such, the monetary value of coffee ultimately contributed to the social atmosphere of the provincial café and ensured a steady clientele.

In addition to financing the activities within the café, coffee was oftentimes used in place of playing cards in the provincial café. John Cobbett also visited Auxerre, a town to the east of Orleans in which he noted similar social and gaming activity. Alongside promising shops and successful businesses, he documents that in Auxerre “every Frenchman plays at billiards,” frequently at cafés after dinner, where “they played by turns, smoked and drank coffee, and disputed most vehemently.”\textsuperscript{124} Risk-taking and gambling over a cup of coffee became commonplace in provincial France, but not without increased surveillance under the Restoration.\textsuperscript{125} As such, many French, especially those concerned about the debauchery of the provincial café, began to support café culture from the comfort of their own homes, thanks to increased household literature in Paris and the provinces that promoted coffee consumption in the home under the Restoration.

\textbf{Section Four: Drinking Coffee Domestically}

Over time café culture expanded rapidly into the homes of many Parisian and provincial French households, including those in the upper and lower classes. Prior to the Restoration, many bourgeois households were well on their way to consuming coffee domestically \textit{en masse}. According to post-modern French cultural historian Cissie Fairchilds, “populuxe goods,” or “bourgeoisified” (i.e., less expensive) versions of luxury goods, including coffee, found themselves in many French homes.\textsuperscript{126} However, with the end of the Napoleonic blockade at the dawn of the Restoration, increasingly more lower-class households began to partake in domestic café culture. French families across the classes implemented café culture from the public sphere into private life with coffee accessories, such as porcelain coffee pots, many of which sought daily use. Berg also drew attention to the European “drinking rituals” of this period that increased the need for these household commodities, many of which were re-appropriated from Eastern luxuries into “indigenous products.”\textsuperscript{127} Commonly, this paraphernalia included coffee pots, pans, burners, and coffee napkins, many of which were styled \textit{à la turque}.\textsuperscript{128} As we shall noticed coffee’s prevalence in France did not support its dependence-inducing properties.\textsuperscript{129}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} John M. Cobbett, \textit{Letters from France} (London: Mills, Jowett, & Mills, 1825) 24-25.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 173.
\item \textsuperscript{125} According to Francis Hall’s, \textit{Travels in France in 1818}, (London: Strahan & Spottiswoode, 1819), where he deemed on page 149 that “coffee-houses” were dangerous and the “intoxicating qualities” of coffee needed to be “apprehended,” it is not surprising that questions of luxury revived from the Revolution with café culture itself. Despite the café’s increasingly diverse clientele after Napoleon, many of those who
\end{itemize}
see, in the nineteenth century, these goods were also “bourgeoisified” and made available to a wider market. The number of French households that owned “tea and coffee accessories,” according to Fairchilds, essentially tripled from 18.6% to 45.3% from the end of the eighteenth century.

Alongside equipment and accessories used to prepare and serve coffee, many French households possessed recipe books with affordable recipes that incorporated coffee. In this regard, a myriad of recipes was created “à la bourgeoisie” and continued to imitate aristocratic cuisine from before the Revolution, to which coffee was often a central ingredient. One example of a bourgeois cookbook from 1817, *La Nouvelle Cuisinière Bourgeoise*, contained “general and particular recipes for making good food at a low cost.” Following its introduction, the cookbook incorporated a recipe for ‘Crème au Café’:

Brown a quarter of a cup of coffee in a frying pan... Cover it, so that it infuses it; if you make your cream in small jars, put an egg yolk for each one, sugar or a grain of salt; if you make it in a dessert pan, you must follow these proportions, and arrange so that there is never any infusion of the rest, so that the taste of coffee or any other smell is stronger.

Coffee was a potent ingredient in this recipe and in the broader consumer society of the time. However, as other recipe books claimed, there were specific ways in which one should prepare coffee in order for it to be “French.”

Manuals for the proper preparation of coffee were prolific and helped those brewing coffee at home to properly imitate public café culture. One example from 1828 by Louis Clerc, entitled *Manuel de l'Amateur de Café*, instructed beginners on how to prepare coffee themselves, and analyzed the cost and quality of various types of roasts consumed in France. After reviewing the names, locations, and prices of various coffees, Clerc identified, coincidently, “Bourbon” roasts to be the least expensive at 28 livres per pound, compared to that of the most expensive “Moka” at 42 livres per pound. Household literature continued to integrate coffee deeper into a domestic setting, with the opulent Moka roast frequently mentioned. In the general *Le Cuisinier Parisien* cookbook, French chef Marie Antonin Carême emphasized the use of Moka coffee in a host of recipes. Ranging from *blanc-manger au chocolat* to *blanc-manger à la vanille*, Carême’s recipes were seemingly intended for the upper classes with the use of

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129. Bourgeoisified here refers to utilizing more cost-effective ingredients to manipulate luxuries into populuxe goods.
132. *La Nouvelle Cuisinière Bourgeoise*, 163-164. “Faites roussir un quarterent de café dans une poêle... couvres-le, afin qu'il infuse; si vous faites votre crème dans des petits pots, mettez un jaune d'œuf pour chacun, du sucre ou un grain de sel; si vous la faites dans une casserole d'entremets, vous devez suivre ces proportions, et vous arranger de manière qu'il n'y ait jamais d'infusion de reste, afin que le goût du café ou de toute autre odeur soit plus fort.”
“vrai café de Moka.” Though as observed previously with the popularity of bourgeois substitutions, these alternatives continued to be manipulated for elite taste.

Alongside texts written for wealthier readers, such as *La Nouvelle Cuisinière Bourgeoise*, recipe collections for the elite still existed, often including a less-expensive version of the dish for the lower-class consumer. One example was the 1828 recipe book *Le Cuisinier Royal*, which contained hundreds of cost-effective recipes. This text invited the non-elite reader to prepare “royal” cuisine with less-expensive ingredients, or even eliminate costly ingredients altogether. Throughout the text, editions “à la bourgeoise” appeared under the “royal” version of a recipe for the less-opulent classes to emulate Parisian culinary culture. The patisserie section of the book included a recipe for a baked good often served with coffee in cafés, entitled “Tourte à l’anglaise, à la bourgeoise”:

> You will put in your dish, either cherries, green gooseberries, plums, apricots, pears or apples that you will cut into pieces; you will put powdered sugar in it, and cover it with your dough, you will brown it with a little egg white, and put over crushed sugar and put it in the oven, or send it to the pastry cook.

Recipes for coffee consumption at home became one of the many ways the café spread beyond the metropole and into the culinary culture of France more broadly.

One of the main ways the lower classes emulated the elite roasts and recipes with coffee was through ingredient substitution. Fortunately, during the Restoration, many food chemists actively sought out alternatives that made café culture more accessible. One travelogue, Auguste Billiard’s *Voyages aux Colonies Orientales*, compared the qualities of each coffee roast available to the French. In this text, he discussed the use of Moka coffee roasts, which Clerc claimed to be the most expensive and exclusive of French coffee imports, though similar in taste to Bourbon coffee. With regard to this alternative roast in shops:

> The best coffee is the one we keep packaged in the store for some time... Bourbon coffee, which of all the species is the most similar to Moka coffee, is inferior only to the latter because the plants and the bean do not receive the same care, one for its cultivation, the other for its desiccation.

136. *Le Cuisinier Royal*, 357. “Vous mettez dans votre plat, soit cerises, groseilles à maquereaux vertes, prunes, abricots, poires ou pommes que vous couperez en morceaux; vous y mettrez du sucre en poudre, et le couvrerez de votre pâte, vous le dorerez avec un peu de blanc d’œuf, et mettez par-dessus du sucre concassé et le mettrez au four, ou l'enverrez cuire chez le pâtissier.”
138. Billiard, *Voyages aux Colonies Orientales*, 106-107. “Le meilleur café est celui que l’on garde quelque temps en coque dans le magasin. Les habitants se pressent plus ou moins de le pilier, à raison du prix et des demandes que le commerce peut leur adresser. Le café de Bourbon, qui de toutes
Thus, consumers beyond the upper classes could use this alternative of Bourbon coffee to enjoy the fashionable and expensive taste of the Moka roast, prompting once more the accessibility of traditionally expensive commodities during the Restoration.

For coffee to be considered “French” as we have seen, sugar was also needed—and expensive—and alternatives were available to reduce the cost of sweetener alongside the Bourbon roast. One solution to avoid paying the high cost of sugar included \textit{le sucre de betteraves} (beet sugar), which enabled even more bourgeois and working homemakers to indulge in luxe café culture at home. Thanks to food chemists of the period, such as Jean-Antoine Chaptal, the focus on beet sugar as a more economical choice met the demand for sugar. In his \textit{Mémoire sur le Sucre de Betterave} he claimed, “when France began to feel the need for sugar, we first began to search, in the syrups of some fruits, especially grapes, for a way to supplement it, and we significantly improved this production... In consumption an enormous quantity of syrups replaced the sugar in more domestic uses.”

Over time sugar prices dropped; but beet sugar nonetheless appealed to \textit{cuisinières}, who began to substitute it for cane sugar in many cases, and facilitated the adoption of coffee among the middle and lower classes at home. Moreover, having coffee (sweetened with sugar) readily available in the home was seemingly necessary in France, but a more feasible need to fulfill thanks to the introduction of bourgeois alternatives and increased trade throughout the Restoration.

\textbf{Conclusion: All of Modern France is a Café}

When the Bourbon Restoration ended in 1830, Europeans from both France and abroad championed the café as a symbol of modernity. In this regard, Restoration set the foundation for cafés throughout Europe and catalyzed France’s status as a modern nation. Critical reviews of the French social atmosphere and culinary culture from the final months of the Restoration circulated and commented on its growing success. One review, \textit{Le Gastronome}, concluded:

And seen now in the cafés, with beautiful spring days... At every hour of the day we would find there bouillons or commodities, poultry with salt, fresh eggs, salads prepared with taste, and wines of choice. Soon, there will no longer be the noise of the boulangerie: the bourgeois and gentlemen, women of the right tone and girls in a daring mood, all who would like to tribute to his table.

Thanks to the myriad of social, economic, and political shifts during the Restoration, the typical French person—ranging from bourgeois gentlemen and women to the working class—gained the opportunity to enjoy the French café.

\begin{itemize}
\item les espèces est la plus ressemblante au café de Moka, n’est inférieur à ce dernier que parce que la plante et la grain ne reçoivent pas les mêmes soins, l’un pour sa culture, l’autre pour sa dessiccation.”
\item 140. Paul Lacroix, \textit{Le Gastronome: Journal Universel du Goût} (Paris: [s.n.], 1830) 4. “En voit maintenant dans les cafés, s’ouvrir avec les beaux jours du printemps... A toute heure du jour on trouvait là bouillons ou consommés, volailles au gros sel, œufs frais, salades préparées avec goût, et vins de choix. Bientôt il ne fut plus bruit que de la maison de Boulanger: bourgeois et gentilshommes, femmes du bon ton et filles d’humeur dégourdie, tous voulaient rendre hommage à sa table.”
\end{itemize}
The café culture of the period also sets the framework for cafés that developed during the latter half of the nineteenth century. As Paris’ reputation continued to expand as the cosmopolitan capital of the world, numerous travelogues to Paris covered cafés exclusively. Maxime Rude’s Tout-Paris au Café in 1877 reflected on the Restoration’s role in making the café “French.” For example, with respect to the Café Anglais, Rude claimed “an English restaurant would be fairer, because coffee and liquor are only served after lunch and dinner. Have you ever seen even a London escapee being served a bottle of pale ale at the Café Anglais between meals?” In addition to comparing the English café unfavorably to those in Paris, he accredited this development to the Restoration:

The name of the café alone marks its origin. It had its first beautiful days and nights under the Restoration, at a time when “our friends the enemies,” as Béranger sang, continued to delight Louis XVIII... It has kept that exterior decency that appeals to people from across the Channel: no wide open front; no terrace, especially with your terrace and chairs offered to all passers-by; no, this public establishment has an air of at home which is its first elegance.\(^\text{142}\)

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\(^{142}\) Rude, *Tout-Paris au Café*, 225. “Le nom seul de café marque son origine. Il a eu ses premiers beaux jours et ses premières belles nuits sous la Restauration, à l’époque où « nos amis les ennemis, » comme chantait Béranger, continuaient à réjouir Louis XVIII... Il a gardé cette décence extérieure qui plaît aux gens d’outre-Manche : pas de devanture large ouverte ; par de terrasse, surtout, avec tables et chaises offertes à tous passants; non, cet établissement public a un air de at home qui est sa première élégance.”

modern take on an integral part of French culture from the Ancien Régime. Undoubtedly, the café touched a more cosmopolitan consumer base beyond the end of the Restoration than ever before, thanks to greater affordability and cross-cultural suffusion of coffee. Furthermore, the restored French café set the framework for broader consumer culture in the remainder of the nineteenth century.

Appendix

Figure 1: *La Belle Limonadière ou le Trône des Mille Colonnes*. 1816. Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Arsenal, EST-204 (93).

Figure 2: *Boulevard des Italiens: Tortoni*. Martial, A.P. 1877. Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, PETFOL-VE-351.

Figure 3: *Boulevard du Temple: Le Café Turc*. Frederick Nash. [s.n.] Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, RESERVE FOL-VE-53 5.

Figure 4: Map of Popular Cafés in Paris under the Restoration, created by me.

Figure 5: *Intérieur d’un Café Chantant*. 1820. Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, RESERVE FOL-VE-53 (D).

Figure 6: *Un Café*. Henry Monnier. 1829. Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, FOL-DC-202 (B,4bis).
The Mystique of the Virtuous Terrorist: Russian Revolutionary Terrorism in the 1860s and 1870s
Rachel Nirenberg (McGill University)

Alienation and Terror
On 4 April 1866, Dmitri Karakozov attempted to kill Tsar Alexander II at the gates of the Summer Garden in St. Petersburg. The facts of the case were confusing at the time and, at any rate, never fully sorted out – it is unclear, for example, even a century and a half later, whether Karakozov was acting alone or had accomplices. More interesting to many people than the facts, however, was what had motivated Karakozov to target the Tsar. Rumours swirled, many spurred on by the reactionary and generally dubious Murav’ev Report, the official published report of a commission set up by the Tsar to investigate the attack, which reported that the assassination attempt was the result of the planning of a vast network of spies and assassins spread across three countries. It was debated whether or not Karakozov was really a Pole or a Jew or a Tartar, whether he was acting on the orders of political exiles like Bakunin and Herzen, and whether his goal was in fact to destroy religion and morality. Karakozov himself was unhelpful on this point (he reportedly told Alexander that he wanted “nothing”), and was ultimately imprisoned, tortured, and executed. Karakozov’s refusal to give a motive for the attack did not prevent others from assigning him one. Perhaps inadvertently, his attempt on the Tsar’s life began a period of assassination and political violence, the provocateurs of which would often cite him as an inspiration. Though the terrorists that followed Karakozov often claimed to be motivated by a duty to the people or sense of oppression by the Tsar, the truth was of course more complicated. It was the combination of lack of opportunity for women and minorities, the failures of the populist movement, both real and perceived, and the seductive nature of violence and martyrdom that drew the would-be revolutionaries of the 1870s and 1880s so irresistibly towards terrorism.

In the mid-to-late 19th century, Russia underwent considerable efforts to modernize and Westernize. While this modernization was certainly valuable in improving Russia’s image abroad (serfdom had long been a point of contention for Russian nobles among their peers), it also upended Russia’s social hierarchy. The result of this was that, as the nature of Russian society changed, large segments of it were left out in the cold. The nature of the family changed. Women were no longer confined to the home, but what they found upon leaving it was that there was no place for them outside of it. Educational opportunities were lacking and where they existed, were severely inadequate; Vera Figner, a participant in the assassination of Alexander II, for example, recalled spending hours

learning penmanship but coming away from her education with little knowledge of basic math.\textsuperscript{149} Denied education and opportunity, searching for respect and validation, large numbers of women turned to revolutionary ideas and circles, where they were treated significantly better than they could reasonably have expected to be treated in general society.\textsuperscript{150} The movement also appealed to other disenfranchised groups, especially Jews, who, frustrated by lack of opportunity and radicalized by the Tsar’s lack of response to waves of pogroms and anti-Semitic violence, also joined the movement in large numbers.\textsuperscript{151} The terrorist ideology of assassinating the tsar also found support among the ranks of the raznochintsy, even those who were traditionally inclined toward liberalism, who were becoming frustrated with the conservative rollback that followed the Karakozov assassination attempt.\textsuperscript{152} Ivan Turgenev, for example, though he considered himself a “liberal of the old school”, openly expressed admiration for terrorists such as Vera Zasulich, the attempted murderer of Fyodor Trepov, governor of St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{153} It was among these groups, which were feeling increasingly frustrated, alienated, and angry, that terrorists began to emerge.

**Populism and Failure**

Terrorism, like many political movements, can to some extent be thought of as a reaction to what came before it. In the case of the terrorists, they were reacting against the populist ideology that had been so popular with the intelligentsia of the 1860s and 1870s. The peasantry, the populist movement held, was an untapped resource in the battle against the tsarist system. It was the peasants rather than the workers who would form the backbone of the revolution. In order to bring this peasant revolution about, the populists believed, it was necessary to go into their communities and to explain to them that they were being oppressed and could only escape that oppression by overthrowing the tsar.\textsuperscript{154} Unlike the terrorist movement, which emphasized high-level assassinations in an attempt to awaken the Russian population, a fundamental pillar of populism was the need for patience. As it was explained by Anton Taksis, a populist and close friend of Vera Figner, “for the revolutionary cause, one needs not so much stormy enthusiasm as patient, tenacious, and durable small deeds”.\textsuperscript{155} The legacy of this program was decidedly mixed. On one hand, many propagandists warmly recalled their time spent in rural Russian communities trying to “educate” them into adopting their views about the necessity of revolution. Even Figner, who complained of feeling “lonely, weak, helpless in this peasant sea”, also maintained that “[the propagandists] were needed [and that they] were not superfluous”.\textsuperscript{156} However, as much as people like Taksis advocated for patience and caution, there turned out to be little tolerance for a program that consisted of tough physical conditions and slow, invisible progress. Most of the propagandists, coming from the upper or middle echelons of Russian

\textsuperscript{151} Geifman, “Thou Shalt Kill,” 12.
\textsuperscript{152} Verhoeven, “The Making of Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 109.
\textsuperscript{156} Figner, “Memoirs of a Revolutionist,” 49, 56.
society, had never seen or experienced poverty on the scale that they did in the villages and in many cases, found it overwhelming and demoralizing. Figner, who spent three months working as a physician in a village near Samara, wondered if it would “be irony to speak of resistance […] to people completely crushed by their physical privations”\(^\text{157}\). She found resistance to be such a ridiculous demand of people so crushed by their material conditions that she did not even propagandize.\(^\text{158}\)

Contrary to the romantic, pastoral expectations of the propagandists, many of whom had never spent any time among the peasants (Figner was certainly not alone in “having no idea how to approach a common person”), the reality of life among the people proved to be difficult, frustrating, and exhausting.\(^\text{159}\) Some of them even came to resent the very people in whose name they claimed to be rebelling. Moreover, many of the propagandists, unfamiliar with the culture or even the language of the places they were living in, were met with deep suspicion by locals, who could not understand why they had come. More than anything, life among the peasants turned out to be extremely lonely. Propagandists could not even contact each other out of fear of arising police suspicion.\(^\text{160}\) They longed for the excitement of the cities and each other’s companionship. Their desire to abandon the program was as motivated as much by their own feelings of loneliness and frustration as it was by its failures.

Still, even if it was to some degree motivated by emotion, the conclusion that many of them came to, that the propagandist movement was doomed to failure, is not an inaccurate one. Even if the propagandists had properly understood the languages and cultures of the places where they tried to foment revolution, not been plagued by feelings of self-doubt, boredom, and depression, and been able to relate to the peasants, they would still have struggled to bring any real change. At most, a few hundred propagandists went to live among the peasants.\(^\text{161}\) In a country as vast as Russia, even if they had managed to sway a few hundred peasants each, it would merely have been a drop in the bucket. Moreover, the attempts of the populists to begin a revolution were frustrated at almost every turn by the police, who, even when they did not arrest them, made their presence known through intimidation tactics. Figner recalled with some frustration the impossibility of having meetings at her home in the country, as “whenever anyone came to the house, no matter who, a rural policeman would make his appearance to keep watch”.\(^\text{162}\) Moreover, over the years, the arrests had accumulated and, as a result, hundreds of populists languished in prison.\(^\text{163}\) Returning to the city, the populists were utterly demoralized, convinced that their movement was doomed to fail, but equally convinced that it could have succeeded had it not been for the police. As Figner and her friends understood it, “the trouble [of the program succeeding] was merely in the lack of political freedom”.\(^\text{164}\) If only the vice grip of the Russian state on expression could be loosened, the peasants could be roused to rebellion.

**Crackdown and Self-Radicalization**

Since Karakozov’s botched attempt to assassinate the Tsar, the progressive era introduced by the Great Reforms had stalled, then reversed completely. Alexander II appointed a Special Council to ensure that

\(^\text{159}\) Figner, “Memoirs of a Revolutionist,” 51.
\(^\text{160}\) Hardy, “Land and Freedom,” 49.
\(^\text{163}\) Hardy, “Land and Freedom,” 2.
such an attempt would not happen again. The Council shut down journals and student gatherings, tightened control over literature, and arrested anyone even suspected of aiding Karakozov in his attempt, torturing or threatening to torture them to the point that some claimed to have falsely confessed.\footnote{165. Verhoeven, “The Making of Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 110.} Claiming the existence of a vast conspiracy of Russian expatriates, nihilists, Poles, and terrorists who sought to overthrow the Tsar and destroy morality and religion, the Third Section received what was essentially carte blanche to break up the ranks of the revolutionaries through fear, intimidation, and violence.\footnote{166. Verhoeven, “The Making of Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 112.} It was into this atmosphere of terror, combined with the moral shock and depression of the populists, in which ideas of revenge against the Tsar and Third Section through terrorism and assassination were able to germinate.

The crackdown had utterly destroyed a generation of urban rebels. Any revolutionary movement would have to be rebuilt from the ground up. In these early days, even by revolutionary standards, the movement was incredibly disorganized; members of each circle would plan and carry out revolutionary activities without any communication or coordination.\footnote{167. Hardy, “Land and Freedom,” 4.} Angry and frustrated, these groups would lash out against the state, with members like Sergei Kravchinsky or Vera Zasulich assassinating or attempting to assassinate prominent figures such as the governor of St. Petersburg or the leader of the Third Section.\footnote{168. Hardy, “Land and Freedom,” 77.} These assassinations only served to make the Third Section crack down all the harder, with little distinction made on the part of the state between the rural populist and the urban terrorist.

It was at this point that the former populists became increasingly enamoured with what historian Philip Pomper calls the “mystique of the virtuous terrorist”.\footnote{169. Philip Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 64.} Though increasing numbers of educated people rejected the Orthodox Church, they found themselves missing the role that it had filled in their lives. As Alexander Blok observed, “some different higher principle [than God] is needed. Since, there is none, rebellion and violence of all sorts take its place”.\footnote{170. Geifman, “Thou Shalt Kill,” 19.} Women within the terrorist movement especially understood themselves in the context of Christianity; in some ways, their extreme readiness to sacrifice themselves for their beliefs can be understood as a projection of what the historian Anna Geifman calls the “Russian Orthodox concept of the woman martyr”.\footnote{171. Geifman, “Thou Shalt Kill,” 12.} There were also overt comparisons. Nikolai Morozov, for example, author of The Terrorist Struggle, compared the Russian terrorists to Christian martyrs.\footnote{172. Hardy, “Land and Freedom,” 141.} People like Karakozov and Chernyshevsky, who were at this time imprisoned in Siberia, captured the imagination of the radical subculture and were viewed as martyrs for the cause. Lenin famously imitated Rakhmetov, a character in Chernyshevsky’s 1863 novel, What Is to Be Done?.\footnote{173. Claudia Verhoeven, “The Real Rakhmetov,” in The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 41.} Sergei Nechaev consciously molded himself into the kind of romantic hero that people saw in Karakozov and Chernyshevsky.
by fabricating heroic sufferings and miraculous escapes from the police in order to amass followers.\footnote{174}

The terrorists were also inspired by each other. Most notably, Vera Zasulich’s attempted assassination of Trepov and subsequent acquittal galvanized the Russian revolutionary underground. Lev Deich, who eventually became one of the founding members of Russia’s Marxist Organization, called it “the forefather of terrorism”.\footnote{175} It inspired Nikolai Kibalchich, who would eventually play a fundamental part in the successful assassination of Alexander II, to join the movement.\footnote{176} Even liberals like Turgenev were impressed; Zasulich’s case is thought to have inspired his 1878 poem Threshold.\footnote{177}

As the would-be revolutionaries became socialized in this culture of violence, the use of terrorist tactics became increasingly accepted. Though some had always advocated for violence as a method of generating change, the epidemic of violence began in earnest with Karakozov. Karakozov’s subsequent arrest and execution did little to dissuade the terrorists; rather, it galvanized and excited them. Karakozov became a martyr and an inspiration. Though the assassination attempt had been a failure, it had fundamentally changed the nature of political assassinations, which, while not unheard of, happened behind closed doors, in a private sphere totally inaccessible to the public. Karakozov had tried to kill the Tsar in broad daylight on a public street. He had, in a bizarre way, democratized suicide.\footnote{178}

Still, it took more than a single botched assassination to drive the revolutionary subculture towards terrorism. Initially, they were greatly dedicated to the propagandist scheme. Still, convinced that, in Vera Figner’s words, “the only trouble was merely in the lack of political freedom”, the populists took steps to authorize limited violence against the police for purposes of self-defence. To this aim, Land and Freedom, the propagandists’ secret political party, created what it called a disorganizational squad or third wing, meant to protect the propagandists from the police using limited force. In the interest of secrecy, it was decided that this group would operate largely independently from the central command of Land and Freedom, with little coordination between them. The group was given the incredibly vague mandate to “utilize violence against government arbitrary deeds when the honor of the whole revolutionary party is at stake”.\footnote{179} In practice, this meant that the disorganizational squad operated with no oversight and a mandate that was essentially all-encompassing. Nor was the squad especially well organized – acts of violence were often committed by regional terrorists who claimed allegiance to Land and Freedom without the foreknowledge of the disorganizational squad, though they were happy to take credit.\footnote{180}

Cannibalization

The list of acceptable targets for terrorism grew enormously throughout the 1870s. Though it was almost always considered acceptable to target agents of the state, it also became acceptable to target those suspected of aiding or abetting them, namely members of the movement suspected to have

betrayed it. This is illustrated most obviously by the different reactions to the murder of Ivan Ivanov by Sergei Nechaev in 1869 and the torture and attempted murder of Nikolai Gorinovich by Lev Deich in 1876. The cases are similar: both Gorinovich and Ivanov were suspected, with little in the way of hard evidence, of betraying the movement to the police. The response to Nechaev’s crime was one of shock and horror; it turned the revolutionary movement, at least temporarily, away from the terrorist tactics he had argued so stridently for.\textsuperscript{181} The response to Deich’s was comparatively muted, though the facts were equally horrifying: Deich had beaten Gorinovich with a club and poured acid onto his face.\textsuperscript{182} By Deich’s own account, the only reason Gorinovich had survived the ordeal was due to Deich’s inexperience – he had never committed murder before and was therefore not very effective.\textsuperscript{183} Violence was now acceptable not just at obvious agents of the state but at anyone under suspicion, regardless of whether or not that suspicion was grounded in fact.

