


Vanderbilt Historical Review

AN UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

Fall 2016



FEATURES:

The Fight for the True Representation of the Four Freedoms, Christopher Zhang

Calculated Caution: Seward and France's Invasion of Mexico, Laura L. Grove

The Transformation of Confederate Ideology and its Legacy, Zachary S. Brown

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Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,

Earlier this semester, several editors of the *Vanderbilt Historical Review* went on a field trip to the Hermitage, the home of Andrew Jackson. It was a great opportunity to learn more about local history here in Tennessee. Even more so, I observed how the legacy of one individual can be carried on by the preservation efforts of the Hermitage preservationists. From his military leadership in the Battle of New Orleans to the minute details of his daily activities, the Hermitage preserved the life of one American who had a notable impact on our country today. The parallel between our publication and the Hermitage is ultimately the remembrance of key events, people, and ideas of our past.

Here at the *Review*, we strive to include a myriad of topics to ensure that each reader will find several articles of interest. In this issue, we have compiled essays on Japanese-Jewish relations during World War II, antievolutionist movements in Texas, and French foreign policy in the years of the early American Republic. The authors of these articles hail from students at universities around the country, such as Stanford University, Northwestern University, and the United States Military Academy at West Point. Our History at Vanderbilt section also features a biography of Yun Chi-ho, a Korean political activist and alumnus of Vanderbilt University. As with every issue, I am confident that the following pages will leave you, the reader, with a renewed understanding of our society today.

I hope these articles inspire readers to one day contribute to the historiographical record, whether through their words or actions. Everything we say, think, or do affects the historical record. Ultimately, we are the writers and makers of our own history.

Best,

Robert Yee

Editor-in-Chief



Vanderbilt Historical Review

The *Vanderbilt Historical Review* is an undergraduate journal of history. We provide an opportunity for undergraduate students to develop skills in historical research, publishing, and editing. To learn more, visit us at www.vanderbilthistoricalreview.com or email us vanderbilt.historicalreview@gmail.com.

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
HISTORY AT VANDERBILT

Yun Chi-ho at Vanderbilt: The Deep Roots of Collaboration

Imperialism, and the cultural hegemony that so often accompanies imperial imposition, have established themselves as some of the historian's most poignant motifs. In this essay, Christian Talley examines a curious form of such imposition: when a member of the native populace, swayed by conceptions of modernity and religion, becomes a frank advocate of Western intervention into his own culture. His case study is Yun Chi-ho, a nineteenth-century Korean international student at Vanderbilt. While Yun believed his case for Western intervention into Korea, which he laid out in his Vanderbilt diaries, to be a sound one, his rigorous adherence to his ideals ultimately destroyed his reputation among his countrymen.

This essay received the 2016 Paul K. Conkin Award for Best Paper in U.S. History at Vanderbilt University.

By Christian Talley '16
Vanderbilt University



First diary entry of Yun Chi-ho (December 7th, 1889)
Source: Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library of Emory University

On October 23rd, 1891, Vanderbilt University's theology students and their professors met at the Inter-Seminary Missionary Alliance, a regional conference on missionary activity. Among them was Yun Chi-ho, a twenty-six year old Korean national, a devout Method-

ist, and one of Vanderbilt's first international students. The son of a Korean general and a member of Korea's elite, Yun came to Vanderbilt to study American modernity so that he himself might be an emissary of progress for the Koreans. Yet Yun's mission was a complicated one. At a time when 'modernity' had become intertwined with imperial imposition, and religion functioned as empire's moral cover, Yun's insights into modernization-*qua*-Westernization trod a thin line. How could his native Korea, beloved and yet a backwater, become a modern power while retaining its national integrity? Could Korea reconcile these ideals?

The missionary conference drew out precisely these tensions—the dual edge of paternalism and progress inherent in a modernizing mission. Lectures for the day focused on the role of Christian missionaries in the 'improvement' of Asia. As Yun recorded in his diary, the first two lectures went smoothly. Dr. Lambuth spoke on missionary works in Japan, followed by Reverend Underwood, who added comments on his missions to Yun's Korea. Then followed Reverend H.P. Beach, who had recently returned from a missionary trip to China. While describing his work there, Beach excoriated the Koreans he had encountered in China. According to Yun, "In the course of the talk he said that he had been disgusted at the dirty Koreans."¹ Yun, inflamed but powerless to lash out, quietly sat as "this remark instantly focalized all eyes on my involuntarily crimsoned face. O, the exquisite torture my whole soul then experienced!"² Yun further wrote, "This attack on the Koreans was altogether uncalled for," and that Beach was clearly "one of those who go to a mission field for no other purpose than for having a little 'fun' and adventure among the poorer classes and coming home to brag on how heroic and devoted they are."³ Surprisingly, Yun finished his entry by saying that Beach was not qualified to judge Koreans anyway, for Beach had only encountered ignorant Korean "coolies" in China, rather than sophisticated Koreans such as Yun himself.⁴

Yun's experience that day was a microcosm of his broader three years of study at Vanderbilt, an experience wracked by isolation and apparent contradiction. In his writings, at times Yun could be a fierce critic of the Korean people but at others delicately attuned to their hopes and prospects. Despite criticizing Reverend Beach, Yun remained convinced that Christianizing Korea would uplift the nation. Despite fighting for the dignity of his people, Yun remained a staunch elitist who spoke negatively of 'coolies' whom he thought were poor representatives of the Asian race. And despite coming to the United States to observe the wonders of industrialization and Christianity, Yun found himself affronted by the blatant racism of the Jim Crow South.

Diaries and the Question of National Loyalty," writes that we must find "the particular moment in [Yun's] life when he turned against the Korean people."⁸ Something, in Caprio's view, must delineate a change between the "pre- and post-annexation phases" in Yun's thinking.⁹ Kim Dohun similarly argues that Yun experienced an "about face" after his return to Korea and after Japanese annexation.¹⁰ Hyung-chan Kim has also tried to identify the "turning point in his way of thinking about Korean independence."¹¹ Did Yun, as Caprio suggests, understandably pivot toward "a modern but predatory imperialist power" over "a backward and corrupt native regime?"¹²

“The question dominating the psyche of the Korean elite at the turn of the century was how they might lurch their nation into modernity.”

Yun's encounter with America, and his detailed recording of it, thus provides a fascinating outlet for historians to analyze turn-of-the-century understandings of race, nation, and empire. A few years after Yun's time at Vanderbilt, the United States would seize the Philippines as a spoil of the Spanish-American war. America's conduct would begin to come under heavy criticism, sparking an extended anti-imperial critique of American foreign policy. Yet, Yun's diaries situate him, an outsider from the East, as definitively pro-empire. Overwhelming consensus on empire's depravity, particularly after decolonization, would appear to have left behind quaint old imperialists such as Yun. Scholars have thus been left to wonder why Yun thought as he did—and to search for the factors that fueled Yun's imperial pathology.

The tensions between Yun's investments in both nationalism and empire would reach their apogee after Yun's return to Korea several years later. Following Japan's annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910, Yun maintained "extensive contacts with Japanese nationals" and "offered... support and assistance to the Japanese colonial government."⁵ Yun continued to support Japan's imperial expansion and its role in World War II until he died in 1945.⁶ His support for the Japanese administration has since led the Korean government to denounce him as a collaborator in Japanese oppression.⁷ How can we reconcile Yun's Korean patriotism with his later support of Japanese colonialism? Why did Yun's views seemingly invert, from pro-independence to pro-dependence, after Japan took the peninsula?

Historical examinations of Yun have devoted substantial energy to this question, particularly focusing on his later writings after his return to Korea. Mark E. Caprio, in his article "Loyal Patriot? Traitorous Collaborator? The Yun Chiho

In contrast to previous historians who have tried to demonstrate when and why an ideological 'shift' occurred from Yun's patriotism to Yun's collaboration, I argue that this is a false dichotomy. Caprio was on the right track in arguing that Yun's support for Japan was consistent with his desire for Korean development. But I extend the analysis much deeper, showing that even Yun's *early* philosophy beckoned for international intervention in Korea. Examining Yun's Vanderbilt diaries (written from 1888 to 1891) demonstrates Yun's deep admiration for Western empires, his hope that external forces might 'civilize' his fellow Koreans, his abiding faith in the power of 'Christianizing' Korea, and his general paternalism and elitism. Rather than undergoing a mysterious shift, I argue that Yun's support of Japanese colonialism was actually consistent with the views he had cultivated for decades—and particularly during his days at Vanderbilt. Yun was ultimately a pragmatist. Rather than diverging from prior patriotism by supporting Japan, Yun's early philosophy anticipated, and in fact hoped for, external modernizing forces to intervene and remake the 'backwards' Korean nation.

KOREA: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The question dominating the psyche of the Korean elite at the turn of the century was how they might lurch their nation into modernity. Yun himself believed a sojourn in America might impart valuable lessons that he could import to Korea. It seemed to Yun that time was of the essence. Indeed, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Korea faced a rapid deterioration of its international prestige and security. It began to succumb to the external forces of imperialism but also to the internal forces of corruption and isolationism. In 1866, France conducted a minor punitive mission against Korea for its persecution of French Catholic missionaries.¹³ In June of 1871, the United States attempted to 'open' the Hermit King-

dom as it had done previously with Japan in 1853.¹⁴ On June 1st, Korean soldiers suddenly attacked an American surveying party sailing up the Yomha River. The Koreans opened fire when the Americans reached Sondolmok, a highly symbolic river bend demarking passage into Korea's interior.¹⁵ Though the Americans suffered no casualties, they retreated and organized a counterattack on June 10th. A heavily armed American landing party overwhelmed Kwangsong fort. The Marines, while killing over 250 Koreans, suffered only three killed and nine wounded.¹⁶ Though the Koreans "fought like tigers," they were miserably outgunned.¹⁷ One Korean cannon captured after the fighting, the Americans learned, had been cast in 1313.¹⁸

The American expedition in 1871 proved to be the first in a long line of setbacks for Korea. In 1876, Korea and Japan signed the unequal Treaty of Ganghwa Island, guaranteeing Japan extraterritoriality and favorable trade provisions.¹⁹ The Korean nation,

faced poverty, a low life expectancy, famine, poor sanitation, epidemics, an animal and wind-based transportation system for people and goods, a village-centered market system, a lack of a national economy and currency, and, foremost, an inability to defend [itself] against the technically superior weapons and better trained armies of Europe and Japan.²⁰

Moreover, public resentment mounted against Korea's ruling regime and especially against King Gojong. Gojong, for his part, attempted reforms to modernize Korea. Gojong very consciously looked to the United States as an example of modernity—"the United States during the Gilded Age looked irresistibly attractive" as a national model.²¹ He sent a delegation to America in 1883 that "brought back glowing reports" of America's transportation, trade, universities, hospitals, free enterprise, and federalism.²²

Gojong, unfortunately, remained powerless to enact sweeping reforms. In 1884, a group of radical Korean progressives attempted a coup d'état known as the Gapsin Revolution. The coup managed to depose Gojong for three days. Yet China swiftly quashed the revolt and re-installed the King. The coup gave China the pretense for a decade of "direct intervention in Korea's foreign and domestic affairs."²³ The Chinese general Yuan Shikai "sat at King Gojong's side, preventing him from doing anything that might interfere with China's control over Korea."²⁴ General Yuan continuously obstructed Korean reforms. He did not allow Gojong "to dispatch ambassadors to foreign countries," allowed the British to seize Geomun Island, organized Korean tribute payments to Japan, blocked the construction of a telegraph line, and cancelled reforms of the Korean currency.²⁵

It was the Gapsin Revolution, in turn, that temporarily forced Yun Chi-ho out of Korea. While Yun played only a minor role, he was friendly with several of the coup's radical leaders.²⁶ Rather than face potential retribution, he decided to



Yun Chi-ho at Emory University (1892)

Source: *Wikimedia Commons*

study abroad and to allow the domestic situation to cool. He thought it unwise to return while "the government remains our enemy."²⁷ While studying at the Anglo-Chinese College in Shanghai, he met the College's founder, Young John Allen. Allen, a well-known Methodist missionary from the United States, was impressed with Yun's intellect and encouraged him to continue his studies in America. Allen helped Yun secure admission to Vanderbilt, at the time still a Methodist institution, as a student in Vanderbilt's Department of Theology.²⁸

A KOREAN IN NASHVILLE

When he first arrived in Nashville, Yun wrote that he sought to study its "civilization, philanthropy, and religion" as a model for Korea's later development.²⁹ Yun would discover that these presumptions did not always match the realities of Southern life. Very quickly, Yun encountered basic barriers to his integration into Southern society that complicated his conception of American modernity. Despite Yun's surprise at the regressive aspects of life in Nashville, he downplayed these concerns in his diaries, seeking to understand how Nashville itself was still in the process of cultivating modernity.

The most complex issue Yun encountered was that of race: Yun did not understand the South's intense racism against blacks. His friend Jordan, an Armenian and fellow interna-

tional student, explained to him that “the prejudice against the colored race is very strong in the South”—an interesting revelation to Yun.³⁰ Yun saw racism as contradictory with basic values of religion and civil society.³¹ Though Asians clearly held a privileged position among non-whites, Yun himself bore the brunt of racial insensitivity on multiple occasions. On the advent of the summer break in 1890, a fellow Vanderbilt student advised him that the dormitories did not serve food during the summer. If he wanted to stay in Nashville, he would have to “go then to your town brethren... the Chinese laundrymen.”³² Yun, painfully recalling his elite status in native Korea, “kept silent.”³³ Yet the “undisguised insult made [him] perfectly wretched all the morning.”³⁴ On another occasion, when Yun had gotten top marks on an exam, a Vanderbilt professor remarked that his performance was proof after all that the “heathen is worth educating.”³⁵

Yun’s experience of racism is further complicated by the fact that his own views of race are regressive by contemporary standards. He was, for example, a frank advocate of exclusion. He disdained the “ignorant rabble” of “coolies” China had sent to the United States to labor, for he considered them poor and unsophisticated representatives of Asia.³⁶ He believed that through exclusion, the United States would admit only the best and most qualified Asians, thus increasing Americans’ respect for Asia.³⁷ In a particularly charged comment, Yun also cited the sexual intermingling of ‘coolies’ with black women in Memphis as deplorable, for it lowered white opinions on, and the “social standing” of, the “Chinaman.”³⁸ “No wonder he is so despised,” wrote Yun.³⁹

Yun’s stance on miscegenation is particularly revealing in understanding his racial views. His words might appear immediately suspect, as an affirmation of anti-black racism. In truth, Yun’s view was more nuanced and was deeply linked to his ideas about modernizing Korea. We must consider two caveats when evaluating Yun’s remarks on race and nation. First, Yun’s priority was not to reinforce or erode the black/white racial hierarchy, but rather to present the best possible image of ‘Asianness’ to white Americans. Yun was concerned less with miscegenation because of the fact that it was with blacks, but rather, he was concerned because he felt it could potentially tarnish Asians’ reputation with whites. Asians, in Yun’s view, needed to be on their ‘best behavior’ when judged by white society. It seemed to him that miscegenation went against this goal as it lowered white opinion of Asian immigrants. In contrast to these ‘coolies,’ Yun considered himself a vanguard representative of Asian legitimacy—a man of letters strongly contradicting the ‘coolie’ stereotype. Yun’s social “performance” at Vanderbilt thus sought to show that he was “the social equal to whites,” and that elite Asians, by extension, deserved respect.⁴⁰

Second, while Yun did see the black condition as degraded, he believed that black communities, like his native Koreans, could be ‘improved’ through education and Christianity. He

fit the black condition into his broader views about the power of modernity to ‘uplift’ and ‘civilize’—views that he simultaneously applied to Korea. Yun saw affirmation of his ‘uplift’ thesis advanced by Nashville’s contemporary black leaders. In one instance, Yun attended a lecture by Dr. J.C. Price on “The Future of the Negro.”⁴¹ In this lecture, Yun focused particularly on Dr. Price’s comments about improvement:

The prejudice against the Negro is not due to the color but to the condition. Change poverty into wealth, vice into virtue, ignorance into intelligence—in short, change condition, the prejudice will disappear... The elevation of the condition—moral, mental and material—this and this only can settle the question.⁴²

Yun seemed particularly impressed with Dr. Price’s comments, idealistic as they were, since they supported Yun’s own feelings about Korea. Yun referred to Price as the “Black Demosthenes” and remarked that “he was eloquent. Dr. Price is a full blooded Negro. He is a living argument against the opinion that the Negro, unless mixed, has no mental powers.”⁴³ Clearly, Yun saw a sympathetic parallel between oppressed Southern blacks and his own native Koreans in their struggle for development.

Thus, judged by modern standards, Yun held regressive racial views. He believed that strong, white, modern, Christian societies could uplift benighted blacks, Native Americans, and Indians. Yet he also simply did not endorse the extreme racism characteristic of the South at that time. In his writings, as on Dr. Price, he affirmed the human dignity of African-Americans. More broadly, Yun endorsed colonialism’s supposed power to ‘improve’—with his insights often based on quite shallow readings of history—to validate his own views about modernizing Korea. While ultimately acts of wishful thinking, he proffered these examples as demonstrating that a nation must “be governed and protected and taught by a more enlightened and stronger people” to be truly ready for independence.⁴⁴ This reflection, recorded in his Vanderbilt diary in 1889, was a telling one. Even these early remarks show Yun’s incipient sympathy for empire and his willingness to downplay major concerns, including racism, in service of the search for modernity.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE WEST AS MODERNIZING FORCES

As Yun’s comments on race show, the question dominating his mind during his time at Vanderbilt was how he might use his education to further the Korean cause. He spoke of “giving education to my people” and presented in many Nashville churches on the need for Western intervention in Korea.⁴⁵ Indeed, his writings show an immense sensitivity to the poverty and ill-governance of the Korean nation. Yun found his countrymen in a pitiable state of ignorance; a fundamentally good people misled by an evil and incompetent government. Korean education remained deficient, the economy predominantly agricultural, the government corrupt and ineffective. In an entry from November of 1890, Yun wrote that “it is



Yun Chi-ho's Family (1936)

Source: Anonymous (Wikimedia Commons)

true that the Koreans are superstitious and ignorant. It is true that there are many things about Korea which I cannot think of without blushing; and none, of which I may be proud."⁴⁶ Elsewhere, he wrote that Korea was "a land just now spelling the A.B.C. of civilization."⁴⁷ In his sermons and lectures to Nashville churches, he praised and cautioned missionaries who did "not know what filthy places the so-called towns and cities of Korea are."⁴⁸ Yet it would be through their missionary work that Korea, in Yun's view, could build the Christian foundation he considered necessary for success.

Another central obstacle to Korean modernization, in Yun's opinion, was the Korean government. Yun expressed this opinion continuously in the many speeches and sermons he gave to Nashville's churches. At one point, Yun commented:

Korea is the subject I hate most to talk about... Poor Korea! A far and rich country she is; but she is poor and despised by being under the government of an uncivilized people. Nor is there any prospect of her deliverance from the present condition, so long as the government neglect[s] the education of the people.⁴⁹

Yun considered Gojong's councilors, the Korean officer corps, and the Chinese to be an "abominable gang of cutthroats."⁵⁰ He wrote that "the worst acts of the worst princes and worst judges in the worst period of English History are far superior" to the acts of the "Korean officers."⁵¹ It was thus clear to Yun that the Korean government was the public's greatest enemy. Yun's solutions to these problems, in contrast, show a surprising elitism as well as a very clear foreshadowing of his later collaboration.

In these solutions, Yun's early writings demonstrate a remarkable deference to imperialism and the necessity of missionaries and Western Christianity in Asia. Yun's philosophy stands in stark contrast to that of later Asians, for example Mao Zedong, who considered imperial and Christian intervention in Asia to have been poisonous.⁵² liYun, simply put, admired empire. He considered England "the school master

of India and all her subject countries," as was America with "the Negro and the Indian."⁵³ For Yun, these two paternalistic and imperial relationships had promoted "the ultimate betterment of the whole race."⁵⁴ Yun's writings in these examples were deliberate parallelisms to the situation in Korea. Yun, in fact, actively wished that a powerful empire might take possession of Korea to impose order and progress.

In an entry from May of 1890, Yun postulated five basic options Korea might follow to its modernization. These were a "peaceful self-reformation," an "internal revolution," "continuance in the present system," the "Chinese Yoke," or an international protectorate.⁵⁵ Yun considered peaceful self-reformation impossible due to the "selfishness" and incompetence of Korea's government councilors.⁵⁶ Yun had already seen that internal revolution was impossible after his scrape with the Gapsin Revolution. He considered the status quo a miserable option: "imbecility, oppression, cruelty, tyranny on the part of the government... ignorance, superstition, poverty, and misery on the part of the people."⁵⁷ Yun considered the Chinese Yoke, already in force, to be similarly terrible. It was the international protectorate (he speculated that it might be either Britain or Russia) that Yun found most pragmatic. Though it would require ceding Korean sovereignty, Yun considered it still the most preferable given that it would supplant Gojong and China's existing incompetence. Yun even reasoned that ceding Korean sovereignty might pay off in the long-run. Yun wrote that "to me the question of Korean independence is of no concern. With a government like the present one, independence will bring no relief to the nation."⁵⁸ Even if Korea, under Gojong, could cast off the Chinese Yoke, it would be still mired in the poverty and ignorance Yun deplored. "On the other hand," Yun wrote,

with a better government—a government that will take patriotic and sympathetic interest in the welfare of the people even dependence [on a foreign power] is no real calamity... a healthy and prosperous nation may at any time recover its independence, but a people kept poor, ignorant and weak by a weak poor ignorant and outrageously selfish government—what good will were [sic] independence do to such a people?⁵⁹

Yun thus advanced an intriguing thesis. Even as early as 1889, decades before his cooperation with the Japanese, he argued that he would rather see Korea fall under an imperial protectorate than to see it retain its independence under its incompetent native government.

The passage is just one among the litany of Yun's calls for imperial intervention. Yun elsewhere wrote that while a "strong and sweeping revolution" would be of "high service" to Korea, the "interference of foreign powers" would be the more pragmatic option.⁶⁰ Yun commented that a fragmentation, or "Polandization," of the Korean peninsula among foreign powers was a valid concern.⁶¹ Yet "everything considered, even such Polandization may be better, or at least not worse, than the stinking stagnation" of Korea's present condition.⁶²



Furman Hall at Vanderbilt University

Source: *Special Collections, Vanderbilt University*

The key corollary to national improvement, in Yun's eyes, was Christianity. Yun believed that Christianizing the world would make "public conscience more delicate" and "justice more strong."⁶³ In Yun's view, national problems were nothing more than the aggregation of individual problems, which were rooted in personal morality: "International sins have their root and source in international hearts."⁶⁴ By improving these hearts through proselytizing, Yun firmly believed that Christianity could ameliorate much of the world's evil.

Yun, who also read history during his studies at Vanderbilt, saw affirmations of the power of empire and Christianity all around him. Nashville itself provided an important case-study. In March of 1890, he wrote:

Nashville was first settled in 1780. This beautiful valley of the Cumberland was then the hunting ground of the Indians. What a wonderful transformation in a century! Palaces now occupy the places where wigwams once stood. Electric car and dummy lines branch out in all directions where, only a century ago, one might have found no roads but paths beaten by hunters' feet. The river is spanned by magnificent iron bridges; and steam boats have supplanted canoes.

Think again that this city, now noted for the number and excellence of its schools, colleges and universities, was a hundred years ago, inhabited by a race who had no characters to represent their thoughts. Their superstition, rude law, and cruel practices disgraced the land they unworthily possessed. Christianity, good government, and an enlightened people have turned a wild forest into the 'Athens of the South.'⁶⁵

As with Dr. Price, Yun drew clear and hopeful parallels between "Indians" and his own Korean people. Though his reading of history is quite shallow (if not absurd, given the horrors of Indian Removal), Yun still saw it as an example of Christian 'improvement' legitimating the missionary cause. As Yun concluded, "There can be no doubt that the heathen world owes great debt to missionaries."⁶⁶

Following this assumption, Yun spent a great deal of his daily life promoting missionary activity within Nashville. He frequently lectured churches about the need for missionaries in Asia. He presented missionary activity in China as great success story where "thousands are yearly added to the Church of Christ."⁶⁷ Yun also attended several send-off ceremonies for missionaries who were imminently departing to foreign lands. Rather than refuting the agenda of 'new imperialism,' Yun was thus an enthusiastic supporter of the West's attempt to spread European culture to the East.

While Yun clearly endorsed foreign intervention even in his early writings, his vision of intervention's end goal was less developed than his critique of the Korean *status quo*. It is, after all, easier to critique an existing system than to theorize an alternative. Yet Yun did provide a basic overview of his vision. Ideally, Yun wanted Korean society and government reformed along the lines of Western classical liberalism. Yun, in his comments calling for an international protectorate, envisioned a "well-disciplined army," a reformed officer corps likely based on merit rather than corrupt patronage, "freedom of the press" and of speech, and a strong education system.⁶⁸ Clearly, Yun also envisioned the Korean peninsula

as a foothold for Christianity. Yun, however, recognized that these were lofty goals given Korea's present condition. Barring the liberal transformation of Korea, Yun singled out two critical priorities that he was desperate to see enacted. The first was the end of Chinese control, the 'Chinese Yoke,' in Korea. Given China's mismanagement, this was an understandable position. Yun considered China's continued dominance to be the worst possible outcome for Korea.⁶⁹ Second, Yun also hoped that Korea would be set on a path to industrial modernity. Perhaps the most successful example of such an 'opened' Asian nation, the society of which Yun said he was most "jealous," was Japan.⁷⁰

SHIFTING TO COLLABORATION?

Twenty years after Vanderbilt, Yun finally got the international intervention he had so long desired, from the power that he so admired. On August 29th, 1910, Japan and Korea concluded the Annexation Treaty of 1910.⁷¹ The treaty abolished Korea's internal government and brought the peninsula into the Japanese Empire. For the next decade, the Japanese military would directly administer Korea.⁷² It was during this turn in Korean history that Yun began to acquire his dark and controversial label as a Japanese collaborator.

Initially, it seemed more probable that Yun would turn *against* the Japanese, rather than support them. In 1911, Japanese authorities arrested Yun and hundreds of other Koreans on charges that they had plotted to kill the Japanese military governor.⁷³ Yun almost certainly had no direct involvement in the assassination attempt.⁷⁴ Yet he underwent "a four-year ordeal of arrest, torture, trial, and imprisonment," and was released only as a goodwill measure on the anniversary of Emperor Taisho's coronation.⁷⁵ Yun's trauma was only a small component of Japan's broader repression of Korea, even in the pre-war era. Under the martial government, the Japanese enforced strict censorship and denied freedom of speech and assembly. In 1919, Korean nationalists carried out a major protest against Japanese rule. (Incidentally, Syngman Rhee, then the provisional President of Korea, futilely petitioned Woodrow Wilson for self-determination).⁷⁶ Despite his brutal treatment at the hands of the Japanese, Yun strongly criticized the 1919 Korean protest in his writings and stood by Japanese control.⁷⁷

What motivated Yun, despite his experience in prison, to remain a supporter of Japanese annexation? As Caprio rightly argues, Yun's logic "trumped" his sense of patriotism.⁷⁸ Yun held out hope that Japan would act as a kind of incubator for Korean development. Yun opined that "if independence were given to us, we [would not be] ready to be profited thereby."⁷⁹ Rather, the Koreans must "learn and wait," and "learn how to use independence when they get it."⁸⁰ As Yun wrote, Japanese annexation had "opened up a field for the development of the Korean people never before dreamed of."⁸¹

Yun's pro-Japanese advocacy, and especially his later public

appearances at Japanese military ceremonies, earned him the "collaborator" label. The Japanese gladly used Yun—by wartime over seventy years old—to encourage Koreans to enlist in the Japanese military. In one notable episode, he led a Japanese military ceremony in chanting "*banzai!*" at a commemoration of the Marco Polo Incident.⁸² Yun's deference to Japan, taken to its logical conclusion, had produced an ugly military nationalism that saw progress in young Koreans taking up arms for the Japanese Emperor, rather than in domestically modernizing Korea.

Yun's positions ultimately become grotesque when juxtaposed with our later knowledge of Japan's subjugation of Korea, which included censorship, theft of historical artifacts and natural resources, forced labor and summary execution, and the impressment of Korean women into sex slavery. Yet where, in this narrative, was Yun's "about face?" Where was his "turning point?" In light of Yun's early diaries, I conclude that the historical search for inversion is misdirected. Yun's continued support for Japan showed a remarkable amount of intellectual *consistency* over time, a position congruent with the views of race and empire he had cultivated since the 1880s. After all, two decades before Japan had annexed Korea, and five decades before Yun's wartime collaboration, he had written that weaker races must "be governed and protected and taught by a more enlightened and stronger people."⁸³

Yun's support for the Japanese colonization of Korea, in light of the Vanderbilt diaries, hardly entails the intellectual inversion the historiography suggests. Even early in his life, Yun was actively seeking the intervention of an imperialist power in his belief that only external forces could reverse Korea's 'backwardness.' Yun did not spend the 1880s and 1890s as a Korean patriot and then suddenly renounce his ideals in the 1910s or 1930s as an anti-patriotic supporter of Japan. Rather, as his diaries show, he had constructed a coherent, genuine, pro-imperial ideology on pragmatic grounds that saw patriotism and collaboration as fully compatible. Working with a modern imperial power to 'improve' Korea was, to Yun, actually an affirmation of Korean nationalism.

Yun's downfall came from the fact that the power colonizing Korea, Imperial Japan, proved to be a monstrous occupier. Intervening history after Yun's death in 1945 proved that Japan's actions in colonizing East Asia were as brutal as they were rapacious and unproductive. Yet Yun, at least in his own mind, was not 'caving' to Japanese authority in his collaboration. The activities and sympathies we now call 'collaboration' were consistent with the viewpoints he had developed at Vanderbilt over forty years before. In this sense, we can read Yun as a misguided and relentless pragmatist, willing to sacrifice some of his tenets in service of what he thought was the greater mission. Yun's tragic gamble, as he himself described it, was that "In this world of alloys, a man of mixed moral character succeeds better than one of purer morality."⁸⁴ 🏛️

Endnotes

- [1] Yun Chi-ho, *Yun Chi Ho's Diary 1890-1892, Volume II* (Seoul: National History Compilation Committee, 1974), entry from October 23, 1891, 223. NB: Yun spells "Koreans" as "Coreans." I have modernized the spelling throughout this paper.
- [2] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from October 23, 1891, 223. Emphasis in original.
- [3] *Ibid.*, 223-224.
- [4] *Ibid.*, 223.
- [5] Mark E. Caprio, "Loyal Patriot? Traitorous Collaborator? The Yun Chi Ho Diaries and the Question of National Loyalty," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), <http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/article/209552>, paragraph 3.
- [6] *Ibid.*, paragraph 51. Caprio theorizes that had Japan won the war, the Japanese would have honored Yun as a significant ally of the colonial administration.
- [7] *Ibid.*, paragraph 1. A 2004 South Korean government commission named Yun as one of 3,090 known collaborators.
- [8] *Ibid.*, paragraph 18.
- [9] *Ibid.*, paragraph 3.
- [10] Kim Dohun, "Yun Ch'iho," in *Panminjok munje yon'gu so*, ed., "Ch'inil p'a 99 (1), 158-166; cited and translated in Caprio, paragraph 18.
- [11] Hyung-chan Kim, "Portrait of a Troubled Korean Patriot: Yun Ch'i-ho's Views of the March First Independence Movement and World War II," *Korean Studies*, Vol. 13, (1989): 83.
- [12] Caprio, paragraph 53.
- [13] Daniel M. Davies, "The Impact of Christianity Upon Korea, 1884-1910: Six Key American and Korean Figures," *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 36 (1994): 802.
- [14] Gordon H. Chang, "Whose 'Barbarism?' Whose 'Treachery?' Race and Civilization in the Unknown United States-Korea War of 1871," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 89 (2003): 1331.
- [15] *Ibid.*, 1346.
- [16] *Ibid.*, 1355.
- [17] *Ibid.*
- [18] *Ibid.*, 1349.
- [19] "Korea: The West and Japan (1860s-1919)," *Asia for Educators, Columbia University* (2009), http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_koreajapan.htm.
- [20] Davies, 806.
- [21] *Ibid.*
- [22] *Ibid.*, 805.
- [23] Patricia Ebrey and Anne Walthall, *Modern East Asia: From 1600; A Cultural, Social, and Political History* (Boston: Wadsworth, 2014), 375.
- [24] *Ibid.*
- [25] Ebrey and Walthall, 375.
- [26] Caprio, paragraph 13.
- [27] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from August 13, 1890, 99.
- [28] Andrew Urban, "Yun Chi-ho's Alienation by Way of Inclusion: A Korean International Student and Christian Reform in the New South, 1888-1893," *Journal of Asian American Studies*, Vol. 17 (2014): 308.
- [29] Yun, *Diary Vol. I*, entry from December 9, 1889, 409.
- [30] Yun, *Diary Vol. I*, entries from December 8-9, 1889, 408-409.
- [31] *Ibid.*
- [32] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from May 4, 1890, 52.
- [33] *Ibid.*
- [34] *Ibid.*
- [35] *Ibid.*, entry from February 6, 1890, 15.
- [36] *Ibid.*, entry from April 1, 1890, 39.
- [37] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from February 14, 1890, 17-19.
- [38] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from February 23, 1890, 23.
- [39] *Ibid.*
- [40] Urban, 310.
- [41] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from January 16, 1891, 145.
- [42] *Ibid.*, 145-146.
- [43] *Ibid.*
- [44] Yun, *Diary Vol. I*, entry from December 24, 1889, 416.
- [45] Yun, *Diary Vol. I*, entry from December 14, 1889, 410.
- [46] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from November 27, 1890, 122-123.
- [47] *Ibid.*, entry from December 14, 1890, 132-133.
- [48] *Ibid.*, entry from March 24, 1890, 37.
- [49] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from February 7, 1890, 16.
- [50] Yun, *Diary Vol. I*, entry from December 23, 1889, 413.
- [51] *Ibid.*
- [52] Mao Zedong, "Friendship or Aggression?" quoted in R. David Arkush and Leo E. Lee, *Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 243.
- [53] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from May 12, 1891, 191-192.
- [54] *Ibid.*
- [55] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from May 18, 1890, 57-60.
- [56] *Ibid.*
- [57] *Ibid.*
- [58] Yun, *Diary Vol. I*, entry from December 28, 1889, 419.
- [59] *Ibid.*
- [60] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from May 18, 1890, 57-60.
- [61] Yun, *Diary Vol. I*, entry from December 14, 1889, 410.
- [62] *Ibid.*
- [63] *Ibid.*, entry from December 23, 1889, 415.
- [64] *Ibid.*
- [65] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from March 7, 1890, 30.
- [66] *Ibid.*, entry from January 26, 1890, 11.
- [67] *Ibid.*, entry from March 2, 1890, 27.
- [68] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from May 18, 1890, 57-60.
- [69] *Ibid.*
- [70] *Ibid.*, entry from April 4, 1890, 40-41.
- [71] "The Annexation of Korea to Japan," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 4 (1910): 923.
- [72] "Korea as a Colony of Japan," *Asia for Educators, Columbia University* (2009), http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_korea imperialism.htm.
- [73] Caprio, paragraph 15.
- [74] Urban, 327-328. Urban points out that of the 105 Koreans ar-

rested in the Japanese investigation, only six were ever convicted. The incident caused an international uproar over Japan's use of torture to extract 'confessions' from Yun and the others. Urban hypothesizes that the Japanese specifically targeted Yun because of Yun's previous activities in the Korean independence movement in the 1890s.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Hyung Woong Hong, *American Foreign Policy Toward Korea, 1945-1950* (Oklahoma State University, unpublished dissertation,

2007), 53-54.

[77] Caprio, paragraph 23.

[78] Ibid., paragraph 22.

[79] Yun, *Diary Volume VII*, entry from March 2, 1919.

[80] Yun, *Diary Volume VIII*, entry from June 5, 1920.

[81] Yun, *Diary Volume XI*, entry from June 8, 1938.

[82] Caprio, paragraph 39.

[83] Yun, *Diary Vol. I*, entry from December 24, 1889, 416.

[84] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from February 27, 1890, 25.m, 160.

THE CRUCIBLE OF COMBAT

Italian Soldiers' Perspectives on the Second Italo-Ethiopian War

As Italy's soldiers advanced into Ethiopia the initial excitement of the invasion soon gave way to anticlimax and horror. Having envisioned a campaign of valorous heroism many soldiers expressed shock and even sympathy when confronted with its naked brutality. As the war dragged on, however – and the Ethiopian defense grew ever more durable – these early trepidations would soon harden into increasing indignation. In this way the jubilation that met the Italians' occupation of Addis Ababa on May 5, 1936 was not purely an expression of imperialistic triumph, but a testament to the common sacrifice and emotional inurement that ultimately allowed Italy's soldiers to so deeply identify with the campaign.

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Commemorative Postcard: Naples - Departure of Soldiers for Italian East Africa

Source: Modena Per Gli Altri - Collezione Privata di Celso Braia

The order arrived at General De Bono's military headquarters in Asmara on September 27, 1935. It was short and unequivocal. "Attack at dawn on third," it read, "repeat third October."¹ The telegram was signed by the Duce himself.

De Bono was ready. Years of planning and preparation had led to this moment. Exercising his authority as Supreme Commander of Italian Forces in East Africa, the general summoned his officers to issue final instructions. They needed only his word of approval. By now Italian troops and

military matériel were all but completely mobilized. Asmara's "every street was jammed with troops, guns, and equipment for war," and "1,000,000 tons of stores and ammunition" had been shipped from Naples alone.² Italy, at last, was poised at the precipice of war. Now, from the inner chambers of Mussolini's fascist government in Rome to the arid plains of Italy's fledgling colonial capital, it was clear that the Italian gerarchi had finally waited long enough. The time for action had arrived.