Eventually, the terrorist wing of Land and Freedom came to eclipse the populist wing it ostensibly existed in order to protect. The propagandists, who were, at least initially, in the majority, found themselves totally unable to control it. As more and more resources were allocated to the terrorists, the propagandists became increasingly frustrated. Maria Oshanina complained that “the farther [the violence went], the more clear it became that all other roots of activity were suffering from terrorism”.\textsuperscript{184} The terrorists, spurred on by their increasing importance, found a charismatic, energetic leader in Alexander Mikhailov. Populists either embraced the terrorist cause, as Vera Figner did, or left the movement in disgust, as was the case for Georgi Plekhanov, who had at one time been one of Land and Freedom’s leaders. With all of the populists either radicalized or not speaking to the terrorists, the culture became even more violent and began to cannibalize itself. Following the arrest of Mark Natanson in 1877, “disorganizers” began hunting down and assassinating the members of their own ranks they believed had turned him over to the police. As arrests multiplied, Mikhailov became increasingly paranoid, ordering assassinations of suspected traitors and government agents.\textsuperscript{185} Even his friends worried that he had lost sight of the goals of the movement in favour of senseless violence. Deich wrote that “before, [Mikhailov] stood unconditionally for agitation among the people and now he began to demonstrate that we had not enough forces to perform [such agitation] and that we needed to concentrate on terror”.\textsuperscript{186}

Ironically, it was the success of the terrorist program that ultimately destroyed it. On 1 March 1881, the People’s Will succeeded in its objective; Alexander II was killed by a bomb thrown by Ignacy Hryniewiecki, a member of the People’s Will’s bomb-throwing unit. For those who had expected the Tsar’s death to tip the peasantry in revolution or free Russia from the harsh repression of a police state, the results of the assassination were disappointing. Rather, it brought to power Alexander III, who immediately began to roll back his father’s more liberal policies. It also brought harsh police reprisals. Members of the People’s Will were executed, imprisoned, or fled the country. A year after the attack, out of the Executive Committee of 1879-1880, only Vera Figner remained at large. She too was

\textsuperscript{181} Pomper, “Russian Revolutionary Terrorism,” 64.
\textsuperscript{182} Geifman, “Thou Shalt Kill,” 85.
\textsuperscript{183} Erich Haberer. “The Heresy of Political Terrorism,” in Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth-

\textsuperscript{184} Hardy, “Land and Freedom,” 77.
\textsuperscript{185} Hardy, “Land and Freedom,” 57.
\textsuperscript{186} Hardy, “Land and Freedom,” 84.
arrested in early 1883, bringing a decisive end to the People’s Will.\textsuperscript{187} Driven by lack of opportunity, the failures of the populist movement, both real and perceived, and an increasing reverence for violence and martyrdom, the terrorists of the 1870s had legitimized violence as a method of social change. The revolutionaries, after all, were trying to bring Russia into a utopia. If, for that to be realized, there needed to be collateral damage, was that not an acceptable cost?

\textsuperscript{187} Derek Offord, "Narodnaya Volya After 1 March 1881," in \textit{The Russian Revolutionary Movement in the 1880s} (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 51.
Monuments as Mediators of Memory: The Casa del Fascio e dell’Ospitalità in Predappio, Italy
Samuel Fox (Dartmouth College)

Monuments are human landmarks which men have created as symbols for their ideals, for their aims, and for their actions. They are intended to outlive the period which originated them, and constitute a heritage for future generations. As such, they form a link between the past and the future.
— Sert, Léger, and Giedion, Nine Points on Monumentality (1943)

Introduction
The twenty-year-long period of Italian fascist rule between 1922 and 1943, often referred to as the ventennio, marked an era of significant architectural expansion throughout Italy. While the architecture erected during the ventennio primarily served utilitarian and infrastructural purposes, it also assumed an important symbolic role with the aim of ordaining the fascist regime as the inheritor of a long and mythologized Italian history. Throughout this period, reproducible fascist motifs, such as fasci, were ubiquitously incorporated into building projects. Articulated through its monumental construction efforts, the regime’s expropriation of architectural design propagated not only fascism’s ideologies but also its aspirations of mimicking the long-lasting cultural relevance bestowed upon empires of the past.

The fascist government’s abundance of urban development and renovation efforts manifested across the nation. Each construction project—from town halls and transport stations to ex novo erected towns—attested to the strength and stability of the fascist state as well as the superiority of Italianità, or italianness, which embodied the ventennio’s deliberately constructed zeitgeist of nostalgia for an autochthonous cultural heritage dating from antiquity. The regime’s nationalist commitment to regenerating Italy’s romanticized greatness was thus particularly evident in its relentless architectural endeavors spanning the country.

Nevertheless, the wealth of architectural projects completed by the fascist state created a dilemma for Italy’s post-fascist democracy. On one hand, the buildings’ infrastructural utility and ubiquity proved essential to Italy’s function, and on the other, the newly-freed country desired to either destroy its fascist architecture as a result of its affiliation with a traumatic past or remove its overt association with the regime. But while Italy’s liberation by Allied Forces in 1943 ousted fascist leader Benito Mussolini, many of his government’s structures were left intact throughout the peninsula, long outliving the dictator who ordered their creation. That so much of the fascist era’s architecture still stands today therefore seems curious, given

190. Lucia Allais. Designs of Destruction: The Making of Monuments in the Twentieth Century (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2018), 6, wherein Allais refers to monument-making as being “widely used by late imperial and national governments in their invention of traditions,” as well as a method of “legitimizing inheritances.”
that Mussolini’s stronghold over Italy ended almost eighty years ago.\textsuperscript{192} Although construction projects of the ventennio were largely concentrated in populous urban centers, a uniquely important example of the regime’s architectural legacy exists in the rural town of Predappio.\textsuperscript{193} There, the Casa del Fascio e dell’Ospitalità—a multipurpose building used mainly for fascist meetings, events, and government-sanctioned community building—was designed by architect Arnaldo Fuzzi in 1934 and completed in 1937 (Figure 1).\textsuperscript{194} Predappio is an especially significant site on which to map the enduring memory of fascism, as it was not only the birthplace of Benito Mussolini but is also his place of rest since being repatriated to his family crypt on the town’s outskirts in 1957.\textsuperscript{195} As the dictator’s hometown, Predappio underwent an extensive refurbishment during the ventennio which resulted in an intensive restructuring of the town’s urban and architectural fabric, epitomized by the construction of the town’s Casa del Fascio.

The Casa del Fascio still occupies a prominent location in Predappio’s main piazza, serving as a case in point of surviving Italian fascist architecture. However, after being overtaken by the post-war government during the collapse of the regime and falling into disuse as its fate was decided by federal bureaucracies, the Casa has become entangled in intense cultural, political, and economic problems throughout its eighty-year-long life. The building has since been co-opted by neofascists who covet it as an artifact physically linking them to the fascist past. Consequently, the Casa del Fascio in Predappio might be classified as a historical monument.\textsuperscript{196} To remedy its appropriation by neofascists—who have recently initiated far-right rallies and pilgrimage-like marches through the town that attract thousands—theoretical proposals to reverse the monumentality of Predappio’s architecture dating from the ventennio are of urgent import, especially in the politically polarized present.\textsuperscript{197} As tides of right-wing nationalist movements and neofascism surge throughout Europe, a particular demonumentalization method worthy of further research and consideration is recontextualization, a form of memory work that forefronts architectural reuse.

The Casa del Fascio as a Monument

When Arnaldo Fuzzi’s Casa del Fascio in Predappio was completed in 1937, its contemporary design and cutting-edge materials provided the rural locale with a structure suited more to a capital city than to a


\textsuperscript{193} Helga Stave Tvinnereim, \textit{Agro Pontino: Urbanism and Regional Development in Lazio under Benito Mussolini} (Solum Forlag, 2017), 3.

\textsuperscript{194} Henceforth, the building will be referred to as either the Casa del Fascio or the Casa.


\textsuperscript{197} Simona Storchi, “The Ex-Casa Del Fascio in Predappio and the Question of the ‘difficult Heritage’ of Fascism in Contemporary Italy,” \textit{Modern Italy} 24, no. 2 (2019): 146, expands on the neofascist marches through Predappio which grow in number each year. Currently, processions start at the Casa del Fascio and end at Mussolini’s crypt in the San Cassiano Cemetery. They occur triannually, on the anniversary of the National Fascist Party’s March on Rome, Mussolini’s birthday, and the date of his death.
village of six thousand inhabitants (Figure 2).²⁸ The Casa’s manifestation in Predappio galvanized popular support for the myth that populist progress and sophistication had stemmed from Mussolini’s rule. Nevertheless, following the Casa’s disuse and structural decline over the past seventy-five years, the answer to whether its presence still represents all that was celebrated during the ventennio depends on who is asked. The building that once signaled the fascist era’s modernity ironically reveals its age through its now-obsolete style. Rationalism, the architectural style that informed the Casa del Fascio’s design, rose to its height during the fascist period and fell from grace with its demise. While popular in Italy during the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, the style’s longevity was cut short by its association with the propagandistic structures of the fascist state.²⁹ Currently, the Casa del Fascio lies crumbling at the corner of Predappio’s main piazza as numerous renovation proposals from local government and heritage entities continue to fail.²⁰ Its gargantuan scale and Rationalist style distinguishes the structure from its modest provincial surroundings, calling attention to the ripple in history responsible for its construction. Though slowly decaying in its abandoned state, the Casa seemingly still exudes the same fascist sentiment that its construction inspired—a phenomenon that especially rings true for the thousands of neofascist tourists who visit the Casa first while on their pilgrimages to Mussolini’s hometown (Figure 3).

As the Casa del Fascio accumulates a growing fleet of neofascist devotees, it can no longer be considered a mere artifact of the past but instead a monument to the regime that built it. The difference between an artifact and a monument is at the crux of analyzing how the Casa del Fascio can or should be demonumentalized. As such, an elaboration alla-storia/locale-1.38334210 where one can find a full description of the most recent project to fail in Predappio. La Stampa, a left-wing daily newspaper based in Turin, Italy, followed the unfolding proposal for a museum of fascism to be installed in Predappio’s Casa del Fascio. The attempted project was funded by the European Union’s heritage foundation, ATRIUM (Architecture of Totalitarian Regimes of the 20th Century In Europe’s Urban Memory), but rising Euroscepticism among the residents of Predappio during an election year ousted the left-wing mayor who spearheaded the project. In January 2020, the first right-wing mayor of Predappio since the ventennio, Roberto Canali (member of the Fratelli d’Italia political party) withdrew plans for the Casa’s conversion into a museum, suggesting that it could attract the wrong crowd. This was done as Canali concurrently issued an edict stating that the Mussolini family crypt would open to tourists year-round. As of December 2020, the Casa’s fate remains uncertain.

198. See Dal Falco, “Italian Rationalist Design: Modernity between Tradition and Innovation.”, 27, for a discussion of litoceramica, produced and nationally exported by the company S.A. Ceramica Piccinelli in Bergamo. The modern construction material, used widely in architectural projects during the ventennio, was lauded for its Italian heritage, durability, affordable price and modern production technique. A notable project showcasing litoceramica, other than Fuzzi’s Casa del Fascio in Predappio, is the Città Universitaria Sapienza, designed by Marcello Piacentini.


on monumentality is necessary if its relationship to the Casa’s afterlife and Italy’s recrudescent nostalgia for fascism is to be understood.

When a monument of any kind is erected, whether an obelisk, a building, or a statue, it demarcates a particular event, sentiment, or person as significant to the people whose space the monument inhabits. Alois Riegl, in his seminal 1903 essay The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Origin, established a dichotomy between “intentional” and “historical” monuments, which facilitates an explicit understanding of the contrasting societal roles monuments may play. Monuments that demarcate a culturally significant person, event, or sentiment for future posterity are called “intentional monuments” and keep a certain history extant in the memory of a culture for several generations.

However, intentional monuments are subject to change. While they are principally markers of a period of great public pride, over time the tides of financial hardship, political instability, war, or even disease may color the culture’s perception of that period. In such a case, the intentional monument no longer captures a memory (of a person, event, or sentiment) that the culture wishes to bequeath to posterity, and so it begins its semantic transition into a historical monument. A historical monument fails to engender the same far-reaching support that an intentional monument would, and instead attracts a fervent “cult” of adherents that worships—or mourns if the temporal context for the monument is bygone—the era in which the historical monument was constructed. According to Riegl, a cult that surrounds a specific historical monument is accustomed to viewing it as an object to be revered and protected, akin to the treatment that is afforded to a religious artifact. Depending on the message intended by the historical monument, the cult-like obedience a monument generates can quickly lead to unrest and even dissent within a society, especially if its cult status is challenged. Sert, Léger, and Giedion maintain that monuments “express the feeling and thinking of [a] collective force—the people,” in Nine Points on Monumentality. Hence, one need only consider the fascist nostalgia that has recently come to the fore of Italy’s body politic to notice the fascist regime’s “collective force,”

203. Alois Riegl’s “Der modern Denkmalkultus” as quoted by Joseph Leo Koerner, 10.
205. Joseph Leo Koerner, 10.
or support, never fully disappeared. And so, far from the culturally inclusive and low-stakes appreciation an intentional monument or historic artifact gathers, a historical monument seems to elicit a uniquely fanatical following, as is clearly demonstrated by the Casa del Fascio.

But what makes a monument capable of inciting civic dissidence? Furthermore, if a building can operate as a monument, how does it embody the concept of monumentality? Though it is established that monuments distill a culture’s curated highlights into arresting visual forms, they do not automatically command respect or admiration by virtue of being created. Maarten Delbeke claims that monuments perform a role in society similar to “architecture parlante,” an eighteenth-century post-enlightenment ideal originating in France, which proposed that buildings were capable of both representing and teaching a culture’s values. While a majority of the literature on monuments and monumentality focuses on didactic and instructive abilities through figurative means, scholars such as Delbeke and Thomas Stubblefield have applied these concepts, first developed for sculpture, to architecture. Regardless of the monument’s form, Delbeke has posited that its didactic ability also lies in “its presence in the city and the effect on its beholder.” That is, didacticism does not inhere solely in figuration; a centrally placed building in a city’s main square may have as much potential to speak of a culture’s values as a statue, fountain, or column. Consequently, discussions of monumentality as it pertains to sculpture are wholly relevant to tackling questions regarding architectural monuments. Scholarly consensus further concludes that both sculptural and architectural monuments are similar in that they move beyond visual cues of didacticism into the immaterial realm. Separate from its formal qualities then, the feelings incited by a monument’s physical presence are markedly affective and play an additional role in its meaning-making to a culture. Accordingly, the creation of a monument is as much about constructing a visually arousing sculpture or building as it is about “transform[ing] the entire public space into a spectacle of exemplarity” via judicious demarcation of space, writes Joseph Koerner. Delbeke even goes so far as to claim that “buildings should be considered not only an integral part of the stock of historical monuments but also as the pinnacle of monumental art,” for they exemplify that monumentality is best forged both formally and spatially. The immaterial features of monuments—the actions or events that occur in and around them—must then be considered as vital co-contributors to monumentality in need of their own analysis.

212. Delbeke, 769.
215. Delbeke, 769.
216. Delbeke, 769.
Though the precinct a historical monument crafts is indispensable to its public reception, a cult of memory may indeed also form around a monument’s visual motifs. An anecdote about the famous Madonna of Rocamadour in David Freedberg’s The Power of Images elaborates on the influence that objects’ appearances possess over humans, and is especially germane to understanding how architecture can function affectively through visual means as a historical monument. Freedberg writes about a friend’s visit to the chapel housing the Madonna of Rocamadour, claiming the friend was shocked as she remarked upon the imbalance between the Madonna’s enormous cult power as a religious object of Catholic devotion and rather unremarkable appearance (Figure 4). Reflecting on the sculpture’s unappealing appearance in comparison to the purported miracles to whom it is attributed, the friend expressed she was angry at her—“her” being the Madonna and not “it,” the sculpture. Freedberg, in this poignant anecdote describing the unconscious power extended to inanimate objects, concluded that “the sign has become the living embodiment of what it signifies.” While in the case of the Madonna of Rocamadour, where the sculpture became the placeholder for the actual Madonna herself, a similar framework might be applied to the Casa del Fascio when attempting to understand the building’s importance to neofascists. The sign, or in this instance the Casa’s physical appearance, becomes the living embodiment of the signifier, resulting in the Casa’s present-day semantic association with the many facets of fascism it upheld: the strong regional and national pride elicited by the regime, the infrastructural advancement of the ventennio—even Mussolini himself. Visually, the Casa del Fascio can be thought of by neofascists not as the crumbling structure it is currently, but the bastion of fascist glory it once was. If a monument is indexed by the specific societal turning point it represents, then the semiotic evaluation offered by Freedberg perhaps explains why a monument catalyzes reverence and ideological stagnation. To neofascist zealots, the Casa del Fascio still represents the fascist era by way of its architectural style, used almost exclusively by the architects of Mussolini’s urban reconfiguration schemes. Though long abandoned by the dominant culture, the building continues to embody the ethos of fascist monumentality and demarcates a space in which the spirit of toxic nationalism and reverence for Mussolini might be reenacted as if it were once again the ventennio, solely because it was from the precinct of the Casa that fascist rhetoric emanated during regime’s apogee. By congregating at this disused and crumbling building, nostalgists can once again live, or imagine having lived in, the fascist era in which the Casa was built.

The Casa del Fascio thus characterizes Riegl’s concept of an intentional monument that, by way of the political discord of fascism and war, has become a historical monument. There is no doubt that the Casa may presently be considered as such to neofascist tourists, whereby it has become a must-see stop in their triannual processions through the town. It seems that despite the

218. Freedberg, 28.
219. Freedberg, 29.
Casa’s current state of dereliction, the physical manifestation of a mythologized and exaggerated past—as communicated by the Casa del Fascio—endures in Predappio. The problem of the Casa’s monumental status becomes self-evident: in its current state as a historical monument, the building functions as a celebratory venue for neofascists that, as posited by M. Christine Boyer, “provide[s] a source of identity in an increasingly alienating and modernizing world” that condemns the anachronistic and antagonistic ideologies of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, avenues for effacing the Casa’s relationship with fascist nostalgia—in order to obliterate its significance as a monument that harkens back to an idealized past—are of prime importance if Italy is to stand a chance of thwarting the far-right sociopolitical counterculture that has proliferated in Predappio as of late.

Pathways towards Demonumentalization

Several countries besides Italy have had to come to terms with their own architecture that originated from traumatic pasts and possessed the potential to become historical monuments. Unlike Italy, however, other governments have adopted different policies and practices for reconciling with their problematic architecture. Three main methods have developed for resolving or forestalling the issues that are likely to follow when a building threatens to become a harmful historical monument: demolition, abandonment, and recontextualization. Demolition, which was favored by Germany in the aftermath of the Nazi regime, has overall proven to be an effective method of erasing significant sites of Nazism which were originally built as intentional monuments. Nevertheless, a majority of the demolition that occurred in postwar Germany was carried out in the immediate aftermath of the war, at a time when the country was grappling with defeat and culpability for the Holocaust. In that moment, ritualistic demolition was viewed as a quick way to end the Nazi reign of power on an optical level. As a practice of announcing new beginnings, the demolition of a cultural epoch’s built legacy has been widely practiced, with examples ranging from Nineveh’s sacking in 612 B.C. to post-WWII Berlin.


preemptive approach to demonumentalization that has historically incited strong rebellion. The Vendôme Column in Paris perhaps best exemplifies iconoclasm as it pertains to the destruction of a monument as a performative placeholder for the effacement of an unreconciled past (Figure 5). Koerner postulates that while the column was “toppled by the energies of a revolutionary populace” during the wake of the Paris Commune, the demolition of the minor monument dedicated to Napoleon’s victory at the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805 seemed to wake a sleeping dragon. The column, which stood in the Place Vendôme for almost 60 years, had become inert as an intentional monument, given that support for Napoleon all but ended and it had not been co-opted as a historical monument by the dominant culture.231 Yet, when destruction of the physical monument commenced in 1871, it had fatal consequences for at least twelve protesters.232 “The column, now turned to rubble,” Koerner writes, “visualizes what seems like the opposite of stasis, namely, unrest, revolt, and civil war.”233 That is to say, toppling the monument alerted the populace to its sudden absence from the square despite its presence going relatively unnoticed prior to its destruction, reifying its latent monumental power. Accordingly, it can be said that the unrest caused by the monument’s destruction was far greater than that which its endurance might have inspired.

Despite the attention drawn to the monument by the Paris Commune’s iconoclasts, the government—following the Commune’s suppression—created a historical monument in the Place Vendôme where an inert intentional monument once stood. Merely three years after its iconoclastic destruction, the column was re-erected and Napoleon’s statue was reinstated on the monument’s apex. Notwithstanding the change in the monument’s purpose as a renewed symbol of the Commune’s defeat, its physical appearance remained unaltered, exemplifying that demonumentalization via iconoclasm does not always work when a monument has stood for an extended period of time, as the iconoclastic act itself can generate a heightened nostalgia for the lost artifact. As echoed by Delbeke, iconoclasm might be a “process of creative destruction,” but the “creation” of meaning resulting from iconoclasm is not necessarily positive.234 In the case of the Place Vendôme, foolhardy destruction paved new avenues for the artifact’s enduring monumentality as a historical monument, proving that iconoclasm cannot be relied upon as a dependable method of demonumentalization. Stubblefield concurs that iconoclasm’s function is merely as a performative act of demolition, writing, “the only productive aspect of iconoclasm is the tendency to produce images in the process of destruction.”235 Therefore, it can be said that the demolition of fascist-affiliated architecture cannot fully erase nostalgia among neofascist adherents. If correct, demolition of the Casa del Fascio should not be explored as a viable option for anti-fascist progress. Since Predappio has already gained a devoted following of neofascists and fascist nostalgists, demolition may even risk generating severe unrest. Though a physical destruction of the Casa might visually communicate the long-fought end of the bygone fascist era, it is vital

to understand that this would not be corollary to the destruction of problematic or romanticized memories attached to the building. On the contrary, iconoclastic demolition might risk producing a surge of neofascist nostalgia.236

An alternative, yet perhaps equally unsuited method for demonumentalizing the Casa del Fascio, is abandonment. It could be argued that this method was already attempted by way of what scholars have described as damnatio memoriae, or the ignorance of the Casa’s existence by the government and its subsequent attempt at erasure from society’s memory. Also called “white-collar vandalism” in the relevant literature, this abandonment could be characterized by the Italian government depriving the Casa del Fascio of vital funding for sixty-four years to the point where it needed immediate structural remediation.237 Abandonment as a potential solution of demonumentalization, however, has been compromised by the repatriation of Mussolini’s body to Predappio, which has turned the Casa del Fascio, Mussolini’s crypt, and the town itself into neofascist tourist destinations. While other locations might invest in the “banalization” of their monuments, a process of normalization wherein the significance of a structure is lost over the passing of time, this does not seem remotely possible in Predappio due to its already established designation as a touristic site.238 Though the passing of time might obscure a culture’s collective memory associated with most buildings, simply ignoring a structure with as much symbolic significance as the Casa del Fascio has proven, in this case, to be counterproductive.239 Perhaps the Casa’s disuse and resulting structural decay may have seemed to physically resemble the sensation of memory erosion, but as a location vital to the history of fascism, Predappio is not afforded the luxury of an easily waning importance. Consequently, more intentional steps than abandonment are necessary in Predappio to prevent the pervasive and ongoing monumentalization of its Casa del Fascio.240 The most suitable remaining option for remedying the nostalgic fascist memories associated with the Casa del Fascio might therefore be recontextualization.241

Recontextualization as a method for the Casa can be practiced through the combined use of what is called “defascistization” and reuse.242 Defascistization, a term used in relevant discourse, relies on the removal of clear fascist visual features on and inside the building, such as fasces, likenesses of Mussolini, and fascist slogans. Akin to iconoclasm, defascistizing architecture from the ventennio provides the performative erasure of the

237. See Storchi, “The Ex-Casa Del Fascio in Predappio and the Question of the ‘difficult Heritage’ of Fascism in Contemporary Italy,” 136, For the use of “white collar vandalism” as a metaphor for the government’s neglect of state-owned buildings, acting as a damnatio memoriae of sorts for the Casa del Fascio.
240. See Stubblefield, 8, for a detailed explanation of the banalization process with reference to Nazi Germany whereby present ignorance of the past is proposed as a method of eroding the memory attached to buildings’ of historic Nazi significance in the future.
troubling past while still allowing the space itself to live on, extending the building’s lifespan and allowing its previous history to be overwritten rather than artificially or performatively destroyed.

Nevertheless, the balance between defascistization and the reuse of architectural fascist monuments must be carefully calculated. If too many of the monument’s structural features that speak to the building’s fascist past are removed—or the building is too defascistized—then the Casa del Fascio risks veering dangerously towards the process of “antagonistic” memory activism, which David Clarke and Anna Bull define as a well-intentioned but ultimately corrosive effort by which the erasure of history leaves “no room for a plurality of points of view, inviting strong counter-reactions.”243 Clarke and Bull, having studied monuments dating from the Confederate States of America, fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany, theorize two distinct and contrasting forms of “memory activism” that aim to ameliorate tensions between romanticized and real perceptions of historical events. Antagonistic memory activism controversially deletes the material evidence of past events, triggering potentially violent reactions. However, “agonistic” memory activism critically engages with the remaining artifacts of the past, ideally problematizing an artifact’s conception and physical survival to encourage reflection and reevaluation through, for instance, curatorial interventions.244 This idea of co-opting monuments of a traumatic past to challenge the tropes used to portray their power and learn from them has come to be known as counter-monumentality.245 Counter-monumentality can thereby be considered as an example of agonistic memory activism, which may be a viable option for demonumentalization of the Casa del Fascio. Even so, such memory activism must be practiced with extreme caution, so as to mitigate potential provocation of extremists.

An Agonistic Approach

Reusing the Casa del Fascio, along with limited defascistization, corresponds to the strategy proposed by Clarke and Bull’s proposal of agonistic memory activism. Ideally, the material evidence of the Casa del Fascio’s fascist history would be left in place along with an acknowledgment of its role in the history of the building.246 By encouraging critical engagement with the material legacy of the fascist era, visitors to the Casa del Fascio can begin rerouting the immaterial spatial legacies of the past while recontextualizing the signs that signify beliefs about the Casa’s fascist role in the past versus its antifascist role in the present. Recontextualization of the Casa del Fascio could fundamentally alter the

243. David Clarke and Anna Bull, “From Antagonistic to Agonistic Memory: Should the Statues Fall?” The Policy Space (blog), May 24, 2017, https://www.thepolicyspace.com.au/2017/24/195-from-antagonistic-to-agonistic-memory-should-the-statues-fall. 3. While a “plurality” of viewpoints, where such viewpoints consist of fascist and Nazi ideals, are completely unacceptable in my own opinion, Clarke and Bull’s work does represent the level of urgency that conversations of demonumentalization have in the current political climate. A middle-ground stance should not be the compromise that needs to be taken to avoid right-wing extremist violence, and yet this is a potential reality accounted for in academic discussions pertaining to monumentality, counter-monumentality, and memory studies.

244. Clarke and Bull, 2.
246. Clarke and Bull, “From Antagonistic to Agonistic Memory: Should the Statues Fall?” 3.
building. If successful, the Casa would no longer physically signify the immortality—both material and immaterial—of Mussolini’s fascist state, nor live on as a sign of ideological survival to neofascist adherents, but instead memorialize the death of fascism and even the strength of those who overcame it.

A successful example of recontextualization and agonistic memory work that predates the coining of either term might best be exemplified by Delbeke’s work on the Musée des Monuments Français, which was birthed in the aftermath of the French Revolution. When the revolutionaries converted the Petits Augustins convent in Paris into a depository of art, holding the belongings of “the church, the crown, and exiled nobility,” Alexandre Lenoir, a French archeologist, was appointed the keeper of the confiscated goods.\textsuperscript{247} Though the art was only relegated to the Petits Augustins while the post-revolutionary National Constituent Assembly determined a suitable permanent location, Lenoir organized the collection, turning the convent into a series of art-lined rooms that narrated France’s history through the centuries. In so doing, Lenoir created a museum that traced the cultural and historical pathway France took toward its revolution, and in 1794 Lenoir opened to the public the collection of confiscated art that he had arranged as the Musée des Monuments Français.\textsuperscript{248}

Lenoir’s opening of the museum to the public importantly conveyed that French society could appreciate the artistic merit of a bygone era without the country’s support of the societal epoch it underpinned (in this case an absolute monarchy); it could even function in complete opposition to it. Delbeke echoes this assumption, writing, “[Lenoir’s] Musée could only exist by dint of the initial removal and partial destruction of historical monuments. It stood at the intersection point between popular iconoclasm and sanctioned, celebratory campaigns of destruction on the one hand, and the widely shared concern with artistic heritage on the other.”\textsuperscript{249} By confiscating the private artistic possessions of the monarchy and publicly displaying them in a museum setting, France was able to recontextualize the art that had been spared from destruction during the revolution. The salvaged artifacts in the Musée des Monuments Français helped France not only convert the material legacy of its oppression into a shared heritage for its new bourgeois state but also, and more importantly, overcome the pain of its monarchical past. The result of this recontextualization, Delbeke writes, is that “in Lenoir’s Musée, France finally saw itself, in its development: from century to century and man to man, from tombs to tombs, it could somehow examine its conscience.”\textsuperscript{250} With the artifacts of a bygone era now in the revolutionaries’ hands, France had the ability to come to terms with its past. Above all, however, France’s full control over its past put it in perfect stead for future self-determination. Lenoir’s Musée, and its practice of reappropriating the artworks that once represented its country’s subjugation by tyrants, substantiates the theoretical possibility that the formal tools of oppression might one day be recontextualized for the greater good of society.

**Conclusion**

Agonistic memory activism would doubtless provide Predappio’s Casa del Fascio with the opportunity to rewrite and recontextualize its history while reckoning with its troubled present. Even so, a mere acknowledgement of the building’s fascist history may only be the first step towards demonumentalizing the building. If only a building’s architectural features are

\textsuperscript{247} Delbeke, “Monuments,” 754.
\textsuperscript{248} Delbeke, 755.
\textsuperscript{249} Delbeke, 757.
\textsuperscript{250} Delbeke. 757.
demonumentalized through memory activism, the building risks being treated merely as a material object rather than a physical space in which events are held and history is made. Therefore, acknowledging the memory that is enmeshed in the activities and events that happen in a building must also be considered as an essential part of coming to terms with the intangible past of the fascist events that took place within the Casa del Fascio. Ideally, utilizing agonistic memory work to convert buildings from the ventennio into officially designated “counter-monuments” for reuse as historical education and engagement venues is a potential solution to helping Italians come to terms with the country’s traumatic past. Nevertheless, since the didactic power of an architectural monument such as the Casa del Fascio lies in both its formal aspects and in its demarcation of space, or the ways in which that space is used, it is important that the building’s affective potential be fully considered. As James Young writes, we must never “passively remark on only the contours of these memorials,” for “it could be said that we have not remembered at all.”

Granted, recognizing the formal markers that explicate the Casa’s past life are essential, but lest we miss the forest for the trees: the Casa has been utilized as a space of fascist convocation as much as it has been employed as an optical marker of totalitarian dominance. If Predappio is to succeed in converting a painful site of indelible pro-fascist memory into a venue of reflection, then central to the Casa’s demonumentalization and mnemonic neutralization effort must accordingly be double-pronged. Understanding that the building propagates fascism’s endurance not only visually but spatially could be key to removing the specter of fascism that has haunted predappio since the beginning of Mussolini’s reign of Italy. As such, the Casa del Fascio’s agonistic recontextualization and reuse may indeed be Predappio’s ticket to incontrovertible liberation—a prospect seventy-five years in the making.

251. Clarke and Bull, “From Antagonistic to Agonistic Memory: Should the Statues Fall?” 2, describes the conception of “memory activism” as a process of dealing with painful, repressed, and controversial histories.
252. Roberto Chiarini, “Perché Ricordare Il Fascismo Aiuta La Democrazia,” Il Giornale, April 20, 2014, https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/interni/perch-ricordare-fascismo-aiuta-democrazia-1012616.html. Roberto Chiarini writes “Eppure, bisognerà pur risolvere una buona volta il quesito: se lasciare cioè che i luoghi, gli spazi, i monumenti evocativi del regime fascista restino stabili occasioni di culto per gli incolmabili nostalgici del duce e per i suoi sempre risorgenti estimatori o invece se non convenga recuperarli alla memoria democratica della nazione riconvertendo in un patrimonio positivo i segni di un passato negative” / “However, the question still needs to be solved once and for all: whether one lets the places, spaces, and monuments that serve as reminders of the fascist regime remain an ever-present excuse for worship of the dictator’s inconsolable nostalgists and his unrelenting admirers, or if it’s not convenient, recover them [the spaces] to the memory of our [present] democratic nation by converting the markers of a negative past into a positive heritage” (own translation).
**Figure 1:** Arnaldo Fuzzi, South-East Facade of Ex-Casa del Fascio e dell'Ospitalita (1934-1937), Predappio, Emilia-Romagna (Own Photograph)

**Figure 2:** 1930s photograph of the Casa del Fascio and its central placement in Predappio Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali - MiBAC

**Figure 3:** Neofascist congregation in front of Predappio’s derelict Casa del Fascio Il Secolo XIX

**Figure 4:** The Madonna of Rocamadour Cochise Ory, Tourisme-Lot Flickr (2014)

**Figure 5:** Pierre-Nolasque Bergeret, Vendôme Column, 1806. Lionel Allorge, Wiki Loves Monuments, (2012)
Protest, Peace, and Memory: Linn Park’s Role in Birmingham’s Resilient City Image
Emily Thorington (Samford University)

In the center of Alabama in the southwest Ridge and Valley region, among rolling hills, red clay mountains, green forests, and dogwoods, a city rose. In 1871, down in Jones’s Valley, investors turned a frontier town into an industrial giant connected to the United States through lacing railroads, from the success of iron, combined by three of the land’s natural elements found together nowhere else in the world. Seemingly out of nowhere, Birmingham, Alabama, “The Magic City,” “The Pittsburgh of the South,” appeared. While these descriptions of Birmingham reflect a city image of fascinating beauty, there were difficult times and disturbing descriptions of the city that gave Birmingham a negative image. This city grew and changed through times of disease, racial injustice, and abandonment in the middle of the twentieth century while moving into revitalization as a medical center and restaurant hub in the twenty-first century. Throughout Birmingham’s history, the connection between the wooded landscape and city buildings is intertwined in the city’s image. Despite negative portrayals of Birmingham, Linn Park’s changing image reflects Birmingham’s resilient city image. Linn Park can be studied as a funneled history of the city because it has been located at the center of the city since the city’s founding and has been a destination for past and present protests. These developments can be better understood by exploring Birmingham’s history with natural and industrial landscapes, elements of city image, monuments and memorials in the park, and how the park continues to change.

Green Spaces, Industrial Landscapes, and City Image
Fascination with Birmingham’s mythical beginning and its blend of industry and green landscapes is the beginning of an ongoing narrative of the role of parks in Birmingham’s city image. In 1910, Birmingham Age-Herald reporter and author Ethel Armes wrote the first history of Birmingham, where she calls readers to join her in discovering a story that is “the Hill Country talking to you and me,” a story that blends nature and industry, one “as old as the hills.”254 This dreamy imagery of wooded places and beauty is both a reality and also an illusion that evolves over Birmingham’s history. In 2010, Professor of Architecture Michael Fazio wrote about the change in the landscape of city buildings and how people have captured the city’s image over different time periods.255 Similarly, geographer D.W. Meinig describes ten different aspects of landscape, including landscape as nature, habitat, artifact, system, problem, wealth, ideology, history, place, and aesthetic.256 These axioms for reading landscapes and different types of landscapes in Meinig’s essays allow for a deeper understanding of layers of Linn Park’s history and how changes in Linn Park’s design and protest in the park connect to the reconstruction of Birmingham’s image.

Linn Park reflects Birmingham’s changing and resilient city image, and urban planner Kevin Lynch’s elements of city form help define the significance of Linn Park’s structural details. The study of the city image is difficult to classify and ever-changing, as Professor of Urban Studies Candi Clouse and Professor of Marketing Ashutosh Dixit mentions in “Defining Place Image.” Lynch wrote a formal analysis of city image and city form in *The Image of the City*. His work is seminal in urban studies and is helpful to analyze Linn Park in a similar way to how artwork, films, and poetry can be analyzed. Lynch presents how mentally mapping a space allows a person to become familiar with it and have a sense of order, security, and orientation. Lynch focused on what he called “city form” and described how its five elements of paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks are interconnected and should inform readings of the city. Edges and landmarks are easily identifiable elements; Linn Park is located on one of the grid squares of north-central Birmingham and is surrounded by civic buildings with City Hall to the west, the art museum in the northeast, and the courthouse and library to the east. Park Place runs east to west on the south edge of the park and 20th Street North ends at the center of the south edge of the park. Twentieth Street is Birmingham’s largest street and runs south through the railroads that divide the city into north and south. Linn Park’s location at the top of 20th Street and civic buildings along its edges have drawn people to the park for many years, contributing to its importance in Birmingham’s city image.

**Central Park and Capitol Park – December 19, 1871 to December 3, 1918**

Linn Park was connected with the city’s image from the beginning. The city incorporated on December 19, 1871, and land surveyor and engineer for the Elyton Land Company, William Barker, designed Birmingham like a grid with streets running north and south and avenues running east and west, creating a map of the city. The railroads are at the very center of the city, running east and west, dividing the city north and south. Barker’s plans for the city included three square parks that fit into the grid beginning clockwise with the parks known today as Kelly Ingram Park, Linn Park (originally “Central” Park), and Guglielmo Marconi Park. Barker’s map had a reference for the city hall planned for 4th Avenue and 19th Avenue at “Central” Park, and later in the park’s history, city hall moved next to “Central” Park, which became an important component in the park’s reflection of Birmingham, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. Armes wrote about the industry, “If ever an industry was set against a large background, one of stirring life and romance,


259. “Linn Park,” Aerial Satellite View, Google Maps, accessed May 6, 2020, https://www.google.com/maps/place/Linn+Park/@33.5207211,-86.8110157,429m/data=!3m2!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x88891b94dd4da80d:0x8d800f8f18798ece!8m2!3d33.5207211!4d86.8099187.

it is the coal and iron business of Alabama.”

Armes blended the narrative of Birmingham with images of the natural and industrial landscape. With the design of the Elyton Land Company, the railroads, and the iron industry, the Magic City grew, and Linn Park began. City leaders had high hopes to move the state capital to Birmingham, which resulted in the name change of the park to Capitol Park. A 1947 *Birmingham Post* newspaper article recorded that in 1883, President H. M. Caldwell of the Elyton Land Company sold the three parks, west, north, and east, to the City of Birmingham for thirty dollars each. The Birmingham Public Library Digital Collection’s oldest document on the park is a typed copy of the deed given to the city from the Elyton Land Company in 1883. Included in the sale’s paperwork was the information that if the state capital moved to Birmingham, it would be on that land. In 1885, lithographer Henry H. Wellge drew a map of Birmingham that could be printed and sold. He labeled Linn Park as Capitol Park with a building in the center southwest edge of the park. He also labeled the two other parks in the city. The park’s name change to Capitol reflected the growing prosperity of Birmingham and hope for its increased prominence in the state as the future state capitol building site.

Despite a positive city image of Birmingham, the park initially reflected racial terror in the city. The first lynching in Jefferson County was at Capitol Park, in 1883. Jefferson County Memorial Project 2020 fellow Kam Thigpen wrote about the lynching of a black man named Lewis Houston and cited two Birmingham newspapers that wrote about the murder. White men accused Houston of assaulting a white woman, threw him in jail, and a mob took Houston to Capitol Park and killed him on November 24, 1883. Houston’s lynching is an example of racial terror, and the fellows cited thirty-three lynching victims in Jefferson County between 1883 and 1940. A note in the JCMP 2020 Fellow report about photos of some greenspaces in Jefferson County said, “These photos are not beautiful. Trees have grown over graveyards . . . . Without added context, nothing identifies these spaces as memorial sites.” The work of the JCMP Fellows connects to greenspaces as memorial sites.

and Louis Houston’s death at the beginnings of the park’s history is a reminder of the dark history that is little known in a place famous for its calm space and location surrounded by civic buildings in the center of downtown.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Birmingham partook in the national urban planning trend of adding and redesigning city parks, including plans for Capitol Park to become the center of a collection of civic buildings. In the late nineteenth century, the quick growth of cities across the country led to crowded industrial spaces, health problems, and the desire for cultivating greenspaces in the cities, including Linn Park. There were health concerns in cities such as New York, and Birmingham had its own problems with cholera in 1873. As a result of the collective dirtiness of cities, city leaders across the country gathered in conferences between 1909 and 1910 to discuss city planning, and the “City Beautiful” movement placed increased attention on city function and appearance. Birmingham’s city leaders contacted the Olmsted Brothers company, a prominent landscape design firm connected to landscape architect giant Frederick Law Olmsted, to design more greenspaces around Birmingham. In 1925, the company created A Park System For Birmingham, which looked at land and decided where to create more parks downtown and in surrounding suburbs. In terms of Birmingham’s natural landscapes, hills, mountains, and a number of rivers, streams, and creeks surround the outskirts of downtown, but there is no central body of water in Jones’s Valley. The parks plan from the Olmsted Brothers Company added more green spaces in downtown; however, many of the full details of plans did not come to fruition. The core of Capitol Park’s design continued in development over thirty years into a civic center that city leaders continued to invest in for a strong, civic-minded city image. The civic center designs for Capitol Park influenced its significance as a location for protest in the following decades.

From the early nineteenth century, Capitol Park became a landmark of the city with a number of monuments. In 1905, the Daughters of the Confederacy unveiled the obelisk that completed the base laid at a Confederate reunion in 1895 to honor its soldiers and sailors. A postcard from 1907 highlighted the Confederate monument in the foreground, prominently on the southern edge of the park at the top of 20th Street North and along east and west Park Place. Capitol Park also held statues of famous citizens including surgeon Dr. W.E.B. Davis and teacher Mary Calahan. After the two World Wars, the park featured two statues

Media, Court, Business, Resident, 12-13.
270. Olmsted Brothers, A Parks System for Birmingham, copyright the Parks and Recreation Board of Birmingham Alabama, 1925, Samford University Special Collection, Birmingham, AL.
honoring people who served in wars, including a World War I Doughboy monument and a Spanish-American War monument honoring soldiers, sailors, marines, and nurses. The war monuments faced opposition throughout the park’s history. Scholar of the American landscape Peirce F. Lewis claims that cultural landscapes, such as buildings, have a great deal to say about the people who live there. Lewis’s work is helpful in reading the monuments in the park and controversy over them, thinking about the people who created them, and how the meaning of the monuments change over Birmingham’s history.

Beyond the monuments, the park was a pleasant place to appreciate in visual art and as a place to listen to music. Postcards of Capitol Park featured paintings and drawings of manicured lawns around the Calahan statue and another of an aerial view of the park’s winding paths. Birmingham artist Carrie Hill art exhibition in 1913 included Capitol Park in three of her twenty paintings of Birmingham. Furthermore, the park routinely held music gatherings such as Sunday summer evenings at five o’clock in 1917, where people sang songs ranging from hymns to “Row, Row, Row, Your Boat.” Descriptions of Capitol Park portrayed it as a peaceful and prominent gathering place. Although Capitol Park was officially a public gathering place, segregation from Jim Crow laws perpetuated hatred and injustice towards black Americans in Birmingham’s parks. Scholar in urban and regional planning Charles E. Connerly wrote about segregation in Birmingham in “The Most Segregated City in America”: City Planning and Civil Rights in Birmingham, 1920-1980. He noted that Birmingham city government leaders listened to white people who wanted segregation, and in 1910, the city government created a law that separated white and black people in parks. Even worse, Connerly noted the Birmingham government did not designate


any park for black people nor put any funds towards parks for them until the 1940s with the creation of Memorial Park in South Elyton. On October 26, 1921, President Harding came and spoke at Capitol Park for Birmingham’s fiftieth anniversary celebration, and there were over 100,000 people in attendance. Fazio cited a Birmingham News article that mentioned that black and white people were in separate sections of the crowd. President Harding spoke about working towards equality for races in a speech that Birmingham Civil Rights Institute Head of Education and Exhibitions Ahmad Ward said was progressive and important in civil rights history. Ward acknowledges that while President Harding did not promote complete equality for blacks and whites, he focused on equal voting rights, spoke out about race in a way that no president had before him, and spoke in the South where segregation was staunchly upheld. Connerly noted that Birmingham city government did not comply with the 1951 Supreme Court ruling prohibiting racial zoning in Birmingham and that segregation continued well into the 1960s. Considering segregation in Birmingham, especially white citizens’ outcry in the early 1900s for segregation, which applied to public parks, make the attractive and peaceful descriptions of Capitol park and the city difficult to read. President Harding’s visit to the park reflected its prominent connection to Birmingham’s city image, and his speech along with the city’s segregation laws reflected racism prevalent in Birmingham’s city image.

Woodrow Wilson Park – December 3, 1918 to December 23, 1986

Winning World War I ushered in new hope for the city, reflected in Capitol Park’s renaming to Woodrow Wilson Park on December 3, 1918 after President Woodrow Wilson led the United States out of World War I. A newspaper article by contributor Harry Garett shed fascinating history on Woodrow Wilson Park after World War I as people carried lit torches up 20th Street and sang at the end of the war. This patriotic article reflected the value of the park to the city. Woodrow Wilson Park remained a welcoming greenspace that balanced Birmingham’s image of industrial and natural landscapes. The 1927 article “Downtown Park ‘Oasis’ in ‘Desert’ of Streets” described the pleasantness of the park as an “oasis” in the city away from the rush of cars and industry. The author presented Woodrow Wilson Park as a perfect retreat for different

280. Fazio, Landscape Transformations: Architecture and Birmingham, Alabama, 4-5.
groups of people from lovers, to business workers, to homeless people. Woodrow Wilson Park captured the sentiment of Birmingham after World War I and continued to reflect Birmingham’s dual landscape identity.

Additionally, Woodrow Wilson Park was a symbol for the city throughout the Great Depression, and its maintenance was of the utmost importance for reflecting the city. The prosperity of the 1920s did not last, but in the middle of the Great Depression, the Birmingham News took pride in Woodrow Wilson Park and saw it as “the city’s own front yard.” The southwest portion of the park had a marker that stated, “the geographical center of the city.” With the significance attributed to Woodrow Wilson Park over its almost then fifty years of history, the article unabashedly pointed out overgrown grounds, faded statues, and rusted fountains, and extended the metaphor of the front yard to the park’s reflection of the city. The article declared, “But Woodrow Wilson [P]ark, unkempt and unkept, symbolizes even more than that: a city which has grown cold in the presence of beauty; and has even forgotten to wash its own face.”

The Birmingham News viewed the park as the center of the city, its appearance reflected the upkeep of the city, and the park symbolized its image. Lewis commented on the axiom of landscape as a clue to culture, an example of moving front grass, or letting wildflowers grow, or getting “ostracized by their neighbors” for concrete yards. Lewis’s work pointed at the heightened importance of the park as a symbol of the city’s front yard as reflective of the appearance of the city. The completion of the library in 1927 on the east edge of Woodrow Wilson Park connected to the image of the park as the “front yard” of the city. In 1932, the Birmingham Post wrote an article entitled, “Beauty Sought in Wilson Park,” about renovations including added pools and five years later wrote a story of thousands of goldfish in the four pools that dirtied the pools until the 1980s.