Five days later the Second Italo-Ethiopian War was officially underway. At precisely 5 a.m. on October 3, 1935, more than 100,000 Italian soldiers surged across the muddy red waters of the Mareb River and advanced from Italian Eritrea into Ethiopia. They marched quickly, inexorably forward, flanked by tanks, artillery, and flights of Regia Aeronautica bombers that droned back and forth over the 60-kilometer front. They met no resistance. Aside from rifle rounds discharged in the cacophony of celebration that followed – as Italian soldiers sang, waved banners, and triumphantly trumpeted their invasion well into the night – “not another shot disturbed the utter tranquility of the first day of the war.”³

For the many Italians who took part in this first phase of the invasion, the Ethiopian campaign originally seemed to offer all of the glory and triumph of war with none of the expected hardship. In reality – as they would discover in due time – the Ethiopian forces of Emperor Haile Selassie had simply withdrawn deeper into the interior of the country, biding their time until the extension of Italy’s supply lines rendered its forces more vulnerable to attack. More than a genuine reflection of Italian military superiority, theirs was a temporary, artificial peace. But as Elvio Cardarelli, a 23-year-old conscript reared on the outskirts of Rome, strode confidently forward the day after the invasion, the ease of the Italian advance seemed only to confirm the indomitable essence of fascist militancy:

We learn that everything is proceeding well; so far only a mere skirmish where one rifleman was lightly wounded... meanwhile our soldiers resume the advance, moving forward with an absolute tranquility.⁴

Elsewhere early testimonies of the invasion were broadly similar. Having girded themselves for battle with the “famed Ethiopian warriors”⁵ who had overwhelmed the Italians forty years prior in the First Italo-Ethiopian War, most soldiers – much to their pleasant surprise – passed the early days and weeks of the campaign without even firing their weapons, advancing seamlessly from one Ethiopian town to the next in their seemingly unstoppable march towards Addis Ababa. At times, this relative serenity was so absolute that it seemed to lull many into a false sense of relaxation. “I find myself well in war,” commented one young corporal, exuding a placid complacency with his new surroundings, “You eat, you drink, you sleep, you work, and you are paid. What more do you want?”⁶

Within the broader spectacle of the invasion, perhaps the moment of greatest symbolic importance would come with the capture of the Ethiopian city of Aduwa on October 6, 1935 – again with no resistance from the city’s inhabitants.⁷ Situated roughly twenty miles from the Eritrean border, Aduwa was, at face value, little more than a dusty town on the outskirts of the Ethiopian Empire. Its infrastructure was limited when existent, and the city held no strategic importance for either the Italian or Ethiopian armies. Yet as a symbol of fascist Italy’s resurgence the significance of its capture was practically

unmatched. It was here, after all, that some 10,000 Italian soldiers had been killed, wounded, or captured in the final battle of the First Italo-Ethiopian War, in what one historian has called the “greatest military defeat incurred by any European nation at the hands of Africans in all of the nineteenth century.”⁸ By 1935 – almost four full decades after the surrender – the shame of Aduwa continued to linger perniciously in the Italian psyche. For many Italians, even those who had had no direct connection to the conflict, the “Aduwa Complex” was an enduring source of national humiliation; a constant reminder that Italy was in some way inferior to the rest of imperial Europe. At every moment of national hesitation “memories of the defeat would be recalled...as a sign that Italy might once again buckle under pressure.”⁹ Even Mussolini – who was only a child when news of Italy’s defeat at Aduwa reached the Italian public – recalled that “the figures of thousands dead and seventy-two cannon lost hammered in my head for years” afterwards.¹⁰

Accordingly, with the fall of Aduwa just three days into the Ethiopian campaign, many Italians were quick to claim a massive moral victory. On October 9, 1935 a “huge picture of Mussolini” was raised over the city gates, complemented by “enormous white [stone] letters – ‘M’ for Mussolini and ‘E’ for King Victor Emmanuel” – which were hastily constructed on “two distant mountains”¹¹ beyond the city. A few days later General De Bono himself rode triumphantly through the city on horseback, greeted – as he noted sardonically in his later memoirs – “amidst the cheers of the population who had been told they must applaud me.”¹²

Still, while his raucous reception by local Ethiopians was largely artificial, the spirit of Italy’s soldiers was definitively not. “Today we finally learned our official number of losses in the capture of Aduwa,” Cardarelli noted privately, not without some pride: “There were zero.”¹³ Moving beyond the numerical realities of the operation, one of Cardarelli’s comrades, Espedito Russo, was even more rapturous about the national catharsis of the city’s capture:

The fallen of 1896 are vindicated. Aduwa is ours. Today will be a memorable day for all of Italy. Everyone rejoices and perhaps a few other fascists [elsewhere] feel a certain pain in their soul. They, too, would have liked to find themselves sharing this sacred duty in the land where – many years ago – our forefathers fell as heroes. On 10-6-35 the Italian flag returns to wave over the city.¹⁴

For now – bathed in the comfortable elation of the campaign’s progress – it was easy to get lost in Italy’s seemingly effortless advance; to fundamentally misunderstand the war effort as a passive and bloodless imposition of force. But these perceptions would not last forever. By the early days of November 1935, the Ethiopian army had finally begun to harass Italy’s invading forces in earnest, launching a protracted campaign of guerrilla warfare along the northern front of the country. Though Italy’s soldiers still remained comparatively better armed and supplied throughout this period – usually



Commemorative Postcard: *The Italian “redemption” at Aduwa*
Source: *Modena Per Gli Altri – Collezione Privata di Celso Braia*

inflicting much heavier casualties than they ever sustained – these first glimpses of serious combat would seriously challenge many soldiers’ original calculus of the war effort. Certainly this was the case when soldiers found themselves embroiled in battle for the first time, but even a secondhand exposure to the brutality of these early skirmishes could be jarring. Indeed – not five days after celebrating the 13th anniversary of Italian fascism on October 28, 1935 – Cardarelli had already begun to assume a distinctly darker aura in his personal diary, as he scribbled privately in the wake of his first confrontation with the visceral and violent evidence of modern warfare. “The wounded – with their clothes soaked in blood, exhausted, and missing limbs – show no sign of life,” he noted somberly. “I distance myself, I cannot restrain myself any longer at the sight of this painful scene... distressing thoughts run through my head; a tempest of indescribable ideas. Once again: is this war..?!”¹⁵

Falling into a fitful slumber later that night, Cardarelli tried to shake the scenes of suffering from his memory. Alas, it was no use. Condemned to the recesses of his own imagination,

he tossed and turned – tormented by nightmares all night long – as he recalled with lingering dread the next morning: “Throughout the entire night the most horrible nightmares disrupted my sleep. There were horribly mutilated bodies that passed before my terrified eyes, one of which – with a severed head – staggered forward before falling into a torrent of blood, where human remains of every sort floated by, carried by the current.”¹⁶

Faced for the first time with the savage realities of the Ethiopian campaign, a number of soldiers were deeply and visibly disturbed by what they saw. As many of their fathers had no doubt realized over the course of the First World War pining for military glory in the abstract was one thing. Fully embracing the requisite violence needed to achieve it, however, was quite another. At least for those soldiers who had yet to directly engage with their Ethiopian adversaries, this sense of general horror was originally so all-enveloping that – in many cases – it often extended into a kind of oblique pity for their fallen foes. Well aware of the military asymmetry between themselves and the Ethiopian army, many soldiers could not help but note the tragic technical deficiencies of Ethiopia’s fighting force, particularly when they tried to make use of Italy’s more modern military implements. “This morning an indigenous soldier found an unexploded hand grenade,” one young recruit somberly noted, “inadvertently pulling the pin, he was killed instantly.”¹⁷ “In the afternoon, a group of natives found an unexploded projectile,” added one Giacomo Agnese in his own diary, recounting an almost identical episode, “handling it out of curiosity, they detonate it... not knowing the cause of the explosion.”¹⁸ As the campaign dragged on – and similar stories became increasingly well-known – these piteous scenes would only further reinforce the absurd power imbalance that continued to separate the two sides, as yet another Italian recruit expounded in one particularly telling anecdote:

“Italians kiss well, we kiss bad.” This phrase uttered by an Ethiopian might raise suspicions on the normality of his sexual activities. And yet many ex-enemies have repeated it to me. Explaining the uncertainty is easy. During an attack our infantry depart with a rifle in their left hand and a grenade in their right. To remove the firing pin from the grenade they have to strip the tab with their teeth, after which the grenade – once thrown – explodes. The Ethiopians have managed to capture several crates of grenades... grenades that they use against us... except that they forget to pull the pin, limiting themselves to “kissing them” (as they had seen us do to ours) with the result that the grenades remain unexploded and are immediately used by the Italians. These [the Italians] make explode by “kissing them well.”¹⁹

Beyond the limited technical know-how of many Ethiopians, a significant proportion of Italian soldiers were similarly underwhelmed by the haphazard discipline and appearance of the East African army confronting them. Here, evidence of their adversaries’ relative disarray not only confirmed many

Italians' feelings of military superiority, but – at least in the case of Elvio Cardarelli – forced them to contemplate whether these seemingly ragtag resistors should even be taken seriously at all. “There are some that are armed with modern rifles, some with older barrel-loading types... and then those that have only a scimitar, lance, dagger, or are completely unarmed,” Cardarelli puzzled privately. “Behind them are women laden like mules, carrying gold and cookware on their shoulders as well as weapons... are we to conclude that these are our enemies...?!²⁰

Similar questions would continue to trouble Cardarelli for weeks to come. And so long as he remained skeptical about the military prowess of the Ethiopians, it was not – as he increasingly intimated – an impossible leap for him to partially sympathize with their suffering. Admittedly, at least in Cardarelli's case, this general unease never amounted to either an outright condemnation of the war or warfare in general. But as he came upon the corpse of an Ethiopian boy less than a week later – shot dead in a panicked burst of Italian fire – it was obvious that the sight of such senseless, innocent bloodshed could not help but arouse his pity:

Friends of the dead arrive, expressing their pain with wails and writhing contortions... there is also a woman with a horrible wound on her face, and another on her neck; she is not yet dead, but guessing that she has only a few minutes to live, she gasps.²¹

On rare occasions, and most dramatically of all, this quiet agitation could even evolve into outright dissent. So it was, for example, in the case of 23-year-old Vasco Poggesi – a child of moderately left-wing parents from the small town of Reggello, Tuscany. Like the bulk of his comrades he had embarked from Italy in high spirits, waxing privately that “young people... have the spirit of adventure in their blood and want at this time to be heroes in the eyes of their fine comrades and of all the Nation.”²² For now, he was as starry-eyed as any of the hopeful young soldiers around him. But that would all change once the war got underway. Faced with the grating pretension of his superiors, and the brutal savagery of the campaign, it was not long before he found himself completely disillusioned with the shallow rationalizations of the Mussolini regime, as he soon ranted privately in one increasingly scathing diatribe after another:

Is our aim really to shine light where there is darkness, or is it rather to conquer a rich and fertile region? No, I do not consider our actions against Abyssinia justified... because an attempt is being made on this occasion to conceal behind a mask of humanity and civilization what in reality is an act of aggression against an enemy that has only its courage and its fury to oppose us... Am I a discordant note in what is – or is said to be – a concert of harmony and complete approval? Yes. I am not a sheep. My mind is not so blinkered as not to see good and evil. And what we are doing is evil.²³

Here, however, it is important to clarify just how remarkable Poggesi's dissent was in the broader context of the

campaign, not only for his clear appreciation of Italy's imperial lust but for his total disassociation with “the behavior of [his] nation.” Indeed, far from epitomizing a general and mounting discord among his comrades, Poggesi's vociferous indictment of the campaign was – in many ways – extraordinarily anomalous; a kind of enraged exception that proved an otherwise prevailing rule of “harmony... and approval.” At times this contrast had not always been so clear. Particularly at the outset of hostilities many soldiers clearly shared some of Poggesi's concerns. Most, like him, were horrified by the butchery of combat. Most, too, expressed some degree of awareness or concern for the piteous plight of their Ethiopian foes. But while Poggesi's original trepidations only became further ossified over time – as he beheld ever more grotesque testaments to the savagery of fascist militancy – those of his comrades usually did not, instead trending more in the direction of renewed purpose and passion. For this majority it had been easy, even natural, to lament seemingly innocent suffering. But so, too, was it easy to feel this horror gradually melt into righteous anger and resentment, as they increasingly began to endure suffering of their own.

As the war effort progressed, one particularly acute source of outrage was the belief that Italy's Western rivals were personally collaborating with the enemy on the battlefield, and even directly responsible for the increasing durability of the Ethiopian defense. Generally speaking this was a gross misrepresentation of reality, though the claim was not without some justification. Throughout the early 1920s and 30s – as Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie labored to integrate his country into the international sphere through its membership in the League of Nations – a number of independent “Europeans and Americans [had been] engaged by the Ethiopian government as advisors to various ministries.”²⁴ Later, when the war began in October 1935, it is clear that some stayed on of their own volition, though as independent actors rather than sanctioned emissaries of their respective governments. In the broader context of the seven-month campaign the participation of this handful of white military consultants would ultimately have a negligible influence on the Ethiopian defense. But in the eyes of the Italian soldiers who encountered them – or heard rumors of white faces among the enemy ranks – this outside interference was interpreted as yet another confirmation of Italy's inherent racial and military superiority. “If up until now the army of the Negus was a jumble of men with neither order nor discipline,” Cardarelli scribbled privately in the wake of one such encounter, “it seems certain that now a few white officials (Belgian, English, Norwegian) have provided these two principal elements – strength and resistance – behind the lines of every army.”

At times it is clear that these already exaggerated perceptions had a way of straying into outright fabrication. Suspecting a secret, conspiratorial proliferation of European officers, Giacomo Agnese privately floated the theory that “beyond dressing like Ethiopian soldiers,” many white officials actu-



Elvio Cardarelli journaling by lamplight at the front
Source: *Dove La Vita Si Nasconde Alla Morte: La Guerra D’Etiopia Raccontata Da Un Soldato Nel ‘Diario Del Mio Richiamo’*

ally “dyed their faces black... to better disguise themselves.”²⁵ Here, even among fellow volunteers, this was an extreme position. And yet although Agnese’s radical opinions did not seem to be widely accepted, his outrage at these officials’ “renunciation of their race”²⁶ was clearly very much shared, as Elvio Cardarelli elaborated in yet another battlefield evocation on the campaign’s racial overtones:

On the enemy side, among the black dead and wounded, a white official was found, fallen a few meters from the wall of the redoubt; a 46-year-old major spit in his face in a sign of extreme contempt. These renegades of their race should be treated no better: they do not merit that respect which is owed who are killed on the front lines – the carcass of this man has not fought for a flag, like all the heroic fallen, but for a master like a mule, and should be treated worse than this, because a mule does not have reason, does not have a soul; but a white man – yes.²⁷

For Cardarelli and others the presence of white officials on the battlefield did more than just solidify the increasing separation between fascist Italy and the rest of Western Europe: it clarified these soldiers’ sense of purpose. Faced, on the one hand, with the purportedly mercenary motivations and tactics of their European rivals – as well as the treacherous defection of countless conscripted *Ascari* – many Italians came to increasingly see theirs as the more virtuous campaign, in which the noble ideals of nationalism had been pitted against the basest forms of human depravity. For those soldiers originally horrified by the carnage of combat, this seeming moral disparity would provide an important rallying point. But per-

haps even more importantly – as Cardarelli had expounded privately several weeks prior to his encounter with the fallen white official – it also heightened the racial animus of the war effort, which had grown ever more pronounced with each new glimpse of the Ethiopians’ brutal guerilla tactics:

We had just marched several kilometers, when a terrifying scene presented itself before our horrified eyes... four stark naked [Italian] soldiers lie in a small clearing that shows traces of a struggle. The bodies are horrendously mutilated; they no longer resemble anything human. Their limbs are detached from their bodies – presenting evidence of deep stab wounds – while their faces have been completely disfigured by a dagger, so much so that pieces of bloody flesh are detached, hanging limply towards the ground. One of these four martyrs was completely cut in half... torn to pieces in a monstrous spectacle. I feel tears wet my eyes... all four were married, and one the father of six children.²⁸

Scarred by what he had just seen, Cardarelli resumed his march. Yet where he had once felt empty anguish at the sight of such butchery – and even, sometimes, an almost tentative sympathy for his fallen African foes – he now felt only a furious and righteous anger: “We resume our journey, with our hearts heavy and our spirits aching, along with a violent desire to avenge those poor mutilated bodies... it’s no longer the time for playing around, nor for using gentle and civil methods with these people...it has begun for us, the truly dangerous period of this colonial war.”²⁹

Given Cardarelli’s marked personal transformation – from reluctant recruit, to occasional critic, to, finally, a steely and single-minded soldier – it is worth devoting particular attention to his private testimonies. Yet he was hardly the only soldier to embrace a more militantly xenophobic appraisal of the war effort as time went on. In the case of Giacomo Agnese, for example, the first triumphant days of the invasion had elicited a similarly tentative degree of sympathy for the Italians’ indigenous adversaries. After noting that many of his fellow soldiers had begun to “enthusiastically raid”³⁰ the homes of surrendered Ethiopians – among other early wartime atrocities – he seemed to offer a tacit endorsement of the sanctions meted out by Italy’s high command. “The major speaks to the troops, admonishing the lack of discipline and the raids of yesterday,” Agnese recorded. “He says that strict action will be taken against those who would continue and informs us that one militant – from the 116th legion – will be shot. He had been surprised trying to force his desires, dagger in hand, on an indigenous girl.”³¹

At this point in the campaign Agnese’s perception of Ethiopia’s inhabitants was probably closer to a kind of imperious paternalism than outright racial hatred. Though not exactly comparable, for instance, he noted that Italy’s colonial conscripts – known as *Ascari* – “seemed physically childlike... nervous and almost delicate,” but ultimately concluded that they were also “incredibly honest” people.³² Similarly, in yet

another acknowledgement of Italy's rapacious advance, he later lamented the "indescribable damage... of the troops' looting," recording the piteous screams of several village women who "climbed on the roofs of their huts to make [their protests] heard."³³ For now, at least, Agnese was not wholly blind to the suffering that surrounded him, comfortable as he was in his inherent sense of racial superiority. But his flippant chauvinism would soon assume a significantly darker tone as the war effort became increasingly onerous. Once generally unsettled by the rampant plundering of his comrades, Agnese's entries began to focus more and more on his own nutritional deficiencies. "Four loaves were distributed [to the unit]," he scribbled bitterly on October 9, "which must suffice for two days."³⁴ By early November the situation had only worsened. "Our hardships and privations have reduced [one soldier] to a skeleton, all eyes and a beard... many remain without meat."³⁵ Within a few more days, he had had enough:

I assist in a wood gathering operation... forcing down the doors of the [village] houses between the protests of their inhabitants. One woman, screaming like a banshee, bares her sagging breasts before our eyes; perhaps she wants to tell me she is a mother, but I don't see any children and I expel her with a stick... suddenly mounted police arrive in the village and everyone sneaks off... the high commanders try to protect the local populations for political motivations, but the minor commanders are obliged to proceed as above, out of urgent need, and a more natural conception of war.³⁶

As had occurred in previous stages of Italy's mobilization there was a clear continuity between Agnese's outrage and his mounting physical hardship, though this time, by contrast, it was channeled externally rather than against Italy's own. To be sure there was still a degree of friction within the ranks, particularly between Italy's higher and lower ranking officers. But this relative tension was also coupled with a new solidarity in the face of an increasingly dangerous enemy, as well as a common assurance that – despite any discord that might still exist among Italy's soldiers – it was only the Ethiopians who directly threatened their survival. This clear distinction was hardly lost on Agnese and his comrades. "Yesterday, a soldier from the 114th... was captured and tortured by the natives," Agnese scribbled somberly, adding that another wounded soldier had "sang [the fascist anthem]" as he was being operated on that morning.³⁷ United in common danger the unit's sense of patriotism had never been stronger. And as Agnese passively recorded in the wake of another Ethiopian assault, now all too comfortable with the violent procedures of the campaign, "In the afternoon a firewood detail from the 144th legion, composed of four men, was assaulted: all killed. Out go our patrols, to set fire to all the villages in the vicinity."³⁸

Steeped in the heat of the war effort Agnese's original moral trepidations had all but evaporated. Yet the greatest traumas of the campaign had yet to come. Throughout December and January the Ethiopian counter-offensive would only contin-

ue to gather steam, exacting an ever more preoccupying toll on Italy's expeditionary units. In the eyes of the Mussolini regime – and its earliest historians of fascist colonialism – this was, bar none, the "black period" of the campaign.³⁹ Having replaced General De Bono in late November following the desultory stagnation of the Italian advance, Italy's newly appointed colonial commander, Pietro Badoglio, confronted a situation in which he had "not only failed to move an inch since replacing General De Bono, but... had actually allowed much of the territory taken by his predecessor to be torn from his grasp."⁴⁰ Desperate for reinforcements, Badoglio sent an urgent wire to Italy in December of 1935 asking for "two more divisions" before swiftly dispatching "two massive columns to halt the advance" of Ethiopian forces.⁴¹ The immediate results were mixed. As Italian colonial historian Angelo del Boca has observed, Italy's swift ensuing victories again proved "ephemeral... compelling the Italians to fall back as far as the entrenched camp of [Aduwa] in the north... and leaving their headquarters in Tembien in the hands of the [Ethiopians]" by the last days of December.⁴²

By now the campaign had assumed a distinctively desperate aura. The fall of Tembien, a mountainous outpost in northern Ethiopia, weighed particularly heavily on Badoglio, prompting the general to launch an ambitious offensive to reclaim the territory between January 20 and 24. Months later this would come to be known as the First Battle of Tembien, most notable to historians for having featured some of the fiercest fighting of the entire campaign. For now, however, it was simply the greatest onslaught Italy's soldiers had yet faced. Here, as had been the case throughout the campaign, the Italians remained vastly better armed than their African adversaries. But the Ethiopians had numbers on their side, having "succeeded in establishing themselves with 160,000 men on the heights overlooking the Italian positions."⁴³ With each new Ethiopian assault, the number of Italian casualties rose higher and higher. A decisive victory – one seemingly assured – was now increasingly uncertain. And in the testimony of one Italian journalist embedded in the soldiers' ranks, General Badoglio was clearly feeling the pressure. "Fully dressed...he sat on a stool in his tent beside the telephone. On the few occasions when it rang, he lifted the receiver and listened in silence, his face a mask of stone in the crude light of the acetylene lamp."⁴⁴

Badoglio was not the only Italian riven with a sense of anxious detachment. Separated as he was from the battlefields of Tembien, Cardarelli was but another of the many soldiers preoccupied with the desperate circumstances of his distant comrades, as he privately recorded just a few hours prior to Badoglio's stoic, bedtime brooding:

A motorcyclist arrives at our unit from the front... three of our divisions – the Gavinana, the March 23, and the April 21 – are completely engaged, while the October 28 is encircled. The [casualties] of the enemy vastly surpass our own; but the forces we are aligned against are superi-

or to ours... the motorcyclist adds that we are [outnumbered] 10 to 1.⁴⁵

For Cardarelli this breathless account was deeply unsettling. But for his distant comrade Giacomo Agnese, a minor official in the surrounded October 28 division, it was a matter of life and death. Three days prior, having dug in along the perimeter of an “advance fortification,” Agnese and his men were only just beginning “to surround the fortification with barbed wire”⁴⁶ in anticipation of the trials to come. Consumed by nervous anxiety, Agnese complained of “stomach

perately staving off wave after wave of the Ethiopian assault, a lone, familiar cry pierced the din of the battle:

At a quarter past noon Ferruccio is hit and slumps to the ground with a cry. We carry him a below and treat him: a bullet has entered under his right shoulder blade, with no exit wound. The wound seems serious, but we try to comfort him, telling him that it is nothing. He remains unconvinced, however, because he feels internal pain and his legs are paralyzed. [The medics] carry him immediately to the central fortification on a stretcher.⁵²

“Once generally uncertain about the allure of abstract military glory these soldiers were now fighting for something distinctly different: revenge, vindication, and survival.”

pains” that plagued him throughout a “terrible night” of restless slumber.⁴⁷ Fortunately he did not have to face these trials alone. Since Agnese’s arrival in East Africa one individual had continued to stick out in his almost fifty pages of diary entries as a recurrent source of comfort and companionship: a man by the name of Ferruccio. Having both grown up in the northwestern Italian city of Oneglia, the two had become fast friends. “Last night between drags of a cigarette I remained with my friend Ferruccio until nine,” Agnese had written contentedly towards the end of November, “chatting about mutual friends, his home and my home, the future.”⁴⁸ By Christmas time the two were practically inseparable. “I gifted Ferruccio a ski mask,” Agnese noted privately, “he received a cake completely reduced to crumbs: I eat a little bit of it with him, and then we eat a few other things.”⁴⁹ Separated from the comforts of home – in a foreign and hostile territory – the two depended on one another like brothers. But all that would change with the Battle of Tembien.

On January 21 – after another fitful night’s sleep – Agnese awoke to the sound of gunfire. “We fight on our left, intensely, for the entire morning,” he scribbled privately later that evening, “in the afternoon we are also attacked on our right side: the three machine guns... jam often.”⁵⁰ By nightfall the Italians’ had barely managed to hold their ground. Hours later, the morning would bring little respite:

The day begins with fighting a little bit everywhere, but above all on our left. We are surrounded. The mountain to our left that looks out over the valley – previously occupied by our Ascari – is now in the hands of the Ethiopians. A missing soldier from the third company, who comes to take refuge in our fortification, brings news of our grave losses. In the central fortification, the largest, where the infirmary is located, it is a parade of stretchers.⁵¹

Over the course of the day the Italian lines slowly dissolved into bedlam. As Agnese struggled to steel his resolve, des-

Throughout the next few days Agnese visits Ferruccio in the infirmary whenever he can. He is tentatively, hopefully, optimistic, but admits each time that Ferruccio “seems worsened.”⁵³ Before falling into a fitful sleep on January 22 – the eve of his third straight day of combat – Agnese writes “I try to encourage him but I almost feel ashamed... I leave him a few sugar cubes.”⁵⁴ The next evening his daily entry is even shorter. “Ferruccio speaks only in monosyllables,” he notes privately, “he continually asks for water but I do not succeed in procuring him any.”⁵⁵

By January 25 the First Battle of Tembien had finally been won. Yet it had come at an extraordinary cost for the Italians, claiming the lives of some “60 officers, 605 nationals, and 417 Ascari.”⁵⁶ “The dead from our battalion number 110,” Agnese recorded in quiet shock, “though they remained in enemy hands for only a short time they are completely naked and horribly mutilated... I try and identify a few, but I have to distance myself out of horror.”⁵⁷ Overwhelmed by the carnage of the battle, Agnese tried to put his feelings into words in a letter to his wife. But the most devastating news was still yet to come:

I had just mailed a letter to Lina to bring her up to speed about the tragedy of Ferruccio, when they came to inform me that my friend was dead. I run, run, followed by many comrades, and I find him close to a grave that has already been dug. I kiss him, and those who knew him kiss him as well, but the gravediggers are in a rush; there is much work to be done, we must bury him. When he is lowered into the hole, I jump down to lay a blanket under his head and over his face.⁵⁸

For Agnese, the loss of his friend would forever change the way that he understood the campaign. He was not alone in this regard. Confronted by the visceral brutality of the war; by personal suffering on a previously unimaginable scale; by an enemy that appeared ever more fearsome and nefarious with each new skirmish, most Italian soldiers only grew increasingly anesthetized to the plight of the Ethiopians as

the campaign progressed. For some, like Mussolini's son Vittorio, who "boasted of the effect of incendiary bombs on terrorized civilians," this numbness amounted to nothing more than a consistent, wanton sadism.⁵⁹ And yet for most – like Morlotti, Cardarelli, and Agnese – a clear transformation had gradually taken place. Once generally uncertain about the allure of abstract military glory these soldiers were now fighting for something distinctly different: revenge, vindication, and survival. War, as they had increasingly come to believe, was not for the merciful. And as Mussolini had cabled General Badoglio in the final days of January, theirs would be a victory "by any means necessary."⁶⁰

As time wore on – and especially in the latter half of the campaign – the use of one particularly insidious implement would come to define the regime's no-holds-barred militarism: poison gas (or 'insecticide' as General Badoglio euphemistically called it).⁶¹ Though it was not until 1996 that the Italian Ministry of Defense finally "admitted publicly that mustard gas and arsine had been used in Ethiopia,"⁶² it remains well documented that from December 1935 through March 1936 "around 1,000 heavy bombs filled with the chemicals were dropped on enemy positions [and] sprayed as a vapor from aircrafts,"⁶³ killing and poisoning thousands of combatants and non-combatants alike. Beyond targeting Ethiopian soldiers alone, historian Alberto Sbacchi has documented that "General Badoglio sprayed villages, herds, pastures, rivers, and lakes with [mustard gas]"⁶⁴ in efforts to systematically exterminate pockets of Ethiopia's civilian population, proudly cabling Mussolini in the wake of the First Battle of Tembien that "rumors circulate of terror from the use of gas."⁶⁵ In the testimony of one Ethiopian commander engaged at Tembien – a rarity within the historiography of Italian colonialism – these chemical attacks were not only a severe source of demoralization for the Ethiopians but arguably the single most important factor in turning the tide in favor of the Italians:

The bombing from the air had reached its height when suddenly a number of my warriors dropped their weapons, screamed with agony, rubbed their eyes with their knuckles, buckled at the knees and collapsed. An invisible rain of lethal gas was splashing down on my men... I dare not think of how many men I lost on [January 23] alone. The gas contaminated the fields and woods, and at least 2,000 animals died. Mules, cows, rams, and a host of wild creatures, maddened with pain, stampeded to the ravines and threw themselves into the depths below. On the next day, and the next and the next, the Italian planes again subjected my army to gas attacks. They dropped it on any spot where they detected the slightest movement.⁶⁶

Given Italy's official repudiation of "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases" at the Geneva Protocol of 1925, great efforts were made to conceal the use of chemical weapons from the Italian public. When in late 1935 a London press photographer published "several photographs of Ethiopians

whose bodies were covered with sores," Italy's ambassador to Britain, Dino Grandi, alleged that the purported mustard gas victims were actually "lepers," and that the entire controversy had merely been drummed up as a "contemptible trick [of] the anti-fascist press to discredit the Mussolini regime."⁶⁷ Chillingly, however, it is clear that these protestations were not intended for the ears of Italy's soldiers, most of whom were not only aware of the Italians' use of poison gas, but – by this point in the campaign – completely unperturbed by their gruesome effects. Staring wistfully after the aircraft that made their way back and forth across the static southern front, 23-year-old Guglielmo Morlotti referred to the pilots overhead as his "lucky friends,"⁶⁸ while Elvio Cardarelli – in an almost casual aside several days prior to the First Battle of Tembien – showed no compunction in acknowledging that "thousands of Ethiopian had [already] been decimated by launching gas bombs."⁶⁹ Shortly after "constructing a cross for Ferruccio,"⁷⁰ Giacomo Agnese offered perhaps the most desensitized entry of all. "Many good pieces of news circulate about the situation at the front," he recorded impassively, "our air force makes much use of yperite [mustard gas]."⁷¹

Faced with an adversary that had no anti-aircraft defenses to speak of, a number of historians have sought to explain how the majority of Italy's soldiers could have been so comfortable with the unspeakable aerial atrocities of the campaign. Some, like Angelo del Boca, have speculated that many acted out of thoughtless "discipline, emulation" and the sense that they were merely "eliminating 'barbarians' or 'sub-humans'."⁷² Others, meanwhile – like Christopher Duggan – have suggested "the willingness of so many soldiers to accept the rhetoric of the regime is partly explained by the fact that the war was very one-sided, with many of the enemy casualties being brought about from the relative safety of the air."⁷³ Yet neither of these explanations substantively acknowledges the degree to which this complicity was – in many cases – engineered through the crucible of combat; not as a passive inheritance of the Mussolini regime but as a direct consequence of their own personal engagement with the campaign. Understood in abstract terminology, the fiery oratory of Il Duce was no doubt a source of wide inspiration. But in the words of Manlio la Sorsa, who privately surveyed the battlefields of Tembien days after the fighting had subsided, fraternity was even stronger than ideology:

Our soldiers are animated by courage and the highest sense of patriotism. Yesterday, I visited a rifleman in the hospital who had been gravely wounded in combat, who wept because they had not allowed him to immediately return to the front to avenge his beloved lieutenant who – dying in his arms – had told him: 'Do not cry but vindicate me!'⁷⁴

Within a month of the First Battle of Tembien the Ethiopian campaign was all but over – a reality perhaps best evidenced by Badoglio's refusal to redouble the use of bacteriological weapons in late February on the grounds that "the enemy was [already] sufficiently weakened."⁷⁵ Though it would still



Candyland-style board game for Italian children chronicling the progression of the Ethiopian campaign
 Source: Brown University Special Collections

be several months until the Italians' triumphant procession into Addis Ababa on May 5, 1936 – an event publicized throughout the peninsula as the genesis of a new, fascist Roman Empire – the Ethiopians would never again seriously challenge the Italian advance, ultimately capitulating in the face of relentless and merciless military force. After months of brutal combat the news of Italy's victory was met with universal acclaim within the ranks. "Civilization has won," declared Manlio La Sorsa, basking in the grandeur of the fascist war machine.⁷⁶ "My dear mother," penned a young Sicilian conscript in a letter back home, "we have conquered a territory three times larger than all of Italy."⁷⁷ Prolific as ever – even from the seclusion of an Italian reserve camp – Elvio Cardarelli was even more ebullient, as he vividly recounted the pandemonium that gripped his comrades the moment victory was proclaimed:

In a moment we are flung from the car, the cries of joy spread rapidly between the regiments... immediately the shouting redoubles, while the vast plain is illuminated with hundreds and hundreds of tricolor rockets... the officers, expelled from their tents and mess halls, merge with us, shouting and singing with us; the enthusiasm becomes delirious... I retire to my quarters around midnight, sweaty, tired, and with almost no voice, but with my heart in celebration; in a [still unfinished] letter addressed to my loved ones, I introduce another sheet, transmitting my joy to them and describing our enthusiasm.⁷⁸

As had occurred throughout their journey south, Italy's soldiers were again engulfed in a surge of irrepressible euphoria. Yet this time the elation was different. More than an expression of pure exultancy, the catharsis of Italy's soldiers was now undergirded by a profound sense of validation and purpose rooted as much in their common triumph as in their common suffering. At one time – in the safe seclusion of their former lives – the bellicose exhortations of Il Duce may have inspired their enthusiasm for the campaign. But as Mario Ravenna mused privately, it was the experience of

shared sacrifice that ultimately solidified it:

The war is finished. Italy has achieved her objectives with a lightning action that has left the world stunned. The enemy flees, disintegrated... the Second Empire of Rome has had its baptism... Italians, at the realization of this great dream, tremble with joy, and we legionaries – who felt the profound meaning of this enterprise conducted with great skill – are proud of it. Our sacrifice will not have been in vain, of that we are sure.⁷⁹

Perhaps most telling of all, however, was the testimony of Giacomo Agnese. Months after the First Battle of Tembien – still stricken by the loss of his closest friend – Agnese had returned to the fateful battlefield to pay his respects. The scene was striking; almost pleasant. Where brutalized bodies had once strewn the mountainside, a modest memorial now paid tribute to Italy's fallen. Moved by the spectacle before him, Agnese could not help but feel enraptured by the momentousness of his friend's sacrifice, as he recorded privately later that day:

Before leaving, I go to the cemetery, which they have doubled in size... they have retrieved the remains of the other fallen from Oneglia... to the right a tombstone reads:

11th Div. CCNN "October 28"

I Fell

For the Fascist Empire

At the bottom, at the face of the entrance, there is a hill with a cross, and to the right another headstone:

You Go Before Il Duce

Our Last Cry: 'To Us!'

And to the left another:

O' Passing Traveler

The Legionaries Rest Here

Who Lived Up To The Laws of Rome

In the corner, right of the entrance, is the Madonna of Tembien. I salute my comrades for the last time, those from Oneglia and all the others, then I go out.

As Agnese's convoy moved slowly on, he looked out – to his awe – on a colony in motion. Here and there, workers carried bits of stone and wood. A handful of soldiers lounged in the sun. "An enormous road was under construction."⁸⁰ All around him, "everything was now alive and moving."⁸¹ For a moment he returned pensively to his diary. "We pass through Edaga Hamus, where I was stationed with Ferruccio for almost a month," he noted quietly to himself. "It is now completely changed: there is an asphalt road where there once was not even a footpath; new constructions made of stone."⁸²

Looking up, he surveyed the rapidly changing landscape. "There is intense work behind the lines," he mused, as if lost in his own thoughts and reflections. Returning to his diary, he put pen to paper one more time.

"You feel proud to be Italian."⁸³ 🏛️

Endnotes


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“PICTURES WORTH MORE THAN WORDS”

The Fight for the True Representation of the Four Freedoms

This paper reflects on the success of the Four Freedoms paintings and analyzes reproductions of Rockwell's original works since Roosevelt's presidency. Between those two sets of images, however, there exists a gap in the intention and message of their respective artists. Rockwell's paintings depicted relatively limited and exclusive individuals, while modern renditions extended the originals' subject matter and continued FDR's initial call for a most inclusive application of the Four Freedoms.

By Christopher Zhang
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Four Freedoms at the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial, Washington DC (2002)

Source: Wikimedia Commons

While Norman Rockwell's series of idyllic paintings that were created in conjunction with President Roosevelt's idealistic "Four Freedoms" succeeded after the President's words failed to appeal to the nation. The paintings' immense success was twofold. First, they fulfilled their immediate purpose of boosting a government war bonds campaign. Second, more profoundly, the paintings rallied the country behind the total war effort and comforted the American population during times of distress. Interestingly, Rockwell's *Four Freedoms* turned away from Roosevelt's original global and ubiquitous application of the Freedoms towards a more domestic and exclusive one. In a time of national crisis, Rockwell chose to step back from the President's untimely and less-pressing human rights agenda and instead portray relatable images of white, heteronorma-

tive, and Christian subjects that could comfort the American people in the context of World War II. In response, later renditions of Rockwell's originals aimed to further Roosevelt's initial mission of extending the right to the *Four Freedoms* to all of the world's people, including those who lay on the periphery of American society at different points throughout the nation's history. A new time of crisis emerged with the 9/11 attacks, however, and both Roosevelt's intended, ubiquitous application of the *Freedoms* and the civil rights mission of *Four Freedoms* reproductions was put on hold in favor of returning to essentially a Rockwell original that comforted Americans. The memory and the fight over the *Four Freedoms*' definition and whom they apply to have paralleled eras of civil rights progression, which Roosevelt, who attempted to install the feeling of necessity for Ameri-



Freedom of Speech (1945)

Source: National Archives and Records Administration

can military involvement in World War II among the nation's people, spearheaded by claiming the Freedoms applied to everyone and modern artists continued. That struggle has also occurred alongside that progression's excluding and conservative backlash, which Rockwell initiated and the *New York Times* took part of, during times of national crises.