Renovations to Woodrow Wilson Park during the middle of economic decline in Birmingham reflected Birmingham’s attention to the park in portraying a resilient city image. Debate over a war monument in Woodrow Wilson Park illuminated the larger issue of the park as a location to remember the lives of Birmingham citizens. In 1932, landscape architects for the park suggested moving the World War I Doughboy monument to the

286. Lewis, “Axioms for Reading the Landscape: Some Guides to the American Scene,” 18.
auditorium at the northwest edge of the park, Legion Field, or to another location in the park. At that time, the City Commission said Alabama law gave the Birmingham Parks and Recreation Board power over decisions in the park. There was a “vehement protest” by the American Legion about the statue’s lost significance if moved to another location. 288 The article noted that was not the first debate over monuments in the park, and it was certainly not the last as debates continue in the twenty-first century. By the 1950s, veterans wanted the Spanish-American War monument and the Doughboy monument moved to the “entrance of the park... where they can be seen by the most people.” 289 Starting clockwise, the Doughboy, Confederate, and the Spanish-American War monument stand at the 20th Street entrance to the park in 2020. 290 Debate over war monuments and memorials in Woodrow Wilson Park illuminate the importance of that location in the middle of the city for honoring citizens of Birmingham. In the 1950s, Woodrow Wilson Park developed as the center of the completed civic center design of its predecessors and of Birmingham’s civic city image. City Hall is on the west edge, Boutwell Auditorium and the Birmingham Museum of Art on the north edge, and the Jefferson County Courthouse and the Linn Henley Library on the east edge. By the 1940s, a contributor to the Birmingham Post wrote about the park as “as the center of a greater Birmingham.” 291 The incorporation of designs from park plans including from the Olmsted Brothers company contributed to the image of the park and the city as prominent and civic-minded.

Woodrow Wilson Park’s location at the foot of city hall and the courthouse added to both negative and positive images of the city during the difficult decade of the 1960s for Birmingham. Kelly Ingram Park, one of the first three parks in Barker’s map, was the location captured in the media from the Children’s Crusade in May 1963 during the civil rights movement. Walking east from the 16th Street Baptist Church towards city hall, thousands of Black children marched but were stopped by local police at Kelly Ingram Park. Birmingham became infamous for news of children sprayed by fire hoses and lunged at by German shepherds, illustrating racial injustice in Birmingham. 292 On June 23, 1963, a month after the Children’s Crusade at Kelly Ingram Park, The Birmingham News published an article entitled, “Botanical Gardens vital in


290. “Park Pl, Birmingham, Alabama,” Street View, Google Maps, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.google.com/maps/@33.5198924,-86.8093681,3a,75y,332.56h,82.43t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sEbF0KErpAuGf5X1Cy0h42Q!2e0!7i16384!8i8192.


city’s cultural, tourist growth, Mattil says.” City Horticulturist Carl F. Mattil spoke with the current Mayor Albert Boutwell, and Mattil believed in continued support of the Botanical Gardens, working on Vulcan, as well as “improvement of Woodrow Wilson Park.”

The Birmingham Botanical Gardens is located southeast of downtown, just over Red Mountain, and opened in 1962 with the “largest conservatory in the Southeast.” Mattil mentioned updating three major existing parks to help the city’s “cultural growth,” however, likely also to divert attention from the negative city images from Kelly Ingram Park. The timeliness of this article reflected the need of Birmingham to present a positive image, specifically in its large, existing parks.

Woodrow Wilson Park became a place of investment to combat Birmingham’s image of hatred in the 1960s. Not coincidentally, the Junior Chamber of Commerce proposed building a statue of Venus, the Roman god of love, in Woodrow Wilson Park. An elaborate fountain costing $100 a month in upkeep, with colored lights, and the statue holding baby Cupid was designed for the park.

Councilman George G. Seibels stated that the fountain would be “a focal point in the beauty of our civic center.” Seibels’s quote put emphasis on a positive appearance not only on the park but on the city government as well. One article suggests that the Confederate monument statue and flagpole would have to move locations so that the Venus fountain could be seen from the street and that the Daughters of the Confederacy would probably not like that. The park’s emphasis on attractiveness, whether through renovations or monuments, is an ongoing debate in the park.

Birmingham Post-Herald news reporter Ted Bryant poked fun at the controversy over the Venus statue; however, the plans for the mythological statue have a great deal to tell about the cultural values of those city leaders and designers. Creating a statue of a Roman god connects to the view of the Roman Empire as one of the most civilized governments and societies in history, which reflects their desire to present Birmingham as a well-run city. The mythology also has a deeper connection to the city’s history, with Vulcan, the Roman god of fire up on Red


Mountain, and that Vulcan and Venus marry. Mattil's suggestion two years prior to develop Vulcan Park where Vulcan stands overlooking the city, and Woodrow Wilson Park where Venus would be, strengthens the importance of mythological gods in the parks. The addition of Cupid would reinforce Birmingham as a city of love and of safety for children rather than of hate. As in 1904 at the St. Louis World’s Fair when Vulcan represented Birmingham’s industry, in the 1960s in Linn Park, Venus and Cupid would reflect Birmingham as a place of civilization and love. While the proposed fountain plans ultimately ended, the design reflected young city leaders’ desire to present the park and the surrounding buildings as a reflection of Birmingham as a civilized place of love in the middle of a difficult city image. Despite the idea for a city image of love, Woodrow Wilson Park continued to host conflicting views on racial inequality as the entrance to city hall and the courthouse. In September 4, 1963, the *Birmingham Post-Herald* stated there was a protest at Woodrow Wilson Park about integrating schools. Woodrow Wilson’s location with city hall on its west side presented it as a place for gathering and protest. A minister named Dr. George Fisher, Sr., gathered 75,000 petitions for closing schools instead of the *Herald*'s phrase “desegregating them.” The article states that one hundred people gathered in Woodrow Wilson Park as Dr. Fisher, Sr., went inside to the school superintendent Dr. Theo Wright. He did not find him and was not admitted to see Mayor Albert Boutwell, so he returned to the park with no avail in their cause for keeping segregation. The park remained a place of protest in the ongoing city debate of civil rights. On April 8, 1968, *Birmingham Post Herald* presented a solemn article by contributor Ron Menton and photographer Dick Cooper about a silent march to remember civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., days after his death. Thousands of black and white Americans walked the streets from the 16th Street Baptist Church, at the northwest edge of Kelly Ingram Park, east to Woodrow Wilson Park to the courthouse. There were services with singing and prayers at Woodrow Wilson Park and on the steps of the courthouse. The photo caption stated that people walked up 20th Street North to the park. This article reflects the significance of the park because of its location by the courthouse, as a memorial, and as a destination for marches from Kelly Ingram Park to Woodrow Wilson Park. These two protests in Woodrow Wilson Park in the 1960s manifested Birmingham’s notorious city image of segregation.

To emphasize a positive city image, city and business leaders decided to invest in adding a new focal point to Woodrow Wilson Park to beautify the civic center. With the difficult year that 1963 was for Birmingham during the civil rights movement, Connerly wrote, “businessmen saw the city’s problems [as] purely economic, reflecting not the overall welfare of the city’s mixed population but rather the welfare of its downtown

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300. Dick Cooper and Ron Menton, “In Tribute To King: A Silent March Held In City,” *Birmingham Post Herald*, April 8, 1968, file 1205.2.125, Martin Luther King Jr. Scrapbooks, 1968, Birmingham Public Library Digital Collections, Birmingham, AL,
“Operation New Birmingham” was a plan that began in 1965 by city business leaders to invest into 20th Street and the civic buildings surrounding Woodrow Wilson Park. Connerly noted well-known business leader Mr. A.G. Gaston and his wife Mrs. A.G. Gaston were among the few black leaders who worked on the plan. “Operation New Birmingham” put emphasis on businesses and the impressive civic center around Woodrow Wilson Park and adding the Birmingham Green to 20th Street with more trees and street wires moved underground. These investments in particular city spaces emphasized the street leading to the civic buildings around Woodrow Wilson Park and visually created a central hub for business and government in the city.

Linn Park – December 23, 1986 to May 31, 2020

The renovation of Linn Park in the 1980s reflected Birmingham’s resiliency through economic challenges, debates over monuments, and working through the negative effects of its inclusion of segregation in city planning and into a new image of stability in the city. The city took a new business direction as a medical center and Connerly wrote that it was “the most successful urban renewal project in the nation.” In the 1980s, Birmingham landscape architect firm Nimrod Long and Associates created a survey to ask people what they looked for in the park, and answers from business workers and city officials included wanting safety, more lighting, and for the park to be a place to gather for lunch. The park underwent its fourth name change, and Birmingham Magazine writer Susan Simon wrote that Woodrow Wilson Park became Linn Park, honoring early city leader Charles Linn. Linn Park retained many of its monuments, including the debated war monuments and less debated statues including the Mary Calahan school teacher statue. Even one hundred years later, Simon wrote about the significance of the park. She stated that Linn Park was “revived at the heart of the city.”

Through a hundred years of changes to the park and the city, through segregation, protests, and peaceful days, Linn Park remained the symbolic “heart” of Birmingham.

While many sources described Linn Park as the center and heart of the city, some people might debate the park’s image as an extension of Birmingham’s image. However, the Confederate monument reflects past Birmingham citizens, its debate today involves current citizens, and a new monument recognizing Jefferson County lynching victims reflects current Birmingham citizens facing past history. Another argument might be that the civic buildings are important but the park is not. However, the civic buildings are there

because of earlier plans for the park as the location for the state capitol. The park is also the entrance to city hall and the courthouse. Another argument might include that the Confederate monument controversy is a park problem and not a state problem. The Confederate monument is a park problem with the monument’s location in question, and it is also a state problem because of the contention with the Alabama Supreme Court. Linn Park’s presence in the news in 2020 remains a statement about the role of the park in reflecting Birmingham’s resilient and changing city image.

Controversy over the Confederate Monument

Birmingham’s city image is currently reflected in a debate over the Confederate monument in Linn Park. The controversy between Birmingham city officials and the Alabama Supreme Court brings up issues of the rights of the city and state deciding how to remember history and how monuments and memorials can change meaning in different times of history. In 2017, the Alabama Memorial Preservation Act “ban[ned] the alteration of any ‘architecturally significant building, memorial building, memorial school, memorial street, or monument’ 40 years old or older.” In 2017, Birmingham city officials disagreed with the law, which does not give them the right to move the Confederate monument. In response, they put up plywood boards around the base so the inscription is not visible. In January 2020, the Alabama Supreme Court fined Birmingham 25,000 dollars for covering up the monument. This debate reflects the questions surrounding the purpose of monuments and memorials in Birmingham and in other places, including questions concerning who put them up, who has the right to take them down, and how their meaning changes over time.

Different voices in the controversy illustrate how the issue connects Linn Park to the city and reflects negatively on Birmingham’s image. On February, 12, 2020, Birmingham Mayor Randall Woodfin argued for why the city should not have to keep the monument. Woodfin said, “The City of Birmingham, founded in 1871, did not exist during the Civil War . . . .” His Twitter caption stated, “We should not be debating about whether or not to keep a monument erected in defense of slavery in the 4th blackest city in America. It is offensive, it is wrong, and it is the exact opposite of progress.” On March 10, 2020, Montgomery Advisor reporter Brian Lyman stated that Senator Rodger Smitherman spoke at a government meeting about the pain the monument causes him, as he lived through Jim Crow. For Smitherman, the monument serves as a marker of racial injustice and a reminder of slavery. He desires ultimately for “designated areas” for these types of monuments. Senator Gerald Allen spoke at the beginning of the evening about

309. Randall Woodfin (@randallwodfin), “We should not be debating about whether or not to keep a monument erected in defense of slavery in the 4th blackest city in America. It’s offensive, it is wrong, and it is the exact opposite of progress,” 0:1:27 to 0:1:34, Twitter, February 12, 2020, https://twitter.com/randallwodfin/status/1227627255423258624?s=20.
the law’s effect on Alabama and after Smitherman spoke, said, “I can understand where (Smitherman) was coming from . . . . At the same time, what we’re trying to do is preserve and protect all history.” These quotes raise questions about how to work through debates over preservation and interpreting history of monuments and memorials across the country.

Similar to Kelly Ingram Park’s design as a space to remember Birmingham civil rights history, the Jefferson County Memorial Project is taking action to address the difficult history of lynchings in Jefferson County. Founded in 2018, the National Memorial for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, Alabama, includes monuments from counties across the country with the names and dates of lynching victims. Founded the same year, the Jefferson County Memorial Project is planning where to put the duplicate Jefferson County monument with the names of the Jefferson County victims. The organization proposed Linn Park, the location of Lewis Houston’s death in the first lynching in Jefferson County, for the location of the monument. A 2019, AL.com news article by reporter John Hammontree states that the city approved the location for the monument, and that GMC architecture firm architects Kyonta Smith and Jane Reed Ross desire to create it as a reflective experience. The park may once again change and add to the space with the existing monuments and memorials. Current Birmingham citizens are not only seeking to confront the history of Linn Park but also ask Jefferson County to face its difficult history and keep the memorial on display.

The layered history of Linn Park reflects the complex tensions between citizens and reveals racism in Birmingham’s history and the changing image of both the park and the city. While the Confederate monument is debated today, the other monuments are not necessarily a huge draw to the park. In the past decade, Linn Park was a location for music gatherings, festivals, and outreach to the homeless. Many reviews of Linn Park on Trip Advisor and Yelp from visitors to Birmingham and local residents during the 2010s describe that there are frequently homeless people in the park, causing them to feel unsafe, but the reviews also mention the monuments, nice greenspace, and music events. The reviews suggest people often visit the park for specific events while its history with Birmingham’s image is lesser known; however, these reviews present the Confederate monument controversy as even more interesting as the monument stands at the entrance of the park right at the top of 20th Street North and next to Park Place where it is visible without entering the park. Furthermore, reviews on both TripAdvisor and Yelp describe the park as the heart and center of the city like news articles from previous decades.

The attention given to Linn Park throughout Birmingham’s history, its multiple changes in name and design, and its reflection on the place of monuments reflects the resiliency of the city and its evolving image. In one year from now, the city and Linn Park will be one hundred and fifty years old. Lewis’s analysis of the “historic axiom” in reading cultural landscapes is beneficial for considering changes to Linn Park’s image. He said, “[w]e must conclude that if there is really major change in the look of the cultural landscape, then there is very likely a major change occurring in our national culture at the same time.” The controversy over the Confederate monument reflects different citizens of Birmingham and also brings up the significance of how places, such as buildings and monuments, existing in one society can have varying meanings to cultures and societies in different times of history. The identity of the park today as little recognized except for the Confederate monument brings into discussion larger questions of what makes a place significant and worth knowing about or visiting. The image of a place, like Birmingham and Linn Park, perceived collectively or personally, can have incredible ramifications on the decisions made: in investing in or abandoning them, in the stories hardly mentioned or with joy told, and in impacting present and future generations of image creators. The importance attached to places changes over time with how people remember and perceive them, which creates new and exciting opportunities to learn about people of the past and also people today.

Postscript – Linn Park in the Summer of 2020

The summer of 2020 continued to show the importance of Linn Park in Birmingham’s resilient city image. After George Floyd’s death on May 25, 2020, protests began across the country, including in Birmingham. In the afternoon on Sunday, May 31, 2020, peaceful protestors gathered in downtown Birmingham at Kelly Ingram Park for “Birmingham, The World is Watching,” a two hour rally for peace and justice organized by the Mayor’s office and the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute. After the two hour rally, speaker Jermaine “Funnymaine” Johnson spoke about not tearing down specific historic places around the city important in Black history. He also said, “I’m not telling you to walk to Linn Park after this rally. I’m not telling you to tear something down in Linn Park, that’s what I am not telling you to do.”

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315. Lewis, “Axioms for Reading the Landscape: Some Guides to the American Scene,” 15.
317. Anna Beahm (@_AnnaBeahm), “Jeramine Johnson, known as FunnyMaine, calls for the confederate monument in Linn Park to be torn down,” May 31, 2020 7:04 p.m., on Twitter, video,
Daylight Time, some protestors arrived in Linn Park and defaced monuments, tore down the Charles Linn statue placed in 2013, and attempted to pull down the Confederate monument. Mayor Randall Woodfin handled the crowd of yelling protestors and said, “Allow me to finish the job for you.” Mayor Woodfin promised to take down the monument in twenty-four hours, and he also faced the legal issues of a 25,000 dollar fine to the city from the state of Alabama for violating the Alabama Memorial Act of 2017 when the city covered the Confederate monument in 2017, and also another 25,000 dollar fine if the city removed the monument. During the city-wide curfew set by Mayor Woodfin in response to the riots the previous evening, on Monday, June 1, a construction company took down the fifty-two foot tall sandstone Confederate monument, and completely removed it by Wednesday, June 3. Linn Park and Mayor Woodfin made national news that week and over the summer. Mayor Woodfin kept his word and kept peace in the city as attention turned to Linn Park.

There were many reactions in agreement and disagreement of the removal of the monument, as well as potential additions of monuments and a name change to Linn Park. On Sunday, May 31, 2020, there was support from protestors in the park, and on Monday, June 1, from civil rights organization leaders and donors to a GoFundMe raising over $60,000 in twenty-three hours to cover the two $25,000 fines from the state of Alabama for violating the Alabama Memorial Act of 2017. There was

https://twitter.com/_AnnaBeahm/status/1267245634131832836.
disagreement from Sons of Confederate Veterans and a man who threatened Mayor Woodfin. The Jefferson County Memorial Project leaders and fellows are working on bringing the Jefferson County monument to Linn Park from the National Memorial for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, Alabama. The city supports a new monument from the Collective, a group that started a GoFundMe on Monday, June 1, the day the city removed the Confederate monument. There is also a potential redesign of the park, as well as a rename to the park to honor the late civil rights leader John Lewis. Linn Park remains a significant place in Birmingham’s city image as citizens continue to shape the city’s history and memory through protests and monuments.

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**Polari and Camp: Homosexual Anti-language and Evolution of Camp Identity in Britain**

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**Introduction**

Polari was an anti-language created by mostly white, gay, working-class men in mid-century Britain, with a focus on camp. This style of presentation, and how people at the time received the Polari-related identity and linguistic cultures, evolved into a subculture and living history of gay identity as Polari slowly became less used as an anti-language, but remained in the knowledge of queer subcultures. This evolution and the changing perceptions of Polari have been indicative of how queer people interact with gay history and camp identity in Britain since the anti-language’s peak. Polari’s highest popularity was during the 1950s and 60s, in conjunction with the increasing cultural repression against ambiguous homosexuality, after the Second World War. It was at this point that Polari manifested as a complete anti-language, used by the working-class men who built it out of other languages and slang. Additionally, Polari has occupied a space in more recent gay consciousness as a light-hearted excerpt of queer history, or a memory of a more oppressive era. However, its influence in queer linguistics, and the overall conception of how gay men should present themselves has continued to impact gay subculture even in times of less widespread usage. Polari’s fading popularity has been linked to gay men who wanted to push back against camp gay presentations of identity, while others have continued to use or revive Polari in order to celebrate queerness during the hardship of the AIDS epidemic. As such, the amalgamation of roles Polari has held allow it to be viewed as a continuous part of British history, despite the changing specifics of use and practice.

Polari’s roots can be linguistically traced back decades prior to its creation, and throughout it’s evolution it has been a marker of British camp gay identity. It has had an ongoing role in gay culture, especially occupying a space between public and personal presentations of camp identity. Regardless of Polari’s use at any given time, people’s perceptions of it reflect the history and factors involved with camp gay identity in British history. Polari has gone through many iterations after its peak usage – as a defining part of groups such as the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence, as an academic thesis topic, and as the subject of art displays in London. All these roles have formed a narrative of the role camp gay identity occupies in Britain at any given time. Polari is a way to centre and show changing gay culture in relation to camp identity, and to help reflect both who is assumed to have possession of camp gay identity, and how desirable it is to have in relation to mainstream culture.

**Definitions**

In this paper Polari will be defined as an anti-language; a method of communication used by a minority because public methods of communication utilised by the majority do not express what they need without placing them in danger.\(^{327}\) This is a definition used extensively in Paul Baker’s work, and is necessary to state here, to give the context from which Polari will be analysed. It is not a complete language in many ways, especially with the diluted modern usage of only occasional words, but at its peak usage, Polari was as much a dialect as other heavily used British slang. While modernly there are dictionaries of Polari, for people to be able to add words to standard English vocabulary, those who spoke it fluently used it comprehensively enough to hold entire

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conversations.\textsuperscript{328}

This distinction gives the clarification and reminder that while Polari is now a publicly studied topic, with books and buyable indices, it was created to avoid intelligibility by outsiders. It was not only made to be unique and exclusionary to those unaware of the words’ meanings, but also specifically difficult to understand, for the safety of those speaking it.\textsuperscript{329} Additionally, while there are now dictionaries of Polari, it should not be separated from the fact that it was comprehensive enough that those who spoke it more fluently could hold whole conversations without using more standard English – this was not only a few words of slang or phrases, but a dialect to many who spoke it.

Homosexuality is used in this paper to term sex between two people who were presenting as the same gender. This is because sodomy, the legal term that would have been used at the time to describe this action, carries connotations of a legal charge, particularly in British history. As such, there needs to be clarification between sodomy as a legal charge and homosexuality. Terming homosexuality as between two people who present as the same gender erases the nuances that come with Polari’s treatment of gender, but this topic will be addressed separately. Those who were in the Polari-speaking community and with whom there are interviews usually termed themselves as, in modern terms, gay men, though they used a variety of terminology to describe this. However, as the gay men’s sexual partners did not always share this label, using ‘homosexuality’ to refer to sexual acts between them captures the sense of what social role their actions had, both to them and others, without giving identity-related labels. Lastly, gay will be used in this paper to refer specifically to men who identify as homosexual, not as an umbrella term for LGBT+ or queer identifying people, as it often is in contemporary academics. This is because speaking Polari often specifically signalled identity\textsuperscript{330}, and this is the term that many of the men who spoke Polari during its peak have used to define themselves later.

Using the word ‘gay’ is also most useful for explaining the connection of Polari camp gay identity and pushback that occurred in later decades.

## During Peak Usage

The demographic of Polari speakers at its height is understood to be largely working-class, masculine, and white.\textsuperscript{331} This is also the narrative that speakers of Polari gave when interviewed in the 1990s, with some men describing being “viewed as being ‘posh’” if they did not use the lexicon.\textsuperscript{332} Polari’s founding in slang comes through in the language itself, with words that are based in a mixture of slang and adopted vocabulary which came from working and navy ships, immigrants, and London dialects.\textsuperscript{333} Additionally, even in the recreation of Polari, historians quickly came into contact with the

\textsuperscript{328} Paul Baker, \textit{Fabulosa! The story of Polari, Britain’s Secret Gay Language} (London: Reaktion Books, 2019), 16
\textsuperscript{330} Baker, \textit{Fabulosa!} 94-5.
idea that a middle or upper class accent was not the ideal, and that the majority of speakers used and retained a regional accent when speaking. Baker advises “Cockney if you can get away with it”, which clearly bases the anti-language in a lower-class linguistic background. This, along with the posturing as upper class - such as mimicking royalty and referring to each other as ‘queens’ - centres the Polari in camp gay identity specifically for and by working class cis men. It created a tone of always being joking and slightly excessive, ignoring restrictive linguistic expectations for men’s speech.

Polari’s subversion of expectations via adapting already existent slang is also shown by the range of languages and backgrounds root words and sections of the lexicon were taken from. The absorption of slang from white, cis, working-class male professions allowed Polari to travel further within the subcommunity. This in turn allowed it to be more applicable once it was outside its original theatre and naval social groups of origin. This flexibility is demonstrated by the Romani, backslang, and rhyming slang found in Polari, along with large amounts of Italian and Romance-based linguistic variation. This, and the fact that Polari was often characterised by the inventiveness and banter of the speakers with each other, meant that Polari also occupied a highly useful and adaptive social space. Increasing this, was that there was a focus on the ability to discuss sexually explicit gossip, sexual orientation, and people’s appearances. It allowed the discussion of homosexuality to become widespread within gay, white, male, and working-class British subcultures, instead of limiting the anti-language to only men in a specific field or those who had been directly taught what the slang meant and how to apply it. Polari’s role at this time exemplifies the use of an anti-language and also shows the widely applicable sense of camp identity for many men that spoke Polari. The collective support of a certain system of identity helped other gay men express themselves in a similar way, and find a community within which they could comfortably live.

Secrecy at the time of Polari’s peak usage also shows how camp gay culture, especially gendered presentation, was viewed by the public, heteronormative society. The specific phrasing that Polari speakers used to discuss the police, such as ‘Betty Bracelets’ or ‘Lily Law,’ shows this interaction with more mainstream society. The mainstream distaste for queering gender in titles, and using differently feminine names to describe cis men in a traditionally masculine job, clearly places camp gay identity in a highly minoritized subculture, if a well-known one. The need for secrecy connected to the illegality of homosexuality at the time – Polari was at its peak in the 50s and 60s, prior to the partial legalisation of homosexual sex. At the same time, the laws that were put into place in 1967 showed awareness for, at minimum, the gay working-class that spoke Polari, and the settings in which it was used, with passages specifically about homosexuality

Expression of gay identity was known about, which marginalised camp expression further as authorities criminalised it. In connection with this rising visibility however, camp expression also became a more effective flagging mechanism, and closed method of communication, as in the case of Polari.

In relation to class and camp identity, while higher-class people did occasionally use Polari, the anti-language was more utilized by marginalised groups. Elton John’s memoir *Me* mentions one of his mentors using Polari, but this was also when gay identity was more shareable, without fear of legal retaliation. Additionally, the music scene that Elton John describes was unlikely to be dangerously homophobic. Polari as an anti-language came out of communities that already had a history of homosexuality – the British navy in the 1950s especially had stories of people joining because it was an opportunity to meet gay men. This does not mean that being gay in the mid-twentieth century was not risky, and that men did not lose careers due to accusations of being homosexual – arrest of and blackmail against gay men was common. However, Polari was in many ways an extension of already existing methods of communication and community building. It created a camp version of presenting homosexuality and non-traditional gender expression with language that the homosexual male population in Britain already understood. Polari was based in Western ideas of gender roles and sex, and in subverting them simultaneously acknowledges and participates in cisgender ideas of both. What Polari did change is in its creation of a linguistic space for homosexual identity and a common homosexual culture.

### Evolution of Usage

Polari’s usage was intentionally limited and preserved during the 70s and 80s, particularly as camp became less fashionable and as younger gay men tried to move society’s conception of gay men towards being more conventional, and away from camp. There was a movement and discussion among younger gay men for to meet more conventional heteronormative aesthetics of masculinity while advocating for homosexuality and presentation. This involved the idea of blending in and be “perfectly normal” as opposed to being easily recognizable as queer and camp. These concepts were pushed for by a different community consciousness, based in a younger generation’s wishes for acceptability. Arguments against camp language were centred on an understanding of gay men as having the same rights and lives as their heterosexual counterparts instead of differentiating through a different social culture. Jonathan Raban was concerned that “[the homosexual] will become no more than a shrill mouthpiece…determined…by a language of body parts and fucking” if a focus on camp identity continued. Gay men who were at one point setting the trend for what was fashionable and camp were “retired as obsolete political vehicles and consigned to a

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museum of gay kitsch.” This pushback especially included Polari.

Importantly, while the movement to push away from camp identity was overarching, it generated public discussion of camp identity by men who had past interactions with it. This was possible due to the widespread past usage of campness. Often, the tone of newspaper column discussions gay “respectibility” is one of men already familiar with queer history, and with enough privilege and ability to engage with this dialogue, if potentially under a pseudonym. As a result, educated and well-connected gay men began to shape queer narratives. Anonymous writers wrote Gay Magazine about Polari, knowing the anti-language’s history, and how it was used by older men. While not all of them can be assumed to have been out, that they knew of Polari enough to discuss it, and to interact with a gay magazine about how gay men should look and behave, is indicative of the ability to engage with other gay men, popular gay media, and community opinions. As such, while it is true that pushback against Polari fits within an overarching movement away from camp, that there is a limit to the viewpoints expressed on the subject is also important to understanding both who directed the change away from Polari and what documents are available for historians to analyse.

Round the Horne is especially notable in relation to Polari’s phasing out as an anti-language, because in many ways it marked the transition of a used anti-language to a more popular cultural phenomenon. The show was made at the end of Polari’s popularity, but also when it had become so widespread that many people knew about its existence, making the jokes and double meanings comprehensible to a larger audience. Furthermore, Round the Horne quickly became a way in which later organisations and academics learnt about and revived Polari, as all the recordings were digitized. However, the outcome was people copying the vocabulary in Round the Horne, resulting in a more rote presentation of Polari. With the anti-language being phased out, many learnt phrases via listening to the show repeatedly, such as in the case of Paul Baker – someone who has since written much of the academic content on Polari. The Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence made a Polari Bible heavily based on what they had heard and adapted from the show. This formalised the language and removed a significant amount of the creativity that original speakers of Polari associated with communication. Creativity was essential in the creation of new phrases and word combinations, so that Polari became less of slang and closer to a complete language. In learning from shows such as Round the Horne, the campness in people’s use of Polari became more privileged and more connected to the idea of relearning camp gay history for the purpose of preserving it, as opposed to participating in original creation. This does not mean that the social aspect of camp gay culture was removed, as that is something that still exists today in many aspects, but especially white men’s focus in engaging with it has changed, and has become one of taking from pre-established ideas as opposed to creating new ones.

The revival of Polari towards the early 2000s, led by various organisations supporting cis gay men, showed a aspect of camp identity being brought back in a historical sense, and as a political and cultural

reclamation. Groups such as the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence – which had continued throughout the AIDS epidemic, despite camp’s unfashionability – led this revival, as a highly public gay-focused organisation. Their speeches and ceremonies have continued to be carried out in Polari, and they have created a dictionary for the anti-language. Polari was thus again used to create a sense of community. Similar to its initial role as an anti-language, it allowed people within the Sisters to use diction as an identifier, though more outwardly than before. Ceremonies held during the 1980s by the Sister of Perpetual Indulgences rely on a sense of gay culture created by the campness and emphasis on homosexual sex that Polari gives. Examples of this include parties for sick and dying celebrities during the AIDS crisis, where they were given a necklace made of sex toys. In this manner, while the history of Polari is perhaps being over-emphasised as a symbol of gay British history, it also allowed a sense of common identity and unapologetic public declaration. This was especially important to some during the AIDS epidemic. While there was a younger movement for more conventional social acceptability, Polari use was a niche refuge for those who already knew it.

Despite the classism and privilege often associated with how Polari has been revitalised, Polari’s newer existence as an open secret has been a part of creating a resurgence in its usage by connecting gay communities in a more open way. For example, an organisation working for older queer people’s resources and support is called Polari. There are also songs such as “Piccadilly Palare”, released in 1990, which is a singular song of an entire album that makes references to Polari’s history and usage. Polari magazine also ran in the early 2000s until recently, connecting gay men and gay history. On the line between community connection and gentrification, there are fashion brands such as Polari, which prints Polari sayings on clothing and uses slang in marketing. In all these connections there is the revitalisation of the vocabulary style of camp, of changing expectations against heteronormative mainstream society. However, in many ways, the confrontational nature of camp has gone, as the community of working class white gay men who originally used Polari no longer have to subvert expectations as drastically. As such, Polari in these contexts has become a connection to the past and to preserving a common sense of gay culture, but it is still distinctly different from the underground usage of Polari in gay scenes in the 1950s and 60s.

**Identity**

Polari gave a linguistic way for people to identify themselves as homosexual, instead of having the focus be on a sexual act. This also helped facilitate the creation of a camp gay identity to form. Gay men in the navy who had wives at home would not use it, for example, whereas people whose entire lives were based on having same-sex relationships, seem to have been far more likely to. Again, this differentiation and social understanding of the role of Polari was facilitated by the working-class background that allowed the creation of Polari’s initial lexicon, and for the emerging sense of homosexuality that men in the navy were creating to become more mainstream. As such, the ideas of a more explicitly and clearly expressed homosexual identity became increasingly normalised in minority gay culture, and then over time increasingly mainstream. With them came

different ideas of gay masculinity. These ideas about identity and representation lead to more adoption of camp style, along with the popularisation of drag balls and shows that often happened on ships within the community of Polari speakers.\(^{354}\)

Additionally, the importance of the growth of Polari reflected the creation of a subcommunity that supported each other, especially against the ‘rest of society.’ While in hindsight the anti-language does not meet with many of the requirements of modern queer people, for the people who spoke it, Polari was very useful. This helps highlight the differences over time in queer communities and in how Polari was viewed. A large part of this is the differing gender presentations that Polari allowed expression of. Modernly there have been more movements to allow spaces to be more friendly to queer people who are neither white nor cis, but this was a form of recognised expression and needed space that was not available before. In interviews with men about gayness in the 1950s in the UK, men are unquestioning about their cisgender identity, regardless of clothing or using different pronouns in Polari.\(^{355}\) Polari was not an activist group or a community, but a method of communication that reached its peak in systems that already had spaces and modes of communication designed for acts of sex that were understood by the participants as homosexual between two cismen.\(^{356}\) This can be seen in the creation of the camp identity that was created, with a normalisation of people wearing women’s clothes, but the underlying assumption that this was for reasons connected to presenting their sexuality instead of their gender.

The weight Polari was given in the creation of a gay identity in the UK in the 1950s and 60s queer public consciousness also helped make it an identity for many. That it identified people with a clearly expressed version of what gay identity was, such as “man-woman” or “woman-man,” depending on if the person was understood to be a gay man or lesbian, helped in growing the publicity of what gay identity was.\(^{357}\) There is a significant amount of evidence for the public holding a basic understanding of homosexual acts and homosexuality – as shown in the legal arguments during the Fanny and Stella case, in which there were allusions to the court already knowing that people cross-dressed and that sodomy occurred.\(^{358}\) The court case relies on a surface knowledge of cross-dressing being common knowledge, and the arguments in the case discuss how much cross-dressing was acceptable to the public, and in which contexts. While still homophobic and transphobic, the case does exemplify a basic level of public knowledge about homosexuality. However, Polari’s growth over time helps visualise the different conceptualisations of gay identity. Referring to each other as queens, and eventually normalising slang on a radio show, was far less apologetic in comparison to past hiding of non-heteronormativity.\(^{359}\) While Polari was spoken to hide from the police or mainstream society, it also came out of a minority that was understood themselves as fulfilling a male social role in their communities. Cis was not a label used at the time.

356. Cis is used here to emphasise that these people were assigned male at birth and
359. “Round the Horne.”
interconnected, self-aware, and highly expressive when in safer spaces. This underground system of communication created community for gay men, instead of isolating them into being individuals living alone or with a singular partner.

**Polari and gender**

When Polari usage was at its peak, its culture of gendering people was based largely on sexuality, and the assumption that people liked others of the same gender because they were male souls in female bodies, or vice versa. As such, gendering of people, and the emphasis on what are considered feminine speech patterns, makes the understanding and presentation of gender among those who spoke Polari complex. There was an emphasis on feminine presentation, while retaining the assumption that the person being addressed is masculine. There are many accounts of people who presented femininely in Polari, and it was not abnormal for people to be called a feminine name; additionally, the usual pronoun to refer to other gay men was “she”. While that is a practice that occurs in modern drag culture, as and including among people who identify as cis men, with Polari’s feminine gendering comes the creation of a space for people who by current standards could present as trans. To ignore this is to ignore part of the legacy of Polari, and the probable impact that it had on further marginalised identities. At its peak Polari was known by many tradespeople, so while there is not clear documentation on Polari and trans identity, they are statistically likely to have overlapped. However, overall the creation of camp identity and presentation in Polari was not to create a space for complete gender transition, with the anti-language still centring cis-male experience. This in turn both affects and mirrors how camp gayness is positioned in British history as a whole. A significant part in the creation and foundation of British camp was cis, gay, and working-class white men, and thus it was their conception of who and what they were that led to these specific subversive linguistic patterns.

**Prejudice**

Modern reinterpretations of Polari show how narratives of gay history and progressiveness are changing the queer conception of what is acceptable and what should be remembered. A significant amount of Polari has been revived and recontextualised to an academic or community standpoint in which it is treated as a part of living history. This is enhanced by the number of people who can still be interviewed about Polari, the amount that Polari features in biographies that mention the UK gay scene from the 1950s-70s, and stories of mid-twentieth century gay Britain. A significant amount of this remembering is romanticised, treating Polari as a fun “forgotten secret language”, which, while accurate, removes a significant amount of the emotional burden that came with the anti-language’s existence. Additionally, light-hearted presentations of Polari erase many criticisms of the anti-language – racism,

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363. Trans* here is used to refer to non-cis identity, it is not a term that would have been used at the time.; Baker, *Fabulous*, 15.
classism, and other prejudices. Through the process of emphasising gay history and remembrance, thereby making this history widely known and accessible, articles often erase nuances in the content itself. In the context of historiography, discussions of Polari are treated as a revival of history by white and well educated cis gay men; as such, the reclamation of camp identity is being done by those who face less stigmatisation for doing so. There is a focus on gay men and white gay male history in Britain that is seen both in the remembrance of specific historical figures, Oscar Wilde’s fame being an easy example, and the content that is preserved in gay history. Many of the icons of British queer culture are white and presented as cis gay men. Polari continues this, as while admittedly far more working class and directly sexual than bourgeois figures such as Oscar Wilde, it still holds the niche of white cis gay male communication. Additionally, white cis male historians, such as Paul Baker and Jez Dolan, are among the few who write academically about Polari. Their standing gives them privileged clout in academia and removes focus from histories of people of colour. Especially when presenting the history of Polari as gay history with no mention of racism or sexism, there is a disconnect between scholarship and the presentation of less privileged narratives. This can be seen in a Liverpool exhibit of Polari, which discusses Polari as a “secret language,” but does not cover the racism or sexism that was inherent in its usage. This also contributes to the idea that the need for homosexual men to hide is over, claiming anti-languages and hidden gay communication as something that accessible to all working class men, and is something they no longer need reflects to privileged viewpoint writing the narrative. There are few racialized public figures focused on in queer British academia – many of the newly revived stories of queer people of colour that enter public consciousness are centred in the United States. However, “camp” is a Polari word, and it and other Polari slang have become defining in queer culture, and evolved into words used to reference Vogue Ballroom scenes, and incorporated into modern queer expression. The truncation of Polari’s legacy in research, available sources, and academics’ works removes the embedded legacy of campness in British queer culture. Presenting Polari as a fun anecdote, to the exclusion of mentioning intersections that non-white, non-cis, and non-male identities would have made with the anti-language, restricts modern academic understanding of camp to an identity only reachable by white cis gay men. This in turn shapes the public narrative of what is allowed to be seen as camp and how people can interact with the term, as the limited works being published are dictating the demographic associated with the term. Polari’s campness also influenced British queer culture’s evolution due to the ideals and amount of common culture that it created. People dressing in what modernly would be called drag, as well as trans* feminine people wearing women’s clothes, occurred long before Polari appeared or became popular.

368. Nick Arnold, “Pride 2019: Seven People Who Changed LGBT History,” BBC Three, June 3 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/1f4c71a6-1359-4241-9f91-7b0a1b5ac9a0.
However, Polari mainstreamed these actions in a way that allowed working-class white gay men to know what camp was, making camp presentation popular in gay subcultures. Additionally, the linguistic distinction provided by differentiating between people who spoke Polari, and those who were “trade”, “Jock,” or specifically a trade ome in the Navy was useful for gay communities. It allowed differentiation between whosimply engaged in homosexual sex but considered themselves straight, allowed a gay identity to present with a common subculture in what was a more mainstream way than past depictions of gay men. The effect of people being aware of Polari after its growing popularity and mainstreaming in the late 1960s has helped contribute to a perception of gay men as being camp and performatively feminine, regardless of the percentage who present that way. It would be far too extreme to say that Polari was the only factor given other causes and pre-existing cultural assumptions, but it helped make campness more mainstream. Additionally, the common style of drag that is presented in the 1950s and 60s has helped create a perception of what cross-dressing and drag looks like in British culture. A lot of this can be seen in photographs of the navy, showing the development of what drag culture and cross-dressing was, by the community that also helped create Polari, and continue to develop both alongside each other.

**Conclusion**

Despite its changing usage over decades, Polari's unique role as an anti-language has allowed it to become indicative of how camp gay culture is expressed and viewed in Britain, acting as a marker for how camp identity was perceived. During its peak usage, Polari was used to subvert heteronormative expectations for working class cis white gay men. It also allowed its users more freedom to express gender, and this changing of mainstream society’s cisnormative presentations gave space to create more camp identity. Over time the privilege that came with needing to have academic resources to know Polari, and the prioritisation of white camp identity, has changed Polari’s connections to modern camp identity and culture. British narratives of camp through Polari are still used to subvert heteronormative and cisnormative expectation of how gay men should speak and act, but there is a simultaneous ignoring of the intersections that camp identity has made outside of Polari’s original social sphere.

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Balkan Neo-Nationalism: Right-Wing Reconstruction of the Macedonian Identity and National Awakening
Nikola Kajmakoski (Loyola University Chicago)

Identity in a Post-Yugoslav Macedonia

The establishment of the Republic of Macedonia following the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991 saw the creation of various political parties within the newly independent country. One such party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), has dominated Macedonian politics for nearly thirty years. Since the organization’s inception, VMRO-DPMNE has claimed ideological descent and lineage from the original Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) that existed during the final years of the Ottoman Empire. The IMRO that existed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sought the creation of an autonomous Macedonian state and recognition of the Macedonian identity. Those that were willing to fight for the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia were thus considered Macedonians.

Although VMRO-DPMNE portrays itself as the successor to the original IMRO, the actions undertaken by this right-wing conservative political party have not backed up its claims. In a similar vein to its “predecessor”, VMRO-DPMNE seeks the reunification of the historical Macedonian borders into an autonomous nation-state, hoping to undo the partition of the region by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913. Moreover, VMRO-DPMNE seeks the recognition of a distinct Macedonian identity on the international level. This second goal means the recognition of a separate Macedonian ethnos, language, culture, and religion as distinct from that of Macedonia’s Balkan neighbors. The founding members of IMRO might look at the contemporary Republic of North Macedonia and see that their vision of the recognition of the Macedonian identity and the creation of a Macedonian nation might have been accomplished. However, one can argue that these same chetniks (paramilitary fighters) would not approve of VMRO-DPMNE being their successors. When moving past a surface level analysis, one will see that this right-wing nationalist party has both reconstructed the Macedonian identity and manipulated the historical legacy of IMRO in order to justify its chauvinistic ideology.

Identity and Exclusion

The underlying principle of IMRO was the unity among the various ethno-religious groups in Macedonia against the common aggressor that was the Ottoman Empire. This

unity was reflected not only in the membership of the organization, but the representative body that was established in the Krushevo Republic. The adoption of William Gladstone’s “Macedonia for the Macedonians” served as the rallying cry for all those living in the region: they were all Macedonians (inhabitants of the region) and would die fighting for their homeland, as evident by the movement’s other slogan, “Smrt ili Sloboda” (Death or Freedom). A British politician, Gladstone sought the creation of a Balkan federation wherein an autonomous Macedonia was to serve as a member-state. In fact, Pitu Guli, a revolutionary who has been mythologized by Macedonians all over the world, was a Vlach, a Romance-speaking ethnolinguistic group found south of the Danube in southern Albania, northern Greece, southwest Bulgaria, and Macedonia today. However, contemporary leaders and supporters of today’s VMRO-DPMNE have stripped the inclusiveness from the term Macedonian, having now redefined the term to refer exclusively to ethnic, heterosexual, and Orthodox Christian Macedonians. Not only does their definition exclude the likes of Pitu Guli, but also attacks ethnic Macedonians who do not fit into their chauvinistic and exclusivist definition of being “Macedonian”.

During the Ottoman period that lasted from the late fourteenth until the early twentieth century, identity was constructed on the basis of religion, rather than other factors such as ethnicity and language. In other words, the different religious groups inhabiting the Empire were grouped together according to their religious affiliation. This system of religious-based identification is known as the millet. There existed a millet for each religious group within the Empire; Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and Jews constituted the three biggest millets in the state. The Ottoman Empire used such a system to ensure the proper and stable governing over its mixed population. This meant that the religious leaders had a great deal of autonomy over their communities; each community had its sets of laws and taxation systems. The application of Islamic law occurred whenever conflicts arose that involved a Muslim inhabitant. However, the use of Islamic law was not limited to Muslims; non-Muslims also had access to Islamic courts to resolve conflicts. Being Greek meant that one belonged to the Greek Patriarchate, but one could in fact be ethnically Albanian, Vlach, or Macedonian. Likewise, if one was referred to as a Turk, one was Muslim. This “Turk” could in fact be an ethnic Albanian, Bosnian, Greek, or even Macedonian.

While ethnic Macedonians were predominantly Orthodox Christians before the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the arrival of the Ottomans saw the subsequent conversion of Orthodox Macedonians to Islam, both willingly and through coercion. These Muslim Macedonians were referred to as Nashintsi or Nashi Turtsi (“Our Turks”) by their Christian counterparts. In fact, some Nashintsi joined the national movement in the nineteenth century: Mustafa Vojvodata, a Muslim Macedonian who aided the cheti (paramilitary bands) near Skopje, became a hero in numerous Macedonia folk stories. Nikola Karev, the first president of the Krushevo Republic and leading member of

IMRO, called upon other Muslims, like Mustafa, to fight against the Sultanate and secure statehood. In contemporary Macedonia, despite the fact that these are ethnic Macedonians that have the same legacy as their Orthodox counterparts, VMRO-DPMNE does not consider these Muslims to be “true” Macedonians and pursues aggressive policies designed to alienate them from their Orthodox Christian counterparts. Perhaps the best example of these policies can be seen in the name VMRO-DPMNE uses to refer to the Nashintsi in its propaganda. VMRO-DPMNE refers to Muslim Macedonians as Torbeshi (“the bag carriers”), which refers to their traditional clothing and carries an exceptionally pejorative meaning amongst conservative Macedonians. In fact, this policy has turned many Nashintsi towards politically associating themselves with the other Muslim groups and political parties in Macedonia and not with their ethnic counterparts. In fact, some Nashintsi now identify themselves as being Albanian or Turkish as a result of this alienation.

In a similar vein to the Nashintsi, VMRO-DPMNE attacked Macedonian members of the LGBTQ+ community, with a similar goal of alienation from the Macedonian nation. In June 2019 the first ever PRIDE parade was held in Skopje. Known as Skopje PRIDE, this event enabled individuals to freely and publicly assert their identities without feeling ashamed; IMRO never expressed animosity towards ethnic Macedonians due to their sexual orientations and instead might have supported the assertion and recognition of one’s identity.

When the news broke that Skopje PRIDE was scheduled, VMRO-DPMNE and its supporters organized a counter-parade designed to enforce the “traditional” Macedonian identity, free of any queer individuals. VMRO-DPMNE’s attempt to convince the Macedonian public of the existence of an internalized national enemy has manifested itself in the LGBTQ+ community. This positioning of the LGBTQ+ community as an enemy has seemingly been successful, as many LGBTQ+ Macedonians revealed personal conflicts between their sense of identities within both groups.

**VMRO-DPMNE and Antiquization**

The most chauvinistic policy undertaken by VMRO-DPMNE was its attempted process at antiquization of the Macedonian identity. Antiquization refers to the beliefs that the Macedonians of today have an unadulterated continuity (i.e., direct descent) from the time of Alexander the Great. This view opposes the official standing of the Macedonian government that follows the scholarly consensus: the ethnogenesis of the modern Macedonian is a mixture of the ancient Macedonians, South Slavic tribes, and other Turkic groups (i.e., non-aryan, Tatars, Pechenegs, etc.). Although these migrating groups assimilated with the ancient Macedonians, they derived their name from the people that they had assimilated. The idea that the ancient Macedonians were of non-Hellenic origin has precedence. According to both Thucydides and Herodotus, the Macedonians were a foreign, non-Hellenic...

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people\textsuperscript{380}; Strabo believed the ancient Macedonians to have spoken a language different from the Greeks, and Demosthenes thought the Macedonians to be neither Greek nor having to do anything with Greeks; they were simply barbarians.\textsuperscript{381} Regardless, this intentional neglect of historical research on the origins of the Macedonian peoples seems ridiculous, yet VMRO-DPMNE has continued to disseminate their views onto the population of the country. In an interview with a Greek newspaper in Salonika, Nikola Karev, a nineteenth-century revolutionary and one of the founding members of the original IMRO, expressed the Macedonian people as descendants of Alexander while also acknowledging the other elements in their ethnogenesis.\textsuperscript{382} A key figure in the Macedonian awakening, Karev’s statements are seemingly undermined and manipulated by VMRO-DPMNE through its policy of antiquization.

VMRO-DPMNE’s rejection of the nation’s mixed heritage is not a new phenomenon. Following the creation of a Turkish nation-state by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkish nationalists constructed a Turkish identity by “connecting themselves to the land of pre-Ottoman Anatolia”.\textsuperscript{383} By electing to only emphasize their Hittite ancestors from antiquity and ignoring the migration of the Turkic peoples that helped establish the Ottoman Empire, many viewed this as an attempt to distance the fledgling Turkish nation from the atrocities the Ottomans had committed, such as the Armenian Genocide (1914-1923).\textsuperscript{384} In a similar vein, leaders and supporters of VMRO-DPMNE have renounced their Slavic and Turkic roots to escape the persecution of their Macedonian identity and the possibility of it being claimed by other groups. VMRO-DPMNE has selectively chosen specific traits of the Macedonian identity in order to create an alternate identity that further divides and alienates not only the ethnic Macedonian community, but also the other groups living within the country and the neighboring nations in the Balkans. Although these right-wing nationalists claim the legacy of IMRO, they have intentionally manipulated that legacy in order to further their chauvinistic ideology. In this way, the nationalism of VMRO-DPMNE is similar to that of the Turkish leader, Atatürk, but not to that of the original IMRO.