President Roosevelt's 1941 Annual Message to Congress introduced the nation and the world to his vision of "Four Freedoms" - freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear - that he believed to be inalienable to individuals "everywhere in the world."¹ Since the address, it seems as if Roosevelt's profound set of principles have been nothing but praised. At the 2012 dedication ceremony of the *Four Freedoms* Park on Roosevelt's Island in New York City, lead speaker, Tom Brokaw, claimed that the content of FDR's address "on that day and forevermore... defined the aspirations and the rights of all."² At least five other FDR and *Four Freedoms* monuments, located everywhere from the nation's capital to Burbank, California, echoed similar sentiments of complete praise for FDR's supposedly world-changing phrase. A Four Freedoms Award that is annually granted by the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute exists even to this day.³ However, those who praised Roosevelt and his genius address after the commencement of World War II failed to note the *Four Freedoms'* initial failure in the public eye. *The New York Times*,

for example, utilized the term "lend-lease" twenty times in its issues that circulated during the week immediately following Roosevelt's address to Congress. Meanwhile, the term *Four Freedoms*, the intended main point of the speech, did not appear once in that same week's issues.⁴

With war raging on in the European theater, Roosevelt's international application of the *Four Freedoms* may have hindered its success among the nation's population in an isolationist and post-World War I United States.⁵ During his original speech to Congress, President Roosevelt made a distinct effort to include the phrase, "everywhere in the world," after reciting and describing each individual freedom.⁶ Hearing a set of freedoms that were meant by the President to be enjoyed by all of the world's people, instead of just Americans, may have turned many of the latter away from the phrase. The President's words, however, were not deliberately trying to deter Americans away from the prospect of a more internationally involved United States. In the midst of recent developments of the war, President Roosevelt actually began to appreciate the gravity of the situation, and ultimately decided that military involvement would be necessary for the survival of American ideals. Through calling for the global application of the *Four Freedoms*, the President attempted to establish the notion that the United States would have to assume a substantial role in the world's affairs and the War. Regardless, the *Four Freedoms* gained little traction amongst the public upon their introduction: a failure that could be partially explained by the President's intention for the ubiquitous presence of American ideals in the presence of widespread sentiments of American isolationism.

Although it posthumously received endless recognition as a defining phrase of the American narrative, Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" and his administration's choice of a printed pamphlet as the vehicle through which they were introduced to the American people were too distant and abstract to enable the phrase to succeed at first. The administration's decision to popularize the "Four Freedoms" through a pamphlet published by the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) and the Office of War Information, both notorious for producing dull and exhaustive instead of dramatic and concise written work, did little to help the phrases' cause.⁷ Writers within the OFF recognized the futility of the job even before the pamphlet was published. One of these writers was E.B. White, who noted to his wife, "it really is kind of funny: the President...draws in skeleton form a wholly Utopian picture and now it is up to the writers to state it in more detail without either embarrassing the government or... mak[ing] it controversial."⁸ Affirming White's implied predictions, the pamphlet did little to nurture widespread familiarization of the Freedoms amongst the American people. It drew strange connections and made odd comparisons that were simply difficult to understand. One such comparison was that between the interdependence of all *Four Freedoms* and "the four seasons of the natural year, whose winter snows irrigate the spring, and

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whose dead leaves, fermenting, rebuild the soil for the summer's yield.”⁹ Another connection that was made between 1492 and 1942 as years during which views of the world had been completely transformed further evidenced the pamphlet's many additions to the phrase's confusion and lack of common appeal.¹⁰

ROCKWELL'S FOUR FREEDOMS

Norman Rockwell's series of four corresponding paintings, which he independently created to contribute to the war effort, not from commission, were able to “breathe the breath of life into “The Four Freedoms”” after the President's and government's attempt proved unsuccessful.¹¹ Instead of perpetuating the President's initial, global application of the “Four Freedoms,” which was evidenced by Roosevelt's deliberate repetition of the line, “everywhere in the world,” during his address to Congress, Rockwell's content matter focused more on the domestic application of the phrase.¹² In *Freedom of Speech*, Rockwell depicted a white, blue-collar worker, with a Vermont town report sitting in his jacket pocket, exercising his First Amendment right in the all-American, town hall meeting. The man glows in an almost holy light, highlighting the sanctity of the Freedom and its idealistic commonplace in American small-town life.¹³ In his iconic *Freedom from Want*, Rockwell depicted the sentimental image of a smiling white family ready to enjoy their Thanksgiving dinner, the patriarch eager to carve the turkey and the matriarch donning an apron after preparing the meal.¹⁴ Those two paintings clearly evidenced the common effort Rockwell put into focusing solely on each individual freedom he portrayed in a distinctly domestic setting. Whereas Roosevelt had introduced his “Four Freedoms” as a set of inalienable human rights alongside other convoluting components of his political agenda, such as the lend-lease program and the Economic Bill of Rights, Rockwell presented the *Four Freedoms* in the context of what he envisioned the American way of life to be.¹⁵ Rockwell's achievement of tangibly representing Roosevelt's words with a domestic focus that many Americans found relatable was a primary source of the paintings' success.

themselves best as posters for the government's war bonds campaign.¹⁶ Producing \$123,999,537 in war bonds and capturing the gaze of more than one million Americans along the way, the “Four Freedoms” became a national phenomenon during its April of 1942 war bonds tour.¹⁷ Celebrities such as Madeleine Carroll, a hugely popular actress and heartthrob of the day, made appearances at showings of the *Four Freedoms* and took widespread photographs posing next to the paintings, attaching themselves and their fame to both the war bonds campaign and the paintings' messages.¹⁸ One particularly exciting show utilized the popular Rockefeller Center as a venue and hosted the Army Band to play alongside famous singer, Lucy Monroe, at no charge to all who came in order to maximize turnout for the campaign.¹⁹ An advertisement in the *New York Times* paid for by Jay Thorpe, a high-end New York clothing store, for a *Four Freedoms* show was only one piece of evidence that the paintings and their purpose received support from a broad range of sources.²⁰ In addition to the enormous publicity the tour garnered, the paintings themselves were seemingly ubiquitous in daily American life, located in post offices, schools, hotels, Elks clubs, railroad stations and much more across the nation.²¹

WHO IS LEFT OUT?

While the *Four Freedoms* were extremely successful in rallying the American people behind the war effort, the visual representations of the paintings reflected a small fraction of the American population and left little room for inclusion. The images' defining characteristics of focusing on a domestic setting and on the *Freedoms* themselves, which made the paintings so successful, actually evidenced Rockwell's break-away from Roosevelt's original, global vision for the “Four Freedoms” in favor of a more limited and exclusive one. One example of this exclusion was evident in how the human subjects of *Freedom From Fear*, *Freedom From Want*, and *Freedom of Speech* were all white. The racial composition of the remaining freedom does not prove to be much more diverse; while there are two discernible persons of color in *Freedom to Worship*, three white figures, a black bible, and the rosary cross, the latter two items both symbols of Christianity, com-

“Through calling for the global application of the *Four Freedoms*, the President attempted to establish the notion that the United States would have to assume a substantial role in the world's affairs.”

The immediate success of Rockwell's paintings was immense and measurable by both their total views and financial contribution to the war effort. Although they were originally released in the *Saturday Evening Post* over the course of four consecutive weeks, the first of which was *Freedom of Speech* on February 20, 1943, Rockwell's *Four Freedoms* popularized

pose the clear focal point of the painting. Although Roosevelt and his worldwide vision of humans' inalienable *Freedom to Worship* included all persons' right to worship any religion, it appeared that Rockwell was subtly focused on portraying the white American's freedom to worship Christianity. This did not necessarily mean that Norman Rockwell was a racist



San Francisco mural “Earthquake and Fire of 1906”

Source: Anton Refregier, Library of Congress

Christian who only wanted to depict those who were similar to him. It did reflect, however, Rockwell’s desire to portray the *Freedom to Worship* with subjects to which the majority-white American population would attach themselves. This image allowed Americans to better visualize why their nation was fighting a total war.

Rockwell also focused on heteronormative subjects across those of the *Four Freedoms* that portrayed American families, further evidencing his exclusive vision of the *Freedoms*, as opposed to the all-inclusive one of Roosevelt. In the most iconic of his paintings, *Freedom from Want*, Rockwell depicted a grandmother “plac[ing] a turkey, that most American of birds, on a white tablecloth before her children and grandchildren[.] Her husband... wait[ing] to demonstrate his skills with the carving knife.”²² The image of a large, happy family dining with each other on a characteristically American holiday did well in striking a sentimental note in the hearts of many Americans. However, those who eye the patriarch of the family placed at the head of the table, his wife donning an apron after fulfilling her duties as a woman to tend to the household and cook the meal, with resentment, do so out of a feeling of exclusion. The image simply did not include those who choose to not adhere to traditional gender roles or sexual orientations as a part of the definitive visual representation of American Thanksgiving dinner and who could enjoy the right to the *Freedom From Want*. Through *Freedom From Want*, Rockwell revealed that his definition of who the *Four Freedoms* applied to was not only just a domestic one; it was also one that may have excluded, whether inadvertently or not, those who did not adhere to the time’s heteronormative standards.

Rockwell’s *Freedom from Fear* similarly excluded those who did not fit traditional sexual orientations or gender norms. The painting’s portrayal of a mother tucking her children into bed, the father grasping the newspaper he presumably read after a long day at his white-collar job, resonated deeply with families built in the same traditional structure. However, the scenario of two fathers tucking their children into bed, for example, would simply not be able to attach itself to the image in the same way. The possibility of anything besides the heterosexual familial structure, following traditional gender norms, did not fit into Rockwell’s depiction of who was entitled to the *Four Freedoms*. That exclusion evidenced a breakaway from Roosevelt’s original “Four Freedoms” and his intent for them to be ubiquitous and inherent human rights. Rockwell’s visual representation of the American family in *Freedom from Fear* excluded, yet again, a substantial subset of Americans who did exist on the relative periphery of society at the time.

VISUAL RESPONSES TO ROCKWELL

Renditions of the *Four Freedoms* produced post-Rockwell have pointed to the lack of inclusion in the original paintings on the basis of race and created new visual representations of a more inclusive *Four Freedoms*. For Anton Refregier, creator of the “History of San Francisco” Mural located inside the Rincon Center in San Francisco, CA, additions to the racially limited content matter of Rockwell’s original images were necessary.²³ The mural printed each of the *Four Freedoms* in the corner of a panel, with the focal point of the image being an amalgam of people, among which are Asian and black girls in addition to white children and adults, intertwined in the center.²⁴ Because the mural was created only five years

“Pictures Worth More than Words”

after the *Four Freedoms* were released in 1943, it was obvious that Refregier quickly felt compelled to account for the perspectives of certain groups of people who were excluded by the original paintings. Rockwell’s subtle focus on Christianity as the religion that Americans were free to worship was also addressed in the 1948 mural. Portraying a stack of three books, each of which had either a cross, a David’s star, or a crescent of Islam on its binding, Refregier’s image extended Rockwell’s definition of what religion Americans were free to worship to more than just Christianity, but also Judaism and Islam.²⁵

Refreiger’s portrayal of additional races, which was effectively his decision to continue Roosevelt’s original mission of inclusion and ubiquity through the visual depiction of the *Four Freedoms*, had a historical context of increased awareness of widespread civil rights. The 1948 “Declaration of Human Rights” of the United Nations perfectly embodied the era’s amplified attention to affirming that, as the first article of the document states, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” at least amongst international leaders.²⁶ Many veterans from non-white groups, however, faced a different reality after returning home from World War II. To many minority groups, an opportunity to serve their country and make the ultimate sacrifice was also an opportunity to highlight the distinction between their dedication to their nation and their experience as second-class citizens back home.²⁷ African-Americans, in particular, used the War to win equality and justice in the States by assuming the toughest role as service members in America’s triumph abroad: a “Double-V” Campaign.²⁸ Successful black units, such as the 761st Tank Battalion or the “Tuskegee Airmen” and the 369th Coast Artillery Regiment or the “Harlem Hellfighters,” secured African-Americans’ role in victory overseas.²⁹ Achieving the latter “V,” however, was an even longer-fought battle. The formation of hundreds of citizen and interracial committees around the country between 1944 and 1950 clearly proved that whites and blacks alike both believed that the latter’s efforts in the war merited equality.³⁰ Even though it took some black veterans, such as six who were posthumously presented Medal of Honors by President Clinton in 1977, a great amount of time to earn just recognition from their nation, the hard-fought civil rights mission their peers dedicated themselves to almost immediately earned the attention of Refreiger in his efforts to include every race in depicting those who had the right to the *Four Freedoms*.³¹

A re-creation of *Freedom from Want*, titled *Freedom to Share*, created by Frank Moore in 1994, likewise made Rockwell’s original, racially-constricted subject matter more inclusive. Depicting a family in the same physical positions as the one from *Freedom from Want*, Moore’s rendition differs only in the family members’ race and the contents of the plate in the grandmother’s hands.³² The interracial family, which includes a black patriarch and white matriarch, looked onto the turkey that is instead composed of a motley assortment

of medical supplies including IV drips, medicine bottles, syringes, and pills. Although Moore implemented *Freedom to Share*’s characteristic turkey as a proponent of more equitable healthcare, the deliberate change of the race of five people from *Freedom from Want* was done not only out of criticism of Rockwell’s choice to portray only an all-white family in the original painting. Moore created *Freedom to Share* also out of his own desire to create the representation of the American family that he personally wanted to see. Moore recognized *Freedom from Want*’s exclusivity and edited it so that an interracial family enjoying more equitable healthcare could become another example of who could enjoy the right to the *Four Freedoms*.

Moore, like Refreiger, reproduced a Rockwell painting for the purpose of critiquing the original’s exclusive subject matter in the historical context of a civil rights battle. The difference is that, for Moore, that battle was not just for racial equality, but also for the equality of AIDS victims, the majority of whom were gay men early on, in the eye of the federal government during the United States’ AIDS crisis. The initial spread of the disease in the early 1980s, which infected hundreds of victims with roughly a 50% mortality rate, garnered little attention and public health response from the government.³³ It was only after over 15,000 cases had been reported, with over 7,500 deaths, that the prevalence of AIDS became a point of concern to the Reagan administration and CDC, finally spurring the latter to launch an AIDS prevention plan in 1985.³⁴ The plan, however, did not come to fruition. As chairman for the AIDS task force at the CDC, Dr. John Bennett, recounted, the highest levels of government rejected the proposal and directed them to, instead, “Look pretty and do as little as [they] can.”³⁵ Infected citizens and their supporters did not sit idly by as their numbers increased while the federal government refused to act through vital treatment research and awareness campaigns.³⁶ Activist groups, such as ACT UP, sprung up across the country over the second half of the 1980s. It was clear that the gay/lesbian movement shared close ties with the AIDS movement through the fact that the majority of ACT UP self-identified as homosexual. Frank Moore, a gay man who learned he was HIV positive in 1985, was motivated by his personal experiences to dedicate himself to AIDS activism by producing socially-conscious artwork.³⁷ Through *Freedom to Share*, Moore continued Roosevelt’s and Refreiger’s shared mission of progressing the *Four Freedoms*’ ubiquitous and indiscriminate application. The particular inclusion that Moore strove for, however, primarily involved AIDS victims and the gay/lesbian community instead of the others’ dedication to all nations and all races, respectively. Regardless, Moore still played a role in expanding the definition of who had the right to the *Four Freedoms* by explicitly critiquing Rockwell’s exclusion in the original paintings.



Freedom From Want (1945)

Source: National Archives and Records Administration

AN IMPEDED PATH TO THE FOUR FREEDOMS' FULL INCLUSION

Contemporary national crisis evidenced that Roosevelt's, Reifeiger's, and Moore's mission to extend civil rights through the *Four Freedoms* did not continue unimpeded after Rockwell's conservative step back through his creation of the exclusive *Four Freedoms*. In 2001, that crisis was the September 11 attacks, and in that context, the *New York Times* recreated one of Rockwell's *Four Freedoms* to provide solace and depict a past-day's America that many yearned for during a vulnerable time in the nation's history. Recreating *Freedom from Fear* also served as consolation for a traumatized American population, just as the original did during the original crisis of World War II. The Times' 2001 rendition of *Freedom from Fear* was an advertisement for the paper itself and depicted an image identical to Rockwell's original, aside from the newspaper in the father's hand. Whereas the newspaper headlines in the original read, "Horror, Bombings and 'Women and Children Slaughtered in Raids,'" the recreation's more clearly read, "U.S. ATTACKED: HIJACKED JETS DESTROY TWIN TOWERS AND HIT PENTAGON IN DAY OF TERROR."³⁸ Rockwell's sentimental image of children sleeping as their parents calmly watch on during World War

II, portraying security in a time of peril, comforted a troubled American population during the 1940s. The *New York Times* recycled that Rockwell imagery to comfort the troubled American population of their time, which was feeling similarly vulnerable and scared after the abrupt 9/11 attacks. It was no coincidence that the *Times* published their modern rendition along with a series of Rockwell recreations that ran in issues from November 2nd to December 1st, almost exactly sixty years after the occurrence of the original surprise attack on American soil: Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941.³⁹ Providing a form of "patriotic escapism," or momentary escape from the terrifying reality through art, The *New York Times* comforted the American people with Rockwell's image that did the same during a relatable time of turmoil.⁴⁰

The *New York Times*' reproducing of *Freedom from Fear* was motivated not only by its desire to help put a fearful population at ease, but also by its objective to rally the American people. When President George W. Bush stated that American freedoms were inherently at war with terrorism, he was effectively acknowledging that "Freedom and fear [were] at war;" and that Americans needed to rally behind his administration for the former.⁴¹ This is where The *New York Times* came in. Whereas Rockwell had rallied the American people behind the total war effort six decades before, the Times rallied the American people behind a momentous set of new security policies such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. By showing the American people a sentimental and tangible image of what they were fighting for, the *New York Times* helped elevate the primacy of the government's drastic security policies. These policies, however, did not remain entirely true to the essence of *Four Freedoms* and the guarantees they made to Americans. Not only did the policies suspend civil liberties in the name of the preservation of freedom from fear, but they also fostered vicious anti-Muslim sentiment that would have found no place in Rockwell's original *Four Freedoms* and their global application. The *New York Times*, with the purpose of rallying the American people behind the Bush administration, may have used Rockwell's imagery hypocritically. Aiding the institution of extreme security policies that actually provoked more fear, the *New York Times* failed to stay true to the principle of both Roosevelt's and Rockwell's *Freedom to Share*.

The *New York Times*' perpetuation of circulating rumors about Iraq's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) before and during the Iraq War was another example of the newspaper's aggravation of American fear and the paper's mindless support of the government's security policy and its decision to invade Iraq. The Times' main proponents of poor journalistic practice, epitomized by unjustified trust in unnamed sources and exclusive use of sources that were already in agreement with the administration, during the time included Judith Miller.⁴² After the Bush administration had affirmed that aluminum tubes Iraq had been importing only

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had one possible purpose as a component in the uranium-enrichment process, Miller failed to acknowledge skepticism from within U.S. intelligence agencies and the government of Iraq and wrote a front-page article that strictly aligned itself with the government’s public statement.⁴³ The truth, which diverged from the administration’s narrative about Iraq’s definite possession of WMD’s, one of Bush’s central justifications for the invasion, emerged as the war waged on, forcing the Times to reflect. The Times’ swift apology, titled “The Times and Iraq” and published on May 26, 2004, was the ultimate admittance of guilt.⁴⁴ The *New York Times*’ support of Bush’s hawkish stance through its false exaggeration of Iraq’s WMD possession further revealed the *Times*’ ill-motivated role in provoking American fear in order to garner support for the government’s following drastic actions.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of Rockwell’s *Four Freedoms*’ omnipresence in American life, many neglect the initial flop of the abstract ideals Roosevelt voiced during a high-minded Congressional speech. Rockwell’s narrow interpretation, in terms of race, familial structure, and religion, of the *Freedoms* was undoubtedly a major cause behind the paintings’ success. The paintings’ exclusion, however, was proof of Rockwell’s failure to stay true to Roosevelt’s indiscriminate and global application of the “Four Freedoms.” The wartime American population quickly attached themselves to Rockwell’s familiar images of white, Christian, heteronormative families and more easily saw the domestic ideals for which their nation was fighting. The reactions of following artists was significant over the course of five decades immediately after the war, with renditions created by those such as Refreiger and Moore that fought to uphold Roosevelt’s original intention to include as many people as possible to define who could enjoy

the right to the *Four Freedoms*. Moore’s and Refreiger’s utilization of the *Four Freedoms* to extend civil rights, however, did not continue unimpeded until present day. The national crisis of the 9/11 attacks produced a fearful American population that felt vulnerable and searched for a more inward-looking and domestic image to comfort them. The *New York Times* capitalized on both of those desires, essentially reusing Rockwell’s original and exclusive *Freedom from Fear* to induce a rally effect that would ease the passing of security policies that ironically aggravated fear and betrayed the essence of the *Four Freedoms*. Although the lessons from the *New York Times*’ journalistic fault, in retrospect, may decrease the susceptibility of the American people to allow the news to coax them into blindly following the government’s agenda, the fight to uphold Roosevelt’s primary “Four Freedoms” is still ongoing. The United States is periodically experiencing not only the progression and expansion of civil rights, but also national crises. The panic and sentiments of vulnerability these crises produce introduce a superior objective that oftentimes suspends the efforts of those such as Refreiger and Moore. Widespread fear influencing government action and political leaders’ rhetoric is especially relevant today, as we lay on the eve of the election of a new president amidst a context of global terrorism. Moving forward, it is important to remember that comforting the American people during troubling times with propaganda doesn’t require departing from the *Freedoms*’ original values. Although Rockwell’s *Four Freedoms* are irreplaceable visual representations of some of the United States’ core principles, the nation should be aware, even in times of crisis, of the exclusion of the paintings’ subject matters. Upon that realization, we can continue the ongoing fight to maintain Roosevelt’s initial proclamation for an indiscriminate and ubiquitous application of the *Four Freedoms*. 

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TEXTBOOKS AS COMMON GROUND

The Alignment of Conservative Activists Against the Texas State Board of Education, 1960s

While elsewhere in 1960s America, textbooks typically came under scrutiny by liberals for the limited or poor representation of minorities and women, Texas saw numerous highly organized protests by conservative anti-Communists against the content of schoolbooks. These conservative activists, led by J. Evetts Haley of the John Birch Society-associated Texans for America, developed new tactics designed to censor texts in a political climate that by the 1960s was less willing to entertain the outlandish claims of subversion and Communist infiltration that had been tolerated during the Second Red Scare. These tactics would inform the operations of more mainstream grassroots conservative activists who were otherwise turned off by the harsh rhetoric of radical anti-Communists—such as antievolutionist protesters—later in the decade, as American conservatives began to align ideologically and politically.

By Ashton Dubey
Northwestern University



Texas State Board of Education (SBOE)

Source: *Historeo.com*

As most natives will tell you—probably unprompted—everything is bigger in Texas. This includes their textbook controversies. As recently as 2015, the *New York Times*, among other outlets, reported on a Texan parent chastising the state and publisher McGraw-Hill for distributing a geography textbook that referred to slaves kidnapped from Africa for forced labor in America as “workers.”¹ The year before, the *Times* reported on a battle at the state level over whether a collection of social studies and history texts up for review “overstated the importance of Moses to America’s founding fathers,” “trumpeted the free-market system too much,” and “negatively portrayed Muslims.”² That the state’s textbooks are afforded a sizable share of attention among activists, journalists, and publishers *nationally* is, in part, due to Texas’s large population. As the second most populous state in the nation, Texas consumes hundreds of thousands of textbooks. Purchasing a greater share of textbooks than most other states, Texas is able to influence publishers who aim to produce as few versions of textbooks as possible while appeasing large buyers. However, Texas was a center

of textbook controversy before reaching its present population. Unlike many other large states, Texas’s textbook adoption process is carried out at the state level initially, with one body determining educational material for millions of public school students. A large state may not have the same sort of sway over publishers if decisions over textbooks are decentralized and left up entirely to counties or school districts.

In 1949, the state established the Texas Education Agency (TEA). Among the TEA’s duties was appointing a twenty-one member school board, the State Board of Education (SBOE). The SBOE in turn was responsible for appointing a fifteen member textbook review committee. Members were all Texan educators, limited to a tenure of only one year on the committee.³ They were tasked with reviewing texts and assembling a list of schoolbooks acceptable for use throughout the state, with between two and five texts per subject at each grade level. District-level school boards could narrow the list, but could not expand upon it.⁴

By the 1960s, Texan activists and parents concerned over the content of schoolbooks began to direct their attention to the SBOE. According to historians Jonathan Zimmerman and Joseph Moreau, in *Whose America?* and *Schoolbook Nation*, respectively, the sixties saw the introduction of multiculturalism and more liberal ideals into high school history textbooks, following the stark conservatism that marked textbooks of the Red Scare the decade before.⁵ However, the parents and activists targeting the SBOE were not liberals, who elsewhere in the country were calling for, according to Moreau, the “[integration of] Blacks into largely all-White textbooks.”⁶ Rather, in the early 1960s, the activists were conservative anti-Communists. Fearing Communist sympathies, or at least the negligence of publishers, teachers, and board members, activists associated with the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR), the John Birch Society, and Texans for America (TFA) ran editorials in conservative papers, sent letters to the SBOE, and even forced the SBOE to

hold hearings so that protesters could appeal the board's decisions. To anti-Communists, the enemy was essentially everyone else, with liberal authors and commentators lumped in with moderates, textbook publishers, and the bureaucrats at the SBOE who did their best to remain neutral or non-confrontational.

Moreau and Zimmerman published their studies on history textbook controversies just as the field began to argue that the sixties were a period of great evolution not just for liberals but conservatives as well. Historians David Farber and Jeff Roche acknowledge that, in the popular imagination, "The conservative sixties does, at first glance, have the look of an oxymoronic phrase. The 'sixties,' as conventionally portrayed, is the era of protests, social change movements, rebellion, and, even revolution. It was the heyday of national liberalism."⁷ However, the sixties were also a period of activity among disparate conservative groups, as they began to negotiate a coherent ideology—or at least a successful political coalition.

This paper will examine conservative protests and appeals over the SBOE's textbook decisions in order to argue that the activism of conservative anti-Communists in Texas served as a model for later, more mainstream conservative textbook activists; these later activists not only employed and expanded upon those tactics but did so while following the national trend toward the alignment and eventual unification of disparate conservative groups and interests. Texas was not the only state to see grassroots conservative textbook activism after its supposed demise in the 1950s. Considered extremists by most who did not fall into their camp, the Texan activists associated with these anti-Communist organizations alienated many, including other conservative groups and figures. Yet, Texas's network of activists, subject to substantial media coverage throughout the sixties, stand out for their size, successes, scope, and organization.

This paper, specifically, will follow that alignment not by looking at the outrage conservative anti-Communists elicited in their most fervent critics but to their reception by other conservative groups, particularly antievolutionist activists. Anti-Communists had established networks and tactics that later conservative groups in the state emulated. Other conservatives seized on these networks and tactics, and thus Texas stood out for its antievolutionist activism as well. Though distinct groups throughout much of the sixties, the activists would converge by the seventies, following trends toward conservative unification.


TWO STRAINS OF CONSERVATIVE TEXTBOOK ACTIVISM

In the early and mid 1960s, the anti-Communist protests of Texans for America and the Daughters of the American Revolution as well as the antievolutionist protests led by Texan evangelicals saw widespread attention within and without

the state. Within the state, Austin's *Texas Observer* covered the extremism of such activists through a liberal lens while the widely-read conservative *Dallas Morning News* provided even more extensive coverage, sympathetic to the protesters. Though anti-Communist and antievolutionist protests shared some overlap, with the Parents' Committee of Tarrant County (Tarrant County belonging to the conservative Dallas-Fort Worth area) and the Citizen's Committee for the Investigation of State Textbooks backing both at textbook hearings, a 1964 article in the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* was off when it conflated antievolutionist activists with the "conservative groups [who] protested several books in 1961 on grounds they were critical of capitalism and stressed excessively the idea of equality."⁸ Though linked, the two campaigns were led by separate conservative groups. These groups were not known for their cooperation in the early sixties, as the John Birch Society—with which Texans for America happily associated itself—had alienated more moderate conservatives throughout Texas and the nation.

The John Birch Society's penchant for antagonism and extremist anti-Communist language may explain the particularly strong organization of anti-Communist textbook campaigns in Texas. After all, as historian Edward H. Miller writes in *Nut Country*, "Dallas was a national epicenter for the John Birch Society."⁹ But antievolutionism was mainstream; countless other states saw controversies over the teaching of evolution, particularly in its inclusion in biology textbooks, with Arkansas even defending an antievolutionist statute before the US Supreme Court before decade's end.¹⁰ So why were Texan evangelicals able to garner more attention and participation than other states' when such evolution-related controversies were relatively commonplace? Despite different leadership and even different "liberal" targets, evangelicals were able to reach the SBOE and receive such attention because they borrowed from Texans for America, laying the groundwork for their later convergence. Not only did they utilize Texas's conservative textbook monitoring organizations, they borrowed from the arguments and tactics of TFA and the DAR's successful campaigns. If not a complete alliance, the work of evangelical antievolutionists in their 1964 protest suggests an early alignment with anti-Communist interests and groups.

Few existing histories provide an adequate model for explaining the shared tactics and resources of radical anti-Communists and evangelicals. Roche firmly places anti-Communists such as J. Evetts Haley, his group Texans for America, and their friends at the John Birch Society in the "cowboy" brand of conservatism, one that was particularly strong among conservatives in 1960s Texas. Cowboy conservatism, Roche writes, emerged "full-blown in the 1960s, this type of politics, characterized by an intertwined set of ideas that celebrate individual freedom and community responsibility, entrepreneurial capitalism and traditional family, Protestantism and patriotism."¹¹ Conservative author and



J. Evetts Haley Sr., political activist and historian
Source: West Texas A&M University

candy manufacturer Robert Welch founded the John Birch Society in 1958. The Society became known—and ridiculed—nationally, as they distributed McCarthy-esque literature to “those fearful about communists secretly taking over the American state” and lobbied against civil rights legislation, historian D. J. Mulloy summarizes.¹² The group, along with Haley and other anti-Communist groups, vocally supported US Senator from Arizona and GOP nominee Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign.¹³ On its face, the philosophy of cowboy conservatism—with its explicitly Christian currents—does not appear to be in conflict with the overtly moral and Christian arguments protesters made against the biology textbooks. However, anti-Communism, Roche describes, was the “basis for [this] conservative political philosophy,” and “demanded of its adherents a steadfast belief in the abstract threat of an eventual communist takeover of the United States.”¹⁴ The unwavering focus of Haley and his fellow Birchers on Communism, as well as their repeated attacks on the credibility of moderate and conservative officials, alienated post-Red Scare conservatives throughout the nation.

Antievolutionist activists avoided the outlandish and conspiratorial claims, as well as the narrow anti-Communist focus, that riled the conservative anti-Communist base but alienated most others. Miller, referring specifically to Chris-

tian fundamentalists and conservative anti-Communists, compares their conspiratorial nature. “The biblical literalism of the ultraconservatives went hand in hand with conspiracies since, in their minds, the greatest conspiracy of all was Satan’s ongoing battle with Christianity.”¹⁵ However, the Christian activists protesting the pro-evolution textbooks in ‘64 *avoided* readily available talking points about the deliberate efforts of the government and scientists to fool the public into accepting an ungodly scientific theory. The Creation Research Society was founded in the 1950s, with the intent of using scientific research against evolution to prove a literalist and young earth account of creation.¹⁶ However, in the mainstream press, in protest letters, and at the SBOE hearing, few protesters made the argument that the content of the biology texts were in scientific error or even a hoax, as many other antievolutionists—throughout American history—have argued. Moral and religious arguments dominated the hearing, with one man proclaiming that “I just want to bring out, point out here at first, it’s anti-Bible, it’s anti-Christian and therefore it’s anti-God.”¹⁷ Another protester argued that “It becomes virtually impossible either for the clergy or parents to teach Creation,” appealing to the faith of the board’s members, rather than engaging with the expert biologists testifying on behalf of the publishers.¹⁸

Antievolutionist protesters simply were not as far to the right as TFA, their ideology more mainstream. Before acceptance of evolution became a regular polling question, a 1962 nationwide study suggested that only a third of *high school* students—those with the some of greatest exposure—accepted the theory.¹⁹ Furthermore, the protesters were simply more palatable figures. At the 1964 hearing over the biology textbooks, Vernon Harley, the leader of a group of conservative Texans and a Lutheran minister from Corpus Christi, told the SBOE that “We do not impugn the motives or the intent of those who selected the title.” One might expect a protester to maintain a more respectful tone when attempting to convince the SBOE directly to side with them; and Harley’s rhetoric on the matter was much more charged outside of the hearing, telling a writer for the Associated Press that “Either the Bible is a hoax and we who preach it are deceivers or the people who describe our beginning without God are wrong.”²⁰ Anti-Communist leader Haley and his allies at the DAR and John Birch Society, however, comfortably attacked the allegiances and integrity of authors and state actors in print and in hearings. Birchers, after all, had famously declared President Eisenhower an enemy, calling the popular president too liberal.²¹

The John Birch Society even alienated many of Texas’s conservative religious communities. Goldwater, whose 1964 presidential campaign was often associated with the radicalism of the John Birch Society, was unable to sway “even [the] poorly organized portions of [the state’s] religious community.”²² Historian Sean P. Cunningham writes that, despite the religious language of Goldwater and his allies, “Goldwater’s

campaign not only failed to rally [Christian conservative] support, but was actually rejected and denounced.”²³ Therefore, the alignment between anti-Communist forces in Texas with evangelicals—in the early sixties—was unique.

Antievolutionists appear, at least in part, to have aligned with anti-Communists for practical reasons, borrowing from their earlier successful campaigns. As Roche summarizes, the hearings called for by Haley and Texans for America “provided a public, state-sanctioned forum to broadcast their views on the crucial contest between centralized power and local tradition.”²⁴ Blocking texts at the state level, rather than leaving it to local school boards to block certain texts within their jurisdictions, may seem paradoxical to preserving local interests. After all, while local boards could not add to the list of suitable texts provided by the states, they could narrow it.²⁵ Nonetheless, an investigation by the Texas House of Representative reveals that the SBOE, following a 1961 hearing and protests by TFA, the DAR, and the American Legion, had requested publishers amend texts to conform with many of the conservatives’ protests; both conservatives and liberals associated their rhetoric and tactics with success, even if protests failed more often than not to alter content.²⁶ The 1964 antievolutionist protests too used the localist arguments that appeared to be successful a few years before. In

“Communist technique.”²⁸ To others, it was merely a failure, with the social studies focus leading to a neglect of science education. At the same time that Texans called for better science education in the wake of the Sputnik launches, the Fort Worth Star-Telegram wrote, an SBOE member “denounced the school methods known as ‘Progressive Education.’ He laid to its door the blame for the lack of students of science in the public schools today.”²⁹ While progressive education, particularly with its associations with racial progress, was never fully embraced throughout Texas after the Red Scare, it ceased to be a dirty word among many. Dewey and other Progressives returned to history texts and SBOE members felt comfortable discussing progressive education favorably—albeit with reservations. By 1964, one SBOE member even unfavorably conflated fervent attacks on progressive education with Birchers. The Dallas Morning News wrote, “State Board Member W. C. Graves of Dallas said he had received one complaint that the ‘modern math’ is ‘John Dewey progressive’ education. Graves said he considered the criticism ‘John Birch.’”³⁰ As Texans like those involved with Texans for America saw texts moving away from highlighting only conservative heroes, they were stoked into action. “Liberal” and “progressive” became relative terms, used to attack even those who remained opposed—albeit to a lesser degree than under the Red Scare—to progressive education.

“Texas’s network of activists, subject to substantial media coverage throughout the sixties, stand out for their size, successes, scope, and organization.”

addition to challenging the theory of evolution on religious grounds, protesters appealed to the Board by invoking the right of families and communities to perpetuate their own values. Reverend George Golden spoke to the SBOE on the impossibility of simultaneously “[letting] our religion teach creation and [letting] our schools teach evolution.” While he did not propose teaching overtly Christian doctrine in public schools, Rev. Golden did argue that contradictory information taught in schools undermines the intentions of parents and communities to raise their children with Christian values.²⁷

Despite their shared rhetoric, overlap between the groups’ political opponents was limited; conservative antievolutionists and anti-Communists viewed themselves as in a battle against different forces and developments. Texans for America and their sympathizers in the *Dallas Morning News* repeatedly wrote against progressive education throughout the late fifties and early sixties. To many Texans, progressive education was Communism incarnate, as the use of social studies to shape society represented the abolishment of traditional values. Haley himself called progressive education a

Texas’s sects of protesters, however, were railing against different “liberals”; on the other hand, antievolutionists were protesting a federal policy that—at least in the public imagination—was far removed from the practice and principles of progressive education. Evolution made its way back into the Texan biology class via a collection of texts approved by the National Science Foundation’s Biological Science Curriculum Study (BSCS). Such texts, John L. Rudolph writes, were part of a science education that was itself co-opted to modify society in the context of the Cold War, in particular reference to the national embarrassment that followed the Russian’s successful Sputnik launches.³¹ Rudolph writes, “The topic of cultural evolution received a good deal of play throughout the BSCS program. Social problems, human progress, and broader notions of culture were intermingled in the biological treatment of humans.”³² Though BSCS textbooks included analyses of urgent social issues, including the perils of radiation and overpopulation, BSCS hardliners were cautious not to allow comparisons to progressive education.³³ Indeed, in the Texas press’ many editorials against progressive education, none discussed the perils of BSCS and its ambition to alter American society. With little controversial content—


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beyond evolution—and the urgency of the Cold War, most of the new science curriculum ran into little trouble. However, Adam Laats writes, BSCS-sponsored texts, and those meant to compete with them, increasingly included evolutionary theory and human evolution “thoroughly and explicitly,” and “many evangelical parents reacted with alarm.”³⁴

Despite their only indirect connection to conservative anti-Communist protests, antievolutionist protesters in Texas were nonetheless able to raise a similar level of hell. Whereas progressive education insulted conservatives’ anti-Communist sensibilities, the teaching of evolution was solely an insult to evangelicals’ *Christian faith*. In his history of American legal battles over evolution, evolution education advocate Randy Moore describes the Texas attack on BSCS textbooks as the “harshes” of the sixties, “where the books were denounced in newspapers, in church sermons, and at hearings of the Texas Textbook Commission.”³⁵ In the 1964 debate, protesters barraged the SBOE with form letters protesting the adoption of three evolutionist high school biology textbooks.³⁶ The form letters came largely from members of the Church of Christ, “[contending] that teaching of the theory of evolution conflicts with the religious doctrines of the resurrection of the soul and the creation of the world by God,” the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* summarized. Outside of the organized form letters, protests were sent to the SBOE throughout the year, with the most representative and legible reading “[while] I have not seen or read any of the textbooks, I do know that the presentation of Evolution in an atheistic manner can be very influential, but shouldn’t be, for it cannot stand up against Christian faith in any way!”³⁷

Newspapers throughout Texas and the country covered the controversy, suggesting to many pro-evolutionists not to underestimate the antievolutionists. Nationwide, evolutionists already cautious not to offend the religious convictions of students and parents, expressed their anxiety to the SBOE. Biologists and pro-evolution educators saw the protests as an actual and significant threat, with public skepticism of them teaching the theory already high. Science educators and writers wrote to the SBOE, accompanying their letters with pro-science literature, hoping evidence and reason would keep evolution in Texas’s texts.³⁸ Self-identified pro-evolution Christians wrote to the SBOE as well, condemning the efforts of their literalist neighbors. Furthermore, biologists and science educators attended and spoke at the Texas hearing, on behalf of the publishers, hoping to explain and defend evolution before the board and protesters.

Whereas the strength and noise of the DAR and TFA can be explained by the particularly large presence of the John Birch Society in Texas, the organization of and national attention received by Texan antievolutionists and their critics cannot be similarly explained by a disproportionately large number of antievolutionists. Public misgivings about the teaching of evolution flourished nationally, despite their relative lack of



Evolution, Creationism, and the Battle to Control America's Classrooms, by Michael Berkman and Eric Plutzer (2010)
Source: Amazon

activity between the 1925 Scopes trial and the 1960s; after all, antievolutionists had little to fear, as the only two biologists who had authored high school textbooks that discussed evolution by 1960 saw low sales nationally.³⁹ Three states (Mississippi, Tennessee, and Arkansas) even had statutes banning the teaching of evolution.⁴⁰ While such laws were rarely ever enforced, Arkansans refused to repeal the antievolution statute as evolution made its way back into the classroom and some textbooks, with many in the state calling for its enforcement and some even using antievolutionism as a campaign platform.⁴¹ Controversies similar to Texas’s erupted in Kentucky, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Arizona, and Florida, all against the inclusion of evolution in biology texts throughout the early and mid sixties.⁴² As anti-Communist textbook activism lost steam beyond Texas, antievolutionist activism boomed *nationally*.

No other antievolutionist protest, however, reached the scale or coverage of Texas’s antievolutionist protest, in part due to the attention to textbooks already established in the state.⁴³ The *Dallas Morning News* contributed greatly to the antievolutionists’ coverage, itself an embodiment of the gradual alignment of conservative interests in Texas. One of the two major papers in the state’s second largest city, the *Morning News* was overwhelmingly sympathetic to anti-Communists on the far right.⁴⁴ With close ties to Haley, the paper was consistent in its coverage of the state’s textbook controversies.

Editorials were uniformly approving of TFA and DAR activities. Not only was Dallas a de facto headquarter for conservative anti-Communism, it was also a hotspot for local textbook activism. The Parents' Committee of Tarrant County was nearby, and many debates before the Dallas school board mirrored those at the state level, though the local board had no authority to request revisions.⁴⁵ However, though the Parents' Committee supported the antievolutionist protest of 1964, they did not lead it. The protest was led by evangelicals well outside of the Dallas area. Nonetheless, the protest received particularly detailed coverage by the anti-Communist *Morning News*, with editorials calling evolutionary theory blasphemy.⁴⁶ Unrelated to the *Morning News*' typical anti-Communist focus and initially beyond typical loci of textbook activism (Dallas and the capital), the familiarity of the antievolutionist tactics sparked the interest of the conservative *Morning News*, providing antievolutionists with a sizable and sympathetic print outlet.

What distinguished Texas in '64 from other states also debating the placement of evolution in textbooks was the presence of loud, organized, and successful conservative textbook activism earlier that decade and the network that developed. The network and tactics would continue on in Texas, even after the SBOE ultimately decided against the antievolutionists. As multiculturalism, according to Moreau and Zimmerman, came to dominate the discussion of textbooks nationally, conservatives continued to challenge Texan textbook adoptions in official hearings. As conservative forces in general coalesced behind the Republican party by the end of the decade, so did the efforts of textbook activists. Veteran activists Mel and Norma Gabler and "Mrs. Charles Baker" had been active with the DAR and TFA's campaigns over history textbooks in the sixties, with Norma Gabler serving as the "textbook chairman" of the Jane Douglas DAR chapter.⁴⁷ The two brought to the attention of the SBOE thirty-eight textbooks with supposedly suspect content in 1970. The protests contended that there was "a serious omission of the strict constitutionalist, pro-American, conservative view held by a vast number of Americans" in history texts—expended for the sake of expressing "the liberal-leftist viewpoint" in history texts. However, they also argued that biology texts presented evolution as fact at the expense of a religious model and that texts in general contained "offensive" passages promoting contraceptive use.⁴⁸ "We are well acquainted by now—maybe we ought to give [Gabler] a 10-year pin," one SBOE member joked in 1970 (Baker was also present at the hearing).⁴⁹ The long serving activists had in fact mirrored broader developments in American conservatism. The bombardment of official protests was not in vain either. With continuing coverage from the *Dallas Morning News*, Gabler and the Bakers succeeded in blocking the adoption of an English text with supposedly offensive language.⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

The activists' focus on textbooks was—at its surface—unpro-

ductive, as textbooks became increasingly less important as teaching tools throughout this period. In *Evolution, Creationism, and the Battle to Control America's Classrooms*, Michael Berkman and Eric Plutzer determine that on the controversial matter of evolution, textbook content, state educational standards, and even federal policy matter little in terms of what a teacher actually teaches.⁵¹ Though Berkman and Plutzer published their study in 2008, and the content and strategies of debates over the teaching of evolution and its alternatives in the public classroom have evolved substantially between the sixties and now, there are numerous examples of biology educators teaching evolution despite its absence from textbooks in the fifties and sixties. In the late fifties and early sixties, *The American Biology Teacher* increasingly wrote on how to substantively introduce evolution into the classroom without inciting protests. Speaking at a National Association of Biology Teachers symposium in 1957, a teacher from Edwardsville, Illinois advised her fellow educators to be cautious with regard to teaching evolution, as "most students have been brought up in a church with indoctrination into the idea of a single act of creation," so as not to appear to "try to refute the religious beliefs of our students."⁵² In early 1966, the Associated Press (AP) noted that in Arkansas and Mississippi, which had outright banned the teaching of evolutionary theory, "most schools teach evolution anyway." The potential fine and threat of dismissal, under the Arkansas statute, fenced in educators only "somewhat," with many openly flouting the law.⁵³

However, the AP reporter wrote in hyperbole, echoing the frustration of antievolutionists as the scientific theory worked its way gradually into the classroom and textbook. Proactive evolutionist educators were by no means the norm, as one 1962 study, reported on in *The American Biology Teacher*, suggested to readers tremendous religious opposition to evolution by biology teachers themselves.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, many educators taught evolution to their students. Cautious but determined, these teachers taught evolution on their own initiative, often without supportive materials provided by their states.

This independence of educators was not confined to the teaching of evolution; at least in Texas, the state placed greater educational requirements on new teachers during the fifties and sixties. The newly established Texas Education Agency set up various certificates for teachers, covering not just special education but education in general. These carried bachelor's degree and credit hour requirements.⁵⁵ Most of these requirements were for degrees and hours in pedagogy, but toward the end of the fifties the Agency began to place greater emphasis on having educators more deeply understand the subjects that they taught. At a 1957 hearing, the Board addressed concerns that new educators did not receive adequate training in the subjects they were going to teach. Commissioner of Education J. W. Edgar stated that "I do not feel that we are overloading on education and neglecting the

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subject fields,” noting that the state had already introduced high standards for educators in science, history, and English. Though the state’s requirements placed greater emphasis on teaching methodology than science or history, they nonetheless required familiarity and pre-existing knowledge in the educator’s field, notwithstanding *additional* requirements that individual colleges might place on teachers in training.⁵⁶ These developments did not make textbooks entirely useless; even though the state would place greater emphasis on the expertise of the teacher in their subjects, such requirements were placed on new—not existing—teachers.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, state standards for educators reflect the diminishing importance of texts as a teaching tool, in favor of the teachers themselves.

What Texan textbook activists did accomplish was an early alignment between economics and history-focused anti-Communists and biology-focused Christian fundamentalists. Mary C. Brennan, speaking on the United States at large, argues that, though largely out of the public spotlight, the sixties saw disparate conservative identities coalesce behind the Republican Party first epitomized in Barry Goldwater’s 1960 and ‘64 presidential campaigns.⁵⁸ Many of Texas’s activists were certainly part of this movement; the most prominent, Haley—once a fervent conservative Democrat—ran independent in his 1962 campaign for Commission of Agriculture, and denounced fellow Texan Democrat President Johnson. He also wrote in favor of Goldwater’s ‘64 campaign as the GOP nominee for President.⁵⁹ While in the early sixties, evangelicals may not have fully backed radical anti-Communists, their use of TFA’s successful rhetoric, tactics, and resources suggests the beginning of an alignment that would mirror that of broader developments in American conservatism, those that manifested most noticeably in the “culture war” of the 1990s.

Most literature on textbook controversies, particularly those published during the nineties “culture war,” overlooks the nuances of the developments in American conservatism in the sixties. Zimmerman’s *Whose America?* and Moreau’s *Schoolbook Nation* were published in 2002 and ‘03, respectively—not long after the culture war typically associated with the previous decade. In describing past controversies in social studies textbooks, dating back to the time of the Civil War, they borrow from the language of James Davison Hunter, who introduced the term “culture war” in the early 1990s in response to cultural debates over moral authority in matters of education, homosexuality, abortion, multiculturalism, and race, with one side “progressive” and the other “orthodox.”⁶⁰ While history and social studies education was not the sole focus of 1990s debates, conservative activists (Hunter’s “orthodox”) devoted much of their efforts toward reshaping the content of textbooks and curriculums to mirror their “traditional” worldview.⁶¹

Zimmerman and Moreau nobly endeavor to correct the perception that culture wars themselves were new, noting similar eruptions through the past century and a half; yet, they overlook the links *between* the various battles they describe, opting for a more episodic narrative. In that respect, the fall into the same trap as their contemporary commentators. Such writers not only described community and political efforts to change textbook contexts as unique to the second half of the twentieth century; they also described conservative action over the content of their era’s texts as entirely reactionary and an even more recent development. Though education researcher Sherry Keith, writing on “External Pressures on the [Textbook] Selection Process,” notes that “Over the past three decades there has been considerable controversy regarding the content of instructional materials,” such new controversies, as she describes, were typically liberal efforts to reform texts and “[to identify] racism and sexism” in texts.⁶² Other studies, such as *Molding the Good Citizen: The Politics of High School History Texts*, engaged with conservatism, but not historically. Instead, they spoke of conservative talking points particular to the culture war of the nineties, such as same-sex marriage.⁶³ Textbooks of the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s were, striking for “the sympathy of the educational establishment to... the rise and flourishing of many diverse liberal social movements.”⁶⁴ Though English professor Joan DelFattore, in *What Johnny Shouldn’t Read: Textbook Censorship in America*, focuses more than other studies on the conservative response to liberal gains in textbook content, she too describes such activism as arising out of 1980s and the conservatism associated with the Reagan Administration.⁶⁵

Reexamining the textbook controversies of the sixties through the activities of *conservatives* allows us to better understand just how the tactics and arguments of 1990s culture war combatants came about; later activists were not merely reacting against the cementing of multiculturalism in the public school but building upon a longer tradition of grassroots activism against various liberal causes. Since the culture war subsided, many historians have begun to pay greater attention to such conservative activists and trends that were previously unnoticed. The sixties was a period of activity among disparate conservative groups, as they attempted to unify politically. While the process of alignment was gradual, it was also broad; George Nash in *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945* notes the deliberate efforts of those at conservative publications *National Review* and *Modern Age*, both established in 1956, to create a unified conservative front, drawing traditionalist and libertarian camps to a movement that “desperately needed to discover unity and clarity.”⁶⁶

Such alignment occurred at the grassroots level as well. Of course, such elites and intellectuals represented a small portion of conservatives. Lisa McGirr looks to California’s Orange County in the 1960s, observing the coalescing of conservative grassroots activism with conservative businessmen

and the conservative intellectual sphere.⁶⁷ As Sean P. Cunningham notes in his account of modern conservatism's rise in Texas, such business and intellectual participation was often lacking in grassroots efforts, turned off by the perceived extremism of DAR, TFA, and John Birch Society members.⁶⁸ This is true of Texas's textbook debates as well. Business leaders stayed out of Texas's textbook debates, and the radical anti-Communist that jumpstarted such debates were viewed by intellectuals as an embarrassment.

Other educational protests at the time saw the alignment among grassroots activists, not just between different classes of conservatives (intellectuals, grassroots activists, business leaders); however, those were typically couched entirely in the language of anti-Communism. McGirr and Michelle Nickerson both discuss the battle in California over sex education, where anti-Communists dominated PTAs and argued that the destruction of sexual and gender mores were anti-Christian.⁶⁹ However, the sex education debate, unlike the antievolutionist debate in Texas, was consistently framed by activists as one over Communism. The destruction of such standards did not simply undermine Christian community values but, as Nickerson summarizes, "were threats to the social order that invited revolution."⁷⁰ While anti-Communists maintained a Christian rhetoric, using their religion to further repudiate the godless Soviet Union, the threat of Communism was always at the forefront of discussions. Such anti-Communist rhetoric was entirely absent from the debate over the teaching of evolution in Texas, in both SBOE hearings and Texas newspapers.

Texas's 1960s textbook controversies, relative to the national conversation of the nineties, did not constitute a culture war. Multiculturalism, evolution, and sex ed were not yet established enough to elicit the rage of a national conservative movement. Furthermore, of course, such a movement did not exist in its fullest form in the sixties. However, the organized anti-Communist activism around education and history textbooks, as well as the antievolutionist activism of

the sixties that borrowed greatly from the anti-Communists, provide an early account of what that movement would become.

Texan protesters Baker and the Gablers began as anti-Communist activists with the Daughters of the American Revolution. Though they remained focused on the subjects originally associated with the DAR (social studies), by 1970 they also took up the antievolutionist cause as well. And though McGirr and Nickerson's Californian activists framed their crusade against sex education in terms of anti-Communism, Baker and Gabler dropped the paranoia of Communist infiltration, and merged the anti-progressive education stance of anti-Communists and the anti-BSCS stance of antievolutionists under a unified position against a general "liberal" enemy.⁷¹

This unified front was not contained to a few Texan housewives either. Writing in 1979, Indiana English teacher Edward B. Jenkinson observed that by the early seventies, though "individual parents still protest books," many "do so with the advice of one or more of at least two hundred organizations in this nation that want to change the public schools. The number of parents protesting books has increased markedly during the last decade, and the number of incidents of attempted censorship has nearly tripled."⁷² A teacher since the 1950s, Jenkinson argued that procedural changes caused the spike in censorship attempts. However, protests were more organized and included a wider range of talking points as well. The protesters Jenkinson observed objected not just to novels with profane language or sexual content, but stories, histories, and other textbook content that might offend the broad spectrum of beliefs now under the conservative umbrella, whether they be attacks "on family, home, and adults," "on authority of established law and order," "on Bible and Christianity," or promote a welfare state and revolution.⁷³ The Gablers were responsible for one such organization, the Educational Research Analysts. By the late 1970s, they were protesting before school boards in Indiana.⁷⁴ 

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THE PREACHER PRESIDENT

Jimmy Carter and His Public Outreach Program

When Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1976 he sought to contrast his administration to the secrecy that helped define the Nixon and Ford Administrations. His solution was a robust public outreach that connected the American people with their government's policy decisions. This study examines Carter's public outreach program during the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties and the energy crisis. It will examine why the program received varying degrees of success for different policy proposals.

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James Earl "Jimmy" Carter, the 39th President
Source: Department of Defense

Public opinion matters in American politics. In order to be elected and track support for policy proposals once in office, a candidate relies on polls to gauge popular opinion. Jimmy Carter, the 39th President of the United States, was no exception to this rule. In 1976, the nation continued to suffer from a general distrust in the federal government following President Richard Nixon's resignation from office in August 1974. Consequently, Carter ran on a platform advocating increased government transparency during the 1976 election. This campaign strategy helped the largely unknown governor to defeat the sitting president, Gerald Ford, in the general election. Once Carter entered the White House in 1977, he remained committed to government transparency and regaining the trust of the American people.

Carter desired to do what was right for the future of the United States and its citizens. In order to steer the nation in the right path, Carter envisioned multiple policy proposals. The proposals needed Congressional support order to become law. The 39th President, unlike many of his predecessors, never served in Washington as a member of another administration, member of Congress, or other political role. As a result, he did not have many contacts across the city and did not understand, or abide by, all of the traditions that ran the nation's capital. Carter's outsider status in Washington (as well as the election language he used against Washington insiders) created early friction between the executive and legislature.¹ Carter had to rely on the American people as the only force that could persuade Congress to support the executive's plans given the friction that existed. Carter and his advisors reasoned that if public opinion was largely in favor of the President and his proposals that Congress would feel pressured to side with the outsider. The Carter Administration used polls in order to gauge public opinion on major proposals. When public opinion polling showed a majority (or at least a plurality) of citizens agreed with Carter's ideas and proposals, then the case was clear for congressional action on the matter.

Many times though, and often on the most important issues, public opinion did not immediately support Carter's proposals for the nation. When an alignment did not occur between Carter and the American people on a major proposal, the Carter administration developed a public outreach strategy. The outreach consisted of national television addresses, speeches by members of the administration across the nation, and focus groups made up of key community leaders. Over time, Carter and his advisors designed the strategy to increase public awareness about the issue with the administration's spin on the facts. In theory, the more Americans that understood the issues at hand, the more support the policy gained. The president's strategy worked on multiple occasions, including ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties.

The public outreach strategy did not always work so successfully. When Carter and his team could not reconcile the differences between the President and the people, the strategy's

result was the opposite of the intended result. When this occurred, Carter appeared inflexible, and he found himself consistently supporting policies that the American people were unwilling to support. This occurred, for example, during the energy crisis that plagued much of the Carter administration's later half. By consistently speaking about the energy crisis, Carter's strategy backfired. On this issue, the administration continued to remind the American people that they had not developed or implemented any solution to the nation's energy problem.

The failures of the Carter Administration's public outreach strategy disastrous for Carter in the 1980 election. Political rivals took advantage of the political environment. Meanwhile Carter continued to remind the public that he was inflexible on the energy crisis and he achieved no progress on the issue. As a result, Carter first faced a primary battle from the political left by Senator Ted Kennedy. After a damaging primary election, Carter went on to lose to Governor Ronald Reagan. There was no doubt that the political environment was unfavorable to any presidential incumbent in 1980. At the time, the national economy was struggling, and the Soviet Union appeared to be seeking a more aggressive Cold War strategy. Carter's public outreach program for the energy crisis, however, only exasperated the re-election challenges that he faced.

Public outreach worked for the Panama Canal Treaties but not for the energy crisis due to a variety of reasons. For instance, the Panama Canal Treaties were a proactive policy proposal. Carter's proposals to combat the energy crisis, on the other hand, were reactive. Additionally, the treaties seemed far less complex to the American people than the energy crisis. The treaties required a few, seemingly straightforward, transactions to occur. Conversely, it was not easy to predict the effects of Carter's energy proposals. Finally, the treaties were foreign policy, as opposed to the energy crisis, which affected Americans at home. These factors influenced the potential for public opinion to change through presidential public outreach. Carter's ability to harness this potential led to the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, but his insistence to push public outreach when that potential was not present led to his political defeat.

VICTORY, DEFEAT, AND LESSONS LEARNED

Carter did not learn about polls and recognize their importance upon his arrival to the White House. Instead, he developed a system to react to public opinion approval during the fourteen years before his presidency. During this time frame, Carter rose from a largely unknown state senator to Governor of Georgia. Additionally, the future president claimed some narrow victories and experienced crushing defeat during the elections in which he participated. These experiences shaped Carter into a politician with a genuine interest in what his constituents thought about his policies. Unlike other politicians, however, Carter's interest in public

opinion transcended the need for re-election. Consequently, the future president learned a variety of methods in order to reach out to his constituents and convince them that his political ideas were worthy of their support.

In 1962, Carter campaigned in his first major election (he previously held a position on a local school board), when he ran against Homer Moore for the Democratic nomination in Georgia's 14th Senate District.² Initially, he lost the election by fewer than two-hundred votes; however, Carter accused his opponent of fraud in a key county.³ Following a lengthy court battle, he won the nomination and eventually the Senate seat. The lengthy appeals process, however, had physical implications for Carter. After two weeks of court hearings, the candidate lost eleven pounds.⁴ It would not be the last time that an election affected the future president's health. The election of 1962 taught Carter a practical lesson in politics: every vote matters in a close election. Therefore, he believed that he had to generate greater public support in order to mobilize potential voters for his next election bid. The new state senator owed his victory to the people, and he would take that to heart.

While a state senator, Carter learned how to shape his public image while in office. He took pride in his visibility to constituents and frequently contacted them on a variety of political issues. In order to maintain a high degree of visibility he frequently wrote letters to the local newspaper and delivered speeches about the legislative battles occurring in Atlanta. However, with a future gubernatorial campaign in mind, Carter intentionally avoided publicity on controversial issues such as school integration.⁵ The decision was primarily political, but it emphasized that the then state senator cared about his reputation with his constituents. In a matter of months though, Carter's desire to be popular at home would move beyond the obvious political motives.

Carter defined the 1962 state senate election as a turning point in his life because it signaled the beginning of his life in public office.⁶ However, Carter's gubernatorial campaign in 1966 served as a turning point for his relationship with the public. Carter decided to enter the race in June of the election year after he learned that his political rival Bo Callaway, a Republican state senator and West Point graduate, also desired the position.⁷ In the early days of the campaign, Carter believed he made relatively successful strides towards becoming the Democratic nominee. In a statewide poll conducted by Gerald Rafshoon, who would later join Carter in Washington, Carter received only 4.2% of the votes in a race between all of the Republican and Democratic candidates.⁸ Carter did better on Election Day, but his 20.9% performance in the Democratic Primary still put him more than 20,000 votes below the threshold needed to enter a run-off election for the nomination.⁹ The people of Georgia's dismissal of the candidate changed Jimmy Carter the politician.



Jimmy Carter and General Omar Torrijos signing the Panama Canal Treaty (1977)

Source: *Carter White House Photographs Collection*

Following the failed campaign, Carter's health faltered once again. The politician lost twice as much weight as he did following the court hearings years before (22 pounds), and, to make matters worse, Carter found himself in serious debt.¹⁰ Years later, Carter admitted that following the election he felt as though "life had no purpose."¹¹ In his time of struggle, Carter turned towards his re-invigorated faith and found new meaning for his political ambitions. In 1966, following a long walk with his sister Ruth, Carter's religious transformation began.¹² Between 1966 and December 1968, Carter declared himself "born again" after he had multiple religious experiences.¹³ These religious experiences changed not only his religious life, but also his political life.

In the wake of his religious experience, Carter viewed his role as a politician much differently. In particular, Carter's views on the people he represented changed. He came "to realize that that in every person there is something fine and pure and noble," and it was his role as a politician "to provide a society within which these human attributes can be nurtured and enhanced."¹⁴ The media and public noticed Carter's new emphasis on his faith. Hal Gulliver, the editor of the *Atlanta Constitution* wrote that Carter's faith meant that he had "a profound caring about people."¹⁵ In 1962, Carter learned the necessity of caring about people in order to gain their votes. However, seven years later, Carter's care for his constituents and future voters exceeded basic political objectives. He was poised to run for governor again, and return to Atlanta as a people's governor.

THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNOR

Carter won the 1970 gubernatorial election for governor with relative ease. After a victory in a run-off primary, Carter defeated the Republican candidate, Hal Suit, in the general election by nearly 200,000 votes.¹⁶ Armed with a popular mandate and his new regard for his constituents' beliefs and opinions, Carter was ready to employ public opinion measurements to judge his popularity across the state.

Governor Carter arrived prepared to tackle some of the controversial issues that he once dodged as a state senator. The new governor, however, needed to rally public support for his new controversial legislative agenda. His first, and arguably most controversial, proposal focused on the reorganization of the state government. The proposal called for a fundamental restructuring the government in order to increase both efficiency and the governor's level of control. Carter introduced his plan in HB 1 shortly after entering the governor's mansion.¹⁷ Expecting legislative opposition, Carter launched a large public outreach program. Carter's budget included \$15,000 to the public relations firm Bell and Stanton to promote the bill to the people of Georgia and another \$14,000 was allocated to create an eight-minute film in support of the proposal.¹⁸ Furthermore, the Governor listened to his advisors (primarily Rafshoon), and then traveled for about six weeks during the summer of 1971 to speak to some 13,000 Georgians and promote his plans while listening to their concerns.¹⁹ During these trips, Carter took on the persona of a preacher more than an elected government official. Rafshoon wrote to the Governor that the outreach "actually gives the little man a voice in government (we've certainly

talked about this a lot).²⁰ He went on to write that the program aimed to have the average citizen:

come away with a warm, favorable feeling towards the reorganization concept. Let him see this and then the next time he sees his legislator, he'll say, 'Man, I really like Carter's plan to save money, give more services.'²¹

The plan certainly served Carter's political goals. On April 6, 1972, after nearly a year of public outreach, the governor signed the reorganization bill into law.²² Carter's first public outreach campaign achieved a tangible victory.

In a 1974 speech before the National Press Club, Governor Carter claimed that "for too long politicians have been isolated from the people. They have made political decisions from an ivory tower."²³ In an environment where "our people feel that they have little access to the core of government and little influence with elected officials," Carter saw it as his mission to bridge "this chasm between people and government."²⁴ Carter saw a much larger purpose in his outreach program than politics. His public appearances served to heal and connect a population separated from its government. Carter's relationship between his government and his constituents followed a similar model to a Southern Baptist pastor and his congregation. A pastor's main aim is to build and foster a strong relationship between his people and God, who at one point, may have, become disconnected from each other. Similarly, Carter's re-born religious experience introduced him to the power that a leader could have in building relationships. Between 1971 and 1975, Carter's political congregation consisted of the inhabitants of Georgia. In 1976 he would attempt to broaden his influence to the entire United States of America.

1976: AN OUTSIDER'S OUTREACH

In December 1974, only a month before he left office, Carter announced the beginning of his presidential campaign at the Atlanta Civic Center.²⁵ The soon to be former Governor of Georgia was committed to winning the Democratic primary election and the general election as a Washington outsider who could bridge the rift between the American people and the federal government. The 1976 election was the first presidential election since the Watergate scandal destroyed the Nixon administration and made Ford the 38th President of the United States. Carter and his advisors believed that given "Watergate, economic setbacks, and confusion in Washington that maybe... the 1976 election, will be quite different from the ones in the past."²⁶ In this different election, Carter believed his bridging method between the government and the people would resonate with the electorate.

Carter's belief was correct. During the campaign, he emphasized his values in contrast to the incumbent, Ford, who many Americans continued to see as an extension of a dishonest Nixon presidency. At a luncheon in Baltimore, Carter boldly stated he "wouldn't tell a lie...make a misleading statement...betray a trust... [or] avoid a controversial issue,"

and if he did not follow through during the campaign he told the audience "don't support me, because I wouldn't deserve to lead this country."²⁷ In April 1976, while Carter was on pace to win the Democratic nomination, the Democratic frontrunner challenged the audience that "if there are things you don't like about our nation...take advantage of this year, election year, and help guarantee...that our country actively represents the finest aspects of our people."²⁸ This message propelled Carter to victory in the primary election.

Carter continued this down-to-Earth strategy into the general election against Ford. Following the presidential debates, Carter scored better than Ford on a scale that measured whether each candidate was more deceptive or open.²⁹ The American people's trust in Carter and the belief that he would increase the White House's transparency helped propel him to victory over Ford. Carter ultimately won 297 electoral votes to Ford's 240 and received 50.1% of the popular vote.³⁰ During Carter's inaugural address, the new president reaffirmed the principles that got him elected and told the American people that they gave him "a great responsibility—to stay close to you, to be worthy of you, and to exemplify what you are," but he was "confident that in the end we will triumph together in the right."³¹ After a short period of time in office, the President proved that he could work with the American public in order to move proposed policies forward.

THE FIRST TEST: PUBLIC OUTREACH AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

In 1977 the Carter administration faced its first public opinion challenge: the Panama Canal Treaties. The treaties were a foreign policy priority in Washington, and multiple administrations had negotiated them before Carter took office. The final agreement gave Panama full control of the canal by 1999, but granted the United States the right to defend the waterway if an adversary threatened access. In return, the United States would ensure Panama received a share of the canal's tolls, and the United States would provide loans and credits to the Panamanian government.³² The treaty was initially unpopular with the American people; however, as the chief negotiator of the treaties, Sal Linowitz, noted, Carter "was truly insistent on getting a treaty, and was prepared to pay a political price for it."³³ The young president understood that convincing the American public to believe in the treaties would take a great deal of work. He told his staff that he truly believed the treaties were in "our highest national interest."³⁴ In the coming months, Carter and his advisors strove to change public opinion on the treaties and gain ratification from the Senate.

Pat Caddell, the chief pollster in the White House, stated that the administration conducted more polling on the treaties than on any other policy issue during Carter's time in office. He noted, however, that because the issue was so controversial, Carter likely would not have committed to the treaties if he allowed public opinion to set his political agenda.³⁵ In

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June 1977, Caddell's polling company, Cambridge Survey Research, found that only 29 percent of Americans supported the treaties, compared to 44 percent who disapproved ratification.³⁶ A few months later in August, the administration received mixed polling data. One poll showed 39 percent approval for the treaties.³⁷ Another poll taken at the same time, however, revealed only 25 percent approval for the treaties.³⁸ It was clear that the Senate would not ratify the treaties when some polls showed such low public opinion. Although public opinion did not influence Carter's agenda, it did influence many senators' agendas. One important member of Carter's Panama Canal Treaties organization was George Moffett, the Director of Research for the Committee of Americans for the Canal Treaties. A prominent California pollster, Mark DiCamillo, wrote Moffett after Carter's time in office and confirmed that California's senators would not have supported ratification while public opinion was so low.³⁹ The Carter team needed to find why Americans opposed the treaties and then change the public's perception of them.

Carter knew in his mind that the treaties were best for the nation. He now needed to guide his political congregation to the same conclusion. In order to do this, he first needed to find out what the primary opposition to the treaties was. He assigned Caddell to this task. It did not take the pollster long to find one reason many Americans opposed ratifying the treaties: they did not understand the issue. One poll asked American citizens to answer three basic, fact-based questions about the treaties. Only one in fourteen Americans could answer all three questions correctly. Of those who answered all three correctly, 51 percent approved of ratification.⁴⁰ In a letter to his staff, Carter stated that "many Americans do not understand exactly what the Treaties do. Recent nationwide polls indicate that most Americans would support the Treaties if they understood that our country retained the right to defend the Canal and keep it open to ships of all nations."⁴¹ Carter's aide, William Blair Jr., seconded the President's belief and stated that "the Gallup findings strongly suggest that great knowledge of the treaties' provisions results in higher levels of approval."⁴² Caddell and the Carter staff drew the conclusion that an informed public would translate to popular opinion.

To inform the public, Carter took to the airwaves. Carter and his team prepared their talking points based on conclusions drawn from further polling of the American public.⁴³ In February 1978, Carter decided that he would make a public address on television to address the treaties directly. In preparations for the speech, Carter's speechwriters identified the main objection to the treaty and provided Carter with refutations to each.⁴⁴ During the speech, Carter quickly looked to dispel rumors about the treaties. Within minutes, Carter said, "Let me answer specifically the most common questions about the treaties." He proceeded to directly quote the treaty and counter his opposition's arguments one by one.⁴⁵ Carter received another unlikely supporter in the me-


dia: John Wayne. In one thirty second television ad, the all-American actor plainly asked the American people to "write your Senators in support of the Panama Canal treaties. I'd appreciate it."⁴⁶ The television advertisements were not, however, the only outreach tool that the administration used.

The administration also brought multiple groups of local leaders to the White House to receive briefs on the treaties directly from the administration. Jack Watson, one of Carter's closest advisors, made the opening remarks at one of these briefs. He told the crowd that "the purpose of this briefing this afternoon is a simple one. It is in effect to conduct straight-forward, factual briefing about the Panama Canal Treaties, of which you will note there are two."⁴⁷ In another brief, Jane Wales, the Assistant Deputy Secretary of State, told a group of prominent women leaders that "the President wants to be sure that the American public is informed on the treaties—their contents and history."⁴⁸ The meeting, which lasted approximately two hours, featured speeches and question and answer sessions with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ambassador David Popper, Secretary of the Air Force John Stetson, Admiral James Holloway of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the First Lady Roselyn Carter.⁴⁹ Another meeting for Hispanic leaders featured Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ambler Moss, Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander and Vice President Walter Mondale.⁵⁰ These meetings gave local leaders the opportunity to hear direct from administration officials and formulate an informed opinion on the treaties.

The feedback from these local leaders was overwhelmingly positive. The National President of the National Association of Colored Women's Clubs reported shortly after her meeting at the White House that the President should "feel assured" that she would "get the message across to [her organization]."⁵¹ Additionally, the President of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union told the President that she planned "to make a report of the conference to our membership so they will be advised of the treaty and intent of the treaty at this time."⁵² Sister Elizabeth Barrett sent such a letter to her organization, the Leadership Conference of Women Religious. In the letter, she told her members that "it is urgent and very important to write to your senators indicating your support of the treaties and to suggest others that they likewise write."⁵³ This sort of feedback showed the success of the administration's briefing program. The local leaders returned home from Washington and then contributed free advertising for the administration.

Over time the combination of television addresses directly from the White House, celebrity advertisements, and meeting with local leaders succeeded in turning around public opinion regarding the treaties. During the public outreach process, Moffett made the following observation:

Pan [sic] shows Admin [sic] to be good at two things. One is education—or persuasion—of the public...It has



First debate between Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter meet at the Walnut Street Theater in Philadelphia (September 1976)

Source: David Hume Kennerly, *Gerald R. Ford Library*

significantly [sic] changed public opinion, not by the bravura of the President's speeches, but by patient, well-plotted and continuous series of briefings, meetings, and grass roots conferences involving leaders of business, labor and civic opinion.⁵⁴

Public opinion poll data in April 1978 finally supported Mofett's observation. In a letter to Carter, Louis Harris, a national pollster, found that "by a relatively narrow 44-39 percent, a plurality of the American people now favor" the treaties.⁵⁵ With more Americans supporting the treaties than ever before, Carter had a case to make for Senate ratification.

Shortly following these poll numbers, the Senate moved forward towards ratifying the treaties. On April 18, 1978, just fifteen days after Harris declared that a plurality of Americans supported ratification, the Senate voted to ratify the second treaty with 68-32 vote, the same margin as the first treaty.⁵⁶ Carter succeeded in his first major public outreach effort as president. After nearly a year of public outreach, he was able to change public opinion to support one of his policies. Carter and his team did not turn on their conviction of the treaties' vitality to the nation's well-being despite negative poll numbers. Instead, the President made his case to the American people and guided them through intellectual discussion to come to the same conclusion that he had already reached. Furthermore, the success of the Panama Canal Treaties public outreach program reaffirmed to Carter that similar programs would work in the future with similar controversial issues.

A HARD CASE TO MAKE: PUBLIC OUTREACH AND THE ENERGY CRISIS

In the spring of 1979, Rafshoon informed Carter that "energy has very quickly become the most significant domestic political issue."⁵⁷ He was right; Americans faced rising energy prices and shortages. The crisis directly affected the average American family, and, as gasoline lines grew with seemingly no end in sight, the public looked for a figure to blame. Stuart Eizenstat, a top Carter aide, informed Carter that "nothing else has so frustrated, confused, angered the American people—or so targeted their distress at you personally."⁵⁸ Another aide, Richard Moe, seconded Eizenstat's remarks and believed that "many people think no one is in charge of this issue and the President, naturally, is getting most of the heat."⁵⁹ Consequently, Carter saw his poll numbers sharply drop that spring. At the end of March, Carter's approval rating was only 39 percent, compared to 50 percent disapproval. By the end of June, only 30 percent of the nation supported the President.⁶⁰ Repairing Carter's approval numbers and fixing the energy crisis itself would require a public outreach effort even more powerful than during the Panama Canal Treaties.