**Defining Nationalism**

Nationalism has become one of the most powerful forces in the modern world but has never had an agreed upon definition. After synthesizing the views of the “founding fathers” of nationalism (i.e., Mazzini, Rousseau, Herder), one can define nationalism as a movement that brings together the “vital aspirations of the modern world: for autonomy and self-government, for unity and autarchy, and for authentic identity”.\textsuperscript{385} People derive their identities from their nations and owe their primary loyalty. These identities are constructed on the basis of similar languages, religions, traditions, and shared historical experiences by people of a nation. During the

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\textsuperscript{381} Ajansı, *Rising Sun*, 28.


nineteenth century, nationalistic movements no longer rooted themselves in Enlightenment thought. Rather, these nationalistic movements were inspired by Romanticists such as Johann Gottfried Herder, who argued for the existence of the folk spirit of the people. This primordial spirit was a national tradition that continued from the earliest of times. Nationalism became a cultural movement of the intelligentsia; it became a manner in which peoples could search for a national soul or mission. Cultural nationalism developed in Central and Eastern Europe in opposition to the political nationalism of Western Europe; in both Central and Eastern Europe the nonexistence of a strong middle class saw these movements deferred to other segments of the population. This lack of a strong middle class in Eastern Europe saw the manifestation of Herder’s folk spirit in the peasantry, which then used their emotions and feelings to stimulate them into action.

Continuing the search for the folk spirit, nationalistic movements during the latter half of the nineteenth century saw the rise of national egoism. National egoism can be defined as the maximization of the interests of a nation and the nationality (i.e., its people). Becoming culturally aware of themselves, various groups across Europe sought the establishment of independent nation-states that represented the interests of their people. These newly independent nation-states would be further characterized by the homogeneity of their people; the sovereignty over the nation belonged to the nationality that constructed the nation. These desires for homogenous nation-states would characterize the dissolutions of the various multiethnic empires that existed in Eastern Europe during the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

**Ottoman Macedonia**

The waning years of the Ottoman Empire were characterized by the violence caused by various groups that sought the establishment of their own independent nation-states. These movements predominantly involved the Christian subjects of the Empire who felt that they were not being given the same rights as other religious groups that were granted different rights and exemptions on the basis of their religion. The nationalistic movements in Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria sought to establish autonomic nation-states wherein the ethnic majority prevailed over the religious. Having now prevailed in their search for a national spirit, these movements sought for their proposed nations to be defined by their national identity.

In order to address these social inequalities and to deter future nationalistic movements, the Ottoman Empire enacted a series of reforms. Introduced by the incumbent Sultan Abdülmecid in 1839, the Gülhane Decree sought to secure life, fortune, and honor alongside an equal system of taxation and military mobilization, for all the citizens of the Empire, regardless of the religious background of the citizens. This Decree aimed to address the antagonism of the devşirme (“to collect”). Also known as the “blood tax”, the devşirme was the practice wherein Ottoman military officers would take young boys away from their families in order to raise them as servants to the state. Imposed onto the Christian subjects of the Empire, these boys would be converted to Islam and trained for either military or civil service, with


the most notable profession being the yeşileri, or Janissaries (i.e., the Sultan’s personal troops).

While the Gülhane Decree curbed nationalistic fervor for a moment, actions undertaken by later sultans such as Abdülhamid II transformed the sultanate into an absolutist regime that openly targeted non-Muslims and saw a return towards nationalistic tensions. A national consciousness arose amongst Macedonians in response to Ottoman absolutism and the national ideologies of the emergent Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek nation-states. Although having found their primordial folk spirit much later than other groups in the Balkans, the Macedonian nationalists soon formed the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization to achieve not only an autonomous Macedonia in response to the social inequalities and absolutism of the Empire, but also for the widespread recognition of a distinct Macedonian identity.

It is this organization and its ideology that today’s leaders of VMRO-DPMNE manipulate to justify their creation of an exclusivist and alienating Macedonian identity.

The millet system used in the Ottoman Empire was a different method of identification than that used by the other empires of the time. Here, religion served as the most important point of reference for defining individuals. But religion was not only used as a means for identification; religious affiliation also influenced a system of government of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire.

Sultan Mehmed Fatih’s re-establishment of the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul following his Byzantine conquest meant that the Greek Orthodox Church now held political and religious power to govern the post-Byzantine Orthodox Christian community and subsequently became considered “Greek”. However, the Patriarchate was not always the sole governing body over Orthodox Christianity and its followers, as autocephalous churches existed in places such as Peć and Ohrid. To consolidate its power over the Christian population, the Patriarchate petitioned the Sultan to absorb these autocephalous churches, thus bringing all Orthodox Christians under the influence of the Patriarchate in 1767. The absorption of these autocephalous churches ultimately served to bring greater power to the Patriarchate, as more Orthodox Christian Ottoman subjects were brought under its influence. In addition, the replacing of Old Church Slavonic with the Greek language by the Patriarchate for religious purposes gave birth to nationalist movements in Serbia and Bulgaria that were both anti-Ottoman and anti-Greek. The establishment of an autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church in 1831 freed the Serbians from the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate and helped them construct their own sense of national identity. Moreover, dissatisfied Bulgarian priests demanded separation from the Patriarchate to place a Bulgarian Orthodoxy in line with the newly awakened Bulgarian national spirit and nation, and thus the Bulgarian Exarchate was established in 1872. With the absence of an autocephalous church in Macedonia, all three Orthodoxies and nationalistic movements placed their eyes on Macedonia, a region in which the population was largely indifferent.

to the various labels that these external movements were placing upon them.³⁹⁰

The Macedonian Question

The Macedonian Question refers to the clashes between Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia in their numerous attempts to instill a national identity over the population of the Macedonian region. These inhabitants were mostly Slavic-speaking and Orthodox Christians. But conflicts arose amongst the three external powers as to exactly what form of Orthodoxy the inhabitants practiced and which Slavic language they spoke. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia soon established schools and churches across Macedonia that were in competition with one another; the intent of these institutions was to convince the inhabitants of Macedonia that their language and religion were most similar to that of the institution they were attending. For example, Macedonians attending a Patriarchate-affiliated church were told that they were a Slavic-speaking ethnic Greek. Likewise, an individual being educated in a Bulgarian school and attending Exarchate-affiliated churches was told that they were in fact not Greek, but ethnically and linguistically Bulgarian. These institutions were originally not meant to be vehicles of attempted assimilation, rather they were institutions meant for cultivating religious affiliations of the inhabitants and thus their identification in accordance with the millet system. Being Greek, Bulgarian, or Serbian during this period was a religious label, and not a national identity. The introduction of nationalist ideologies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries turned a cultural-linguistic-religious conflict into a much more violent one; this race for national assimilation over the inhabitants of the Macedonian region became known as the Macedonian Struggle between 1893 and 1908.³⁹¹ Today, VMRO-DPMNE often references the Macedonian Struggle to portray Macedonia’s neighbors as aggressors and an unwillingness to accept the Macedonian identity.

From the clashes between Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek forces over the assimilation of the inhabitants of Macedonia emerged a fourth group that claimed the inhabitants for themselves: the Macedonians. While at first largely indifferent towards the labels placed upon them, they gradually began to seek recognition of themselves as distinct from the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians.³⁹² Macedonians became convinced that the only way to achieve recognition and social equality was through an armed conflict. Small paramilitary bands were soon formed all across Macedonia during the 1880s. Although the number of chets was increasing, these paramilitary bands were too fragmented to undertake any actions designed to achieve Macedonian autonomy. However, a small group of men came together in order to unite the cheti into one organization.³⁹³ Collectively, these men came together on October 23rd in Salonika in order to establish the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in 1893.

Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)

Dame Gruev, Andon Dimitrov, Ivan Hadzi Nikolov, Hristo Tatarchev, and Goce Delcev founded IMRO with the goal of creating an organized paramilitary force to fight for the creation of an autonomous Macedonian state. These men did not seek to exclude anyone from this autonomous Macedonia; regardless of religion, language, or ethnicity, all within the borders of Macedonia would be considered equals to one another. Likewise, these individuals did not restrict membership into IMRO to solely ethnic Macedonians. Membership was extended to all those that were willing to fight for freedom from the Ottoman Empire. This policy of unrestricted membership is one of the defining features of IMRO that separated it from other national revolutionary movements within the Balkans. IMRO's membership policy is reflective of the mixed population inhabiting the region; IMRO created a regional identity alongside an ethnic one. One can see here that VMRO-DPMNE has intentionally “forgotten” the regional Macedonian identity that encompassed the other groups in the region (i.e., Albanians and Aromanians). These other national movements sought to assimilate the peasantry into a national movement that was led by the elites and did not recognize other groups within their borders. The national movement in Macedonia would be undertaken by the peasantry who would undergo a process of education at the local (i.e., village) level and would be overseen by members of IMRO.

The receptiveness towards non-ethnic Orthodox Macedonians as members of IMRO meant that there was no process of Muslim demonization as a characteristic of this national movement. Similar to other populations across the Balkans, there was a conflation of the term “Turk” in relation to the Muslim population. Oftentimes “Turk” was used interchangeably to refer to other Muslims that were not ethnically Turks (i.e., Albanians). For IMRO, it was not the Muslims that were the enemy, rather the Ottoman government that happened to be Muslim. In fact, Goce Delcev made repeated appeals to his “brother Muslims” to take up arms against the Ottoman forces. Even today, there exists the folklore hero of Mustafa Vojvodata, a Muslim who took up arms to help the cheti in Skopje against the Ottomans.

Unlike other national movements, IMRO was not defined by a reliance on external powers outside of the Balkans, as it has been documented that these powers sought to maintain the status quo in the Balkans rather than support an autonomous Macedonia. However, IMRO was in fact supported and in part funded by Bulgarian nationalists at the time. These Bulgarian nationalists wanted IMRO to succeed, albeit for different reasons than the organization was hoping for. Wanting the return of the short-lived borders given to Bulgaria following the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, Bulgarian nationalists sought the creation of an autonomous Macedonia that would then be annexed to Bulgaria, wherein the process of Bulgarization of the inhabitants would again take place. Thus, these Bulgarian nationalists aided in funding IMRO, but the expansion of the network of cheti proved to be expensive, forcing IMRO to turn towards more deviant methods of securing arms and munitions as peasant contributions and Bulgarian funding proved to not be enough. When visiting Macedonia in 1902, American missionaries Ellen Stone and Ms. Tsilka were kidnapped by the chetnik Jane Sandanski and forced to hike into the chetnik’s mountainous retreat. Demanding an initial sum of 25,000 liras, the rebels released both Stone and Tsilka nearly six months later after the organization received a reduced

394. Mazower, City of Ghosts, 2.
396. Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties, 2.
ransom of 14,500 liras. When later discussing the kidnapping, Stone and Tsilka offered compliments to Sandanski’s cheta while referring to their treatment in captivity, as the chetniks had even helped Tsilka deliver her baby. Although the sum was reduced, the ransom was enough to pay for 200,000 rounds of ammunition and 5,000 rifles. Dubbed the “Miss Stone Affair,” this affair has often been referred to as the first modern hostage crisis in the United States.398

With the issue of arming the organization having been solved, IMRO launched a campaign of civil agitation. In order to first start their rebellion, cheti all across Macedonia would attack unresponsive Christians and Muslims alike to stimulate the population into action. These actions of stimulation were undertaken by some radicalized members of IMRO, who chose foreign-owned entities as bombing targets. In April of 1903, the French steam ship named the Guadalquivir was bombed in the harbor of Salonika, alongside various German businesses in the city. These bombings were carried out with the intention of gaining international awareness of the plight and cause of the Macedonians, but the only response IMRO received were a series of arrests of numerous organization members by the Ottoman government. IMRO would respond to these arrests several months later by officially launching its rebellion. On August 2, 1903, communications across the Monastir vilayet were downed after numerous komiti (another term used to refer to chetniks) cut the telegram lines and damaged the railroad tracks. Fighting between the komiti and the Ottoman troops soon broke out, with the former proving successful and capturing the town of Krushevo. This uprising became known as the Ilinden Uprising, as it took place on the Orthodox holiday that celebrates Sveti Ilja (Saint Elijah).


The Krushevo Republic

In what was designed to be a micro-level state that would mirror the (hopefully) eventual macro-Macedonian state, the autonomous Krushevo Republic was established. The Republic’s governing body had formed with representatives from the various ethno-religious groups living in the city: Macedonians, Vlachs, Albanians, etc. Nikola Karev, elected as the first president of the Krushevska Republika, thought that the establishment of the Republic would serve as an open invitation for other Macedonians across the region to take up arms and revolt. However, this call-to-action largely failed due to the ignoring of orders by indifferent chetniks.399 In combination with the inaction of other Macedonians, the arrival of additional Ottoman forces in Macedonia brought the destruction of the infant Krushevo Republic only ten days after IMRO had founded it. The establishment of the Republic would mark the closest that IMRO came in its attempts towards establishing an autonomous Macedonian state, as their greatest fears were soon realized when following the conclusion of the First Balkan War, Macedonia proper was partitioned amongst Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia by the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest.

The dream of IMRO was the establishment of Obedineta Makedonija, or “United Macedonia”. However, the quad-partitioning of the area saw the Vardar region given to the Kingdom of Serbia, the Pirin region given to the Tsardom of Bulgaria, the Aegean region given to the Kingdom of Greece, and the regions of Golo Brdo and Mala Prespa given to the Principality of Albania.400 Although nationless at this time, the Macedonian people were aware of the existence of their identity due to the efforts undergone by IMRO. Now minority populations within their new states, the Macedonians expressed themselves through

400. Ajansı, Rising Sun, 8.
language, culture, and religion until nationalists in these states began to suppress their identities. For these other Balkan nations, issues arose on how to move forward with their newly acquired lands and the now-minorities that inhabited them. VMRO-DPMNE’s current hostility towards the modern nations of Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Serbia are rooted in this suppression of the expression of a Macedonian identity.

Serbian Response to the Macedonian Question
The period between the end of the nineteenth century and the end of World War I saw the active pursuing of expansionist policies by Serbia. After acquiring the Vardar region, the Serbian Patriarchate absorbed the Macedonian church and Serbian was declared the official language in both administration and education. Moreover, during the interwar period authorities of Yugoslavia eliminated the usage of the name “Macedonia”. Following administrative reforms by King Alexander, this region now became known as “Vardarska Banovina” and its people referred to as “Southern Serbs”. In what will be revealed as a common theme later on, Serbia turned towards medieval historical legacies to justify its attempted Serbanization of northern Macedonia. Agents of Serbanization argued that because Tsar Stefan Dushan had been crowned in Skopje as the “King of the Serbs and the Greeks”, the population living in Vardar Banovina were remnants of his empire, and thus historically belonged to the Serbs. 401 Later efforts made by the communists of Yugoslavia saw the end of these attempts of Serbanization. On August 2, 1944, forty-one years after the Ilinden Uprising, The Yugoslav government recognized Vardar Banovina as the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, turning it into the sixth federal republic within Yugoslavia. The

inhabitants of this Republic were to be known as Macedonians, who were to have their own Macedonian language and later Macedonian church. 402 VMRO-DPMNE’s animosity towards the Serbian Orthodoxy stems from this attempted Serbanization of the Macedonian language and religion. On the other hand, the Serbian Orthodox Church does not recognize the Macedonian Orthodox Church following the latter’s announcement of autocephaly on the bicentennial anniversary of the absorption of the Archbishopric of Ohrid in 1967.

Bulgarian Response to the Macedonian Question
The Bulgarian answer to the Macedonian Question argues that there exists no such thing as a “Macedonian”. Bulgarian nationalists claim that Macedonians are in fact Bulgarian: the language is a dialect of Bulgarian, the land of Macedonia is a parcel of Bulgarian land, and its history is part of a larger Bulgarian history. Not only are the Macedonians in the Pirin region of Bulgarian stock, but the Macedonians in Vardar, Aegean, Mala Prespa, and Golo Brdo regions are as well. In its official publication in 1968, the Bulgarian Academy of Science argued that when the “Serbian bourgeoisie failed to Serbanize the Bulgarian population in Macedonia, [they] put forward the thesis that Macedonians were neither Serbian nor Bulgarian, but ‘Macedon’... there is not a Macedonian minority within the borders of Bulgaria... what is spoken in the Republic of Macedonia is a Bulgarian dialect influenced somewhat from the Serbian language.” 403 This view is still held by select Bulgarian politicians. One such politician is Krasimir Karakachanov, who threatened the potential membership of the contemporary Republic of North Macedonia into NATO and the European Union by stating that the

401. Ajansı, Rising Sun, 46.
402. Ajansı, Rising Sun, 13.
403. Ajansı, Rising Sun, 43.
incumbent Prime Minister Zoran Zaev (from the left wing SDSM party) was attacking Bulgarian history by claiming that a separate Macedonian language and nation have existed as distinct from Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{404} However, this has not always been the official position of all Bulgarian authorities.

In 1948, following the creation of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, the 10\textsuperscript{th} Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided that the Macedonian language, literature, and history would be taught in the Pirin region to encourage the development of a distinct Macedonian consciousness. This attitude of the Bulgarian communists towards recognizing the Macedonian identity was reflected in the national census of 1946 that showed 70% of the population in the Pirin region identifying themselves as Macedonians. The 1956 census showed a drop to 63.7% (187,789 people), while in 1965 only 9,632 Bulgarian citizens were registered as ethnic Macedonians. The census in 1985 failed to identify a single Macedonian in either the Pirin region or the rest of Bulgaria which reflected a new communist state policy of creating a “uniform Bulgarian nation” by recording other minorities (i.e., Macedonian, Vlach, Turk) as ethnically Bulgarian.\textsuperscript{405} One can trace the change in communist Bulgaria’s attitude towards its Macedonian minority to the growing tensions between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia following Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 following disagreements between Josip Broz Tito and Joseph Stalin. After years of maneuvering between the two countries, the Bulgarian communist regime announced in 1959 that the Macedonian identity was an invention created by Tito.\textsuperscript{406} Following this declaration, the Bulgarian government began to pursue an aggressive policy of denationalization of its minorities that lasted well beyond Bulgaria’s transition from communism to democracy. This became known as the Revival Process, wherein minority groups “rediscovered” their Bulgarian roots after being forcibly “Turkicized.”\textsuperscript{407} Only in August 2017 was the Friendship Treaty signed between the then Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria, moving Macedonia closer towards its membership into the European Union and NATO. This treaty recognizes the territorial integrities of both countries while trying to establish a commission that will attempt to resolve the different views of both countries in regard to the territorial and historical claims of each state. Members of the Macedonian parliament belonging to VMRO-DPMNE boycotted this treaty, and even accused Prime Minister Zaev of treason. These objections to the treaty are not without merit, however, as Bulgaria officially recognizes the statehood of Macedonia but not the existence of a separate Macedonian identity or language.\textsuperscript{408}

**Greek Response to the Macedonian Question**

The contention between the Macedonian identity and Greek nationalists is rooted in the belief by the latter that they possess exclusive rights towards the name “Macedonia” and the legacy it entails. The dissolution of the SFRY


\textsuperscript{405} Ajansı, \textit{Rising Sun}, 44.

\textsuperscript{406} Ajansı, \textit{Rising Sun}, 14.


in 1991 saw the creation of an independent Republic of Macedonia on September 8th, 1991. Following this declaration of independence, Greek authorities vehemently opposed the use of the “Macedonia” for this new republic. These authorities argued that Greece had exclusive rights and “copyright” towards the name “Macedonia” and its accompanying symbols (i.e., the Vergina Sun or the Star of Ktles). Moreover, they argued that the recognition of this new state as being “Macedonian” would bring great indignity to Greek history and culture.

Greek nationalists argue that the modern Macedonians, because they are descendants of the migrating Slavic and Turkic tribes, have nothing in common with the Macedonians who inhabited the land in antiquity. These ancient Macedonians were of Hellenic descent and spoke a language that was closely related to the Doric Greek dialects. Moreover, these nationalists argue that Greeks in a contemporary sense are the direct descendants of ancient Greeks, and therefore the successors to the legacy of the Hellenes. They view Tito’s recognition of a distinct Macedonian language and identity as an invention designed to satisfy territorial ambitions of extending the borders of Yugoslavia to the Aegean Sea. From this, they argued that until it was invented by Tito, Macedonia never existed as an independent state.

Much like in Bulgaria, the attitudes of Greek authorities and nationalists towards Macedonia in 1991 were quite hostile. Three years prior to the independence of the Republic Macedonia, the Greek government had renamed its northernmost province “Macedonia” from “Northern Greece.”

Greek authorities maintained that the population in this region had always been ethnically and homogeneously Greek although a census conducted by the International Carnegie Commission of Inquiry in 1913 found that the Macedonians in the Aegean region formed the largest ethnic group, followed by the Turks and then the Greeks. Even after the conclusion of World War I and a population exchange between Bulgaria and Greece agreed upon by Prime Ministers Eleftherios Venizelos and Aleksandar Stamboliski, an estimated number of 150,000-200,000 Macedonians elected to remain in Greece.

Over time Greek authorities introduced processes of assimilation of this remaining population. In November 1925, the Greek Parliament referred to this population with various names: Macedo-Slavs, Bulgarophone Greeks, Slavic-speakers with a Greek consciousness, and non-existent. One year later, the Parliament issued Decree No. 332 which ordered that all Slavonic names of towns, villages, rivers, and mountains be replaced with Greek toponyms. (i.e., Kostur became Kastoria). This decree also saw the closing of Macedonian schools and the reconstruction of Macedonian iconography into Hellenic iconography. The establishment of General Ionnis Metaxas’ regime saw the Macedonian minority in Greece become further repressed. This regime undertook a policy of forced assimilation: the Macedonian language was forbidden to be spoken. Not only did the government mandate the use of the Greek language, but husbands supporting the Greek cause actively forbade their Slavic-speaking wives from speaking the language at home or teaching it to their children.

Those that refused to assimilate were interned on the islands of Thasos and Cephalonia (an estimated 1,600 Macedonians were interned). During the Greek Civil War

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409. Ajansi, Rising Sun, 22.
410. Ajansi, Rising Sun, 26.
411. Ajansi, Rising Sun, 13.
412. Ajansi, Rising Sun, 23.
413. Ajansi, Rising Sun, 31.
414. Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, 125.
415. Ajansi, Rising Sun, 33.
(1945-1949), nearly 60,000 Macedonians emigrated from Greece and settled in the rest of the world (Germany, Yugoslavia, Australia, United States). According to a report in 1994 by the Human Rights Watch, the remaining Macedonians in Greece had become fearful of asserting their identity due to a climate of harassment. Inhabitants of the contemporary northernmost Greek province refer to this Slavic speaking population as Makedhones (Macedonians) that spoke a language similar, yet distinct from Bulgarian. The historical actions of Greek nationalists towards the Macedonian identity and minority living within its borders is the cause of VMRO-DPMNE’s antiquization of the Macedonian identity.

Recently, the incumbent Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and representatives from the Greek government solved the name dispute with the signing of the Prespa Agreement in June 2018. The Prespa Agreement saw the changing of Macedonia’s constitutional name into the Republic of North Macedonia, thus creating a distinction between the Greek province of Macedonia and its northern neighbor. In addition, the Prespa Agreement recognizes the Macedonian language and the citizens of North Macedonia as Macedonians. However, this agreement includes an explicit clarification that these “Macedonians” are not related to the ancient Macedonians. In Greece, the term Macedonia refers to the Hellenic civilization and its cultural heritage. In North Macedonia, the term refers to the territory, language, and a “distinctly different” history and culture from those of the Greeks. This agreement was viewed as the beginning of Macedonia’s path into becoming a member of the EU and NATO. Although Macedonia and Albania’s membership were previously blocked by a coalition of EU states led by France, foreign ministers have recently given the green light for membership talks to resume for the two countries. VMRO-DPMNE has been outspokenly critical of the agreement and the recent blockade by the EU, arguing that the current Macedonian government betrayed the Macedonian identity and legacy for no reason. While VMRO-DPMNE’s objections to the Prespa Agreement have merit, the country’s potential membership into the EU and NATO would see a substantial increase in the quality of living within the country and a protection of its borders.

Albanian Response to the Macedonian Question

The attitudes of the Albanian authorities and nationalists have been relatively kinder towards the Macedonians. Albania has formally recognized the existence of a Macedonian minority within the regions of Mala Prespa and Golo Brdo. Continuing, Albania has allowed the opening of Macedonian schools and the public use of the Macedonian language. Various estimates as to the size of the Macedonian minority in Albania exist, with there being an established baseline of at least 50,000. However, there are still significant issues that both countries need to resolve. Within the now Republic of North Macedonia, both Albanian and Macedonian nationalisms are on the rise and have led to violent altercations between both groups. To reduce these tensions, the Macedonian parliament voted for the recognition of Albanian as an official language alongside Macedonian within the country in 2018. This recognition sought to augment the rights given to the Albanian minority that were initially granted by the Ohrid Framework

416. Ajansı, Rising Sun, 34.
419. Ajansı, Rising Sun, 47.
Agreement in 2001. The adoption of Albanian as a second official language was only possible due to VMRO-DPMNE boycotting the proceedings.\footnote{Sinisa-Jakov Marusic, “Macedonia Passes Albanian Language Law,” \textit{BalkanInsight}, May 18, 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/01/11/macedonia-passes-albanian-language-law-01-11-2018/} VMRO-DPMNE claims that such a law jeopardizes the national interests of Macedonia. While demanding recognition of the Macedonian minorities and identity by other countries, VMRO-DPMNE refuses to grant the same recognition and rights to those minorities living within Macedonia.