Advisors recognized that "no single quick-fix or politically popular action is going to pull the nation through its near term crisis or place it on a solid energy basis for future generations."⁶¹ Carter, however, was determined to present what he believed the best solution was, whether it was popular or not. Two years before the crisis, he unveiled his energy plan



Five U.S. Presidents in the Oval Office (2009)

Source: Eric Draper, *White House Archives*

before a joint session of Congress and called for an overall energy consumption decrease of two percent, gas consumption to decrease ten percent, fewer than six million barrels of oil imported daily, the establishment of a ten month emergency petroleum supply, an increase in domestic coal production by two-thirds, ninety percent of buildings to be properly insulated, and two and half million homes to run on solar power.⁶² Congress did not enact the majority of this legislation. Carter and his staff realized that they had so far “failed the nation on energy leadership” and it was “time to come through.”⁶³ As a result, they proposed the Energy Management Partnership Act of 1979 (EMPA) on May 18, 1978, which restated the President’s 1977 agenda.⁶⁴

Carter’s team enacted many of the same tactics that they employed during the Panama outreach program. On June 1, 1979, the White House hosted another briefing with community and business leaders to inform them on the President’s plan to end the energy crisis. Attendees included representatives from the Consumer Energy Council, National Consumers League, the Sierra Club, and dozens others.⁶⁵ A similar meeting occurred on August 1 where attendees heard from Anne Wexler, Special Assistant for Public Outreach, Elliot Cutler, from the Office of Management and Budget, and Eizenstat.⁶⁶ These meetings met more mixed opinions afterwards than those regarding Panama. David M. Roderick of U.S. Steel guaranteed the President the company’s “cooperation toward achieving a workable program.”⁶⁷ His counterpart, Lloyd McBride of the United Steelworkers of America, agreed that it was time “for Americans to embark on a course marked by a cohesive energy policy that makes use of our own resources.”⁶⁸ Finally, Loyd Hackler of the American Retail Foundation told Carter that “the outlines of [his] energy program offer the nation a direction that can give us lift.”⁶⁹ Unfortunately for the administration, not all leaders had such positive reviews.

The Consumer Federation of America released a scathing press release on the same day as a representative attended a White House brief. The organization told its members that:

President Carter tells you, the American consumer, that this is a crisis, and a crisis isn’t solved by finger pointing. This is a crisis, but a crisis is solved when American consumers and their leaders exercise the responsibility of following their conscience.⁷⁰

The statement reflected the sentiment of much of the nation. The American people believed that they should be able to choose to limit their consumption on their own, and not because of a government mandate. In one poll conducted by Caddell’s company, 48 percent agreed that “conservation is not a realistic solution to the energy crisis unless we are all prepared to accept a much lower standard of living.”⁷¹ The American public was not willing to accept this at the moment. The administration needed to directly reach out to the American public and persuade them that energy sacrifices were necessary.

Rafshoon recognized that the administration had to use direct methods of public outreach rather than indirect methods, such as local leader engagement. He told his staff “to take every opportunity available to help build public and Congressional support for the President’s determined efforts to unite the Nation...for his energy proposals.”⁷² The administration enlisted the help of General Benjamin O. Davis Jr., the well respected retired Air Force general and commander of the famed Tuskegee Airmen, to be the Secretary of Transportation’s representative for the administration’s ridesharing and 55 m.p.h speed limit programs. Davis made speeches in thirty cities with the stated purpose of talking “about the ridesharing and driver awareness in the context of the energy problem.”⁷³ However, Carter and his team found no noticeable changes in attitude from the crowds that Davis addressed. After Davis’, and other administration partners’, nationwide tour failed to change public attitudes towards his proposed programs, it became clear that the message had to come from Carter’s mouth directly.

Rafshoon initially argued that it would be unwise for Carter to make a national address regarding the energy crisis during the summer of 1979. He advised the President that “there tends to be an inverse correlation between the degree to which we hype an announcement and the seriousness with which the press reports it.”⁷⁴ Carter, however, recognized that he had to tackle the issue directly and tell the American people what he believed, regardless of the political ramifications. On July 15, 1979 he delivered his famous “Crisis of Confidence” speech on every major television network from the Oval Office. He opened the speech by reiterating that he was “a president who is not isolated from the people, who feels your pain, and who shares your dreams and draws his strength and his wisdom from” the American people.⁷⁵ During the energy crisis, Carter told the public that he realized “more than ever that as president I need your help. So I decided to reach

out and listen to the voices of America.”⁷⁶ However, in the speech, Carter tied the energy crisis to a larger fundamental lack of confidence from Americans in their government. Despite Rafshoon’s initial hesitations about the speech, the American people responded very positively to the President’s words. Four days after the speech, Rafshoon reported that “the arresting response to [Carter’s] speech has revealed a deep, wide reservoir of enthusiasm for conservation.”⁷⁷ The next day, the White House received 1,221 phone calls. The press office reported that 86 percent expressed positive feelings about the speech.⁷⁸ The opportunity to change public opinion presented itself. The administration now needed to follow through.

an accomplishment against Reagan’s attacks on the Iranian hostage crisis and defense spending. Carter not only failed politically, but his public outreach program reminded the public about his failure. He went on to lose the 1980 election handily.

LESSONS LEARNED

A comparison of two of President Carter’s two major public outreach programs reveals two very different outcomes. Three major conditions existed which created success for the Panama Canal Treaties but failure during the energy crisis. First, the Panama Canal Treaties were a proactive policy by Carter. No specific event forced the treaties into the policy

“President Jimmy Carter’s belief in transparency and his attempt to restore faith in the federal government following the Watergate scandal defined his presidency.”

Carter’s success in directly addressing the American people paved the way for a direct outreach program by the President. In the wake of Carter’s speech, the administration recognized that in the coming weeks it was “crucial that [they] take advantage of opportunities to get our message out about the energy crisis.”⁷⁹ To do this, Carter decided to conduct interviews with a variety of regional newspapers and participate in a call-in show on NPR.⁸⁰ Despite these outreach efforts, the issue continued to plague Carter into the 1980 election season.

discussion. This allowed Carter and his team to shape the narrative. The majority of the American public had no previous experience with the Panama Canal. Therefore, the American public was more receptive to the facts presented by Carter. On the other hand, specific events that Carter could not control caused the shock in the energy market. As a result, most Americans had some previous experience with the energy crisis, which impacted the way that they received the information presented by Carter. Their negative experiences with a pre-existing condition outweighed any new information that Carter brought to the table.

Congress continued to debate EMPA well into the election cycle. It remained a “must pass” piece of legislation.⁸¹ Therefore, Carter and his team continued to emphasize the importance of the bill to the public, despite the fact that the public did not seem to care. Americans ranked oil dependency as only the third most important issue in the election against Reagan (behind domestic spending and military strength). In fact, only four percent of voters identified “energy” as the nation’s most pressing issue.⁸² Regardless, the administration remained inflexible. They touted a variety of energy accomplishments to include the creation of the Department of Energy, a gradual decontrol of natural gas, and the proposed EMPA.⁸³ By insisting on continually talking about energy, Carter only reminded the American public that little had changed.

Second was the direct nature of the Panama Canal Treaties against the complexity of the energy crisis. Carter framed the treaties as straightforward and that two relatively simple treaties would solve the United States’ potential problems in Panama. On the other hand, the word “crisis” made the energy problem seem far more complex. The multiple portions of EMPA and other programs, like ridesharing, made the nation recognize that no panacea existed to solve the nation’s energy woes. As a result, it became harder for the public to throw its support behind Carter and his proposals. Politicians understand that complex policies do not sell well; Carter failed to accept this rule.

Reagan did not need to campaign on energy issues because the incumbent president already made the case for him. Carter happily continued to remind the American public through his outreach program that, despite his best efforts, he could not implement what he believed to be the solution to one of the nation’s problems. The defeat of EMPA in the House signaled the ultimate failure of Carter’s proposal mid-way through the election.⁸⁴ He could no longer use energy as

Finally, and most importantly, public outreach was more successful with the Panama Canal Treaties because it was a foreign policy issue with very little direct impact on individual Americans. Public disapproval for the treaties most commonly referenced national pride. Disapproval for energy proposals referenced the standard of living for Americans. The closer to home an issue is, the tougher it is to persuade the public that it is necessary to undergo a fundamental change. Carter’s reorganization of the Georgia state government proved an exception because, although a domestic issue, the

The Preacher President

reforms did not threaten to change the way his constituents carried out their lives. Carter faced an uphill battle on his energy policies from the beginning because he threatened to change the lives of Americans at home fundamentally. Regardless of the persuasion techniques used, few Americans would be willing to change the way they lived.

President Jimmy Carter's belief in transparency and his attempt to restore faith in the federal government following the Watergate scandal defined his presidency from its inception in 1976 until he left office in 1981. Carter's emphasis on transparency transcended simply satisfying the electorate at the time. His faith and moral code made him firmly believe

that his role as a political executive was similar to a pastor. As governor or president, Carter held to his firmly held convictions on how to solve specific problems. It was then his responsibility to reach out to his constituents and guide them to the same conclusion that he already reached. As a result, he created a strong polling and public outreach apparatus. This system helped him achieve some of his greatest achievements as a public official. However, he learned the hard way the limits of public outreach, and his belief that his position was akin to a preacher cost him his political career. Carter's public outreach strategy had the noblest of intentions. Unfortunately for him, however, noble intentions do not always translate to political success in Washington. 

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
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CALCULATED CAUTION

Seward and France's Invasion of Mexico

The American Civil War was a critical event in the history of the United States, and thus captured the attention of the country's leaders at the time. While this internal crisis was not the only issue facing the United States, all other concerns became secondary when the continuation of the country was at risk. Thus, during the war, Secretary of State William Henry Seward made every effort to keep the conflict contained internally despite the seemingly imminent threat from the French who occupied Mexico at the time.

By Laura Grove
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William H. Seward, Secretary of State (1861-69)
Source: *Prints and Photographs, Library of Congress*

In the 1860s, the United States Secretary of State, William Henry Seward, faced a major dilemma. Just as the United States erupted into the American Civil War (1861-1865), several European powers, including France, encroached upon the sovereignty of Mexico and thus violated the Monroe Doctrine. At first glance it appeared as though both a policy of direct involvement and of neutrality might prove disastrous to the continued existence of the Union. However, the situation was much more complicated. Seward demonstrated his genius as he carefully navigated through this issue. He came to the conclusion that, "The Mexican complica-

tion, so far forth as France's interference is concerned, will, if left alone, soon wear itself out."¹ Thus, insofar as France was concerned, Seward's policy during the Civil War was characterized by inaction. Yet this was only half the story. While he presented the United States as neutral concerning France's occupation of Mexico, he made no secret of where his sympathies lay. Seward did all in his power to assuage the fears and concerns of the French and thus discourage intervention in the Civil War, while still lending as much covert assistance to Mexico as he could get away with. Ultimately he dealt with France in accordance with the practical threat it posed to the continuation of the Union, which proved to be not as severe as it appeared on the surface. Seward not only dealt with the French government shrewdly to avoid provoking it, but also actively voiced his discontent with its actions.

FINANCIAL CRISIS AND FRENCH AMBITION IN MEXICO

Before one can understand the reasoning behind Seward's policy, it is important to understand the situation in Mexico and why France ultimately chose to invade and remain. Just before the American Civil War, Mexico had been engulfed in its own civil war. At its conclusion, the liberal reformer Benito Juarez emerged victorious.² However his new government suffered from serious financial issues, owing over 80 million dollars to France, Great Britain, and Spain collectively.³ The financial crisis in Mexico escalated to such an extent that European involvement became a real possibility. In October 1861 these three European countries signed the Treaty of London, in which each agreed to jointly occupy Mexico until fair reparations were paid. Although this would directly infringe upon the Monroe Doctrine, there was little the United States could do to intervene as its own civil war captured its attention. France, Great Britain, and Spain agreed to refrain from taking any of Mexico's territory or to interfere with the Mexican people's right to choose their own government.⁴ Thus, on December 8, 1861 these powers invaded Mexico at Vera Cruz just as the American Civil War came into full swing. By the 17th of December the troops successfully occupied ports and customhouses awaiting action by the Mexican government.⁵ By April, however, French troops violated

the Treaty of London and began to push further into Mexico. At this point Juarez met with the leaders of the French and Spanish forces and came to an agreement about the money owed. After having achieved this, Great Britain and Spain chose to pull out by the end of April; however, Napoleon III, the Emperor of France, had grander ambitions.⁶

Napoleon dreamed of a French empire in Mexico and thus persisted, invading Mexico City. Even after Napoleon's forces suffered a great defeat at Puebla on May 5th 1862, he continued to commit greater numbers of troops and supplies to the effort. Though the endeavor proved more difficult and costly than he had originally envisioned,⁷ ultimately the invasion was successful, and in 1863 Napoleon offered the throne to Maximilian of Hapsburg, younger brother to the Austrian emperor, who accepted it in 1864.⁸ With this new government formed, the United States withdrew their foreign minister, Thomas Corwin, and refused to recognize Maximilian's government in protest.⁹ The United States viewed France's actions as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine that undermined its authority and posed a threat to national security. However, because the invasion of Mexico coincided nearly perfectly with the start of the American Civil War, there was little Seward would dare do to counteract this. However, Seward did recognize the potential threat of a French presence in Mexico and thus did all he could to prevent this amid the internal turmoil of the American Civil War.

As soon as Lincoln took power, Seward made every effort to prevent European intervention through attempted mediation. The United States' Foreign Minister to Mexico, Thomas Corwin, came to Seward with an idea for a negotiation between Mexico and Great Britain: Mexico would begin to pay its loans to the European powers while accepting several million dollars in loans from the United States over three to five years and agreeing to set aside some territory as collateral for this loan.¹⁰ When this failed, Seward instructed Charles Francis Adams, Foreign Minister to Great Britain, to offer 3% interest on Britain's loan to Mexico in exchange for their pledge not to intervene directly.¹¹ As the situation grew more desperate, Seward made it clear that he was willing for the United States to temporarily take up Mexico's debt to prevent intervention. However, Great Britain insisted that its grievances against Mexico were more than monetary, and thus rejected this offer.¹² Although Seward's efforts to mediate ultimately failed, they demonstrated his understanding of the seriousness of the situation and keen diplomatic mind from the beginning.

UNDERSTANDING THE TRUE THREAT OF INTERVENTION

Despite France's insistence that it would remain neutral in the Civil War, Seward remained cautious, as he understood the ample reasons for which France might intervene. Unlike Great Britain, France did not have a vast reserve of cotton, and thus its supply greatly diminished at the start of the Civil



Charge of the Mexican Cavalry against French troops at the Battle of Puebla (1863)

Source: Mike Manning (Commons Wikimedia)

War, as cotton became increasingly difficult to obtain from the Confederacy.¹³ Additionally, a divided America would mean less opposition to Napoleon III's western ambitions.¹⁴ The French Foreign Minister Edouard Thouvenel assured Seward that "the government of his Majesty does not intend to undertake... any engagements of a nature to implicate it, directly or indirectly, in the internal conflict now existing in the United States."¹⁵ However, while Thouvenel insisted that France would remain neutral in the American Civil War, Seward took little comfort in this. He understood the many sympathies and economic reasons France had to justify supporting the Confederacy.¹⁶ Thus Seward had real reason to fear French intervention over the issue of cotton and French ambition, especially as calls for greater trade access with the Confederacy grew.

In response to French demands for access to Southern ports Seward offered polite sympathy while refusing to jeopardize the war effort, demonstrating his deep desire to keep France neutral in the American Civil War. In discussing Thouvenel's requests for access to southern ports with Foreign Minister to France William Dayton, Seward commented, "The blockade is already very effective, quite as much so as any other

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nation ever established. Proceedings are now on foot which will remove the premature objections of the French consul to which you allude.”¹⁷ This highlights the ways in which the Civil War largely dictated his actions concerning foreign policy. Seward had no intention of allowing the French to break the United States’ successful blockade, for this would endanger the Union war effort. However, he painstakingly worked to appease the French by doing all within his power to supply them with the cotton they desired. He promised to reopen the trade as soon as Southern ports were reacquired and even attempted to grow cotton in southern Illinois.¹⁸ However, these “proceedings” proved unsatisfactory to Thouvenel.

the Trent Affair and simply did not have time to help Dayton work out the issues with France.²⁴ Later he also asked Thouvenel whether France would go to war over the Trent Affair should Great Britain do so, demonstrating where his true concerns lay. Thouvenel replied that while France deplored this violation of international law, it would remain neutral in such a conflict.²⁵ With this assurance, Seward pushed France to the back of his mind. Thus Great Britain captured the attention of Seward, as he understood its more immediate threat to the Union war effort.

“Seward did recognize the potential threat of a French presence in Mexico and thus did all he could to prevent this amid the internal turmoil of the American Civil War.”

While Seward recognized that access to Confederate cotton posed a threat to French neutrality, he also understood that France’s dependence on Northern wheat largely counteracted this threat. Thouvenel declared that if France were not permitted to trade with the Confederacy, it would have no choice but to assist it.¹⁹ However, Seward recognized the complicated nature of this trade issue. Many European countries, including France, depended on the northern United States for wheat. As 1861 proved to be a particularly bad year for wheat in Europe, this trade became all the more crucial.²⁰ Thus Seward recognized the unlikelihood of French intervention in the Civil War over cotton, as this would jeopardize France’s wheat supply. Consequently, he judiciously chose not to meet the demands of the French. Still, he sought to placate the French. Hence instead of straightforwardly rejecting their demands he inquired about the practicality of opening the blockade and politely suggested the best way for France to resume trading with the Confederacy was to hope for a swift Union victory.²¹ He recognized the importance of keeping good relations with the French, but by November 1861 his attention had turned to a more imminent threat posed by Great Britain.

The Trent Affair shifted Seward’s attention to Great Britain as this event constituted a more immediate threat during the Civil War. The diplomatic crisis involved the seizure of two Confederate diplomats sailing under the protection of the British flag.²² The event provoked outrage among the British. Though tensions were mounting with France at this time over the issue of cotton, Seward focused his attention on Great Britain. Talk of France’s desire to break the Union’s blockade in the correspondence between Seward and Dayton came to a near halt, replaced instead by the Trent Affair.²³ Seward’s real concerns lay with Great Britain, demonstrated by his urgent message to Dayton explaining that he was caught up in

Seward was also keenly aware that the French looked to Great Britain for direction in terms of intervening in the American Civil War, and thus also chose to focus on the British for this reason. Great Britain, as the dominant power in Europe, held much sway over the other European countries. In the negotiations that took place before the initial invasion of Mexico, Seward dealt almost exclusively with the British, demonstrating his understanding of this fact. Once the Civil War began, Napoleon III sent a message to British Ambassador Cowley saying, “If Great Britain would recognize the Confederacy, cotton would become available.”²⁶ Implicit in this was France’s promise to follow Great Britain should it choose to intervene on behalf of the Confederacy. Seward recognized this dependence and thus strategically chose to invest his efforts primarily in Great Britain. Consequently, while tensions continued to grow between France and the United States at this time, Seward paid relatively little attention to the issue as the more immediate threat of British intervention formalized with the Trent Affair.

In addition to understanding the importance of the British threat, Seward also recognized the practical barriers that made French involvement unlikely. By the time Maximilian took power in Mexico, a guerrilla force led by Benito Juarez had risen up in opposition to the French presence.²⁷ Thus as the Civil War progressed, Napoleon III focused much of his attention on simply maintaining control in Mexico. In fact, by 1863, Napoleon III began contemplating abandoning Mexico altogether, as the cost of remaining began to outweigh the benefits.²⁸ Additionally, French sympathies for the South diminished as the Confederacy showed less promise. As early as April 1863, Alfred Paul, the French Consul at the Confederate Capital in Richmond, began to take note of the Confederacy’s fading prospects.²⁹ He sent reports to France of bread riots and general chaos, highlighting the disastrous

economy in the Confederacy. Ultimately he concluded that while the people passionately believed in the Confederate cause, the weak, inefficient government doomed their prospects of success. Consequently he greatly discouraged French action in aiding the Confederacy. This in conjunction with France's preoccupation with Mexico served to alleviate Seward's fears of immediate French intervention during the American Civil War.


BALANCING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Though French intervention represented no immediate threat, Seward still sought to remain on good terms so as not to stoke Confederate sympathies. In a letter to Dayton in 1863 Seward explained the need for caution:

Circumstances tend to excite misapprehensions and jealousies between this government and that of France, in spite of all the prudence we can practice. On our part, we studiously endeavor to avoid them. You will, therefore, be fully authorized in assuming that this government does not inspire and has no responsibility for assumptions of a different character made by the press.³⁰

Though the French might be less inclined to intervene in the American Civil War than the British, the French threat still could not be ignored. Thus, as Seward explains, foreign policy at this time would be characterized by caution. By permitting Dayton to disavow any statements by the press that might offend the French, Seward demonstrated extreme attentiveness and acknowledges the sensitive nature of this situation. Seward desired to, in appearance at least, remain as neutral as possible.

Seward demonstrated this prudence in 1863 in his handling of the French reaction to news of the United States' participation in aiding Juarez. General Zirman of the Mexican army ordered arms from Great Britain. Wanting to secure safe passage to Mexico through Union blockades, he approached Charles Francis Adams about sending along a letter that would ensure the cargo's safe passage.³¹ Having obtained the promise that such a letter would remain secret, Adams agreed.³² However, the letter made its way into the London press, and when the new French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de l'Huys, became aware of the situation, he furiously demanded that the United States disavow Adams' actions.³³ Mindful that this issue might provoke France to actively aid the South, Seward quickly complied. He instructed Dayton to assure Drouyn de l'Huys that the United States government viewed the incident "with disfavor and with regret," and that "it regards the proceeding on the part of Mr. Adams as having been one of inadvertence and not of design or motive injurious to France."³⁴ With this assurance, Drouyn de l'Huys dropped the issue.³⁵ However, Seward's apology seems less than sincere. It is clear that Adams knew he was directly aiding Juarez in writing this letter, yet Seward passes it off as an accident. Additionally, Adams received no punishment whatsoever, suggesting that Seward approved, or at least did not disapprove, of Adams' actions. Thus Seward



103 THE "SAN JACINTO" STOPPING THE "TRENT."

The USS *San Jacinto* (right) stops the British packet steamer RMS *Trent*, later coined the Trent Affair (1861)

Source: *British Library*

carefully balanced his desire to see the Mexican government restored in Mexico with his need to maintain good relations with France.

This is not to say that Seward did not make an effort to explicitly discourage French occupation of Mexico during the American Civil War. The need for caution prompted him to primarily express his discontent verbally. Any direct assistance or support given to Juarez was done secretly, as demonstrated with Adams' letter. He periodically sent word to Napoleon III reminding him of the United States' disapproval of French actions in Mexico. Seward made it a point to emphasize the United States' desire, "that peaceful relations may soon be restored between France and Mexico upon a basis... favorable to the independence and sovereignty of the people of Mexico."³⁶ Thus he actively encouraged the French to pull out of Mexico and made no secret of the United States' disapproval of their actions. However, his opinion was not

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accompanied by any explicit threats or strict consequences should France choose to remain in Mexico. Understanding the United States' preoccupation with the Civil War and France's sympathies with the South, Seward wisely made his opinion known while keeping any actions against France or in favor of Juarez quiet.

In the months following the end of the Civil War, Seward's desire and support for the restoration of the Mexican Government in Mexico became more pronounced. With the Civil War concluded, many Americans turned their attention to France and some actively attempted to aid Juarez. To placate France, Seward initially promised he would do all in his power to stop ships leaving American ports with the intent to support Juarez in Mexico.³⁷ He also sent Generals Grant and Sheridan to the American border with Mexico, explaining to the French that this was to ensure that no sympathetic Americans would cross the border to join Juarez forces.³⁸ However, these forces on the border began covertly supporting Juarez soon after they arrived.³⁹ While this constituted blatant disregard for Seward's orders, Seward made no further effort to discourage this or withdraw the troops, suggesting some level of approval of their actions. Additionally, Juarez's success and the decline in French popular support prompted Napoleon III to begin withdrawing his troops in January 1866.⁴⁰ Seward, fearful that the Austrian government might send troops to support its interest in Maximilian, sent a message to Austria threatening that should Austria send troops, "the United States could not engage to remain as silent and neutral spectators."⁴¹ Seward threatened war should the Austrians intervene in Mexico. Hence with the conclusion of the American Civil War, Seward made his opposition to European involvement in Mexico more explicitly known, using force and direct threats to emphasize his view.

Throughout the American Civil War and even after, Seward demonstrated his political genius in his dealings with foreign nations. Post-war, Seward's threats proved successful as no Austrian forces came to the aid of Maximilian. Not long after France's withdrawal, Juarez's forces captured, court-martialed, and executed Maximilian as they took back the



The execution of Emperor Maximilian of Mexico (1867)

Source: *Kunsthalle Mannheim*

Mexican government.⁴² Thus Seward ultimately succeeded in both preventing European intervention in the Civil War and promoting the restoration of Mexican rule through his adept diplomacy. He recognized that while France's presence in Mexico posed a threat to the United States, as it undermined the authority of the Monroe Doctrine and made French intervention in the Civil War possible, the immediate danger of this remained minimal. However, he took great caution in his dealings with the French. He did everything in his power to appear neutral while making his sympathies with the Mexicans clear and met French demands without interfering with the progress of the Civil War. Ultimately foreign policy was shaped by the desire to keep European powers from recognizing the Confederacy. In the case of France, Seward sought to minimize the threat of intervention by keenly avoiding fueling resentment for the United States in France. Thus Seward chose the path of indirect action by means of covert efforts and neutrality, to mollify the French and focused his attention on greater foreign issues that threatened disunion more immediately. 🏛️

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FROM REFORM TO REVOLUTION

The Transformation of Confederate Ideology and its Legacy

Between 1859 and 1863, Confederate ideology in the American South underwent a dramatic transformation. Over the course of the Civil War, the reactionary ideology of the secessionists gave way to the Confederate attempt to create a revolutionary racial state unparalleled in its scope and destructiveness before the mid-twentieth century. In the span of just four years, a movement to preserve the antebellum sociopolitical order had become the most radical nation-building project of the nineteenth century, only to quickly disappear at the end of the war. Using speeches, pamphlets, newspapers, and cultural texts, this study examines the rhetoric behind the rise and fall of the ideology at the core of the failed southern republic.

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First inauguration of Jefferson Davis as President of the Confederate States of America at Montgomery, Alabama, (February 18, 1861)

Source: *Digital Collection, Boston Athenaeum*

The ultimate failure of the Confederate States of America has led many scholars to discount it as a legitimate nation. As a result, Confederate ideology, and particularly its effect on southern nationalism, remains understudied. Despite its short and violent existence, however, the Confederacy was not merely an alliance of elite planters, but also a dynamic and evolving project in nation-building that sought to establish an entirely new kind of republic.

As the fledgling nation established itself in the midst of the Civil War, the ideology at the center of the Confederate experiment transformed in scope and scale between 1859 and 1863. Confederate ideology, with its origins in the rhetoric of secession, would undergo considerable change and emerge in mature form by 1863, persisting until the end of the war. The secessionists of 1859-1861 saw their attempt to establish a new nation as a conservative movement to protect slavery against growing northern political influences. While they would often appeal to the idea of ‘revolution,’ they did so only to promote a reactionary cause – to preserve the antebellum southern socio-political order against northern interference. Rather than radicals, they saw themselves as counter-revolutionaries protecting the original American republic, with state sovereignty intact as they contended the founders would have wanted, from the threat of dangerous Republican ‘revolutionaries’ like ‘Black Republicans’ John Brown and Abraham Lincoln. Thus, early secessionists were often revolutionaries in their actions and means but not in their self-articulated ideology and motive. However, from 1861 to 1863, as the secessionist ideology took institutional form in the shape of Confederate States of America, the Confederate project, due to the practicalities and challenges of war and state formation, had to organize, and rationalize that organization, in novel ways. Practical demands, unimagined by the secession advocates of 1859-1861, required the Confederates to embrace the rhetoric of radical revolution they had long denounced. Rather than simply existing to ensure the preservation of American constitutional integrity based on property rights and state sovereignty, the Confederacy envisioned itself as an entirely new kind of state based on ‘white republicanism’ that, in their view, would serve as a model for the world, a revolutionary project in building a race-based slaveholder’s republic.

THE CONSERVATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF CONFEDERATE IDEOLOGY: THE SECESSIONISTS, 1859-1861

Historians have generally viewed the Confederacy as a reactionary rather than revolutionary experience. Most have

argued that the Confederate project is best understood “as part of a broad reactionary movement among regional agrarian and slaveholding elites that formed a steady counterpoint to the age of revolution and emancipation.”¹ From this perspective the southern republic is framed as a necessity of the pro-slavery secessionist impulse rather than the product of a coherent nationalist ideology. While this view proves ultimately superficial and thereby unable to fully explain the Confederate project as a whole, it nonetheless is reflective of the project’s initial inspiration from the work of the secessionists of 1859-1861. Importantly, the rhetoric of secession, which inspired the leaders of the Confederacy, was profoundly reactionary. Fundamentally, when the “the Palmetto State, long hotbed of aristocratic values and secessionist thinking had taken a decisive step to break up the Union... the purpose of this radical action was conservative.”²


This conservative purpose can be seen in South Carolina’s *Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina*. South Carolina had long been the home of the reactionary pro-slavery fire-eaters who had progressively advocated disunion since the nullification crisis of 1832. By December of 1860, the secession convention presented their project as a conservative measure to protect slavery and the integrity of the Constitution, claiming, “the people of South Carolina...declared that the frequent violations of the Constitution of the United States [by the North], fully justified...withdrawing from the Federal Union.”³ This appeal to tradition echoed the *Declaration of Independence*, as South Carolina secessionists justified their actions as compatible with “the two great principles asserted by the Colonies...the right of a state to government itself, and the right of a people to abolish a government when it becomes destructive.”⁴ While the South Carolinian secessionists purposefully avoided the rhetoric of natural equality that Jefferson used to justify his claims, the appeal to tradition of the *Declaration* is important. The secessionists saw themselves, albeit from a highly sanitized southern perspective, as rescuers of the history and tradition of the founders.

Through this rationalization of secession as a conservative movement, the fire-eaters of South Carolina, unknowingly, set an important precedent that would form the core of the initial basis of Confederate ideology. Secessionists, in their view of themselves, were attempting to restore the Constitution, protecting state sovereignty from northern aggression. Georgian, and future Confederate Secretary of State, Robert Toombs expressed this perspective most clearly in his speech advocating secession in November of 1860, “The [Republicans and the North] are not satisfied with this [Constitution] and began a war upon our political rights and social institutions, marked by every act of perfidy and treachery.”⁵ For Toombs, like the South Carolina fire-eaters, secession was, if anything, an attempt to reclaim the Constitution under threat of a northern revolution. This understanding of secession became increasingly pervasive in the South. However,

the legacy of the American Revolution of 1776 and 1787, its meaning underlying the political rhetoric of the crisis, complicated understandings of secession immensely. On the one hand secessionists advocated revolutionary measures, prominently the dissolution of the Union, for a reactionary purpose, to preserve the revolution of 1776. For example, in June 1858 the radical pro-slavery advocate William Yancey wrote a letter to his friend James S. Slaughter in favor of the Virginian planter Edmund Ruffin’s secession plan:

If the democracy were overthrown it would result in giving place to a greater and hungrier swarm of flies. The remedy of the South is not in such a process. It is in... prompt resistance to the next aggression...no National Party can save us; no Sectional Party can do it...but if we could do as our fathers did, organize Committees of Safety all over the cotton states [as Ruffin suggests]...we shall fire the Southern heart...give courage to each other...we can precipitate the cotton states into a revolution.⁶

Critically, the revolution Yancey had in mind was counter-revolutionary in ideology, meant to preserve and emulate the legacy of the founding fathers. However, on the other hand, secessionists similarly denounced the North and the Republican Party as the agents of a Black Republican ideology labeled ‘revolutionary’ and criticized as such. For example, the very same Edmund Ruffin, who Yancey cited as the model for a southern revolution, advocated secession in his diary by calling the Republican Party, the ‘revolutionary party’ of northern abolitionists and demagogues that sought to destroy the South. Fire-eater newspapers like Robert Rhett’s *Charleston Mercury* and the *New Orleans Delta* were even more impassioned declaring that “no one could any longer be deluded...that the Black Republican party is a moderate party...it is, in fact, essentially a revolutionary party.”⁷ Fundamentally, “Americans in the North and the South remained profoundly influenced by the legacy of [1776 and 1787] [as] both sides claimed to be striving to preserve the government conceived by the founding fathers...Mid-nineteenth-century Americans believed they lived in an age of revolutions.”⁸ Yet the so-called agitators of sectional conflict in the North and South understood this “age of revolutions” in very different ways. Horace White, an editor for the *Chicago Tribune*, celebrated the election of Abraham Lincoln in the winter of 1861 writing, “We live in revolutionary times & I say God bless the revolution.”⁹ In contrast, the South saw this revolutionary world as a threat, designing the rhetoric of secession such that it “fit the model of pre-emptive counterrevolution...rather than trying to restore the old order, [it struck] first to protect the status quo [of antebellum slavery] before the revolutionary threat [could] materialize.”¹⁰ By 1861 many of the same forces, particularly increasing cultural and economic divisions between North and South, appeared to be creating a Confederacy based on a conservative and counter-revolutionary ideology. These forces would eventually frame the Unionist war effort as a nationalist and revolutionary project to preserve the Union and abolish slavery.



Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America

Source: *National Archives and Records Administration*

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY CONFEDERACY OF 1861

As the Confederacy began to take shape in 1861, it was deliberately constructed to reflect the counter-revolutionary motivations of its secessionist origins. The Confederate Constitution itself, published on March 11th 1861, clearly exemplifies this conservative impulse. By far the most remarkable aspect of the text is its similarity to the U.S. Constitution. However, it featured two central differences; unlike its predecessor, its preamble directly proclaimed the independent sovereignty of the states stating that “each State [is] acting in its sovereign and independent character,” and, most strikingly, it explicitly mentioned and unambiguously protected the institution of slavery.¹¹ Importantly, these changes, more than anything, were designed to produce a “new Confederate Constitution [that] left no doubt that slavery was the foundation of the new republic; it was a proslavery Constitution for a pro slavery state.”¹² However, the tremendous degree of similarity between the Confederate Constitution and its 1787 predecessor suggests that its authors were trying to perfect, rather than destroy, the initial vision of the founders by protecting slavery and justifying the primacy of states rights.

Thus, this new constitution was not an attempt to revolu-

tionize American governance. Instead, it was a deliberate, targeted, and proactive counter-revolutionary measure to eliminate the vulnerabilities of the founders’ vision, caused primarily by the compromises at the Constitution’s heart, that Confederates believed had allowed for the Black Republican revolution to corrupt the founding document in the first place. Many of the most influential advocates of secession, as well as proponents and founders of the Confederacy, helped to promote this view. For example, in 1861 Southern polemicist and social theorist George Fitzhugh promoted the idea that the counter-revolution of 1861 was a perfection of the spirit of 1776 by declaring that “the general outlines of the American Constitution and the Union worked well...the only evil we have suffered under our institutions has arisen from our connexion [sic] with the north...let us preserve our [Confederate] government in its present form until some great and pressing evil suggests and necessitates a change.”¹³ Fitzhugh’s rhetoric was convincing, and it was also supported at even the highest levels of the Confederate administration. The most prominent source of this perspective of the Confederacy as a conservative project comes from President Jefferson Davis’s first inaugural address, given on February 18th 1861. As the Confederacy’s newly minted first head-of-state, Davis justified his government by declaring that:

It is by abuse of language that [secession and the formation of our new government] has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each state its government has remained, the rights of person and property have not been disturbed...with a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers in so far as it is explanatory of their well known intent, freed from the sectional conflicts which have interfered with the pursuit of the general welfare.¹⁴

While, in hindsight, this rhetoric may seem to contradict the eventual scale and violence that would define the Confederate project, the Confederacy’s status as a conservative counter-revolution was nonetheless a central contention of the Davis administration and its supporters during the early years of the war. Davis would revisit the theme in his speech to the Confederate Congress in April of 1861, echoing John Dickinson’s 1775 *Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms* by telling the Congress that through the North’s aggression had “the principles of the Constitution been corrupted.” According to Davis, President Lincoln and the North believed, unlike the founders, “that in all cases the majority should govern...[consequently] we feel that *our cause* is just and holy...we will continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self government.”¹⁵ It is clear from Davis’s attachment to this argument, which framed the Confederacy as a counter-revolutionary project to preserve what had been established in the Revolution of 1776 and 1787, that he believed it an effective basis for legitimizing and understanding secession and the new Confederate nation. Even as late as 1862 a speech by James Henley Thornwell, a Presbyterian preacher in South Carolina, reminded his audience, “We are not revolutionists – we

are resisting revolution [against the founders]. We are upholding the true doctrines of the Federal Constitution. We are conservative.”¹⁶ This argument forwarded by Fitzhugh, Davis, and Thornwell, was not only an attempt to justify the Confederacy to its opponents, but also an effort to promote the Confederate nation’s legitimacy among the many citizens who had once been, or still were, ardent unionists. “By labeling the North as the enemy of the original Constitution,” as Davis did in his inaugural address, “[the Confederate President] appealed to the upper-south and to all who had loved the Union...he kept non-slaveholders (and foreign nations) in mind when he said little about slavery. In Davis’s ideology for 1861, defense of constitutional liberty—not defense of slavery—became the reason for being a nation.”¹⁷ By 1862 it appeared that the successes of the Confederacy, on the battlefield and in statecraft, were the accomplishment of a conservative counter-revolution. However, underneath this façade, as the challenges and practicalities of war and state formation set in, a new Confederate revolutionary ideology emerged and would come to redefine the project.