Conclusion

Following the dissolution of the SFRY and the resulting independence of the Republic of Macedonia, the political organization known as VMRO-DPMNE emerged, claiming to be the heir apparent to IMRO, the nationalist movement of the Macedonians against the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the heir to IMRO, VMRO-DPMNE seeks the reunification of the transnational region of Macedonia in order to establish a “United Macedonia”. Moreover, VMRO-DPMNE also seeks the recognition of a distinct Macedonian identity on the international level. The recognition of the Macedonian identity thus means the recognition of a language, culture, history, and religion separate from that of Macedonia’s neighbors in the Balkans. However, VMRO-DPMNE has instead constructed an alternate Macedonian identity via the manipulation of IMRO’s historical legacy designed to legitimize its chauvinistic ideology. The underlying foundation of IMRO was built upon the unity between the many ethno-religious groups inhabiting Macedonia who opposed Ottoman rule; all were to be considered equals in this imagined nation. Through processes such as antiquization and attempted suppression of minorities within Macedonia today, this right-wing nationalist party and its supports has redefined the Macedonian identity as referring to solely ethnic, heterosexual, cisgender, and Orthodox Christian Macedonians.
“Freedom Through Education:
Anarchism and the “Ferrer School,”
c.1909-1915
Amelia Christofis (University College London)

Introduction

In 1909, Spanish educator and freethinker Francisco Ferrer was executed in the trenches of Barcelona’s Montjuic fortress. Ferrer was falsely accused of single-handedly inciting the so-called ‘Tragic Week’ in Catalonia, a week of bloody anti-colonial rallies and street-fighting that claimed hundreds of lives. As a response to Ferrer’s death, the Modern School movement was founded in New York and came to represent a significant strand of Anarchist and radical thought in “Progressive” Era America. Aside from his political activities, Ferrer became internationally well-known amongst radicals for his pedagogical commitment to reason rather than emotion, social class cohesion rather than individuality, and scientific learning rather than intuition – a model of education implemented in his Escuela Moderna in Barcelona. Between 1901 and 1909, 109 Modern Schools opened across Spain. Ferrer’s philosophy helped shape that of the radical community in New York, which rallied to protest his death. Emma Goldman wrote that “Ferrer has been murdered. I am broken in spirit and body,” and Leonard Abbott summed up the dominant view within the group that “everyone felt…that a crime had been committed against civilisation.”

Both these individuals were instrumental in the formation of the Ferrer Association in June 1910, which had the goal of linking cultural and educational radicalism with collective social commitment and class consciousness. In January 1911, the Association established the Ferrer Center at 6 St Marks Place, headed by former Columbia University faculty member Bayard Boyesen. It became a site for intellectual and artistic expression and a meeting ground for Anarchists and the broader Left, who included fighters for free-speech, women’s rights activists, socialists, and violent radicals.

Ten months later, a Modern School for children – referred to in this paper as the “Ferrer School” – opened in the Center, organised along the lines of the Escuela Moderna. Another key influence on the school included the League for Libertarian Education, set up in 1897 with the aim of establishing a day school in Paris. Ferrer and American Anarchists were guided by the League and its prospectus – but the latter’s doctrine of “Freedom Through Education” presented long-lasting challenges to the Ferrer School. The prospectus argued that a proper social and economic environment coupled with freedom to explore nature and...

421. Avrich, The modern school movement, 34.
understanding the needs of the child would destroy the unjust system children grew up in, replacing it with rational organisation. However, it was the uncertainty surrounding how daily life in the school would work in practice, what radical ideas children should be taught, and why they should be taught them, all whilst grappling with irreconcilable differences in wealth, race, and ideology that made “Freedom Through Education” an impossible concept for the Ferrer School to fulfil.

Emma Goldman, described by Paul Avrich as “the most famous and articulate anarchist in America,” was involved in the Modern School movement in New York from its very beginning and solicited funds for the Center and the School during her United States-wide lecture tours. Goldman recognised that the divide in the Ferrer Association reflected the divide in the broader Anarchist movement of the period. She distinguished what she called the American Anarchist movement, or the English-language movement, from the foreign anarchist movement, made up of mostly Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, Italy, and Spain. Typically, the belief at the time was that the latter was more prone to militancy – they supported a working-class revolution, whilst those affiliated with the former often merely disagreed with many aspects of American society without actively pursuing change through violent means. This difference manifested itself in the Association and, thus, the Ferrer School, where children were mostly from working-class Jewish immigrant families and teachers were mostly middle-class, Anglo-Saxon, American-born men.

The school was active in New York for less than four years. Throughout 1914, the Center’s involvement in the mass industrial violence plaguing New York prompted leaders to choose between the welfare of their pupils and their revolutionary goals. The school was eventually forced to relocate to Stelton, New Jersey, where it operated as a colony until 1953. This paper will focus on the New York years in order to analyse what the concepts of “freedom” and “education” meant to those associated with the Ferrer School. It will also explore the relationship between the school, the Center, and the community of New York Anarchists during a period that frequently appeared to be defined by violence, industrial unrest and economic depression.

The Establishment of the “Ferrer School”

In 1901, Francisco Ferrer began a school for working-class children in Barcelona, which focused on developing the child’s critical faculties through scientific investigation of social issues. Ferrer maintained that schools established by the state – and in Spain, often overseen by the Catholic Church – reproduced class relations and authoritarianism, but a Modern School which promoted libertarian values could bring a new society into being. “He died,” Emma Goldman wrote, “as he had lived, proclaiming with his last breath: ‘Long Live the Modern School!”

428. Ibid.
432. Veysey, The communal experience, 81.
Deeply affected by Ferrer’s work and execution, a meeting in June 1910 at the Harlem Liberal Alliance between twenty-two radicals – only half of whom were active Anarchists – led to the creation of the Ferrer Association. The Association issued a statement of purpose defining the following goals: to create an educational centre for radical thought, to continue the protests against Ferrer’s execution, to set up a day school for children along the lines of the Escuela Moderna, and to aid all national and international movements for liberation. The meeting was run by Alexander “Sasha” Berkman, with the help and support of his friend Emma Goldman – both were Russian Jewish immigrants and co-editors of the Anarchist magazine Mother Earth. Most funding for the Association came from Mother Earth readership, including Alden Freeman, heir to a massive Standard Oil Company fortune. Intending to introduce international Anarchism to Americans, the magazine began in 1906, running until 1918, when the government shut it down after deporting many of those involved. Its readership has been estimated to be anywhere from 3,500 to 10,000 Americans.

Emma Goldman came to the United States at age sixteen, where she became increasingly radicalised working in a glove factory. When she left her traditional Jewish marriage at the age of twenty, her “entire possessions consisted of five dollars and a small hand-bag.” In 1892, Goldman helped Berkman prepare to kill steel mogul Henry Clay Frick. For the attempt, Berkman served fourteen years in prison, but she was not indicted.

At the meeting in Harlem, Sasha described the proposed school as one where children would be “forming their own ideas and imbibing natural notions of everything about them;” he had already been running a similar Sunday school experiment for some months beforehand. Laurence Veysey points out that the Ferrer Association’s membership brought into contact college-educated Anglo-Saxons with recent Eastern European immigrants at a time when class, linguistic, and geographical differences made such mingling rare. Lola Ridge, an Anarchist poet of the early twentieth century, recalled seeing Jewish people for the first time at the Ferrer Center when she was in her thirties. Florence Tager also highlights the significance of working-class involvement in major political activism through the creation of the Ferrer Center and their continued work to keep it alive. Further, Kathy Ferguson described the Center as “a foretaste of freedom...where Anarchists could relate to each other.” It operated for a year in the East Village before expanding in 1912 to East

438. Ibid.
439. Cornell, Unruly Equality, 47.
441. Morton, Emma Goldman, 47.
107th Street in Harlem, an area inhabited mostly by working-class immigrant families.\footnote{Avrich, \textit{The modern school movement}, 96.} This brought in a larger influx of radicals and allowed for various organisations, such as the Mexican Revolutionary Committee and the Syndicalist League, to set up their headquarters there.\footnote{Abrams, "The Ferrer Center," 312.} The years in Harlem were by far the Center’s most successful, with its close proximity to Central Park and the immigrant community around them which both inspired and found inspiration from the Ferrer Center. By 1914, the Ferrer Association boasted several hundred adult members, with over three hundred people attending some activities.\footnote{Veysey, \textit{The communal experience}, 79; Tager, "Politics and Culture in Anarchist Education," 404.}

The relationship between the Ferrer School and the Ferrer Center meant they shared not only space, but also resources and money. Those involved in one inherently got caught up in the other, making the activities of the Center crucial in understanding the day school. A typical week at the Ferrer Center involved evening lectures on topics such as radical literature performed by Leonard Abbott and birth control by Margaret Sanger.\footnote{Avrich, \textit{The modern school movement}, 71. For more information on Esperanto as an international auxiliary language, see: Timothy Goldman – both were campaigners on issues such as birth control and free love at this time. The Ferrer Center was not only for Anarchists, but also a haven for outspoken outsiders in New York’s new and ever-changing society. Also available at the Ferrer Center were language lessons, art classes, concerts, plays, and balls.\footnote{Tager, "Politics and Culture in Anarchist Education," 400.} James Morton – an early member of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) – taught English and Esperanto, an artificial auxiliary language that was popular amongst fringe groups, to recent immigrants.\footnote{Tager, "Politics and Culture in Anarchist Education," 400.} The art programme, directed by Robert Henri, was experimental – he encouraged total freedom of expression, never teaching methods or technique.\footnote{Abrams, "The Ferrer Center," 319.} Man Ray, a second-generation Jewish immigrant who would become one of the most significant Surrealists of the twentieth century, studied under Henri at the Ferrer Center, remarking that he “never criticised our works.”\footnote{Abrams, "The Ferrer Center," 319.}

The Ferrer School also operated on these vague, libertarian principles. Paul Avrich remarked that the students “read books for pleasure, worked on crafts, and acquired practical skills” instead of “relying on memorisation and recitation, preparing for exams, or acknowledging religious rituals.”\footnote{Avrich, \textit{Sasha and Emma: The Anarchist Odyssey of Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman}. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 205.} Bayard Boyesen was the first director of the Ferrer School, when it had eight pupils – seven of whom were under ten.\footnote{Tager, "Politics and Culture in Anarchist Education," 400.} After a year Boyesen left due to “pressures of an anarchist classroom,” and the school’s next director,
John Coryell, also resigned hastily for similar reasons.\(^{460}\) There is a consensus among historians that the pressure these men faced was not only from dealing with a classroom that had no rules, but also because the children of the school came from immigrant families – the teacher and students were often culturally distinct from one another. Next came Will Durant in 1912, who was perhaps the most influential director of the school. When Durant started work at the Ferrer School, he had nine pupils; this rose to twenty-six by December 1913.\(^{461}\) Under Durant, a Sunday school was started for children who were unable to attend the day school, a radical reading room opened in the Center to the general public from 4-11 pm every day, and a Ferrer Dining Club was organised, which involved discussing controversial topics over dinner.\(^{462}\) He left barely a year to marry his sixteen year old student, Ariel, but continued lecturing on more adult topics in the evenings at the Center, including talks on “Sex and Religion” and “Homosexualism.”\(^{463}\)

The overarching philosophy of the Ferrer School is at the centre of historical debate. Vague notions of “libertarian” or “freedom” cannot be clearly translated to a classroom atmosphere, particularly given the school’s lack of permanent leadership. One way of uncovering what kind of “education” took place and what “freedom” really meant is to examine articles written by both teachers and students. One pupil, Emma, recalled that “we were always building or planning something, and our school life was very zestful.”\(^{464}\) She highlights the close relationship between the adults of the Center and children of the school when she recalls being taken to the offices of *Mother Earth* to spend time with “Tia” Sasha Berkman and to get involved in the work they were doing for the magazine. Given the age of the students and the strict nature of public schools, it is surprising to read that the children were not only close to the adults but also became involved in their activities. Soon, the Ferrer School transformed the inspiration gained from the offices into more practical means – their own magazine, so students and teachers could write about the “free society” they were attempting to create.\(^{465}\)

Will Durant’s 1913 essays in *The Modern School* entitled “Problems En Route” and “The Ferrer Modern School” can be used to uncover the students’ general school schedule – or lack thereof. In “Problems En Route,” Durant describes the school as teaching “everything under the sun, from match-making to French,” including maths and “correct English… when mistakes are made by the children and by myself.”\(^{466}\) It is clear from this article that Durant saw his students as his equals, allowing them to correct him when he made grammar mistakes and taking them to the nearby Central Park so that they could “feast on the wealth of the summer sun… their heads on my breast or on my outstretched arms.”\(^{467}\) Durant states his intention for writing the “personal note” about the children in the magazine, saying it is his only chance “to acknowledge a debt which I can never repay” to both the parents and the children.\(^{468}\) He had a personal connection to

462. Ibid.
467. Ibid.
468. Ibid.
his work at the school – the lines between leisure and structure blurring.

In his essay “The Ferrer Modern School,” Durant describes the teaching as “individual,” with the student deciding what subject they wanted to be taught at any moment.\(^{469}\) One-on-one instruction was provided on a variety of topics including history, geography, and reading. On the topic of discipline, Durant says, “we have none. Discipline means some sort of compulsion, doesn’t it?\(^{470}\) This is evident in the times students were allowed to arrive at the school: The class just now consists of nine pupils in regular attendance, ranging in age from 4 to 10. They do not assemble at any given hour; they come when they wish to come and go when they wish to go. Last Monday Gorky came at 7.30, Stuart at 8, Oscar at 9, Rion at 9:30, Amour at 9:45, Madga and Sophie at 10, and Ruth and Revolte at 11. That day was exceptional in its demonstration of the ‘liberty of assemblage’ on most days we are all together before 10.\(^{471}\)

Durant’s writings show that the children loved the school and their teacher, as they still arrived at school and were eager to learn amidst such relaxed rules. Indeed, during the 1913-14 academic year, attendance at the school ranged from 94-97%.\(^{472}\) This did, however, occur on a small scale - the greatest number of students at the Ferrer School was 30 pupils in 1914. This is, though, what made the Ferrer School so different from American public schools, which were described by Emma Goldman as “what the prison is for the convict and the barracks for the soldier — a place where everything is being used to break the will of the child, and then to pound, knead, and shape it into a being utterly foreign to itself.”\(^{473}\) Parents likely sent their children to the Ferrer School because American public schools encouraged conformity and assimilation, which many recent immigrants rejected. His eagerness to over-embellish the idyllic circumstances in which he found himself may have stemmed from not wanting to have sacrificed his Catholicism in vain. Durant wrote that during his time at the Ferrer School, Anarchism “went straight to my heart (not my head),” so he retained more of a passionate interest in the ideology of his friends and colleagues but did not contribute to it personally.\(^{474}\)

It is hard to argue – and most historians have not – with the unequivocal desire that those involved with the school had for creating a different experience. However, one can put into question the quality of this education. As Veysey points out, most leaders knew very little about teaching and cites the contemporary surge of interest in “progressive” education at this time as a reason they pursued it at the Center in the first place.\(^{475}\) It is worth noting that Veysey himself was educated at the Ferrer School after it had moved to New Jersey. By attempting to link radical movements, such as the Ferrer School, with the chaos and protest of the time he was writing in, the 1970s, Veysey uses the heritage of a movement close to his childhood to make sense of the present day. Many other scholars had the same idea – interest in exploring this footnote in the Anarchist movement exploded in the 1970s and 1980s, which were both decades defined by radical change. Despite this scholarship what those in the school and the Center really

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470. Ibid.
thought of the word “freedom” remains unclear. There were conflicting pedagogical philosophies that pulled the school in different directions. At the very least, Will Durant seemed certain of his own—“free the child, and the child will free the race.”

**Anarchism in Crisis: The “Ferrer School” flees New York**  
Before the 1910s, there had been a rising sense of industrial unrest in the United States since the economic depression of 1893. Despite some progressive reforms in many cities, wealth continued to flow disproportionately, and companies operated with little regulations. For Anarchists, their goal was clear. It was their responsibility to ensure that the poor became conscious of their position in the oppressive social hierarchy, so that when the time came, they would be the ones to steer the course of revolutionary upheaval. This desire to overthrow the existing social order led to Anarchists being depicted as the enemy of American society. The mainstream press often presented Anarchists as animals, infectious pests and tools of the devil, and families would notoriously warn their children of the monster in the dark, “Red Emma”–turning famous figures like Emma Goldman into bogeymen. Much of this ridicule stemmed from fears of mass immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe between the 1880s and the 1920s. Whilst Eastern European Jews appeared to dominate the militant revolutionary wing of the Anarchist movement, this movement was small in comparison to the number of immigrants who arrived in the United States during this period. Andrew Cornell uses newspaper circulation records and lecture receipts to suggest that there were 50 to 100,000 Anarchists in 1915. Between 1880 and 1924, approximately 2 million Eastern European Jews migrated to the United States and in 1910, and there were over 1.1 million foreign-born residents in Manhattan alone. Anarchism became a household term after the 1886 Haymarket Affair, when six Anarchists were convicted after a bomb killed a policeman sent to disperse a labour rally in Chicago’s Haymarket district. Paul Avrich argues that the reaction to the affair constitutes the first red scare in American history, in which the tendency to view Anarchists as violent European immigrants became a common trope. Given that Eastern European immigrants were disproportionately working class and many of them—particularly the older generation—were seen as slow to assimilate into American society, they were easily identified as threats. In 1901, a young anarchist named Leon Czolgosz assassinated President McKinley, resulting in a number of arrests of other radicals despite proof that he acted alone. McKinley’s successor, President Roosevelt, warned that “the anarchist is a criminal whose perverted instincts led him to prefer confusion and chaos to the most beneficent form of social order.” In New York in 1914, the combination of rising industrial

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478. Ibid.  
484. Ibid.
tension and the tendency of the press to attack Anarchists at every opportunity made the Ferrer Center’s atmosphere become volatile. It was mostly the involvement of the Ferrer Association leaders – and even children of the Ferrer School – in the Ludlow Massacre protests, the Lexington Avenue bomb incident, and the argument surrounding adult involvement in how the children should be taught that led to the school’s relocation to Stelton. The structures that held up the Ferrer Center – however unstable to begin with – came crashing down.

In Colorado, the United Mine Workers went on strike for fourteen months against the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company. When the company hired an agency to shoot at protestors, who fought back, the National Guard was sent in and sided with the company, resulting in more violence. More than a dozen women and children suffocated to death in a pit underneath a burning tent, an event that became known as the Ludlow Massacre. The massacre prompted mass protest in New York throughout March and April 1914 organised by Anarchists associated with the Ferrer Center, which included a march on Union Square and Fifth Avenue and the use of the Center’s resources to feed all of the protestors. The protests were a show of unity for Anarchists, but problems became apparent – Leonard Abbott, who was effectively the leader of the movement, used children of the Ferrer School to assist with running the demonstrations. Protests at the Ferrer Center brought up the divisive issue of violence, with most Anarchists not publicly revealing these disagreements for fear of appearing disunited in public. The media attacks on the Ferrer School as a result of increased scrutiny of the Center led wealthy sympathisers to withdraw their funding. However the Association, writing in *The Modern School*, continued to insist that education and politics must not be separated – “the Ferrer Association is not only a day school for children; it is a social institution.”

Political commentator Charles Willis Thompson wrote a piece in the *New York Times* in late March of 1914 on the organisation of the “latest movement against society” – the Ludlow protests, particularly the march on Union Square and Fifth Avenue. The protest, Thompson writes, was a product “not of the I.W.W. [Industrial Workers of the World] nor of the Anarchists, but of the Ferrer School where the three pupils originated it.” Thompson was referring to Frank Tannenbaum and two friends he met at the Ferrer Center. They asked Goldman to help them raise funds for a few meetings about the unemployment issue, which then erupted into a movement when they heard about the events in Colorado. The piece served mostly as a warning that Anarchists were not taken seriously enough. In the article, Emma Goldman was interviewed, saying that “it was a very diplomatic move on the part of the authorities not to interfere last Saturday… because you know that when hungry people are driven to desperation they can’t reason. They ought not to be expected to, either.” She also warned that since the Haymarket Affair, an intellectual class sympathetic to Anarchist

486. Ibid.
488. Ibid.
491. Ibid.
ideals had developed in the United States. They were more dangerous because they “have tasted the good things in life” and thus could easily identify shortcomings in the lives of the working-class.\textsuperscript{494} Detective James J. Gegan was also quoted, saying that his superiors didn’t understand the “seriousness of this movement... they are gaining strength, and unless they are checked serious consequences may result.”\textsuperscript{495} Thompson described the Ferrer School as intending to turn out graduates filled with a “settled discontent with the present social system” and thus a determination to end it.\textsuperscript{496} He ended his piece warning the reader to take Anarchists, and the threat of the Ferrer Center, more seriously.

This article addresses a few aspects of the state of the Anarchist movement in early 1914. First, the Ferrer Center, for the first time, had made headlines for its involvement in a controversial event. Whilst it had been the host of divisive lectures by divisive people since its creation, the audience had been mostly kept within either Lower Manhattan or the immigrant community of Harlem. This was a very public display of solidarity with the proletariat, organised by a few older students of the Ferrer School using Emma Goldman’s money. It was inextricably linked to the Ferrer School and was met, as it was likely intended to be, with fear from many New York residents. Secondly, the “intellectual class” Goldman referred to included the upper-middle class leaders within the Ferrer Center. These leaders had only recently, in the late 1900s and early 1910s, joined the Anarchist movement after meeting figures such as Goldman whilst campaigning on other issues.

Many scholars have noted that these usually Anglo-Saxon men often came into the movement because they wanted to entertain a fascination with the poor that became prevalent during the “Progressive” Era. Their reason to identify with the movement was not economic and instead stemmed from an altruistic interest in the working-class that often overlapped with an interest in the exotic foreign. Carl Zigrosser, who was a student and admirer of Boyesen at Columbia, said he came to the Ferrer Center on a quest for a new, foreign experience.\textsuperscript{497} Goldman is perhaps wrong in her assertion that this type of Anarchist made the movement more dangerous than before. These were the leaders more likely to push, for example, freedom of education in an individualist sense, rather than political. They came to the Center to experience something exotic – after a certain point, perhaps the appeal of danger would diminish.

Thirdly, the \textit{New York Times} had a smaller circulation to other New York dailies around this time, but was popular with, and had a large amount of influence on, the era’s upper classes.\textsuperscript{498} Thompson was perhaps attempting to provoke some sort of reaction from either them or the authorities with his article. There were indeed violent figures associated with the Ferrer Center that New York residents, as Thompson says, should be fearful of. During the Ludlow protests, Anarchist Marie Ganz invited the protestors to storm into the Standard Oil Building on 26 Broadway and murder John D. Rockefeller, Jr – in her words, to “shoot him down like a

\textsuperscript{494} Thompson, "So-called I.W.W Raids."
\textsuperscript{495} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{496} Ibid.
When asked about a fellow Anarchist, Craig Sinclair, Ganz said that his views were “far more extreme” than her own – Sinclair, Thai Jones points out, spent almost all of his free time at the Ferrer Center. It is said that the bomb was intended for the Rockefeller Estate in Tarrytown, in retaliation for the Ludlow Massacre, and that it had been accidentally detonated whilst the three young Anarchists were trying to make it. There had been a speak-in at Tarrytown a month earlier which many leaders of the Ferrer Center had attended, linking them to the plotting of the attack. Andrew Cornell writes that Alexander Berkman and half a dozen members of the Ferrer Association met at the Center to plan an attack in retaliation for Ludlow, yet, all those associated with the Ferrer Center repeatedly denied any knowledge of such a plan. On July 11th, 5,000-12,000 mourners descended on Union Square to pay their respects. It was framed by the Anarchists of the Ferrer Center as a conspiracy against them; however despite these accusations, the protests had catastrophic ramifications for the future of the Ferrer School. The entire July 1914 edition of *Mother Earth* was dedicated to the “cloud of mystery” over what really happened, and mourned the three dead Anarchists, which likely hindered their protests of innocence. In an article titled “The Lexington Explosion,” it is stressed that “if, as is frequently suggested, Caron, Berg and Hanson were constructing a bomb which they intended to use in Tarrytown or against the Rockefellers, they did not communicate their intention to their friends.” The article also includes Berkman reciting his discussion with the police after he was called into questioning in the wake of the explosion. Berkman repeatedly denied knowledge of any violent plots against any person. When asked if he knew about any explosives in the apartment occupied by Caron and the others, he responded “I did not, and I do not know it yet,” reiterating the view of many at the Center, one which questioned the narrative of the police. The Anarchists of *Mother Earth* had great affection for martyrs. The Ferrer Center and school were set up in honour of the martyr Francisco Ferrer, but in addition to this, frequent references were made across years of the *Mother Earth* archives to wrongfully imprisoned or killed comrades, whether they were involved in the Haymarket Affair or assassinated a President. Police did target Anarchists, and after the events of July 4th, the attacks on the Ferrer Center became relentless. In one instance, a child at the school was approached by a police detective with ice cream and questions about the explosion.