WHITE REPUBLICANISM:

THE REVOLUTIONARY CONFEDERACY, 1861-1863

As Fitzhugh, Davis, and Thornwell promoted a conservative vision of secession and the Confederate project, a much more radical understanding of the Confederacy was also taking shape. By 1863, as Abraham Lincoln’s *Emancipation Proclamation* and *Gettysburg Address* were redefining the Union, the counter-revolutionary ideology once central to the Confederate project gave way to a much more radical revolutionary and ideological understanding of the Confederacy as a new kind of republic based on white republicanism and slaveholding that was fundamentally different from that of the founding fathers. This tension was evident as early as February 13th, 1861 when Leonidas W. Spratt, the editor of the *Charleston Standard*, criticized the conservative nature of the provisional constitution and the very rhetoric that Jefferson Davis would espouse days later:

The South is now in the formation of a Slave Republic... [the idea] that the South...is in a mere assertion of its independence... [and that it is] best for the South to strike out...is an inadequate conception of the controversy. The contest is not between the North and South as geographical sections...[we believe that] equality is...the right of equals only...But the real contest is between two forms of society which have become established...Slavery was within [the North’s] grasp, and forced to the option of extinction in the Union or of independence out, *it dares to strike, and it assents its claim to nationality* and its right to recognition among the leading social systems of the world...[we are creating] a Confederacy...that will stand aloft and serene for ages amid the anarchy of democracies...our [new] Republic will not require the pruning process of another revolution; but, poised upon its institutions, will move on to a career of greatness and of glory unapproached by any other nation in the world...we are

erecting a nationality upon a union of races [with whites as the social aristocracy].¹⁸

This racial and revolutionary view of the purpose of the Confederacy was radically different from the logic of secession, particularly in its commitment to revolution on the basis of rigid racial inequality that the founders failed to make implicit. At the time Spratt voiced his criticisms in early 1861, this rhetoric gained little traction as, compared to the proponents of the Confederate project as counter-revolutionary, Spratt was little more than a radical and marginal intellect. However, by March, Alexander Stephens, none other than the Vice-President of the Confederacy, would embrace a similar view and produce its most famous articulation in his well known *Cornerstone Address*. In his infamous speech, providing his own interpretation of the new Confederate Constitution, Stephens mocked Davis’s contention that the Confederacy’s legitimacy was tied to the founders’ understanding of republicanism stating:

The prevailing ideas [among the founders was that slavery]...was wrong...it was an evil...those ideas were fundamentally wrong. Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery -- subordination to the superior race -- is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth.¹⁹

The *Cornerstone Address*, thereby, articulated a radically different understanding of the purpose of the Confederacy from that which the earlier secessionists and Davis had proposed. Rejecting the idea that secession was the result of northern violations of the Constitution, Stephens instead advanced the very same argument which President Abraham Lincoln had long promoted, that the founders did believe what they wrote in the Declaration, that all men were created equal and that, fundamentally, “the driving force behind secession, [and that] the assumption...upon which Davis...relied... [that the Confederates were following the republican vision of the founders]...was absolutely false.”²⁰ For Stephens, the Confederacy was a revolutionary opportunity to overturn, rather than preserve, the founders’ experiment in favor of a new kind of explicitly white republican ideology that would firmly establish the Confederacy as a slaveholder’s republic.

While Stephens’ articulation of the Confederacy’s founding ethos was powerful, in 1861 even most members of the Davis administration considered this revolutionary perspective radical. Yet, overtime this rhetoric would serve as the basis for growing Confederate nationalism as the nation’s administration needed to manage the resulting civil war through new institutions and policies that proved much more coercive than the advocates for secession could have imagined in 1859-1860; “following victory at Manassas...the Confederacy [was transformed] in unexpected directions...by [1862] a different nation with different policies had emerged...the

Davis administration discarded tradition in favor of innovative, demanding policies...[allowing] a redefined sense of [revolutionary] nationalism...[to take] shape.”²¹ The requirements of Confederate military success meant that the pressures of creating a nation, and a nation capable of waging

new nationalism would manifest in many domains including high politics, understandings of the Confederacy’s role in global affairs, religion, and education. Evidently, Confederates understood that a white slaveholders republic would require the creation of white republican culture.

“[A]s the challenges and practicalities of war and state formation set in, a new Confederate revolutionary ideology emerged and would come to redefine the project.”

war at that, replaced the need to simply justify the fledgling Confederate state’s existence, in rhetoric and policy, to its citizenry. Increasingly, replacing its founding rhetoric, the necessities of waging war became the dominant force shaping the Confederate government and its nationalism, contributing to the movement away from the conservative rhetoric of the country’s founding. Ironically, it was the conservative Davis that made this revolution of the state possible. However, Davis was often bitterly opposed by an anti-administration faction, led by Alexander Stephens, who believed that a centralized state was a threat to the authority of the states, which the Confederate constitution gave primacy, initially, in response to the corruption of black republicanism.²² But between 1861-1863 the Confederate state expanded rapidly, commencing military conscription, giving the President the power to suspend habeas corpus, instituting price-fixing measures in Richmond, temporarily placing an embargo on cotton exports, and even beginning to use a ‘war tax’ to finance the war effort among numerous other measures. The transformation of a states rights confederation into a coercive and heavy-handed state terrified ideological revolutionaries like Stephens. While its reach was actively undermined by opponents like Stephens, this new state served to promote their revolutionary ideological goals as they helped to foster the “greater strength of Confederate nationalism...[as] this change in Confederate polity [towards centralization]... came...in response to wartime emergencies...[which] no one originally willed or planned.”²³

Ironically, the need to justify the increasingly powerful Confederate state provided the opportunity for the revolutionary ideology advanced by many of its most prominent opponents to serve as the basis of a new white republican socio-political order. Even the Confederates who were most vociferously opposed ideologically to a centralized state realized, especially as the initial zeal of secession faded in the face of immense bloodshed, that cultivating a strong sense of nationalism was essential for the Confederacy’s continued morale and legitimacy. Thus, the demands of the Civil War, and the advantages of a centralized state to promote a national ideology, allowed for revolutionary white republicanism to emerge as the core of Confederate nationalism. This


What made this white republican ideology so different from the rhetoric of constitutional integrity and state sovereignty, which was central to the conservative counter-revolution, was that it was, as Stephens had articulated, explicitly racial. In his view, slavery did not have to be protected to preserve the constitution but rather because it was the natural basis of a republican government. Radical Confederates, building off Stephens, began to contend that the founders had failed to understand this and the Confederacy was an opportunity to build a white republic that would act as an ideal the world over. Subsequently, as they went about constructing their nation, “Confederates...[sought] to [discredit] the new black and red varieties [of republicanism]...one Confederate supporter coined the term white republicanism to describe the South’s [revolutionary] project.”²⁴ In a March 1862 article in *De Bow’s Review*, Dr. Cartwright, a prominent advocate of the moral good of slavery in the antebellum period, argued that this new form of republic would “demonstrate the strength, stability and permanency of a government founded on natural instead of artificial distinctions in society.”²⁵ Similarly, in May of 1861 the editors of Rhett’s *Charleston Mercury* had begun to promote the superiority of the white republican revolution of the Confederacy declaring that, unlike Lincoln’s black republican revolution, “[t]he statesmen of [the Confederate] Revolution are no vain social theorists... intoxicated with wild utopian dreams [like the abolitionists and socialists]...no Kossuth, no Mazzini, no Louis Blanc among them.”²⁶ Increasingly, Confederates began to imagine themselves as embodying the best goals of the democratic and nationalist European revolutions of 1848, rather than 1776, viewing the black and red republicans of the North as the embodiment of the radicals who encouraged the degeneration of society in 1848 into “riot and confusion...anarchy with torch, stake, and scaffold – blood barricade and guillotine...[driving] her blood stained chariot wheels over the ruins of the [nations].”²⁷ To the Confederates, the New York draft riots of 1863 and Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus in Maryland acted as a confirmation for this view of northerners and their federal government as violent and dangerous revolutionaries. Aligning themselves ideologically with the progressive but moderate republicans of 1848, rather than radicals like the architects of the French Second Republic

who established universal male suffrage as a central feature of their constitution, the leaders of the Confederate project argued that they were leading a white republican revolution against “black republicans [like the radical revolutionaries of Haiti, Germany and France] [who] had perverted the true meaning of republican government by insisting upon racial equality...[asserting that they] are also Red Republicans.”²⁸ While initially rebuked by Davis, this explicitly racial, and pro-slavery understanding of the Confederacy as a revolutionary white-republican project was highly appealing to those who would design the new state and promote southern nationalism.

WHITE REPUBLICAN CULTURE: ABROAD AND AT HOME

One interesting consequence of white republican ideology’s role as the principal source of Confederate nationalism can be seen in how Southerners imagined themselves as increasingly important in world affairs. In a March 1862 article in *De Bow’s*, George Fitzhugh, once a champion of the conservative counter-revolutionary vision, highlighted the Confederacy’s importance as a bulwark against the emerging global threat of black and red republicanism. He connects the Confederate cause to Russian Emperor Alexander II’s 1861 emancipation of the serfs arguing that “the Russian nobility must have represented admirably their serfs...But the emperor has caught the Jeffersonian-French fever, and is determined to liberate and outlaw the serfs...[like in the North] there will arise... trade unions, red republican hymns, riots, barricades and blood-revolutions.”²⁹ Fitzhugh now argued that only the success of the Confederacy, as a model for the world of a revolutionary white republican nation, could prevent the spread of black and red republicanism. However, at the same time, the *Daily Richmond Enquirer* praised Poland’s January Uprising of 1863-1864 against the Russian Empire, arguing that “there is nothing in this movement of a...radical or Red Republican character...[the revolutionary] cause of Poland is the same cause for which the Confederates are now fighting.”³⁰

While the Confederates were now using the ideology of white republicanism to understand foreign affairs, its most prominent applications occurred internally as the basis of a broad cultural program. One of the most interesting examples of white republicanism’s expression can be seen within religious writings of the time. In the antebellum period, slavery advocates used paternalistic readings of the Christian bible to justify the contention, as articulated by John C. Calhoun, that slavery was “instead of an evil, a good—a positive good.”³¹ Consequently, for most religious leaders in the Confederacy, as seen in Thornwell’s essay “Our Danger and Our Duty,” secession was justified as a reactionary attempt to preserve the moral institution of slavery from the corruption of free labor and the race war associated with black republicanism. Nonetheless, the realities and ideological pressures of the Civil War forced religious leaders to expand their defense of slavery by embracing revolutionary rhetoric and ide-



Alexander Hamilton Stephens, Vice President of the Confederate States of America


Source: *National Archives and Records Administration*

ology. Consequently, this older religious argument for slavery was transformed, emerging as a new justification for the righteousness of the Confederate’s revolutionary cause. For example, following the Second Battle of Bull Run in August of 1862, the influential reverend Stephen Elliot, the presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the South, justified the Confederate project as godly on the basis of a revolutionary white republican ideology in his sermon, “Our Cause In Harmony With The Purposes of God in Christ Jesus:

The great revolution through which we are passing certainly turns upon this point of slavery, and our future destiny [and Republic] is bound up with it...when the deeply-laid conspiracy of Black Republicanism threatened to undermine this divinely guarded institution, God produced for its defense within the more Southern States an unanimity of sentiment and a devoted spirit...to risk a revolution in its defense.”³²

This fusion of white republicanism and Christianity was meant to justify the Confederacy, but was also important in fostering a Confederate identity as “Confederate nationalists sought to strengthen their cause before the world and their own people...the authority of the clergy at least rivaled that of the new Confederate state...[so] patriotism, [on the basis of white republicanism], was to be wedded to piety.”³³

Similarly, the architects of the Confederate project were



Map of Confederate losses during the Civil War (1861-1865)
 Source: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army

also acutely aware of the need to re-invent education along white republican lines. The Confederates believed that a white republican education was essential to creating white republican citizens. D.S Richardson, a Confederate teacher expressed this sentiment clearly declaring, “As for buying Northern books, I cannot consent, I will quit my profession first.”³⁴ Consequently, Confederates “addressed the issue of an appropriate national language...restoring a purity of diction that would lead white southerners toward their English linguistic roots and away from both Yankee degeneracies and what the [educational] texts called ‘Africanisms.’”³⁵ The racial basis of white republicanism was immediately evident in these books. For example, the Confederate textbook *A grammar of the Latin language for the use of schools, with exercises and vocabularies* was filled with stories of ancient Roman masters and their loyal slaves and, for no clear educational purpose, instructed students that “in Africa men eat human flesh.”³⁶ In many texts, like the *Confederate States Speller & Reader*, pejorative descriptions of the natural condition of Africans was contrasted with passages that romanticized the brutality of slavery:

Hark! How mer-ri-ly they sing as they pick the white cotton from the pods...these ne-groes are well fed, and well

clad, and well cared for when they are sick. When their task is done these is noth-ing to trou-ble them. Which of us that lives to any pur-pose, has not his task to do, as well as the ne-gro?³⁷

While this rhetoric pre-dated the Civil War, by 1863 it was being presented to students primarily in the spirit of Confederate and southern nationalism rather than simply a justification for the morality of slavery. The authors of these textbooks had clearly embraced the Confederacy as a revolution to uphold a proper racial ordering of society and believed that it was essential to provide children with a white republican education.

THE COLLAPSE OF WHITE REPUBLICANISM AND THE RISE OF THE LOST CAUSE MYTH

Despite the clear shift ideologically towards labeling the Confederates as revolutionaries later in the Civil War, even in 1864 the politically minded Jefferson Davis, perhaps still hoping for international recognition, still insisted that he was not a radical. In a speech to a crowd in Augusta, Georgia, Davis continued to echo the founders’ principles: “Our [struggle for independence] is no revolution...we are a free and independent people in States that had, [after] the North’s

violations of the Constitution], the right to make a better government.”³⁸ Others like Mary Chestnut, a prominent member of the Confederate planter elite, continued to understand the Confederacy as counter-revolutionary. While her husband embraced the revolutionary rhetoric, she wrote in her diary that “this war was undertaken by us to shake off the yoke of foreign invaders...we consider our cause righteous...[the North] grew rich...we grew poor.”³⁹ However, by 1863 these views had become anachronistic. Even many of the most ardent counter-revolutionaries like Edmund Ruffin now admitted that the Confederacy “was not [validated as]...an act of law-authorized secession, but [instead] as an act of just revolutionary violence.”⁴⁰ The reactionary counter-revolution that had motivated the secessionists of 1859-1861, and was espoused by Davis throughout the war, had been replaced by a fully revolutionary ideology.

When the Confederacy collapsed in 1865, southerners lamented not only the collapse of the slavery, but also that their white republican revolution would be swept away by black republican tyranny. However, in one of the great ironies of post-war America, former Confederates would spend the following decades trying to obscure this revolutionary and racially charged ideology. They would instead produce the beginnings of the Lost Cause movement, advocating for a highly idealized history of the Confederacy by reviving the rhetoric of Jefferson Davis and the other conservative counter-revolutionaries. In his memoir *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* Davis continued to identify the North as the primary cause of secession stating, “How easy it would have been for the northern people, by a simply

honest obedience to the...Constitution to have avoided...all these crimes and horrors...if necessity on their part justified a violation of the Constitution, necessity on our part justified secession from them.”⁴¹ Surprisingly, Alexander Stephens, his Vice President and ideological opponent, now largely agreed in his *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States*:

Many writers of this day claim, that the late War was the result of two opposing ideas...upon the subject of African Slavery...those who assume this...are but superficial observers...Secession...[after the Constitution had been violated]...arose from...the nature of the Government of the United States...[in the Constitution]...paramount authority had never been parted with by the states.⁴²

The centrality of race-based slavery and revolutionary ideology that defined the *Cornerstone Address* was conspicuously absent. By the end of the nineteenth century the idea that the Confederacy was a revolution for white republicanism had, by and large, disappeared. In its place re-emerged, albeit in a highly sanitized revisionist form, the rhetoric of the original vision of the Confederate project that the proponents of a reactionary counter-revolution had proposed in 1861. While obscured following the war by the Lost Cause movement, Confederate ideology underwent a profound transformation from 1859-1863.⁴³ It was imagined first as a counter-revolution for the Constitution, before re-emerging as a revolutionary effort to establish the racial hierarchy of white republicanism as the sociopolitical basis of a new slaveholder’s nation. ■■■

Endnotes

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[2] Paul D. Escott, *The Confederacy: The Slaveholders’ Failed Venture* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 1.

[3] “Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and

Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union,” *The Avalon Project*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp

[4] “Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union.”

[5] Robert Toombs, “Secessionist Speech, Tuesday Evening, No-

From Reform to Revolution


- ember 13,” in *Secession Debated: Georgia’s Showdown in 1860*, ed. William W. Freehling and Craig M. Simpson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 38.
- [6] John Witherspoon Du Bose, *The Life and Times of William Lowndes Yancey: A History of Political Parties in the United States, from 1834-1864; Especially as to the Origin of the Confederate States* (Birmingham: Roberts & Son, 1892), 376.
- [7] James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 232-233
- [8] Andre Fleche, *Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 5, 12.
- [9] Fleche, *Revolution of 1861*, 5.
- [10] McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 245.
- [11] “Constitution of the Confederate States; March 11, 1861,” *The Avalon Project*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_csa.asp
- [12] McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning*, 78.
- [13] Anne Sarah Rubin, *A Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861-1868* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 16.
- [14] Jefferson Davis, “First Inaugural Address – February 18, 1861,” in *The Routledge Sourcebook of Religion and the American Civil War*, ed. Robert Mathisen (London: Routledge, 2014), 21.
- [15] Jefferson Davis, “Our Cause is Just” in *The Civil War and Reconstruction: A Documentary Collection*, ed. William E. Gienapp (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 73-74.
- [16] “Our Danger and Our Duty,” *Documenting the American South*, <http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/thornwell/thornwel.html>
- [17] Escott, *The Confederacy*, 15.
- [18] “The Philosophy of Secession; A Southern View, Presented in a Letter Addressed to the Hon. Mr. Perkins of Louisiana, in Criticism on the Provisional Constitution Adopted by the Southern Congress at Montgomery, Alabama,” *Documenting the American South*, <http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/secession/secession.html>
- [19] “Cornerstone Address, March 21, 1861,” *Internet History Sourcebooks*, <http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1861stephens.asp>
- [20] Harry V. Jaffa, *A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 316.
- [21] Escott, *The Confederacy*, 21.
- [22] Members of the anti-administration faction often deliberately undermined the Confederate administration’s grand strategy for the good of their respective home states. For example, Stephens spent most of the war at home in Georgia rather than with Jefferson Davis in Richmond. While Stephens tended to affairs in Georgia he frequently criticized Davis as a despot, particularly chastising his suspension of Habeas corpus.
- [23] Emory M. Thomas, *The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 76-77.
- [24] Fleche, *Revolution of 1861*, 141.
- [25] Dr. Cartwright, “Abolitionism: A Curse to the North and a Blessing to the South,” *De Bow’s Review* 32, no. 3 and 4 (March and April 1862): 300.
- [26] “The Palmetto Guard—Presentation of Colors,” *Charleston Mercury*, May 7, 1861.
- [27] “The Palmetto Guard—Presentation of Colors.”
- [28] Fleche, *Revolution of 1861*, 144.
- [29] George Fitzhugh, “History of the Origin of Representative Government in Europe,” *De Bow’s Review* 32, no. 3 and 4 (March and April, 1862): 206. Red Republicanism was used as pejorative term to describe radical European revolutionaries particularly socialists and communists.
- [30] Drew Gilpin Faust, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1990), 13.
- [31] John C. Calhoun, *Speeches of John C. Calhoun: Delivered in the Congress of the United States from 1811 to the Present Time* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1843), 225.
- [32] “Our Cause in Harmony with the Purposes of God in Christ Jesus. A Sermon Preached in Christ Church, Savannah, on Thursday, September 18th, 1862, Being the Day Set Forth by the President of the Confederate States, as a Day of Prayer and Thanksgiving, for Our Manifold Victories, and Especially for the Fields of Manassas and Richmond, Ky,” *Documenting the American South*, <http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/elliott5/elliott5.html>
- [33] Faust, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism*, 22-23.
- [34] D.S Richardson to Calvin Henderson Wiley, 1864, Calvin Henderson Wiley Papers, *Southern Historical Collection*, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
- [35] Faust, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism*, 11.
- [36] William Bingham, *A grammar of the Latin language for the use of schools, with exercises and vocabularies* (Greensboro: Sterling, Campbell & Albright, 1863), 204.
- [37] John Neely, *Confederate States Speller and Reader* (Augusta: J.T. Paterson & Co, 1864), 100.
- [38] William J. Cooper and John M. McCardell Jr., *In the Cause of Liberty: How the Civil War Redefined American Ideals* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2009), 84.
- [39] Mary Boykin Chestnut, *A Diary from Dixie* (New York: D. Appleton, 1905), 200-201.
- [40] Edmund Ruffin, *The Diary of Edmund Ruffin* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1972), 294.
- [41] Jefferson Davis, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (New York: D. Appleton, 1881), 182
- [42] Alexander Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States* (Bedford: Applewood Books, 2008), 10, 521.
- [43] Proponents of the Lost Cause Myth portray secession and the Confederacy as a heroic project for states’ rights and the Southern way of life against insurmountable Northern aggression. “Lost Causers” typically minimize or even deny the role of slavery as an impetus for the Civil War.

FACING THE CHAMPION OF THE WEST

The Origins of Japan's Wartime Jewish Policy

During World War II, Japan adopted specific policies for dealing with Jews. This paper addresses the ideological sources of those Jewish policies, and how those sources influenced state policy in the late 1930s and 1940s. The primary thrust of this paper will analyze first the intellectual reaction to the forged Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, an infamous portrayal of a totalitarian plan for a Jewish "super-government." Secondly, this paper will show how Japan ultimately came to adopt a benevolent policy towards the Jews due to policy makers' desire to cooperate and influence an imagined hegemonic Jewry within western business, government, and media, derived largely from a Protocols worldview.

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The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1934 reprint)
Source: *The Patriotic Publishing Co.* (Commons Wikimedia)

In 1940, the Nazi ambassador in Japan, Eugen Ott, wrote to the foreign office of Berlin, praising the popularity of anti-Semitic texts in Japan, such as *The Jewish Problem and Japan*. This book was written by a Kiyo Utsonomiya, who had been writing anti-Semitic literature throughout the 1930s. However, Kiyo was, in fact, only the pseudonym of Naval Captain Inuzuka Koreshige, who, during the 1930s and early 1940s, was instrumental in the settlement of Jewish refugees in occupied Shanghai.¹ For these actions, he was given a cigarette case from the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of

the U.S. inscribed: "In Gratitude and Appreciation for Your Service for the Jewish People."² Nazi officials, of course, were unaware of the pseudonym. Nonetheless, the same man who had written on the "Jewish Peril" (yudayaka) was also responsible for saving thousands of Jewish lives; these two seemingly divergent lives were actually one life. Inuzuka was not unique either. Japan's wartime policies concerning the Jews carried the same apparent contradictions as Inuzuka's own actions and writings. In truth, the contradiction was only apparent; the nature of Japanese anti-Semitism naturally led to benevolent treatment of the Jews. This distinct character of Japanese wartime policy had its roots in the unique development of conceptions of the Jews and anti-Semitism in Japan throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

Firstly, it should be made explicit, as is implied above, that Japanese anti-Semitism did not originate with Nazism, as one might intuitively assume. Actually, one "Jewish Expert," Koyama Takeo, outright rejected what he termed "hand-me-down," European-style anti-Semitism.³ According to Goodman and Miyazawa, "the role of Nazism was to legitimate and reinforce these ideas, not create them."⁴ In short, Nazism did not simply seep into Japanese policy or culture from Nazi Germany and the Axis alliance. Individuals like General Shioden Nabutaka, who looked more favorably on Nazism, were the exception rather than the rule among Japanese "Jewish experts."⁵ Japanese anti-Semitism was rooted in trends and events decades before Nazism arose in Germany.⁶

When anti-Semitism did arise in Japan in the early twentieth century, Japan had a very small Jewish population.⁷ At the turn of the century, Japan did not distinguish between its Jewish residents and other foreigners, being "totally unaware of their separate faith and identity."⁸ According to Pamela Shatzkes, "Until the mid-1930s, the attitude towards the tiny Jewish community in Japan can be described as one of tolerance or indifference founded on ignorance."⁹ Due to this limited conception of the Jewish people, when Japan was introduced in full to anti-Semitism in the 1910s, the connec-

Facing the Champion of the West

tion between actual Jews and the abstract “Jewish Peril” was not as developed as it had been in European countries with sizeable Jewish populations. In other words, Japanese anti-Semitism was based more around a fear of an abstract “Jewish institution” poised to gain global domination than it was around actual Jewish people.¹⁰

EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF JEWS IN JAPAN

The first Jews to settle in Japan came to Yokohama after the opening of Japan to the West in the 1850s. By 1895, this community had grown to around 50 families. Nagasaki also developed a Jewish community, which, during the 1880s, grew to about 100 families, although Yokohama remained the most active Jewish community. A third Jewish community came into being in Kobe as well. By 1905, the Nagasaki community had disintegrated, and, after the 1923 earthquake, the Yokohama Jews migrated to Kobe, which would become the central city for Jewish refugee life during World War II.¹¹

Anti-Semitic portrayals of Jews entered into Japan as early as the 1880s with the translation by Inoue Tsutomu in 1883 of Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice*.¹² The play itself is most famous for its Jewish moneylender character, Shylock. However, unlike many European portrayals of Shylock, in Japan, Shylock was not in any way a sympathetic character. Interestingly, the Japanese portrayal of Shylock was influenced more by Japanese archetypes than by Jewish ones. The character, named Gohei in an early version, was modeled off of a traditional miser character from Kabuki tradition.¹³ As Goodman and Miyazawa write, “Japanese attitudes toward Jews are thus deeply rooted in the modern, as well as the traditional, Japanese cultural experience.”¹⁴

Other evidence of Japanese interaction with European anti-Semitism prior to the Siberian Expedition of 1918 can be found as well.¹⁵ An article in 1882 notes the “Russian persecution of Jews,” and in 1899, another article describes “anti-Semitic racial ideology” when describing the events of the Dreyfus Affair in France.¹⁶ Anti-Semitism was likely first printed as a noun by Kemuyama Sentaro in “Antisemitism and Zionism,” in which he views Judaism and Zionism favorably.¹⁷ A 1916 article by Terada Shira exaggerated the political influence of the Jews in an article titled “Are the Jews poised to take over the World?”¹⁸ In a similar vein, Dr. Shibata Hisao warns to “beware of the invisible empire,” and notes the enormous economic and political influence of the Jews, though he also notes that the Jews are “the superior race,” praises them, and sees them as possibly transforming totalitarian Russia into “a liberal society.”¹⁹ This intellectual discourse prior to the Protocols’ introduction demonstrates that the skeleton of thought supporting Japanese anti-Semitism, particularly the view of Jews as global hegemony, was apparently already in place.²⁰

THE PROTOCOLS IN JAPAN

In summary, the *Protocols* depict a series of 24 sections of

text from “the meetings of the learned Elders of Zion.”²¹ The *Protocols* assert that, by manipulating public opinion through control of the press, creating discord through the promotion of liberalism, and controlling the globe’s financial institutions, the Jews would come to take over the world’s nations and establish a “Super-Government.”²² Ultimately, though liberalism would be “inculcated,” the Jewish state would create a totalitarian system, which the Gentiles, referred to as *goyim*, would accept as they would be weary and take refuge in the Jewish despotism.²³

Indisputably, the *Protocols* were the vehicle through which anti-Semitism was introduced to Japan on a significant scale and popularized among a group of intellectuals. The *Protocols* were written by Russian secret police agents in France between 1903 and 1907.²⁴ Thereafter, they were widely distributed and published after the Russian Revolution, becoming the “hymn book of CSA [“Conspiracy and Scapegoating Anti-Semitism”] in the world since the twentieth century.”²⁵ The *Protocols* entered into Japan through the Siberian Intervention in Russia, where it was dispersed through the ranks of the White Army forces alongside whom Japan fought.²⁶ The *Protocols* were picked up by Russian specialists in the army, such as Higuchi Tsuyanosuke, Yasue Norihiro, and the aforementioned General Shioden. Even by the beginning of the 1920s, translations from military men, academics, and even a Shinto priest had proliferated in Japan. By 1921, presentations were being given on *yudayaka* and publications proliferated. In the same period, Yasue was designated as a “Jewish expert.”²⁷

There are two primary reasons for the spread of this conspiratorial ideology in Japan during the 1920s. Firstly, the *Protocols*, popularized as they were during the Russian Revolution and Civil War, were inherently linked to Bolshevism and, by extension, left-wing ideology. Certainly, much of Japanese anti-Semitism in the 1920s was influenced by a fear of the “Red Jew.”²⁸ For example, in *The Roots of Red Ideology*, journalist Ariga Seika writes “The ideological core of communist ideology is the monotheism of the Jewish race.”²⁹ Ariga sees Judaism and Communism as inseparable. Likewise, in a round-table discussion on the “Jewish problem” in 1929, Mitsukawa Kametaro refers to the “Jewish communist conspiracy” that has taken root among “Jewish Perilists,” noting the Justice Ministry’s belief in a “Jewish plot to communize the world.”³⁰ Brian Victoria also notes that the *Protocols* were used to counter Marxist dissent in Japan.³¹ Shillony goes as far as to write that “Japanese anti-Semitism was thus, at first, part of the anti-communist campaign.”³²

A second reason is that a more general socioeconomic and political distress, related to the growth of nationalism as well as the rise of social movements, made Japan a suitable breeding ground for “Conspiracy and Scapegoating Anti-Semitism.” Because the Japanese had little direct contact with Jews, they were easy to blame.³³ As economic conditions worsened



Koreshige Inuzuka, head of the Japanese Imperial Navy's Advisory Bureau on Jewish Affairs

Source: *Testimony of Showa History Vol. 3* (Commons Wikimedia)

in the 1920s, nationalists saw “a convenient and logical explanation” in the *Protocols* conspiracy.³⁴ Concurrent counter-cultural and progressive social movements, such as feminist and labor movements, could also be connected to the Jewish conspiracy to undermine national values.³⁵

The spread of Japanese anti-Semitism in the 1920s should be seen as a broader ideological movement as well.³⁶ Shillony's generalization of anti-Semitism as a component of anti-communism ignores the fact that anti-Semitism was actually a larger ideological attack on Western values. To Japanese nationalist intellectuals, “Jewish ideology” encompassed liberalism, democracy, materialism, and individualism as well as socialism. These values were inherently contrary to Japan's spiritual path, which was centered on national defense and collective social harmony.³⁷ In fact, one anti-Semitic work, *The Jewish Plot and the anti-Japanese Problem*, focuses almost entirely on the threat of the West.³⁸ Another example of such conflation can be seen in Soebe Ichinoske's *Poison of the World*, where he writes “excessive individualism, early sexual activity, non-arranged marriages and spiritual rupture” are all consequences of the attempt to “Judaize the world.”³⁹ Judeophobia and anti-Westernism were inherently linked in the minds of Japanese anti-Semites, and increasingly became one and the same. Ultimately, Japanese anti-Semitism was not merely a manifestation of the *Protocols* conspiracy, which asserted that the Jews would inculcate and pretend to support liberal values in order to destabilize society. Rather, in the Japanese case, the Jews came to represent those values

themselves. This conflation would have a profound impact on Japan's wartime policy concerning the Jews.

THE PROTOCOLS AND JEWISH POLICY

After 1936, the intellectual anti-Semitism that had proliferated in the 1920s manifested itself in actual actions taken by the government.⁴⁰ The government fired notable Jewish academics, sponsored anti-Semitic literature through “government-supported channels” such as KSG and *Studies on the Jews*,⁴¹ and began to censor and punish criticism of anti-Semitism.⁴² The primary reason for these policies was an attempt to appease Japan's new Nazi ally, a partnership beginning in 1936 with the Anti-Comintern Pact. However, while Japan adopted some of Germany's anti-Semitic domestic practices, it decided to “ignore consciously and discard” certain aspects of Nazism, as evidenced by *Mein Kampf*'s lack of full translation until 1942.⁴³ Moreover, Japan's Jewish policies, at least prior to Pearl Harbor, were generally benevolent and did not lead to persecution.

These policies are inherently linked to the influence of the *Protocols* conspiracy on the Japanese understanding of the Jews. Most importantly, Japan's treatment of the Jews became a notable aspect of its public relations with the West. In short, Japanese officials hoped that benevolent treatment of the Jews would enhance its image abroad and counter the decline in relations with the United States. Because the *Protocols* depicted a world where Jews controlled Western media, Japan tried to portray a positive image to them so that they, through their dominant influence, could help to ameliorate US-Japanese relations in particular. Therefore, Japan could not openly persecute Jews for fear of the response from an international media run by Jews.⁴⁴ Sakamoto asserts that “Ultimately, Japan became involved in helping the Jews out of a sense of isolation.”⁴⁵ In other words, Japan responded to its political isolation from the United States by hoping to gain the support of American Jewry. Japan believed that American Jews had the loyalty of Roosevelt and could indirectly influence US foreign policy. Good treatment of the Jews, therefore, could lead to positive changes in US foreign policy.⁴⁶

Ironic policy decisions resulted from this skewed worldview. As US relations worsened leading up to Pearl Harbor, Japan increasingly supported a pro-Jewish policy.⁴⁷ In fact, the good treatment of the Jews by Japan was personally and deliberately conveyed to Jewish leaders throughout the world.⁴⁸ Moreover, Japan had a particularly and unusually lenient policy concerning Jewish immigration. Japan had expected refugees to find easier paths to Western countries, and Japanese officials were shocked to suddenly be harboring as many refugees as they did.⁴⁹ In December 1938, during the Five Ministers Conference, Japan formulated for the first time a succinct Jewish policy, which would last until the end of 1941. The policy ultimately stated that Jews were to be treated like any other foreigners. The Conference declared

explicitly that, although the Jews could not be embraced due to Japan's allies, Japan could not reject them either, out of its "desire not to alienate America."⁵⁰ As late as 1940, an official wrote "If Jewish leaders in America... should be inclined to become pro-Japanese, the American public opinion would obviously change in one night."⁵¹ By the end of 1938, Japan's policy wished to avoid "alienating American interests which it hoped to cultivate."⁵² According to Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita, Japan ought to avoid the international tension created by Germany's treatment of its Jews, and, instead, promote better US relations.⁵³

In addition to their focus on their image abroad, Japanese officials and "Jewish experts" in Manchuria and China believed a benevolent policy towards Jews would result in the importation of US capital. Japanese officials believed that Jewish capitalists abroad in the United States would react favorably to Japan's good treatment of Jewish refugees and residents and, in gratitude, aid in the development in Manchukuo.⁵⁴ Japan sought to attract US capital to Japan to aid in the creation of the New Order in Asia.⁵⁵ The "Manchurian Faction" took the lead in this policy of importing US capital. In fact, along with the desire not to alienate the US, the Five Ministers Conference also stated the "need for foreign capital" as being "particularly" important in the Jewish policy that was adopted.⁵⁶

"Jewish experts" such as Inuzuka lost influence, along with their *Protocols* conspiracy-based ideology, which ultimately promoted benevolent Jewish relations, Nazi influence took its place in large part.⁵⁹ In the words of German consul Fritz Wiedemann, "We were under orders to instruct the Japanese authorities about the racial policies of Germany... the internment of Jews in the Shanghai ghetto has been instigated by German authorities."⁶⁰ Therefore, if Japanese policy could ever be described as "aping" Germany, it would be after 1941. Moreover, it is apparent that these policy shifts were not exclusively, or even largely, in the direction that Japan's Jewish policy naturally took, exported as they were from Germany rather than being grown from existing Japanese ideas.

Japan continued to resist the extremes of Nazi policy. The German plan to exterminate the Shanghai Jews was not carried out by any means.⁶¹ Additionally, scholars often emphasize the relative leniency of ghetto regulations.⁶² The maintenance of a somewhat benevolent policy must be explained in large part by a continuance of *Protocols* ideology. From a public relations standpoint, Japan did not want "propaganda that we are oppressing and driving away Caucasians."⁶³ Japan clearly overestimated the United States' commitment to Jewish well-being. Likewise, the aforementioned policy explanation given in 1942 notes that a "rejection of the Jewish people... will also be bound to be utilized as counter-propaganda by England and the United States."⁶⁴

“Japanese anti-Semitism was based more around a fear of an abstract ‘Jewish institution’ poised to gain global domination than it was around actual Jewish people.”

In assessing the 1938 Conference later in 1942, Japanese policy makers noted "The purport of this policy plan was to treat the Jewish people well, and thereby promote introduction of foreign capital and avert aggression of relationship with England and the United States."⁵⁷ This remark perfectly sums up the aim of the 1938 policy which was influenced so greatly by the *Protocols* conspiracy of the Jewish control of the West. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, however, the document notes that these aims had become obsolete. Certainly, Japanese policy after Pearl Harbor changed. For example, Jews in Japan were ordered out of ports and into the interior, synagogues on mainland Asia were closed, Inuzuka was retired, and surveillance was increased. This trend culminated in the formation of the Hongkew Ghetto in Shanghai in February 1943.⁵⁸

To place these changes in context, two points should be understood. First, the influence of Nazi Germany on Japan's Jewish policies increased after 1941. Japanese policy had, in part, come under the purview of Nazi Germany. Once the

COOPERATION IDEOLOGY

One other factor that influenced Japanese policy, also largely through the *Protocols*, was what I will term "cooperation ideology," namely, that belief that cooperation with wealthy, powerful Jews would bring Japan practical benefits. However, the early conception of a cooperation ideology predates the *Protocols*. The precedent was Jacob Schiff. During the Russo-Japanese War, Schiff helped to float about 200 million dollars in loans to Japan. For his assistance, Schiff was the first foreigner awarded the Order of the Rising Sun, and "became a symbol in Japanese eyes of the rich American Jew."⁶⁵ Reference to Schiff in relation to Jewish power, and Japan's ability to take advantage of it, was frequently noted. Nakada Juji, for instance, notes the Jews as the world's "financial leaders" and describes the benefits from working with people of such wealth as well as noting the need to repay Schiff's support.⁶⁶ Koyama also noted the gratitude for Schiff as a reason to befriend the Jews, along with the pragmatic benefits resulting from allying with the powerful Jewish economic influence in China.⁶⁷



Japanese diplomat Sugihara Chiune, known as “Japanese Oskar Schindler”

Source: *Government of Japan* (Wikimedia Commons)

This cooperation ideology became a focal point in Japanese policy in the late 1930s. Its foremost proponents were military leaders, especially Kwantung officers. In 1933, the Kwantung police chief reported that while the Jews were enemies, Japan could benefit from them.⁶⁸ Ultimately, the Kwantung position stressed the need for foreign capital to develop Manchuria, a need that the Jews could help fill.⁶⁹ This position became formalized in the Five Ministers Conference, which outlined the “exceptions” to the clause that “no special effort” would be made in regards to Jewish immigration: “However, exceptions may be made for businessmen and technicians with utility value for Japan.”⁷⁰ Inuzuka and Yasue were the prime proponents of this exception.⁷¹

Even after 1941, this cooperation ideology remained influential. Japanese authorities emphasized that Jews “who are or will be made use of” should be treated as friends, while others should be strictly surveilled.⁷² Kapner and Levine also write that the reluctance of the Japanese to persecute the Jews may, in part, be explained by “hopes of access to Jewish capital.”⁷³ Kranzler also sees cooperation ideology as a key component of the difference between Japanese and European anti-Semitism, a difference that he believes resulted from a lack of a history of religious conflict.⁷⁴

RACIAL EQUALITY

One final, controversial aspect of the origin of Japan’s wartime Jewish policies remains to be analyzed: Japan’s official

stance on racial equality.⁷⁵ Shatzkes writes “as the self-declared champion of racial equality after World War I, Japan could not openly embrace an ideology which sanctioned persecution of an ethnic group.”⁷⁶ In fact, as has been shown, the racism of anti-Semitism was explicitly criticized by Japanese intellectuals, such as Yoshino, who refers to the Japanese Siberian soldiers as the “virus carriers” of anti-Semitism.⁷⁷ By the mid-1930s, Manchukuo had been described as a state of “racial equality” (*minzoku byodo*). In this way, a failure to accept Jewish refugees pouring out of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe would belie the slogans.⁷⁸ Officials also frequently used the rhetoric of racial equality. In 1939, Foreign Minister Arita stated that “Jews will receive no discrimination.”⁷⁹ More explicitly, the Foreign Ministry’s reply to Nazi efforts to expel Jewish musicians from Japanese institutes noted “Our government cannot do anything that might be interpreted as supporting racial discrimination or taking a position against the Jews.”⁸⁰

This excerpt brings to light a key question concerning Japanese sentiments: was there a genuine belief in not being racist against Jews that became policy, or did the policy arise out of fear that Japan would be *considered racist* and hypocritical abroad? Certainly the former quote and others suggest that racial equality was mere rhetoric used to avoid the criticism of Western nations. As was quoted in part previously: “while supporting eight corners under one roof [*hakko ichiu*] and racial equality on the surface. We do not want propaganda that we are oppressing and driving away Caucasians.”⁸¹ Likewise, the 1942 Policy Explanation, also previously quoted, notes that “an overall rejection of the Jewish people will not only be contrary to our own policy of world unification, but will also be bound to be utilized as counter-propaganda.”⁸² Sakamoto ultimately asserts that Japanese policy makers were not concerned with their rhetoric in their actual actions, noting the lack of moral discussion in diplomatic cables.⁸³ While it is hard to read the minds of these policy makers, it is undebatable that the perceptions of the West’s beliefs regarding anti-Semitism were key in the implementation of a pro-Jewish policy. That being said, it should still be emphasized is that 24,000 people nonetheless were saved from the Holocaust by an Axis ally at a time when Western nations proved reluctant to accept refugees.⁸⁴

Perhaps the most unique and profound aspect of Japanese anti-Semitism and Japan’s Jewish policy and rhetoric during the war was not the identification of the Jews as the enemy of the West, undermining the values of Western Civilization and threatening the nations that embodied that culture; rather, to the Japanese, the Jews were the representatives of the West. In 1943, retired General Nakaoka Yasutaka wrote “The Jews, detestable as they are, possess a strong spirit... Only Japan, which has a strong spirit of her own... can confront them in battle. In the present war, the champion of the East and the champion of the West are pitted against each other.”⁸⁵ The Jews were the West, and, by extension, the “Jewish

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Peril” was a concentrated form of the anti-Westernism that had been present in Japan since the early 1800s, although it was heightened yet further in the 1930s and 1940s. In this way, the critiques of racism that were so prevalent among Japanese intellectuals could be countered because Japanese anti-Semitism could not be compared with European anti-Semitism because it was implicitly anti-Western in and of itself. In other words, Jews became the personification of the Western values that Japan saw as threatening the foundations of the nation.⁸⁶ Inuzuka was therefore an anti-Semite and a Jewish hero because his anti-Semitism was so abstracted by the unique development of ideology in Japan. The *Protocols* conspiracy coalesced with reactionary Japanese values to produce a Jewish race that was both fundamentally a threat and a tool, for both Japanese economic goals and public relations. 🏛️



A Jewish girl and her Chinese friends in the Shanghai Ghetto during WWII

Source: Shanghai Jewish Refugees Museum

Endnotes

[1] David Kranzler. *Japanese, Nazis & Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938-1945* (New York: Yeshiva UP, 1976). 327.

[2] Ibid., 173-174.

[3] David G. Goodman & Masanori Miyazawa. *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype* (New York: The Free Press, 1995). 126.

[4] Ibid., 96.

[5] Kranzler, 207.

[6] Differences between traditional European anti-Semitism and Japanese anti-Semitism will be explored more later. However, in short, the two key differences lay first in the lack of a Christian image of the Jew as the murderer of Christ or the anti-Christ, and, secondly, Japanese anti-Semitism came to regard the Jewish people not as enemies of Western Civilization, but, rather, as the foremost representatives for it.

[7] Even by 1941, there were only a few hundred Jews who lived in Japan. Ben-Ami Shillony. *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan* (New York: Oxford UP, 1981). 165.

[8] Shillony. *The Jews and the Japanese*. 132. Shillony writes that “The Jews who settled in Japan carried passports of various foreign Western nations and were just a small group within a foreign community, itself a tiny minority within Japan. They were not conspicuous as Jews.” Even by 1937, Jews in Japan “were either stateless or possessed other citizenship.” Pamela R. Sakamoto. *Japanese Diplomats and Jewish Refugees* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998). 40.

[9] Pamela Shatzkes. “Kobe: A Japanese Haven for Jewish Refugees, 1940-1941.” *Japan Forum* 3, no. 2 (1991). 257-273. 10.1080/09555809108721424. 258.

[10] As Brian Victoria phrases it, Japanese anti-Semitism “had very little to do with flesh and blood Jews at all.” Brian D. Victoria. *Zen War Stories* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). 87.

[11] Daniel Ari Kapner & Stephen Levine. “The Jews of Japan.” *Jerusalem Letter. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, 2000. <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/jl425.htm>.

[12] Goodman and Miyazawa note 1883 as “the first authenticated appearance” (29). However, Jennifer Golub notes an earlier translation in 1877. Jennifer Golub. *Japanese Attitudes toward the Jews* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1992). 1.

[13] Goodman/Miyazawa, 30.

[14] Ibid., 36.

[15] This expedition, as will be seen, is when the Japanese were introduced to the major anti-Semitic text *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

[16] Jacob Kovalio. *The Russian Protocols of Zion in Japan: Yūdayaka/Jewish Peril Propaganda and Debates in the 1920s* (New York: Peter Lang, 2009). 16-18.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.; Kovalio notes further examples, one of whom, Oniwa Eiju, writes that “The Jews... [are] all a bunch of Shylocks” (21). The role of Christian missionaries in promoting anti-Semitism is not clear. Kovalio asserts that missionary efforts did not use “Judeophobic motifs” (15). On the other hand, Golub writes that “Christian missionaries arriving in 1873 brought their theological brand of anti-Semitism” (pg. 1).

[20] Despite this, Kovalio emphasizes that Judeophobia did not exist substantially in Japan before the *Protocols*, writing that Japan was “terra nulla for widespread Judeophobia prior to the arrival of

the Protocols” (22). I maintain my position that these early writings evidence a context into which the Protocols were introduced which likely made the acceptance of them more likely and widespread among intellectuals than it otherwise might have been.

[21] Sergyei Nilus. “The Protocols of the Meetings of the Learned Elders of Zion.” Trans. Victor E. Marsden. *The Protocols of the Meetings of the Learned Elders of Zion with Preface and Explanatory Notes* (No publisher given, 1934). 142-228.

[22] *Ibid.*, 164.

[23] *Ibid.*, 171-179. As has been noted, the Japanese lacked a religious motivation, in a Christian or Muslim sense, to persecute Judaism. What the Japanese feared was the sort of “Jewish institution” as is presented in the Protocols. This “institution” that would form a key role in the formation of Japanese wartime policy was the one that was presented in the Protocols conspiracy.

[24] Goodman/Miyazawa, 78.

[25] Kovalio, 7.

[26] Goodman/Miyazawa, 78.

[27] Kovalio, 23-26.

[28] Kovalio, 23.

[29] *Ibid.*, 32.

[30] *Ibid.*, 51. Kovalio reproduces the so-called Heibon Roundtable discussion in full. Mitsukawa, in the discussion, distances himself from the “Jewish Perilists.” Mitsukawa also links the “Jewish peril” to the military, who he implies are the foremost proponents (53).

[31] Victoria, 79.

[32] *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*, 157. Shillony also sees the military and right-wingers as the primary conductors of the campaign against communism, and, by extension, against Jews.

[33] Stanley Rosenman. “Japanese Anti-Semitism: Conjuring Up Conspiratorial Jews in a Land without Jews.” *The Journal of Psychohistory* 25, no. 1 (1997). 3. Rosenman writes that the conspiracy created “an epiphany explaining the mysterious failure of events... sprang from the externalization of infernal images onto the Jew... rendering them visible, real, and far from oneself.” Shatzkes notes that the lack of acquaintance, in addition to socio-economic distress, was a contributing factor (258). Of course, economic distress and nationalism were factors in anti-Semitic scapegoating in Nazi Germany as well, as one can see in the “stab-in-the-back” myth and the context of recurrent economic crises.

[34] Shatzkes, 258.

[35] Golub, 2.

[36] Shioden, for example, “later stressed that his introduction to the Jewish problem was not the result of anti-Bolshevism” (Goodman/Miyazawa, 126).

[37] In 1934, the Army Ministry denounced “liberalism, individualism, and internationalism” as ideas as subversive to unified national defense. Likewise, in 1937, the Education Ministry condemned these “Western ideologies” as contrary to the “special bonds of loyalty” unique to a Japan in which “social harmony was more important than individual competition.” Miles Fletcher.

The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1982). 68, 84. Fletcher refers to two pamphlets, “The Basic Principles of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It” and *The Fundamental Principles of*

the National Polity.

[38] Kranzler, 197-199.

[39] *Ibid.*; Kovalio, 31. Kovalio includes numerous other examples that evidence this. One particularly colorful example noted is the children’s novel *Superman of the Great Orient*, in which the Jewish villain, Bazaroff, is a conglomerate of capitalism, communism, and Zionism (33). Another interesting example can be seen in the writing of Zen Master Yasutani Haku’un. To Yasutani, Jewish support for ideas of liberty, individualism, equality, and hedonism undermined the Confucian and Buddhist social order: “We must clearly point out the fallacy of their evil ideas advocating liberty and equality” (Victoria, 73). Buddhism, therefore, was a bulwark against liberalism, which, as Victoria points out, was substituted with “scheming Jews” (87). Victoria also meaningfully points out that Japan’s anti-Semitism was not a mere “aping” of its Nazi ally, but a “home-grown” ideology to counter liberal ideology, “the last effective barrier to the rule of the military” (78-83).

[40] I should note here that research on the beliefs of commoners regarding Jews is hard to come by. However, Shillony’s characterization of anti-Semitism as “an intellectual fad” in *The Jews and the Japanese* (164), Golub’s assertion that anti-Semitism did not spread below the middle class (2), and the numerous examples that will be explored later regarding citizens’ response to Jewish refugees all suggest that anti-Semitism was a phenomenon that primarily existed among higher class intellectuals.

[41] Kranzler, 202-203, 217, 325. KSG is a Japanese acronym for “Society for International Political and Economic Studies.” Kranzler, describes the first “phase” of Japan’s Jewish policy, from 1931 to 1935 as “one of indifference” Kranzler also notes here that only in the mid-1930s did the “purely theoretical” research of Jewish experts “achieve a pragmatic end” (211).

[42] Golub, 2. In the 1920s, there was considerable debate on “The Jewish Peril.” The most prominent dissent came from Yoshino Sakuzo, who writes that “It is unacceptable for Japan to emulate the West on this issue” (Kovalio, 43). In 1921, Yoshino exposed the Protocols as a forgery and dismissed the conspiracy (*The Jews and the Japanese*, 166).

[43] Sakamoto, 41-42. Ultimately, Sakamoto asserts that Japan “could not comprehend the degree of Nazi hatred.”

[44] *Ibid.*, 13-14.

[45] *Ibid.*, 5.

[46] *Ibid.*, 21, 72.

[47] Kranzler, 218 & Tamar Engel. “The Jews of Kobe.” 1995. <http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tamar/Kobe/Kobe.html>

[48] Shatzkes, 260.

[49] Sakamoto, 7, 30.

[50] Shatzkes, 260.

[51] Kranzler, 613. In the appendix, Kranzler provides a handful of primary documents. This is from one such document, written by Yoshiuori Inuzuka in 1940 concerning an “Explanation for Doubts in Operation on Jews in America.”

[52] Sakamoto, 60.

[53] Kranzler, 234. One direct manifestation of this worldview was the so-called Fugu Plan, developed by “Jewish experts” such as Inuzuka and Yasue. The plan was aimed at inviting German Jews to live in Manchuria in exchange for Jewish support in

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America, where the Japanese believed Roosevelt could be influenced (Golub, 2).

[54] Sakamoto, 4.

[55] Kranzler, 235.

[56] Shatzkes, 258-60. In 1939, The Moslem and Jewish Problem Committee advocated the creation of a Jewish settlement in Shanghai in order to "solicit capital from British and American Jewish financial groups (Sakamoto, 27).

[57] Kranzler, 620. This is from another document provided by Kranzler in the appendix, in this case written in February 1942 concerning "Jewish Measures in view of the 1942 Situation." It spells out the policy plan adopted at the Liaison Conference along with an explanation of the changes from the 1938 policy.

[58] *Ibid.*, 477-485 & Golub, 3.

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] Kranzler, 488.

[61] Golub, 3.

[62] Kapner/Levine note Japanese resistance to German "advice and encouragement," as well as the "exemplary record" in Shanghai. In *Jews and the Japanese*, Shillony also notes the ease of obtaining day passes for work, the fact that many Jews were not forced into the ghetto, and the lack of labor camps, family divisions, and executions (188-89). Kranzler reaffirms all these and also adds that the population density of the ghetto was partially caused by the unexpected fact that many Chinese chose to stay in the ghetto, a fact which in itself points to a relatively higher standard of living in Hongkew compared to its European counterparts (492-504). I should emphasize that I am not attempting to excuse the ghetto or write as an apologist. Rather, I am noting the relative lack of social restrictions in the ghetto.

[63] Sakamoto, 152.

[64] Kranzler, 621.

[65] *The Jews and the Japanese*, 148-9 & Sakamoto, 17.

[66] *The Jews and the Japanese*, 162

[67] *Ibid.*, 178.

[68] Sakamoto, 17.

[69] *Ibid.*, 53.

[70] David G. Goodman & Masanori Miyazawa. *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype* (New York: The Free Press, 1995). 111.

[71] *Ibid.*, 56. Engel also notes the authorities believed that the Jews held crucial scientific knowledge that would aid in Manchuria's development. The notion of Jews as scientific authorities also had precedents, most notably Albert Einstein, who visited Japan in 1922 and "personified the image of the Jews as geniuses" (*The Jews and the Japanese*, 167-8). The Japanese were aware of the "Jewishness" of both Einstein and Schiff. (168, 149).

[72] Kranzler, 481.

[73] Kapner/Levine.

[74] Kranzler, 207. "The key to the distinction between the Japanese and the European form of antisemitism seems to lie in the long Christian tradition of identifying the Jew with the Devil... The Japanese lacked this Christian image of the Jew and brought to their reading of the Protocols a totally different perspective.

The Christian tried to solve the problem by eliminating him; the Japanese tried to harness his immense wealth and power to Japan's advantage."

[75] I should note briefly that humanitarian efforts played a part in Japan's admirable and exceptional treatment of Jewish refugees and are especially lauded by Jewish writers on the subject (see Kapner/Levine, Engel). Two names that stand out are Sugihara Sempo (Chiune), who, as Japanese consul in Lithuania, issued thousands of transit visas of questionable validity (Sakamoto, 106-114), and Kotsuji Setsuzo, who bribed Kobe police, where the refugees landed as they entered Japan, to allow many to stay past the expiration of their visas (Engel). Also, the efforts of Japanese commoners should be noted as well. Jews in Kobe were given many anonymous gifts and donations as well as preferential treatment in shops. Free medical care and accommodation was often given also (Shatzkes, 265 & Kapner/Levine). "There was not antisemitism to the refugees in Kobe, only compassion and kindness (Kranzler, 317, quoted from Leo Hanin from his account to Rabbi Tokayer).

[76] Shatzkes, 258.

[77] Kovalio, 57.

[78] Sakamoto, 53-54.

[79] *Ibid.*, 66. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke stated in a similar vein in 1940 "I am the man responsible for the alliance with Hitler, but nowhere have I promised that we would carry out his anti-Semitic policies in Japan. This is not simply my personal opinion, it is the opinion of Japan, and I have no compunction about announcing it to the world" (Kapner/Levine).

[80] *The Jews and the Japanese*, 181.

[81] Sakamoto, 152.

[82] Kranzler, 621.

[83] Sakamoto, 167-168. She notes that while references to "racial equality and racial harmony" were made often, these notions are not found in diplomatic cables to those dealing with the refugee problem abroad.

[84] *Ibid.*, Sakamoto closes her book emphasizing such. Recent work by Takashi Fujitani emphasizes the often unhelpful manner in which what he calls the "argument of obvious duplicity" is advanced. While this argument asserts that the Japanese government used egalitarian rhetoric, particularly concerning Korean colonial subjects, as a facade for propagandic purposes or otherwise, Fujitani writes that this position distracts historians from looking at the effects of such rhetoric on actual policy decision as opposed to the often ambiguous, complex intentions. Takashi Fujitani. *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as American During World War II* (London: UC Press, 2011). 47-48.

[85] *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*, 159.

[86] Goodman and Miyazawa go to great lengths in fact comparing anti-Semitism and traditional anti-Westernism in Japan. For example they look at Aizawa Seishisai's *New Theses* as a rhetorical precedent for later anti-Semitic texts (20-25). They even go so far as to take a traditional anti-Semitic polemic and substitute "occult religion" and "Western barbarians" with "Jews" and "Judaism" to produce "a classic anti-Semitic harangue" (27).

THE ARTISTIC ARTIFICE OF THE IMPRESSIONIST GAZE

Impressionism, the Look, and the Modern Social Structure

During the nineteenth century, a woman's place and power in society was a recurring subject in Impressionist paintings. The Impressionists utilized the female gaze, in particular, as a means to define female social mobility and reveal the resulted male anxiety of this new development. Though these works seem to celebrate a woman's ameliorated agency, they are actually artistic artifices unearthing the intensity and endurance of the nineteenth century's male-dominated culture. Through the painted gaze, these artists ultimately brought about an awakening concerning modern day's gendered social construction.

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Edouard Manet, *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* (*Un Bar aux Folies-Bergère*)

Source: Courtauld Institute of Art

The Impressionists seem to render their paintings as exact reflections of modern life only upon initial examination; as revealing and avant-garde as they were, the Impressionists' works were artifices commentating on the nineteenth century's modern progression. With subjects as controversial as recognizable figures in prostitution and contemporary men bathing, the Impressionists were the visual commentators of their time, either revealing new leisurely activities, cross-divisional social class interactions, or the forefronting presence of women within society. It is particu-

larly the topic of women that most Impressionists concern their work. However, no matter the creative presentation of the woman, the Impressionists implicitly note the extent to which the modern age allowed women to socially progress. During the Impressionist era, women have gained the ability to gaze or become a spectator both inside and outside the picture space; it is here that the Impressionists' mastery of visual artifice for their social mobility becomes evident. Though Impressionist artworks represent the modern woman's increasing flexibility and mobility as a spectator, they



Berthe Morisot's *The Harbor at Lorient (Vue du petit port de Lorient)*
Source: National Gallery of Art

are more reflections of the restrictions placed upon women's new freedom as opposed to celebratory replicas of women's social change in nineteenth century Parisian culture.

THEORIES ON THE IMPRESSIONIST GAZE

The motif of woman as spectator, whether within or without the picture space, was popularized during the turn of the twentieth century. As Griselda Pollock clarifies in "The Gaze and the Look: Women with Binoculars - A Question of Difference," the Impressionists, particularly Edgar Degas and Mary Cassatt, admired the image of the woman, especially her ability to gaze.¹ Pollock continues her analysis by constructing the social implications of a woman's gaze and how the independent artistic group represented it within its works. The great bulk of her argument is a psychoanalysis on how the gaze impacted men negatively and how this physio-social interaction constructed both sexes' social roles. However, what is not sufficiently explained is that men were commonly portrayed as spectators of these gazing women, nor is it explained that the male's voyeuristic action within the painting was a reflection of nineteenth century social conventions.

Pollock continues in "Modernity and the Spaces of Femininity" and elides vital information that establishes the extent to which women transgressed within the modern era.

Her argument demonstrates how space illustrated within a female Impressionist's work exemplifies the differences of space between private and public, proximal and compressed, for a man versus a woman. Consequently, Pollock suggests that female Impressionists, like Cassatt and Berthe Morisot, confine the female subject's space in accordance to historical social conventions and are able to visually articulate the female perspective due to their relation to the modern woman;² the artists achieve this, for example, by painting female subjects in positions where they are displaced from city life while looking enviously behind physical boundaries, as seen in Morisot's *The Harbor at Lorient*. In addition, the author implies that the rendering of space specifically painted by a woman's hand is the only means of reflecting the restrictions placed upon a woman at this time.

Though Pollock's article is groundbreaking work on how women, both as artists and citizens, were confined in the social sphere and artistic profession, her argument becomes faulty when she references Edouard Manet's *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* of 1882.³ She fails to acknowledge that Manet's work is similar in spatial configuration to Morisot's work, *The Harbor at Lorient*, as being compressed and displaced, which counteracts her argument of female artists creating female relatable works as expressed through space. Thus, this negates the notion that female artists were the only Impression-

ists capable of portraying female social confinement. Lastly, Pollock omits the fact that a male figure is present staring at the female bartender in Manet's work, again ignoring the significance of the male's voyeuristic action in Impressionist paintings and how this interaction enforces the definition a woman's place in modern society.

The analysis of Pollock's two articles on women within the nineteenth century Parisian culture is helpful, for it establishes a basis on how female social limitations were represented within Impressionist paintings by both genders. Her

Laura Mulvey concludes, the female viewer had the choice to "identify herself with the male viewer (both viewer of the picture, and by association, the viewer in the picture), or identify with the female in the picture."⁶ Using Eva Gonzalez's *Une Loge aux Italiens* as an example, if the female viewer identified with the male viewer, "she [became] not an object but the subject of the look"⁷ and no longer appeared yet acted.⁸ By becoming a viewer and spectator, she transgressed normal femininity within modern Paris, meaning the Impressionists painted women's agency and their ameliorated social capabilities.⁹

“[T]he Impressionists were the visual commentators of their time, either revealing new leisurely activities, cross-divisional social class interactions, or the forefronting presence of women within society.”

recognition of the female gaze inside and outside the pictorial space emphasizes the gradual presence of women in social atmospheres, their gained freedom, and the effects of this freedom upon both sexes, ultimately leading to the notion that the gaze is a predominant factor determining a woman's flexibility and progression in Impressionist paintings. Pollock's analysis of female space also illustrates that the Impressionists formulated certain visual elements to allude to how women were still restricted within their gained freedoms. However, what is important to note is that the gaze was a constant element that the Impressionists of both sexes utilized to explain women's confined progression. The gaze, not space, was a visual signifier of both freedom and restriction as well as an universal observation made by Impressionists of all genders to visually explicate the extent of female progression, as seen in Manet's *A Bar at the Folies-Bergere* of 1882 and many other works. More specifically, the interplay of gendered gazes by the man as spectator and the woman as both spectator and subject from within and without these paintings unveils how Impressionist works did not represent female progression, but were actually artistic artifices of the restrictions placed upon women's new ability to gaze.⁴

A WOMAN'S GAZE AND ITS "POWER"

As commonly stated within the art historical discipline, "[t]he way that looking is staged within an image can echo (or subvert, in some instances) dominant patterns of looking within the culture in which it is produced."⁵ Now positioned as both viewer and spectator, the way that nineteenth century women looked in an image, such as Cassatt's *Woman at the Opera* of 1879, both echoed and subverted modern Parisian patterns of the gaze. One way in which a woman undermined this trend was by her new freedom to look, for it was only typical for men to possess the look at this time. As

However, if the female viewer were to identify herself with the female spectator, she essentially accepts herself as the object of the look and mimics the male viewer's perception of women as objects; consequently, she denies herself power, limits her sight, and echoes typical patterns of modern gender construction. Within this position, the female spectator is now looked upon by two men, a female impersonating a male viewer in addition to the male spectator in the painting. Whether impersonating a male viewer or assuming the role as female spectator, the female spectator does not escape the male gaze in either situation, enforcing the Foucauldian notion that "Men's surveillance disciplines women."¹⁰ In regards to this Foucauldian notion and Lacan's mirror theory, the female viewer is therefore forced to relate herself to the female spectator within the piece as one having the power to gaze but always kept under the male watchful eye.¹¹ Here, the Impressionists created an artistic artifice, one that seemed to have represented the transcendence of a woman's gaze in society, but ultimately revealed her sustained immobility by omnipresent male dominance.

HIS GAZE AND ANXIETY

By analyzing the female gaze through the male gaze, male social construction in modern Paris is also defined. As spectators and viewers without surveillance, the male figures within Impressionist pieces "[stand] for looking as a masculine prerogative within late nineteenth-century French culture."¹² In paintings such as Pierre-Auguste Renoir's 1876 *La Première Sortie*, Cassatt's 1879 *Femme dans une Loge* (Lydia), and Manet's *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* of 1871, the male spectator directs his gaze upon the female spectator with the addition of the male viewer gazing upon her as well. Therefore, Berger's concept that "men act and women appear" still remains true due to how two men actively gaze upon one woman and

The Artistic Artifice of the Impressionist Gaze



A Box at the Theatre des Italiens (Une loge aux Italiens)
Source: Musée d'Orsay, Paris

subdue her power to gaze, forcing her to still appear while the men remain to act.¹³ The direction of these gazes “tells us more about the dominant construction of masculinity, its projections, fears, and anxieties.”¹⁴ It reveals the nineteenth century man’s need for overarching dominance in modern society through the submission and limitation of women, ultimately implying his anxiety and fear of female potential.¹⁵ Again, the interaction between the gendered gazes unveil how the Impressionists portray one subject, all the while painting a hidden meaning - that is, the overt display of male dominance as expressed through his gaze with subtle suggestions towards his insecurity of female power.

A MODERN AWAKENING

The presence of such an artifice within Impressionist artworks implies the intellectual development of self-awareness in French culture. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Impressionists paralleled many theories, both literary and philosophical, on social consciousness. One exemplary writer, who was in tune with this social consciousness as well as the changing art scene, is Charles Baudelaire. His writing on modernity talks of how the “Modern man... is compelled to the risk of becoming a self-conscious being or agent” and also “suggests that forms of social consciousness, by which

individuals construct their identity, can only be adequately expressed in modern life by means of metaphors, by representations.”¹⁶ Other poets in addition to Baudelaire, like Stéphane Mallarmé and Arthur Rimbaud, wrote alternative meanings to their texts and created metaphors allusive to the subject’s eventual self-awareness.¹⁷ The nineteenth century was thus an age of defining the modern man as being more self-aware within society through the means of metaphors, representations, and artifices- a concept inescapable from the Impressionists’ works.

The Impressionists’ application of the gaze between the genders, in particular, was the process through which they revealed their awareness of gender construction in the Parisian nineteenth century. Michael Fried boldly states that Manet was “the first painter for whom consciousness itself is the great subject of his art” and comments on Manet’s “self-consciousness about his relationship to reality.”¹⁸ The artist portrayed consciousness through representations, paralleling his humanist contemporaries, by manipulating each gender’s gaze. As viewers themselves, the artists’ gazes initiated their own social awareness, enabling them to visually translate the implications of the gendered gazes in art, particularly the ones concerning social restrictions upon women. Moreover, it is important to note that this application of the gaze was not only portrayed in Manet’s work, but also in the paintings of Cassatt, Gonzales, and Renoir. The fact that other Impressionists of each gender painted this interplay of gazes further demonstrates an universal observation and awareness of modern Parisian gender construction, that both men and women had realized this highly structured society and their role within it.

The artist’s painted realization and the effects of Lacan’s mirror theory influenced the self-consciousness of the viewer, specifically about his role within society. The Impressionists therefore initiated a perpetual cycle of self-realization and awareness of gender social construction, first within themselves then the viewer. These multifaceted, layered artworks were not only artifices representing the true social role of each gender, but were also visual vehicles spurring an awareness of modern social structure in both artist and viewer alike. 🏛️

Endnotes

- [1] Griselda Pollock, "The Gaze and the Look: Women with Binoculars - A Question of Difference," [excerpt] in *Dealing with Degas, Representations of Women and the Politics of Vision*, eds. Richard Kendall and Griselda Pollock (New York: Universe, 1991), 112-130.
- [2] Griselda Pollock, "Modernity and the Spaces of Femininity," in *Expanding Discourse. Feminism and Art History*, eds. Norma Broude and Mary D. Garrard (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 230-243.
- [3] *Ibid.*, 251.
- [4] It will be noted that from here on spectator will indicate those possessing the gaze within the painting and viewer will indicate those possessing the gaze upon the painting.
- [5] Tamar Garb, "Gender and Representation," *Modernity and Modernism: French Painting in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 225.
- [6] Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," *Screen* 16, no. 3 (1975), 8-18.
- [7] Pollock, "The Gaze," 112.
- [8] John Berger, "Ways of Seeing," *Critical perspectives on art history* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 128.
- [9] Ruth Iskin, *Modern Women and Parisian Consumer Culture in Impressionist Painting* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 57.
- [10] Pollock, "The Gaze," 112.
- [11] Pollock, "The gaze," 112. Lacan's theory states "the child looks to this Other for confirmation of what is has seen [within the mirror], an image which it is told as his/hers," with 'Other' referring to an authoritative figure.
- [12] Garb, "Gender and Representation," 225.
- [13] Berger, "Ways of Seeing," 128.
- [14] Garb, "Gender and Representation," 223.
- [15] Though not discussed in this essay, the reasons for this direction of the male gaze hints towards the desire of portraying the cultural ideals of masculinity, as seen in Tamar Garb's "Gustave Caillebotte's Male Figures: Masculinity, Muscularity, and Modernity," as well as an aversion to homosexuality, referring to Patricia Simons' text, "Homosexuality and Erotics in Italian Renaissance Portraiture."
- [16] Briony Fer, "Introduction," *Modernity and Modernism: French Painting in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1993), 53.
- [17] Roger Pearson, "Unfolding Mallarme: The Development of a Poetic Art," (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Daphne Merkin, "Rimbaud Rules," *The American Scholar* 72 no. 1 (Winter 2003): 45-52.
- [18] Michael Fried, *Three-American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella* (Fogg Art Museum: Harvard University, 1965), 4-10.

NOT YOUR “AVERAGE” COUP D’ÉTAT

The 14 July Revolution and the “True Coup” Question

What distinguishes a “true” revolution from a coup d’état? Which title best describes the so-called 14 July Revolution? This paper explores the origins, events, and aftermath of this pivotal period in Iraqi history. The author would like to thank Dr. Alexander Maxwell for his many useful comments and encouragement in writing this paper.

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Leaders of the July 14th, 1958 Revolution
Source: Anonymous (Commons Wikimedia)

On 14 July 1958, the first Iraqi Republic was formed, the result of a swift revolution that swept away the Iraqi monarchy and took the world by surprise.¹ Led by ‘Abd al-Karīm Qāsim, the Hāshimite Monarchy was brutally deposed through the execution of King Faisal II and most of the royal family.² The ensuing power vacuum saw Qāsim himself assume the position of Prime Minister of Iraq; however, his regime lasted just under five years, from 14 July, 1958, until 8 February, 1963.³ While this may fit the description of the “average” revolution or coup d’état, down to its leader’s grisly demise, there are many differing narratives of the 14 July Revolution that disagree on everything from its origins to the reasons for the resulting regime’s eventual failure. However, what sets the Revolution and Qāsim’s regime apart is what both managed to accomplish during their short lives. Such historical debate begs the following question: how representative of Iraqi society, or how “true,” was this revolution? This paper endeavors to ascertain the origins, events, and aftermath of the 14 July Revolution. It will discuss key events leading up to the Revolution, the drama around the

Revolution itself, and the manner in which Qāsim ruled the first Iraqi Republic. While scholars and historians today continue to argue over the finer details, there is little doubt that the 14 July Revolution, the demise of the monarchy, and the birth of the First Iraqi Republic constituted a period of rapid change and upheaval in Iraqi history.

ROAD TO REVOLUTION: ‘ABD AL-KARĪM QĀSIM AND THE FREE OFFICERS’ MOVEMENT

Today it is acknowledged by both the participants themselves and modern historians that the Free Officers’ Movement in Iraq was inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s campaign of the same name and the success of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution.⁴ While the 14 July Revolution did not occur until 1958, the first signs of dissent allegedly emerged as early as September 1952.⁵ The clandestine movement – formed by those officers in the Iraqi Armed Forces who were keen to emulate Nasser’s success in Egypt – followed the Egyptian example, advocating pan-Arabism and building on the “tide of Arab nationalism” that so threatened the British monopoly of the Middle East.⁶ The movement challenged the rule of the young Hāshimite Dynasty, one of several monarchies established by the British in 1921 following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa’id’s regime, which today is remembered as ‘al-‘ahd al-fāsid’, the “Corrupt Regime.”⁷ Nuri’s regime was indeed authoritarian. However, it is likely that his sympathy for the British and his compliance with their demands was what condemned him in the eyes of many Iraqis.⁸

To understand the origins of the Revolution and the immense popularity that Qāsim’s regime enjoyed in its early days, several key events in Iraq’s history must be explored. Iraqis were especially opposed to their government’s commitment to the controversial Baghdad Pact, formalized in 1955.⁹ A treaty made between Britain, Iraq and Turkey, and later, Iran and Pakistan, the pact was intended to ensure collective defense in the Middle East, not only to “contain” the Soviet Union and protect the region against the perceived threat of encroaching communism, but also to safeguard Britain and the United States’ own security interests in the Northern Tier.¹⁰ Known first as the Turkish-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Co-operation, the pact was advocated strongly by

American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who saw the futility in establishing a successful regional defense strategy against the Soviets without the cooperation of the Arab states.¹¹ The “winning over” of Iraq was especially important, given her proximity to the strategic pass through the Zagros Mountains and access to the Tigris-Euphrates valley, the acquisition of which would establish vital lines of communication with Turkey.¹² Despite its heavy investment, the United States never officially joined the pact, a disappointment to which many historians attribute the pact’s eventual failure.¹³ While Iraq benefited somewhat from the pact (a key incentive being the return of the Habbaniya and Shaiba air bases to Iraqi sovereignty), the British ultimately gained far more from the arrangement.¹⁴ As scholar Richard L. Jasse notes, Nuri’s attempts to “negotiate” the conditions of the pact were cleverly circumvented by the British to their advantage, only confirming Nuri’s reputation as Britain’s “stooge” to Iraqis.¹⁵

Another blow to the popularity of the Hāshimite Dynasty was the formation of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) in 1958. This union of Nasser’s Egypt and Shukri al-Quwatli’s Syria, while brief, has been described, naturally, as “one of the most important victories in contemporary Arab history” by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party.¹⁶ The Hāshimite response to Nasser’s “greatest triumph yet” was the formation of the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan in 1958, an alliance between cousins King Faisal II and King Hussein of Jordan that lasted a mere six months.¹⁷ The brief alliance irretrievably damaged the reputation of the monarchy in Iraq; as scholar Uriel Dann notes, Iraqis did not appreciate their own “unloved and alien royal house” aligning with “its needy relations abroad.”¹⁸ Of particular concern to Iraqis was whether they would have to assimilate Jordan’s considerable debt, thus again rendering Iraq at a disadvantage, the result of an “imperialist manoeuvre masquerading as virtue.”¹⁹ In comparison to the U.A.R., the Arab Federation was a poor substitute, a cheap attempt at unity that left much to be desired.