These events prompted further discussion on violence. In August, Will Durant gave a lecture at the Ferrer Center entitled “Why I am opposed to violence” – that month’s edition of *The Modern School* reminded everyone that the sole purpose of the Ferrer Association was educational. This was in stark contrast to its insistence that politics and education were intertwined a few months earlier. Still, the police brutality and

500. Ibid.
surveillance continued. A plethora of prominent radicals resigned from the Ferrer School advisory board, resulting in the withdrawal of more funds and yet more American-born liberals distancing themselves from the Ferrer Center.\textsuperscript{509} Emma Goldman, the closest person the Ferrer Association had to a leader, was nowhere to be seen. In her autobiography, she recalls being in the West Coast in “engagements” but “eagerly [scanning] the papers from New York. I had no anxiety about Sasha… but I longed to be at his side, in my beloved city, to take part with him in those stirring activities.”\textsuperscript{510} With police pressure, infighting and a lack of leadership, the movement threatened to collapse. It was the lack of clear direction within the Ferrer Center, as reflected in the lack of direction within the Ferrer School, which put Anarchism in New York in jeopardy. The Association, as it stressed time and time again during this period, was solely educational in purpose. However, the nature of that education had turned the likes of Frank Tannenbaum and Arthur Caron into violent revolutionaries, whilst claiming it stood merely for freedom of thought. Leaders most associated with the day school for children knew that it could not continue in the current climate and hatched a plan. Led by Harry Kelly and Leonard Abbott, a more serene environment was found in Stelton, New Jersey, to create a colony. Anarchists would each buy a small plot of farmland next to one another and carve it into residential plots, with a space for the school in the middle.\textsuperscript{511} In the December 1914 edition of \textit{Mother Earth}, an article entitled “A Ferrer Colony,” written by Harry Kelly, Leonard Abbott and the Association’s treasurer Fred Hirsch, spoke of activity by the Association that was “both necessary and desirable” but had “a harmful effect on the children and warp[s] their minds.”\textsuperscript{512} They spoke about this feeling being there “for some time,” but it increased given recent events, and must happen now for the physical and mental benefit of the children.\textsuperscript{513} Kelly, the pioneer of this move, finally got his way, and in May 1915 the Ferrer Colony was established. The vessel that carried Arthur Caron’s ashes accompanied the Ferrer School in its move from Harlem to Stelton.\textsuperscript{514} It served the “peaceful function” of a bell to call children to class but also, as one of the few reminders of the New York years, represented the change of philosophy the school underwent by moving away from the New York Anarchist Movement.

\textbf{Conclusion}

At the Ferrer School, “Freedom Through Education” failed at the first hurdle. Due to a multitude of differences within the Anarchist Movement, the school was not able to define its central pedagogy, ultimately not fulfilling the goals the Ferrer Association set out to achieve. The “freedom” discussed by those associated with the school often translated to simply instructing the children to follow the philosophies of their teachers, which then contradicted the notion of freedom entirely. For example, Will Durant wanting to produce “fighters” for a free world was directly at odds with his assertion that the children should be able to choose their own ideology.\textsuperscript{515} Inherently, the school had to lead them down some sort of path – true libertarianism was simply incompatible with

\begin{itemize}
    \item 509. Tager, "Politics and Culture in Anarchist Education," 410.
    \item 510. Goldman, \textit{Living My Life}, 386.
    \item 511. Cornell, \textit{Unruly Equality}, 49.
    \item 512. Harry Kelly, Leonard Abbott and Fred Hirsch, "A Ferrer Colony," \textit{Mother Earth} 9, (December 1914), 333.
    \item 513. Ibid.
    \item 515. Durant, \textit{The Ferrer Modern School}.
\end{itemize}
schooling at that age, as the leaders of the Ferrer Association soon discovered. Teaching was not along the lines of the Escuela Moderna, in which Francisco Ferrer drilled a politically charged class consciousness in his students through a regimented prospectus that included radical literature and working-class history. It did not follow the doctrine of Leo Tolstoy’s Yasnaya Polyana either, which argued that children would develop radical thought after being allowed to experience nature free of any influence at all. Instead, the school’s leaders tried to do both and neither simultaneously, all whilst involving the young students in Anarchist activities such as allowing them to help plan the Ludlow protests. Those within the Ferrer Association manipulated the teaching to try and fit their own Anarchist – or otherwise – principles, and through exposing them to adult lectures and meetings, attempted to develop their own radical successors. Due to the immense danger Anarchists both created and found themselves in through constant police harassment, the Ferrer School was a ticking time bomb of an institution. Throughout 1914, the bomb exploded – quite literally in the case of the Lexington Explosion involving three Ferrer Center Anarchists, but more generally, infighting on what direction to take the teaching of the Ferrer School added to longstanding pressures between the immigrant and American-born radicals. This, then, was the turning point which had been bubbling under for some time.

The Ferrer School left a lasting effect on the New York Anarchist Movement. In the late 1910s, the Bureau of Immigration targeted the membership of the Ferrer Association for deportations. Their connection to what the Bureau called a “cult [that] finds expression in but few of the Anarchist doctrines” was enough evidence of a crime against the state. The Department of Justice published documents that shows they used articles from both The Modern School and Mother Earth, including the one on the Lexington Explosion, to build up a case against Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman. The colony at Stelton, and leaders such as Harry Kelly who moved there, however, escaped prosecution because of the change in attitude and teaching towards individual education after the move, and operated untouched until 1953.


Empire in the Street: Public Fountains as Markers of Ottoman Urban History 1453-1800
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Introduction

The Ottoman Empire famously had “a rich historical obsession with fountains.” The Ottoman çeşme, or public fountain, built upon a long-established tradition of fountains in the region, and could be found the length of the Empire, from Cairo to the Balkans. Çeşmes served a vital role as water sources and had a special symbolic and spiritual significance, drawing upon the Turko-Mongol tradition and a religious connection with rivers of paradise. Furthermore, Ottoman fountains nearly always featured a poetic “foundation inscription” that identified the commissioner and the foundation date, which provided a venue to project one’s name, influence, and power. Like the influence of the Empire itself, these water-giving monuments were concentrated in the urban locations under Ottoman control, and played an important role in Ottomanizing captured urban space.

This paper will expand the current çeşme discourse spearheaded by Shirine Hamedeh’s “Splash and Spectacle: The Obsession with Fountains in Eighteenth Century Istanbul,” and extend the discussion to the whole of the Early Modern period. It will unite new conjectures with the tangential references to çeşmes spread throughout the existing scholarship to form a cohesive narrative. The too-often-sidelined çeşmes will take the center of focus, just as they stood at

the centers of the Ottoman urban environment. Ottoman çeşmes reflect the ebb and flow of the Ottoman Empire's Early Modern urban history, from the capture of Constantinople, the Ottomanization of conquered territory, codification and consolidation of power, the return of the Sultans to Istanbul, to the Tulip Period and European encroachment. One can trace these broad imperial moments over time through the changes in the fountains' political function, construction, patronage, and design. This unique view of the Ottoman Empire will fill in gaps in the existing scholarship and illuminate how the çeşme acted as a marker of urban Ottoman history. From these fountains, the Empire flowed into its urban space. As a result, its phases of expansion, consolidation, beautification, and eventual colonization are all legible in the çeşme and its urban surroundings.

Expansion

The çeşme was a marker of the Ottoman's arrival as a major imperial power. Tursen Bey’s chronicle reports that a few years after the capture of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II's building projects ensured that the city was “prosperous, ornamented, and well-organized,” with “every fountain a water of paradise.” It is evident from the chronicle that he viewed fountains as necessary for a thriving city. Imperial fountain sponsorship brought two crucial functions particular to this young moment in Ottoman history. Firstly, the new capital had a diminished population, and Mehmed sought to remedy this by attracting people back to the city. New sources of water were necessary to support the planned population increase. However, their use was more than utilitarian. Çeşmes further served as a symbol of legitimacy. Fountains connoted divine authority in Eastern Christian as well as Islamic tradition as waters “of paradise,” and could appeal to Mehmed II’s both Christian and Islamic subjects. Furthermore, fountains invoked a civic authority harkening back to the Romans, whose ancient aqueducts and pipes still brought water to the city. By building fountains and repairing damaged parts of the water supply, Mehmed literally tapped into a powerful symbol of civic clout, while still bringing a distinctive Ottomanness in the çeşme's design. Thus Mehmed used the çeşme to “stamp” his newly repopulated city with a “seal of his power,” behind which laid the force of thousands of years of religious and civic symbolism. It is no accident that Ottoman Sultans donned the region’s ancient imperial mantle: Kayser-i Rum (Caesar of Rome), an evolution that the fountains parallel in their adoption of Roman water supplies. The Sultan's new practical and legitimizing fountains demarcated the capital city of an ascending Empire replacing the old, embodying the historic moment.

During the Ottoman Empire’s continued expansion, now into former Mamlûk territory, çeşmes continued to serve a prioritized role in the Ottomanization of captured urban spaces. Following the addition of a tower to the citadel of Aleppo, the second earliest Ottoman architectural project in the city was a çeşme, the “Qastal al-Sultan,” built during the reign of Süleyman I in the 1530s. In Jerusalem, too, the Ottomans placed a priority on çeşme construction. The

528. Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpaugh, *Image of an Ottoman City: Imperial Architecture and Urban*
1527 Fountain of Qasim Pasha was the Ottomans’ first architectural intervention to the Al-Aqsa Mosque grounds that was not repairs to existing structures. Like in 1450s Istanbul, these çeşmes were a major priority because they established an imperial presence in captured urban space. However, they also reflect a new era of Ottoman imperial expansion.

As the Ottomans continued to dominate more and more urban space, they sought to bind new lands to the Imperial state. As a part of this process, the çeşme’s role was augmented: the fountains forged an intercity network. The çeşmes of Jerusalem and Aleppo were part of a wider, standardized construction project in the urban centers of the Ottoman’s newly-conquered periphery. In the center of newly-conquered Ottoman space one could expect to find a recently-built fountain with stone arches, a dome, and often a wooden roof for shade. These new fountains visually linked the provincial cities “to each other, and to Ottoman rule.” Thus, the çeşmes popping up across the Empire’s increasingly wide swaths of territory became a universal and connecting symbol of Ottoman urbanity. As the state attempted to forge a network between the provinces and the metropole, it built a parallel network of fountains. Through the standardized çeşme, the larger imperial moment of integration is legible.

Consolidation, Codification, and Çeşmes at the Center

As the Ottomans maintained their rule, they continued to Ottomanize and integrate urban environments. A crucial part of this was the construction of fountains with distinctly Anatolian architecture at hubs of travel. One of the Empire’s new symbols of urban presence was the hân, or urban inn, which facilitated travel and deepened inter-regional economic and cultural connections in the Empire. Hâns had at least one çeşme located in a prominent place such as the front entrance or the center of the courtyard, because one of their essential services was to provide a water source to travellers. The çeşme, therefore, became a visual symbol of the new Ottoman hân because it was centrally located and easily seen. In this way, public fountains became visually associated with the new hân which played a crucial role in Ottoman urban interconnectedness starting in the mid-to-late-16th century. As more hâns were built around the Empire, çeşmes were built in tandem to service them; again fountains paralleled the wider pattern of Ottoman history.

The hân fountains’s architecture itself further pushed Ottomanization in the provinces. For example, the Damascene Hân al-Bâšā built by governor Lâlâ Mustafa Pasha (r. 1563–68) features an Anatolian-type masjid-fountain in its courtyard. This type of hân fountain was located in the center of the courtyard with a small mosque built on a raised platform above it, and is originally a

Experience in Aleppo in the 16th and 17th Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 40-41.
530. Watenpaugh, Image of an Ottoman City, 41 ; Denny, “Art, Infrastructure, and Devotion,” 204.
531. Watenpaugh, Image of an Ottoman City, 43.
533. Boqvist, “Building an Ottoman City,” 201.
Seljuk design. These Anatolian fountains were a noticeable deviation from the pre-existing Damascene architectural language, and would have stood out in the cityscape.\(^{534}\) Links to “Anatolian architectural tradition” such as this symbolized a particularly “Ottoman presence”\(^{535}\) in provincial cities such as Damascus. These fountains placed imperial architecture literally at the center of the hans facilitating travel throughout the Empire. The çeşme thus continued to reflect the history of the Ottomans as the Empire, mirroring its intensifying inter-urban and province-metropole connections during the 1500s.

Çeşmes also paralleled the increasing codification of the Empire in the sixteenth century, beginning during the Kanuni Sultan’s reign. The Ottoman Empire adopted the Hanafi Law Code and introduced a network of Kadis to implement it across the Empire. They acted as “the face of Ottoman rule,” and embodied the state’s expanding power.\(^{536}\) Part of the responsibility of the Kadis in Istanbul was to manage the cities’ çeşmes. Up until the mid-1500s, most of Istanbul’s çeşmes used free-flowing faucets, which wasted water and sometimes overflowed, flooding the streets. In a 1564 decree, Süleyman ordered that the faucets should be replaced with “burmalı lüles” (faucets that could be closed), and assigned the Kadis to oversee the burmalı lüles’ implementation.\(^{537}\) The çeşmes of Istanbul were thus integrated into the Sultan’s new Hanafi codifying network, and the çeşme faucet itself became a medium through which Süleyman expanded the powers of the state and engaged in his efforts towards codification, capturing the broader history of the time.

Çeşmes point to this new era of codification throughout the Empire, not just in Istanbul. One of the important points of codification was the adoption of the Hanafi legal code empire-wide. The Ottomans built schools to train students in the Hanafi code, and fountains were a fundamental part of the effort. For example, Governor of Damascus Šamsî Ahmad Pasha (r. 1554-1560) adopted the Mamlûk tradition of a fountain house attached to a school\(^{538}\) when he built a Hanafi school. In his substantial endowment, Šamsî Ahmad Pasha built a structure for the education of “students in hanafi jurisprudence” with a “fountain” in its southern wall.\(^{539}\) The “proliferation” of these fountain Hanafi schools extended beyond formerly Mamlûk territory\(^{540}\) as Pashas built similar foundations across the rest of the Empire.\(^{541}\) By adopting the Mamlûk-type fountain and school combination to educate a new generation in the Hanafi code, the Ottoman state could establish itself as the successors to the Mamlûk caliphate while standardizing Hanafi within the Empire. Çeşmes were therefore literally an integral part of the Empire’s widespread Hanafi

\(^{534}\) Boqvist, “Building an Ottoman City,” 201.

\(^{535}\) Boqvist, “Building an Ottoman City,” 198.


\(^{539}\) Boqvist, “Building an Ottoman City,” 192.


codification effort, as the Ottomans built them into the sides of schools they founded in urban centers.

In the following century, Sultans and their imperial representatives continued to use fountains to bring imperial sovereignty into the urban spaces of the Empire. By this point in the Empire’s history, Ottoman urban spaces were directly associated with imperial çeşmes, a development evident in Ottoman literature. For example, in a section of Evliya Çelebi’s Seyahatname (book of travels) about Tophane, he complains about the lack of çeşmes compared to the large size of the town. He expects there to be more çeşmes in such a significant urban space. This indicates that çeşmes were widespread in the towns and cities of the Empire, because there must have been a large number of fountains in other Ottoman towns in order to set Çelebi’s expectation. His Seyahatname evinces that by the 16th century, fountains were so embedded in conceptions of Ottoman urbanity that a town with only a few of them was met with surprise and complaint.

Çeşmes and Conflict

Evliya Çelebi did not just identify the absence of fountains: he admired their construction. His Seyahatname celebrates Sultan Murad IV’s fountain architecture as symbolic of imperial piety, sovereignty, and splendor. Imperial symbols such as çeşmes became especially important when that sovereignty was threatened, such as the circumstances that led to Murad’s reign. He came to the throne after the first regicide in Ottoman history and the deposition of Sultan Mustafa I. In this crucial moment of Ottoman History, the beginning of Janissary uprisings, çeşmes helped Murad re-legitimize the sultanate. Throughout his reign, he sponsored many building projects at which fountains were the heart, such as the Han Kara Muğur. As Evliya Çelebi’s writing illuminates, elaborate imperial çeşmes could bring back a sense of imperial sovereignty that wavered during the Janissary revolt, and embodied the re-imperialization of formerly rebellious urban spaces. As the 16th century became more internally fraught, Janissary uprisings were not the only conflicts çeşmes paralleled.

Çeşmes also stood in the middle of contemporary conflicts between the metropole and the periphery, conflicts that were expressed through pious foundations, or waqfs. Like with hâns, Ottoman waqfs almost always had at least one çeşme, usually placed in a courtyard or some other central location. Typically profits from a commercial space of the waqf would go towards maintenance of the fountain. These charitable foundations demonstrated the endower’s power and influence in the community, and could be used to support or undermine Ottoman state authority, part of broader friction between the metropole and the periphery in the seventeenth century. For example, the Mamluk amir Ridwan Bey who “ruled Egypt

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546. Watenpaugh, Image of an Ottoman City, 96, 111, 157, 158, 170, 191.
like a monarch” built a massive foundation near Bab Zuwayla from 1629 to 1647, which included a çeşme.\textsuperscript{548} Ridwan Bey’s foundation physically manifested his individual power and presented a viable alternative to Ottoman civic benevolence. In this way the çeşme as a crucial part of the foundation became a weapon against imperial sovereignty, mirroring the larger struggles of the Empire’s history.

\textit{Waqfs} played out another conflict of Ottoman politics between the state and its elite subjects in their use as a tax shelter, and they reflected the dangers that accompanied imperial politics. If a family put its property and wealth into a \textit{waqf}, it could avoid state property seizures, taxes, and inheritance laws. As Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet observe, this was especially important for state officials “fearful for the survival of their property [...] in an environment where the rise in politics was in inverse ratio to the likelihood of a natural death.”\textsuperscript{549} For example, when Hasan Paşa was executed at Yedikule in 1598, his thoughts were with the public çeşme he built as part of a \textit{waqf}, as he requested that he be buried by the fountain.\textsuperscript{550} This sort of avoidance of state taxes and laws continued into the eighteenth century and only increased with the economic prosperity of that time, with families such as the Karaosmanoğlus of the Balkan heartlands.\textsuperscript{551} The çeşmes of \textit{waqfs} were therefore part of a wider world of elites dodging the Ottoman state and the ups and downs of imperial politics, and can thus tell the history of their historical moment.

\textbf{Restoration and the Opulent 18th Century}

The Sultan’s sovereignty declined during the Köprülü dynasty in the latter half of the seventeenth century. However, the Sultan returned to prominence with the Edirne Incident of 1703 and the return of the Sultans to Istanbul. The royal treasury was flush from the life-term tax appointment system debuted at the prior century’s close, and the House of Osman needed to re-establish its presence in Istanbul. In order to do this, Ahmed III turned to fountains, just as Mehmed II, Süleyman I, Murad IV, and many other Sultans and Pashas had before him. Instead of the typical wall-based çeşme, Ahmed’s huge public fountains were freestanding or jutted sharply out of buildings, literally projecting imperial presence into urban space (contrast figures 1 and 2 with 3).\textsuperscript{552} His efforts to capture the attention of the people of the street seem to have been successful, as according to French visitor Charles de Pertusier, “\textit{On ne passe guère près de la fontaine [...] sans y être arrêté par le génie des arts qui vous invite à la contempler}” (One hardly passes close to the fountain before being stopped there by its artistic genius which invites you to contemplate it).\textsuperscript{553} Furthermore, Mehmed II commissioned a large number of these freestanding fountains, underscoring the “omnipresence”\textsuperscript{554} of the recently returned sultanate. Fountains were thus an important visual indicator of the Sultanate’s return to Istanbul and the new politics of the eighteenth century.

\textsuperscript{549} Boyar, and Fleet, \textit{A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul}, 147-148.
\textsuperscript{550} Boyar, and Fleet, \textit{A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul}, 147.
\textsuperscript{551} Barkey, \textit{Empire of Difference}, 261.

\textsuperscript{554} Avcioglu, “Istanbul: The Palimpsest City in Search of Its Architext,” 203.
Figure 1: (Top) Birkat al-Sultan, built in Jerusalem 1536; Figure 2: (Bottom) Grand Fountain, built in Samokov, Bulgaria 1660.

Figure 3: Fountain of Mahmud I, built in Tophane in 1732. Free-standing fountains like figures 2 and 3 are referred to as Maydan fountains. Though Maydan fountains appear in earlier periods of Ottoman history, it is clear that the scale and visual presence of the eighteenth-century Maydan çeşme are far more ambitious.

Under the reign of Ahmed III, the Empire entered the Tulip period, and the era’s economic stability manifested itself in the fountain’s opulence. The rapid economic growth of the period provided extensive resources for building projects including a proliferation of extravagant çeşmes (fig. 4). Shirine Hamadeh asserts that the number of fountains built in Istanbul and the surrounding area increased by four times in the eighteenth century compared to the seventeenth.555 While this number may be slightly misleading, as Walter Denny argues that older fountains may have been replaced or destroyed with time,556 breakdown and replacement likely do not account for the entirety of such a sharp increase in the 18th century. The Ottomans’ newfound wealth is

evident in the sheer number of new fountains commissioned. The era’s economic prosperity is further evident in the fountains’ wealth of materials and intricacy heretofore unknown in Ottoman fountains (see figure 3). These new richly-decorated fountains were not isolated to Istanbul, and could be found across the periphery. The opulence of this phase in the Empire’s history shines through the expensive materials adorning the fountains; as Ünver Rüstem writes, these fountains brought “elite splendor” “out onto the street.” The Sultan was back and wealthier than ever, and these huge, glistening, freestanding çeşmes encapsulate that historical moment perfectly.

Figure 4: Fountain of Ahmed III, built in front of the Topkapı Palace, Istanbul in 1728

Democratization of Çeşmes Amid a New Set of Patrons and Influences

In the Tulip period, the Empire saw a nascent middle class thanks to the Empire’s economic prosperity and reformed tax system. Mirroring the rise of the middle class, the proliferation of fountains was no longer a top-down process: for the first time women and non-elites built çeşmes. These changes in patronage are evident in the increasing diversification of çeşme inscriptions. Fountain patrons, who used to be limited to Sultans, Pashas, or the extreme elite, expanded in the eighteenth century to include a diverse array of bureaucrats, guilds, and a “growing proportion of women.” The people who were “taste-maker[s]” now stretched beyond the upper elite, reflecting the “increasingly porous socio-cultural boundaries” of contemporary urban society. Common poets competed with those of the court to compose the best inscriptions for new fountains. More people than ever before could stake their claim on urban space by commissioning a fountain. Before the 18th century, Ottoman çeşmes took the Empire to the people of the street. Now, with a growing middle class of urbanites, the people of the streets used çeşme to establish their place in the Empire as well.

The new diversified patronage of the 18th century increased the potential for the fountain to be a “potent symbol of political and social will.” As a part of this development, çeşmes became a new forum for the expression of dissent against the state.

559. Kôse Nilay, and Mesut Meyveci, İstanbulun 100 Hanım Çeşmesi, (Topkapı, İstanbul: İstanbul Büyüksheir Belediyesi Kültür A.S, Yayınları, 2017).  
which underscores the çeşme’s parallel relationship with the politics of the Empire. For example, during the Janissary revolt of 1730 the Janissaries hung Mustafa Paşa’s body on an imperial çeşme and nearly destroyed the çeşme of the Sa’dabad gardens. The inscription of a fountain in the town of Nafplio in the Peloponnese from 1734 identifies its patron Mahmud Agha’s “affiliation with the Bektaşi order,” another way of expressing dissent. A final example is the popular opposition to the 1787 declaration of war, in which protesting posters were stuck on public buildings such as the palace, mosques, and fountains. The fact that fountains are included alongside mosques and the palace indicates their importance in getting a political message out to the populace and the state, and their new role as a symbol of non-imperial social will. Using dissident episodes such as these, one can trace the politics of the Empire during the 18th century through the Ottomans’ çeşmes.

In the midst of this ‘democratization’ of çeşmes and the opulence of the 1700s, however, there was a darker undercurrent. As the 18th century progressed the Ottomans increasingly felt the looming influence of a colonizing Europe, through trade, travel, and consulate courts. This too is readily apparent in the çeşmes of the era. While many of the çeşmes’ designs reimagined “traditional” elements already present in the Ottoman visual repertoire, as the century progressed, they “combined and juxtaposed” these with European Neoclassical, Baroque, and Rococo architecture.

Designs such as those found in figures 5 through 7 increasingly made an appearance in the architecture of new çeşmes, and visually indicate Europe’s creeping influence in Ottoman affairs. Once again,

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566. Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 382.
Figure 5: (Top) Detail of the fountain outside the entrance of the Nuruosmaniye Mosque, built in Istanbul in 1755; Figure 6: (Bottom) Fountain of Abdülhamid I, built in Istanbul in 1777

Figure 7: Fountain of Mihrigah Sultan at Eyüp, built in 1795. The Baroque, Rococo, and Neoclassical influence is obvious in these late eighteenth century çeşmes

Conclusion
From the Ottoman Empire’s ascendance as a major imperial power to the end of the Early Modern era, the Empire’s çeşmes have been an important imperial facet. Public fountains lay at the center of hans, waqfs, gardens, and neighborhoods, and their presence was synonymous with the urban spaces of the empire. The çeşme was an icon of the Ottoman urban environment and fulfilled a vital community need, representing a claim on urban space that could project, support, and even challenge imperial sovereignty. In this function, the fountain parallels imperial and individual efforts to establish physical and symbolic presence within urban society, and mirrors the Empire’s struggles for power. Throughout Ottoman history, the çeşmes’ inscriptions, number, opulence, and design all indicate the circumstances of the broader urban society. Thus, by tracing the trends surrounding the Ottoman çeşme, one traces the larger patterns in the Empire’s Early Modern urban history.