The social composition of the Free Officers’ Movement reflects the class divisions that had been allowed to flourish in Iraqi society under the monarchy. The majority of the movement’s membership were educated military men who usually also belonged to the broad social stratum known as the *effendiyya*. A vague categorization, *effendiyya* refers to anyone who has received an education of any form. Described as “westernized,” the *effendiyya* typically wore Western dress and did not conform to traditional customs.²⁰ Despite the term *effendi* originating from the Byzantine Greek word meaning *seigneur*, or master, whence it passed into Ottoman Turkish, the *effendiyya* were in the majority from the working middle class, the sons of merchants who, through Western education, came to hold such positions as teachers, officials, health workers, engineers and officers—the social opposite of the ruling Hāshimite elite.²¹ Belonging neither to the ruling elitist class nor the traditional masses, their relative lack of identity in Iraqi society, as scholar Michael Eppel

points out, “made the *effendiyya* ripe for absorbing a nationalist ideological response,” as was the case with the Free Officers.²² As historian Phebe Marr states:

The fourteen members of the central committee may be taken as fairly representative of the movement. The overwhelming majority were Arab sunnī. There were only two shī’ah and no Kurds... Most came from the middle or lower middle class, although three – Qāsim and the two ‘Arifs, ‘Abd al-Salām and ‘Abd al-Rahman – came from poor families... All had been educated at the Baghdad Military Academy; one, Qāsim, had been a school-teacher first.²³

While its origins suggest that the Free Officers’ Movement was a “genuine” reflection of the voice of the Iraqi middle class, this assumption is challenged by the fact that, by 1957, it only had between 170 and 200 members.²⁴ Furthermore, Marr alleges that the Revolution “succeeded more because of luck and audacity than as a result of long planning or extensive organisation.”²⁵ This condemnation of the movement as “unorganised” both confirms and contradicts descriptions of the countenance and leadership capabilities of de facto leader Qāsim, which differ radically from source to source.²⁶

Qāsim’s character has been analysed in depth by those that knew him personally and by historians today; some attribute the success of the Revolution to him while others blame him for the failure of Iraq’s first Republic. A significant figure, Qāsim was born in 1914 in Mahdiyya, one of many poor quarters in Baghdad. He was, according to records published during his regime, of pure Arab descent, and was thus praised for his racial purity. However, he was later condemned by his rivals as the mixed offspring of a Kurd and a Turcoman.²⁷ Despite his impoverished upbringing, it is widely acknowledged by friend and foe alike that Qāsim was a successful soldier, having attained the status of brigadier by 1955.²⁸ Regarding his personality, however, agreement is not universal; descriptions of him as “jumpy, moody and unpredictable, but capable of exercising much personal charm” do not reflect the memories of those that orchestrated the Revolution alongside him, specifically that of General Ismail Al-Arif.²⁹ In his so-called “first hand account,” titled *Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After*, Al-Arif details his participation in the 14 July Revolution and his dealings with Qāsim, his alleged friend of fifteen years.³⁰ He describes Qāsim as a brave, shrewd, and courageous officer who was “beloved by all his troops for his courage and simplicity.”³¹ Of Qāsim’s home life, General Al-Arif writes:

He [Qāsim] lived very simply. Many poor people used to visit him frequently because he served the poor by sharing his salary with the needy. In return, they would come to clean and cook and serve him, although this was strictly a voluntary action on the part of the people who loved and respected him.³²

The accuracy of this benevolent description is somewhat validated by the fact that, after he had been executed, it was found that Qāsim was “virtually penniless” and that he had

Not Your “Average” Coup d’État



Map of the United Arab States (red) and Arab Federation (green) in 1958

Source: Roxanna (Commons Wikimedia)

been donating his government paychecks and military pension to the poor.³³

Like the memory of his character, Qāsim’s role in the build-up to the Revolution – and the amount of credit he should be awarded for its success – is debated. Conflicting reports place him at the pulse of the clandestine movement, while other accounts diminish his role as its leader. What is clear, however, is that Qāsim joined the movement a number of years after it was formed. Indeed, General Al-Arif claims that he himself recruited Qāsim to the movement in the summer of 1954.³⁴ While both Marr and Dann believe that preparation for the Revolution quickly became a “one-man job,” both neglect to mention the contribution of the Iraqi Communist Party.³⁵ Government records indicate that this political party was one of the main proponents of the Revolution, heavily involving itself in recruiting allies from within the Iraqi government and even negotiating the supply of arms from abroad.³⁶ Similarly, efforts were made to destabilize the monarchy; specifically, photographs of King Faisal, reputedly a delicate monarch by nature, in “compromising homosexual positions” were used to convince Islamic clerics of the apparent degradation of the monarchy and thus the necessity for its removal.³⁷ However, despite these preparations, the road to revolution did not go as smoothly as anticipated; several coups were planned but subsequently postponed before the Free Officers eventually made their move.³⁸

ONE SURPRISING HOUR: THE 14 JULY REVOLUTION

Ironically, the opportunity to oust the Hāshimite Dynasty came about as a result of its obligations as a member of the Arab Federation. An unexpected revolt in Lebanon prompted King Hussein to call for military aid, lest the conflict

spread to Jordan. In response, King Faisal commanded Iraqi troops to march to his cousin’s assistance. However, both Qāsim, who was in charge of the Nineteenth Brigade, and ‘Abd al-Salām ‘Arif defied these orders by marching instead to Baghdad and initiating the first phase of the Revolution.³⁹ A reputation he would later exploit to justify his overthrow of Qāsim, ‘Arif is widely acknowledged as the dominant leader at the outset of events on the 14 July 1958.⁴⁰ His battalion quickly overpowered government forces at the Mobile Police Force Headquarters, the Washshāsh camp, the Broadcasting House, and Baghdad airport.⁴¹ ‘Arif himself proclaimed the establishment of the first Iraqi Republic over the radio in the early hours of 14 July.⁴²

Regardless of the competing historiography surrounding this revolution, the execution of the Iraqi royal family was nothing if not brutal. Having awoken to find the al-Rihāb Palace surrounded by ‘Arif’s troops, the Crown Prince, King Faisal’s uncle, immediately surrendered.⁴³ Crucially, General Al-Arif contradicts this claim, asserting that the royal family in fact tried to resist arrest.⁴⁴ Either way, the outcome was the same: the majority of the royal family and their staff were gunned down in the palace grounds.⁴⁵ The Crown Prince’s body was mutilated, his hands and feet removed, and what remained of his torso was dragged through the streets.⁴⁶ Nuri too was hunted down; while he initially escaped arrest, he was found days later, reputedly disguised in a woman’s veil, and killed.⁴⁷ While at first quietly buried, his corpse was later exhumed and suffered the same fate as that of the former Crown Prince. It was reported that the mob, “unsure of his [Nuri’s] grave... hastily dug up all new graves, unearthing the bodies of old people and children.”⁴⁸ “In one surprising hour,” the Free Officers had deposed the Hāshimite Dynasty, the entire revolution, so Qāsim claimed, costing the lives of just nineteen people.⁴⁹ Such a swift victory – indicative of how little support the monarchy had by the end – called for immediate celebration, though not likely to the extent that General Al-Arif remembers:⁵⁰

The streets of Baghdad were filled with people from the first moment of the announcement of the Revolution. All religious and ethnic groups rejoiced in unison because for the first time in 600 years they felt free. Christians, Jews, Kurds, Arabs, and the small minorities felt that this was the people’s revolution, for all people, without discrimination.⁵¹

AFTERMATH

While many Iraqis rejoiced in the victory of the Revolution, others decried the violence and bloodshed, and lamented how it would affect their country’s international reputation.⁵² Britain was shocked by the speed and brutality with which the monarchy had been overthrown. British Pathé News videos shared its government’s concerns with the public, lamenting the loss of “royal fledgling” Faisal, whose education at Harrow endeared him to the British, while also warning of further Soviet involvement in the debacle.⁵³ Propaganda

such as “The King is reported a prisoner; the Crown Prince is dead; only one thing is certain – the Kremlin is jubilant” and “Britain has given Faisal and his government wholehearted support, but the warmth of a London welcome melts no ice in Cairo or Moscow” reveals which leaders, namely Nasser and Khrushchev, Britain found most threatening.⁵⁴ The United States too felt threatened by Qāsim’s rise to power, both in an ideological and a practical sense. American nationals living and working in Iraq were targeted, resulting in the forced evacuation of the American Embassy in Baghdad. Morris Draper, an officer on the Baghdad Pact Secretariat, was one of those evacuated. In an interview conducted in 1991, he shared his opinion on the Iraqi regime:

The new rulers were a combination of pure thugs and some ideologues. One of the first things the revolutionary group did was to give all the students passing grades from high school on up, regardless whether they took a test or had done acceptable work. The students were demanding it. They were demonstrating in the streets all the time. That is sort of self-defeating, but it is what happens. The regime was appeasing one group after another.⁵⁵

“[T]he ‘winning over’ of Iraq was especially important, given her proximity to the strategic pass through the Zagros Mountains and access to the Tigris-Euphrates valley.”

Draper’s observation that the new regime was trying to “appease” the different factions in Iraqi society is supported by Qāsim’s extensive efforts to unite all Iraqis under the guise of Iraqi nationalism. While some Western states clearly vehemently opposed the 14 July Revolution and its resulting republic, Qāsim’s greatest challenge would be to convince his own people to follow his example, a campaign that he would ultimately lose.

Qāsim went to great lengths to legitimize his rule and, like many autocrats, he attempted to restructure the historical memory of Iraq, foremost in the eyes of Iraqi citizens themselves.⁵⁶ In a dramatic departure from the Free Officers’ initial commitment to pan-Arabism, he adopted a vaguely-defined but firm commitment to Iraqi nationalism, which is summarized by the mantra “Iraq is part of an Arab Nation and it is not a part of a part.”⁵⁷ Qāsim relied on contemporary scholars to both refine his new-found nationalistic philosophy and to popularize it.⁵⁸ One such intellectual was Sāti’ Al-Husri, who wrote:

For every nation is conscious of and knows itself by means of its particular history. We can say that historical memories bring people nearer to each other and create a kind of moral kinship. A nation that has been subjugated and forgets its special history has lost its self-conscious-

ness; that self-consciousness will not be recovered until it recalls and goes back to that history.⁵⁹

Following Al-Husri’s teaching, Qāsim tapped into Iraq’s rich history and associated Mesopotamian folklore to inspire a shared sense of nationalism amongst Iraqis. Through the use of such symbols as the Akkadian Sun (the symbol of the Mesopotamian Sun God Shamash) on the Revolution’s flag and in the revised state emblem, Qāsim sought to invoke Iraq as “the cradle of civilization and place of strength” it had once been, in an attempt to unite Iraq’s mixed and fractious make-up of sunnī, shī’ah, and Kurds.⁶⁰ He formed the Ministry of Guidance and the Directorate of Folklore to promote the shared history of these three warring groups, hoping to foster between them “cultural commonalities” that would pave the way for a new national self-consciousness.⁶¹ Furthermore, through his efforts, Qāsim was claiming a certain degree of historical superiority over other Middle Eastern nations, thus distancing Iraq from the wider pan-Arab movement and avoiding competition with Nasser.⁶²

Like much of the competing historical narrative about this event, the reasons for Qāsim’s seemingly abrupt rejection of pan-Arabism and his subsequent embrace of Iraqi nationalism post-Revolution are not entirely clear. Scholar Orit Bashkin discusses the conflict between pan-Arabism and what he terms “territorial-patriotic nationalism” in his article *Hybrid Nationalisms: Watanī and Qawmī Visions in Iraq Under ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, 1958-61*.⁶³ Bashkin identifies each of the two ideologies as having different goals yet similar values; while pan-Arabism (*qawmī*) considers “Arab culture, history, and language the markers of national identity and often strives for political unity with other Arab states,” nationalism (in this case, Iraqi nationalism, or *watanī*) considers “Iraqi (rather than Arab) geography, archaeology, and history the key features of national identity.”⁶⁴ The latter, he suggests, had three goals: first, to recognize and celebrate Iraq’s Mesopotamian heritage; second, to emphasize the importance of “the people,” aligning with Qāsim’s communist tendencies; and third, to glorify the “blessed, peaceful and miraculous Revolution of July 14, 1958.”⁶⁵ To foster this new Iraqi identity, the aforementioned Ministry of Guidance began several culturally significant projects. These included the establishment of several commemorative public holidays, like Child Day, Tree Day, and May Day, to celebrate the Revolution’s anniversary and other distinctly Iraqi traditions, and the funding of



The Iraqi state emblem adopted under Qasim (1959-1965)
Source: AnonMoos (Commons Wikimedia)

archeological excavations in various historically significant sites, including Babylon, Samarra, and Mosul. A marked increase in the popularity of Iraqi theatre and art was also recorded around this time.⁶⁶ As Bashkin states, “in the monarchic era, *watanī* projects were subsumed under Pan-Arab projects; now they were given center stage.”⁶⁷ What had been started by the oppressed and discontented *effendiyya* soon became, under the careful and directed care of Qāsim, a full-blown patriotic nationalistic revolution. However, the influence of pan-Arabism was not entirely gone. As is likely the case, Bashkin reasons that both *qawmī* and *watanī* are fluid, constantly changing and building on each other. Perhaps the real reason that Qāsim vacillated between pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism was an effort to not “burn any bridges” and isolate certain sections of Iraqi society before his regime had matured, possibly the most logical means of staying in power.⁶⁸ This certainly seems to be reflected in the interim 1958 Iraqi Constitution.⁶⁹

The interim Constitution was the first of several significantly progressive reforms instituted during Qāsim’s regime. Announced thirteen days following the success of the Revolution, the Constitution confirmed Iraq’s status as a republic and Islam as the official state religion. However, at the same time it proclaimed Iraq part of the Arab Nation, while also promising Iraq’s Kurdish population “national rights” as equal citizens.⁷⁰ The arrangement of the new republican cabinet also appeared, at first glance, to be unexpectedly diverse. Described by Marr as being “remarkable for its coverage of the opposition,” it included representatives from the National Democratic Party, Ba’athists, Marxists, Kurds, and

Arab nationalists, amongst others, thus continuing Qāsim’s tactic of not prematurely stepping on anyone’s toes before he had the opportunity to consolidate his power.⁷¹ While Qāsim himself held the positions of Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and commander in chief of the armed forces – a powerful trio – the otherwise diverse cabinet established the new regime as more than just another of the ineffective governments that so often follow coup d’états.⁷² Even the hated British were remembered in the new Iraqi Republic, as the regime pledged to honor all pre-existing oil contracts with the West.⁷³

Another significant reform instituted by Qāsim was the Agrarian Law. Announced in September 1958, this law enabled the property previously owned by the ruling elite to be expropriated to the masses, who were in turn given loans and equipment to utilize it.⁷⁴ As General Al-Arif observes, “only a few days previously, these same peasants had been serfs of the feudal sheikhs, who had appropriated these immense plantations.”⁷⁵ This was the jewel of what has come to be known as the “golden age of the Qassem era,” referring to the first few months immediately after the Revolution, during which numerous issues of social welfare were addressed.⁷⁶ However, Qāsim’s debut as Iraq’s leader was not without its problems, the first of which arose within Qāsim’s own inner circle, when ‘Abd al-Salām ‘Arif, desiring the union of Iraq and Egypt, challenged Qāsim’s authority. While ‘Arif was ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment, the rift destabilized the illusion of Iraqi unity that Qāsim had worked so hard to create.⁷⁷

There are several narratives that seek to explain why the first Republic of Iraq failed. The “ethnic” narrative suggests that Qāsim’s regime did not appreciate, cater to, or promote tolerance for the needs of the different minorities in Iraq, and that it was in fact doomed to failure from the outset, given the assumed incompatibility of the various denominations within Islam and tensions between Arabs and Kurds.⁷⁸ This argument is supported by the existence of discord within the regime and, moreover, that it was in fact able to topple the regime. Potentially, Qāsim’s desire to unite his people under the banner of Iraqi nationalism proved too radical a shift in the immediate wake of the thirty-seven year reign of the monarchy.⁷⁹ In contrast, the “pan-Arab” narrative accuses Qāsim of “promoting social fragmentation rather than unity,” arguing that had Qāsim embraced pan-Arabism wholeheartedly, as was the “original goal” of the coup, he would not have been deposed.⁸⁰ While the “communist” narrative removes any blame from Qāsim (stating that the Western powers were instrumental in his downfall), the Ba’athist’s claim the Republic failed because “the reactionary character of the regime was becoming apparent once all the false progressive pretenses borrowed from certain past movements had been unmasked.”⁸¹ Following an assassination attempt, Qāsim became increasingly isolated from others, barricading himself in his office at the Ministry of Defense for up to fourteen

hours at a time.⁸² In his suspicion, he failed to recognize that just as education had stimulated the *effendiyya* to organize themselves, so too was opposition to Qāsim's regime cultivated through schools. Whether or not the Ba'athist regime, which deposed the first Republic in the Ramadan Revolution of February 1963, lived up to Iraqi expectation, however, is a question that is worthy of further investigation.⁸³

Perhaps, having discussed the event, it is no longer pertinent to refer to the 14 July Revolution as “the Revolution”; rather, it should be remembered as one uprising in an extensive history of unrest that has hindered Iraq throughout the twentieth century. As the evidence suggests, this revolution was not a true testament to the desires of the Iraqi populace, the makeup of which is far too complex to be governed by one man or ruled by one philosophy. Yet neither was the Revolution an average coup d'état. Qāsim's considerable investment in appeasing Iraqi society and his attempts to foster Iraqi nationalism mark his regime as more than “just a dictatorship”; instead, as Qāsim claimed, it was a genuine attempt to throw off imperialism and forge a new future for Iraq. While following in the footsteps, as it were, of the French Revolution, Nasser, and even the Soviet Union, the 14 July Revolution stands apart and remains an important turning point in Iraq's history. The conflicting accounts of Qāsim and of the



The July Revolution (1958)

Source: *Unknown* (Commons Wikimedia)

14 July Revolution testify to the immense social and political upheaval that continues to plague Iraq today, and, to an extent, the entire Middle East – a region so at odds with its history that it cannot hope to move forward until some effort is made to rectify its past. 🏛️

Endnotes

- [1] The 14 July Revolution may also be referred to as simply “the Revolution” or, conversely for the purpose of comparison, as a coup d’état in this paper.
- [2] With regard to the spelling of names and place names, I have borrowed heavily from the various sources consulted. In cases of multiple spellings, I have picked one version and used it throughout consistently. For example, there are many different spellings of Qāsim, including Qassem and Kasim. I have used the spelling offered in Phebe Marr’s *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985). In other cases, where there was only one spelling used, I used what was available; for example, in the case of General Ismail Al-Arif, author of *Iraq Reborn: A First-hand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After* (New York: Vantage Press, 1982) the author refers to himself in this spelling, so I have followed suit. In all cases, the person or place in question should be clear.
- [3] Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 93.
- [4] Uriel Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 19; Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 91-92.
- [5] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 154.
- [6] “Iraq Bombshell,” *British Pathé News* video, 1:46, 17 July 1958, <http://www.britishpathe.com/video/iraq-bombshell>; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 155.
- [7] Gerald De Gaury, *Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq’s Monarchy* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 1. Gerald De Gaury spoke fluent Arabic and has published numerous works on the history of the Middle East. His book is written as an eyewitness account and is evidence of his bias towards the Hāshimite Dynasty; in the book’s foreword, De Gaury writes that “History will amply prove, if it has not done so already, that the country [Iraq] was happier and better ruled in their day than it has been since the revolution.” See also Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 16.
- [8] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 10.
- [9] See Richard L. Jasse, “The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?” *Middle Eastern Studies* 27 (1991): 140-141, accessed January 12, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283420>.
- [10] Jasse, “The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?” 140-141, 143, 149; Ara Sanjian, “The formulation of the Baghdad Pact,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 33 (1997), accessed July 19, 2016, doi: 10.1080/00263209708701153.
- [11] Sanjian, “The formulation of the Baghdad Pact,” 226-227.
- [12] *Ibid.*, 234.
- [13] Scholar Ara Sanjian states that “Iraq’s membership eventually came to be seen as a burden by other members in the pact and her withdrawal after the 1958 revolution was not much regretted.” See Sanjian, “The formulation of the Baghdad Pact,” 260.
- [14] See Jasse, “The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?” for more on the specific conditions of the Baghdad Pact.
- [15] It would seem for every gain Iraq made from the pact, it was actually Britain that truly profited. For example, “His Majesty’s Government would make payment of £2,755M to Iraq for this property in return for Baghdad’s promise to spend £2M in purchasing arms from Britain.” See Jasse, “The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?” 141, 151, 153; Sanjian, “The formulation of the Baghdad Pact,” 260.
- [16] “A survey of the Baath Party’s struggle 1947-1974,” 1974, *Internet Archive*, archived March 27 2008, accessed December 1 2015, <https://archive.org/details/ASurveyOfTheBaathPartys-Struggle1947-1974>, 24.
- [17] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 11.
- [18] *Ibid.*, 12.
- [19] *Ibid.*
- [20] As Eppel notes, the title *effendi* can be used to describe many different people. “Was a merchant from the market, who had studied for a year in the first grade of a modern elementary school and had replaced his galabiyya with afaranji suit, also entitled to that title [*effendi*]? According to the concepts and customs of society in Baghdad and Mosul, and even in Nablus and Jerusalem, such a person could at times consider himself to be an *effendi*, and good manners dictated that, in such a case, he be addressed by that title.” See Michael Eppel, “The Elite, the *Effendiyya*, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30 (1998): 228-230, accessed January 12, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/164701>.
- [21] *Effendiyya* is the plural; *effendi* is the singular. See Eppel, “The Elite, the *Effendiyya*, and the Growth of Nationalism,” 228-237.
- [22] Eppel, “The Elite, the *Effendiyya*, and the Growth of Nationalism, 1921-1958,” 234.
- [23] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 154. The apparent lack of diversity within the Free Officers’ Movement suggests that it cannot be considered representative of the Iraqi populace as a whole, something that diminishes its rumoured reputation as a “true” revolution.
- [24] *Ibid.*, 154.
- [25] *Ibid.*, 153.
- [26] *Ibid.*, 153-155.
- [27] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 21. Qāsim made numerous attempts to “legitimize” both his rule and his regime. His efforts are discussed in detail later in this paper.
- [28] Dann notes that the parallels between Qāsim’s and Nasser’s education and military career are uncanny. See Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 21-22.
- [29] Not to be confused with ‘Abd al-Salām ‘Ārif or ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Ārif. To avoid confusion, General Ismail Al-Arif will henceforth be referred to as “General Al-Arif.” General Al-Arif was born in Baghdad in 1919. “He graduated from the Iraqi Military Academy in 1939 and later from the Corps of Engineers College and the General Staff College,” having attained a B.A. in Law and a Ph.D. in International Relations. He was the Minister of Education in the first Iraqi Republic. See Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 34; Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 22.
- [30] Marr warns researchers of the flaws of *Iraq Reborn* in her review of the book. See Phebe Marr, Review of “Iraq: The Contemporary State; *Iraq Reborn*,” *Middle East Journal* 38 (1984), accessed January 12, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/helicon.vuw.ac.nz/>

stable/4326803.

[31] Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 45-46.

[32] *Ibid.*, 46.

[33] Eric Davis, *Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq* (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 117, accessed January 15, 2016, https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=4qRW5KpgDM4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

[34] Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 45-46.

[35] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 19; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 155-156.

[36] "Report of the Hungarian Ambassador in Baghdad on the preparations for the Iraqi revolution in 1958," December 18, 1958, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive*, translated by András Bocz, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122512>, 2-3.

[37] While such tactics can be considered "natural" in such situations as these, and should therefore not be unexpected, the very fact that such an important group within Iraqi society needed to be "convinced" to revolt suggests that the "need" for revolution was not so obvious to all. See Chris Sibilla, "The Iraqi Revolution – of 1958," part of: "Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History," *Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST)*, July, 2014, <http://adst.org/2014/07/the-iraqi-revolution-of-1958/>.

[38] This supports Marr's description of the Revolution as "unorganized." However, the aforementioned efforts of the Iraqi Communist Party suggest otherwise. See Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 155; "Report of the Hungarian Ambassador in Baghdad," 3.

[39] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 28-29; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 156.

[40] Qāsim's relatively late arrival "gave color to suspicions that he was waiting to see if the coup would succeed before advancing." See Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 157.

[41] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 29-30.

[42] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 156; "Report of the Hungarian Ambassador in Baghdad," 4; Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 30-31. Interestingly, this announcement was broadcast prematurely, before the royal family had been executed, indicating that Ārif at least was confident of success.

[43] The situation was not as dire as the Crown Prince presumed. As Marr notes, "Had the crack royal brigade resisted, the revolt might have been put down then and there. As it was, reinforcements among the Free Officers were needed to take the palace." See Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 156; Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 30-31; Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 58-60; Davis, *Memories of State*, 109.

[44] Given that General Al-Arif stands alone in his assertion, it can be assumed that he has attempted to justify the murder of the royal family by fabricating their supposed "resistance." This throws his "firsthand account" into disrepute. See Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 60.

[45] De Gaury, *Three Kings in Baghdad*, 194; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 156-157; Davis, *Memories of State*, 109.

[46] The Crown Prince's body was reportedly hung outside the Ministry of Defense, the location of Qāsim's new headquarters. See De Gaury, *Three Kings in Baghdad*, 195; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 157.

[47] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 157; Davis, *Memories of State*, 109; De Gaury, *Three Kings in Baghdad*, 196-197.

[48] De Gaury, *Three Kings in Baghdad*, 196-197; Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 157.

[49] "The Historical-Extempore Speech by Our Sole Leader Major-General Abdul Karim Qassim at The Reserve-Officers' College," 1959, *Internet Archive*, archived September 20 2011, accessed December 1 2015, <https://archive.org/details/TheHistoricalExtemporeSpeechAtTheReserveOfficersCollege>, 4; Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 34.

[50] Davis, *Memories of State*, 109.

[51] Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 65. This contradicts modern accounts of the immediate aftermath of the Revolution; according to Dann, out-of-control mobs looted the royal palaces, attempted to raze the British Embassy, and toppled statues of King Faisal I. Crucially, Jews and Christians were threatened with death. See Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 33-34.

[52] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 157.

[53] "Iraq Bombshell," *British Pathé News* video, 1:46, July 17, 1958, <http://www.britishpathe.com/video/iraq-bombshell>.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] Sibilla, "The Iraqi Revolution – of 1958"

[56] Several of Qāsim's methods would later be adopted by Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party. See Davis, *Memories of State*, 110.

[57] "The Historical-Extempore Speech by Our Sole Leader Major-General Abdul Karim Qassim at The Reserve-Officers' College," 1959, *Internet Archive*, archived September 20 2011, accessed December 1 2015, <https://archive.org/details/TheHistoricalExtemporeSpeechAtTheReserveOfficersCollege>, 14.

[58] Davis, *Memories of State*, 110-111.

[59] Sāti' Al-Husri, *Muhādarāt fi nushū al-fikrah al-qawmīyah*, 3rd edition, (Beirut: Dār al-'Ilm li-al-Malāyīn, 1956), 26-27, in L. M. Kenny, "Sāti' Al-Husri's Views on Arab Nationalism," *Middle East Journal* 17 (1963): 239, accessed January 28, 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4323606>.

[60] The state emblem also incorporated obvious Soviet iconography, including mechanised gears and a sheaf of wheat. See Davis, *Memories of State*, 111; "The Historical-Extempore Speech by Our Sole Leader Major-General Abdul Karim Qassim at The Reserve-Officers' College," 1959, *Internet Archive*, archived September 20 2011, accessed December 1 2015, <https://archive.org/details/TheHistoricalExtemporeSpeechAtTheReserveOfficersCollege>, 7.

[61] Davis, *Memories of State*, 111.

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] Orit Bashkin, "Hybrid Nationalisms: Watanī and Qawmī Visions in Iraq Under 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, 1958-61," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43 (2011), accessed January 12, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/helicon.vuw.ac.nz/10.1017/>

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[64] Bashkin, “Hybrid Nationalisms,” 294.

[65] Qāsim once declared, “Brother workers! If you wish to stamp out imperialism, you have to exert yourselves to work an extra hour,” a distinctly Soviet slogan. See “Principles of 14th July Revolution,” 1959, *Internet Archive*, archived May 26 2011, accessed December 1 2015, <https://archive.org/details/PrinciplesOf14thJulyRevolutionAFewCollectionsOfTheEpoch-making>, 11-14. See also Bashkin, “Hybrid Nationalisms,” 296.

[66] Bashkin, “Hybrid Nationalisms,” 297-298.

[67] *Ibid.*, 297.

[68] *Ibid.*, 294.

[69] See Kenny, “Sāti’ Al-Husri’s Views on Arab Nationalism” for further reading on the subjects of watanī and qawmī, as detailed in the various works of Al-Husri.

[70] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 158 and “Provisional Constitution of the First Republic of Iraq – 1958,” in Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 102.

[71] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 158.

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] “Action in Middle East: British & U.S. landings nip revolts in bud,” *British Pathé News* video, 3:34, July 21, 1958, <http://www.britishpathe.com/video/action-in-middle-east>.

[britishpathe.com/video/action-in-middle-east](http://www.britishpathe.com/video/action-in-middle-east).

[74] However, while approximately 4.5 million dunams of land had been reassigned by 1963, only about 1.5 million dunams had actually been handed over to the poor. See Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 170-171 and Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 65.

[75] Al-Arif, *Iraq Reborn*, 65.

[76] Housing in the slums of Baghdad, the female condition, education, and the improvement of working conditions were amongst the first issues tackled by Qāsim’s regime. See Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 54-56. See also Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 169-170.

[77] Perhaps, more accurately, Qāsim “fabricated” the illusion of Iraqi identity, given its apparent fragility. See Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 159-160.

[78] Davis, *Memories of State*, 112.

[79] Sibilla, “The Iraqi Revolution – of 1958.”

[80] Davis, *Memories of State*, 113-114.

[81] “A survey of the Baath Party’s struggle 1947-1974,” 30. See also Davis, *Memories of State*, 114.

[82] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 176.

[83] “A survey of the Baath Party’s struggle 1947-1974,” (1974), 30.

THE UNDERDOG STRATEGY

Transatlantic Consistency in French Alliance, 1745-1755

Historical events are often examined in regional vacuums. However, transnational comparisons of events often leads to a more dynamic analysis of any given event. Very broadly, this essay discusses French foreign policy in the mid-eighteenth century. The comparative methodology, juxtaposing French treatment of two traditionally marginalized or undervalued groups, provides greater insight into the cohesiveness of French foreign policy not necessarily apparent when using traditional, regional historical context.

This paper was deemed a winning project at the Vanderbilt Undergraduate Research Fair.

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A battle during the Seven Years' War

Source: *Portraits in Revolution (American Revolution)*

Europe in 1750 was in many ways at the height of its glory days. The Palace of Versailles, outside Paris, stood as a monument to the wealth and power of the monarchy, and cities like Paris and London were experiencing extreme physical and economic growth. The European drive for global colonial development was also characteristic of the Eighteenth Century, with almost every European power expanding their holdings in the New World as well as exploring areas of the Far East. After all, with so much extravagance and development raising costs in Europe, competition for territory and economic monopoly in new, exploitable lands became an essential facet of the eighteenth century world. France, in particular, stood as the height of

Continental glamour, wealth, and power, unaware that later decades would completely topple its powerful monarchy. A great deal of their power came from the strong strategic alliances she built to stabilize her place within the large and complicated European balance of power. Despite France's domestic prosperity, though, her colonies struggled to maintain their hold over the areas long-claimed for France. Facing increased competition with the British in the New World, France sought alliances with powerful native tribes in order to bolster her control of New France.

Traditional spheres of historical study, particularly those focused on the early modern world, have examined in great de-

in North America “not for a short-term settlement but for a sovereign state projected far into the future.”² Colonial officials attempted to recreate British life in the New World by developing community structures like stratified social classes and the traditional judicial system.³

haut and the Ohio Valley, they did not necessarily agree on the appropriate way to protect their North American holdings, which had direct effects on French preparedness for escalating tensions in the region.

“Hegemony in the New World, [the French Continentalist thinkers] argued, would come as the result of European-based military and diplomatic maneuvers.”

The French, on the other hand, were faced with a more desolate colonization process. New France was comprised of much less hospitable land to the northwest of the British colonies, like Canada and the Great Lakes. While French land did extend into fertile lands in the south, large scale agricultural production was much less viable in much of New France. Instead, French colonists worked largely as fur trappers, exporting their goods back to France through Quebec and New Orleans.⁴ Most importantly, the British had densely settled their land on the eastern seaboard of the New World. On the other hand, while the French retained influence over a great deal of land, French settlements were small and far from each other.⁵ The shortage of stable French communities encouraged colonists to consistently interact with Native American communities. By closely involving themselves with Native American tribes on a personal as well as economic level, many French established lasting ties to the communities and grew to understand the people which with they worked very well.⁶ Nonetheless, the lack of sufficiently spreading and growing French communities to rival Britain’s colonies became a substantial disadvantage for the French in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

WHY NORTH AMERICA?

Throughout the eighteenth century, France persisted in its attempts to grow its colonial holdings in the region by both holding physical territory and developing stable communities. Given France’s comparatively weak position in North America, this policy goal created confusion among contemporaries, who, to use Voltaire’s famous quote, imagined Canada and the Northwest Territories—called the *pays d’en haut*—to be solely “a few acres of snow.”⁷ Compared to French islands in the Caribbean like Haiti and France’s holdings along the Mississippi, including the developing city of New Orleans, the northern parts of North America were largely inhospitable to agriculture and colonists alike.⁸ Yet, many French policymakers did consider France’s northern territories to be strategically significant in the grand scheme of the nation’s fight against Great British preeminence in the New World. Yet, even if French officials could agree that there was a strategic advantage to maintaining the *pays d’en*

THE CARIBBEAN LINK

The *pays d’en haut* were, as Voltaire suggests, often a desolate place, and such a desolate place understandably created skepticism within France and even among colonial officials in the region surrounding the value of holding the territory at all. In the words of La Galissonnière, a French official in the colonies, “Canada, that sterile portion of the New World, and which, costing its possessors enormous expenses, gives them back only furs that they purchase far too dearly,” was not a practical economic investment.⁹ Colonialism in the eighteenth century was a fight for, above all, increased economic power to both fuel domestic prosperity and maintain a favorable place in the “balance of commerce” that influenced the European order.¹⁰ Often, the New World was the perfect solution for many European powers: the land was a source of new agricultural production and, in some regions, allowed for the growth and promulgation of slave labor. As La Galissonnière suggests, the bulk of French profit from its colonies came not from Canada but from the Caribbean, where the sugar trade made islands like Haiti essential to the economic system of the region.¹¹ With such obvious economic incentive lacking in the *pays d’en haut*, maintaining a region that had little to no visible potential to contribute to this long-term goal became difficult to justify.

Regardless, the French did work passionately throughout the mid-eighteenth century to hold its northern territories as the British increasingly fought for influence in the region, as the value of North America lay in its strategic, rather than commercial, significance. The land itself may have been considered worthless, but the British did attempt to move further west from their land into the Ohio Valley, French-influenced territory that bordered the *pays d’en haut*. La Galissonnière makes it clear in his assessment of Canada that because there was no agricultural or other economic incentive for the British to look towards the *pays d’en haut*, he believed their interest in the territory must have been strategic.¹² Indeed, French territory was optimally situated around the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, which flowed to New Orleans and the profitable Caribbean, and the Great Lakes, leading to the St. Lawrence river and the Atlantic. The Great Lakes region and the Ohio

The Underdog Strategy

Valley were therefore the quickest and most efficient means of both transportation and communication between Canada and Louisiana.¹³ With the British having colonized the east coast and looking to move westward and the Spanish holding land along the Gulf of Mexico south into Latin America, France found itself caught between two major European rivals looking for imperial predominance. The French were convinced, then, that the British were attempting to expand westward not for economic or agricultural reasons, but as a means of blocking access to France's holdings in the south.¹⁴ To allow a foreign power like Great Britain to control the middle of the American territories would be detrimental to French cohesion and efficiency in the region.

THE EUROCENTRIC STRATEGY OPTION

Even with the strategic significance of the North American wilderness established, many in France encouraged the government to remain focused not on its conflicts in New France, but on its relationships with other continental European powers. To be sure, French holdings in North America were threatened by British claims to unsettled land, but 'Continentalist' thinkers within France remained convinced that New France was only a small piece of an international diplomatic policy created and maintained in Europe.¹⁵ Hegemony in the New World, they argued, would come as the result of European-based military and diplomatic maneuvers.

While there were certainly powerful advisors in France who advocated for a more hands-on approach in New France, understanding the influence of the Continentalists in France is key to understanding the French mentality towards the New World. For example, one of France's biggest rivals in European sphere was the Austrian Empire which, while lacking overseas colonies compared to France, Britain, Spain, or the Netherlands, held a great amount of land in continental Europe as well as an influential amount of diplomatic prowess. Austria and Spain maintained a strong alliance through their common Habsburg family ties. Britain and the Netherlands also had their own defensive alliance, while France had been allied with Prussia since 1741.¹⁶ Prussia, though, lacked colonies in the New World, meaning that France stood alone among the European powers of the New World. Even more threatening, their territory in the New World was increasingly surrounded by Spain and Britain. Continentalist thinkers therefore proposed that, to avoid losing their piece of the New World, the French should dismantle these alliances in Europe or, at least, create neutrality before their impending conflict with the British.

French proponents of a Eurocentric foreign policy made their case even as it pertained to North American territories. While the developing conflict itself was in the New World, the players that would actually decide the issues of sovereignty and boundaries at hand remained in the Old World. To abandon continental foreign policy in favor of focusing on the New World would, some argued, alienate the very

powers that would help France maintain its power and sovereignty both in Europe and abroad. In particular, the Dutch, who were traditional allies of the British, could tip a Franco-British struggle in favor of the British, so currying their favor and attempting to ensure their neutrality in an impending military clash could save France's contested holdings.¹⁷

NATIVE AMERICAN ALLIANCES

Whether or not more French ministers and advisors valued connections on the Continent over those in the New World, colonial officials did pursue strong alliances with Algonquin-speaking tribes in the *pays den haut* and the Ohio Valley. The history of this relationship with Native Americans in the northern regions of the New World is a complex one. Over the course of their decades-long alliance, the French and Native American cultures blended and evolved together. Neither culture completely absorbed the other, yet mutually developed practices became intrinsic to both communities.¹⁸ Creating such culture was not easy or immediate; the cultural differences on subjects so important as land ownership and leadership complicated both groups' ability to maintain fluid integration of two very disparate cultures. The French sought, above all else, order and rationality in the Native American way of life, whereas the Native Americans aimed to "[knock] the order off balance, from asserting the personal, the human exception."¹⁹ Gradually, the two sides were able to establish enough common goals and perspectives to allow for successful interaction. The French then began the delicate task of maintaining the allegiance of the Algonquin—many of whom the French feared would attempt to ally with either the British-allied Iroquois Confederacy or other tribes to the west—without offending the authority of their leaders.²⁰ In 1671, the French did claim the Algonquin territory as a subject nation of France, but this declaration was largely symbolic; Native American tribes still retained a great deal of power over the French because of their influence over and knowledge of the land in which the French traded.²¹ What developed over the next century, then, was more akin to partnership than the conquering the French crown had anticipated in 1671.

Confronted with the economic incentive for heightened trade that the Europeans brought, though, Native American tribes—particularly the Algonquin and the Iroquois—quickly adjusted to the new realities of their world. Tribes began to migrate seasonally in order to harvest marketable resources as varied as furs and maple sugar.²² This practice created a new aspect of Native American society in which "trade both defined the political economy of Native people in the western interior and created a social world where trade, diplomacy, peace, and warfare were deeply intertwined."²³ While Native American tribes assuredly did not assimilate into European society, they did learn to play by Europe's rules in the interest of economic prosperity.



Conference between the French and Indian Leaders around a Ceremonial Fire by Vernier (c. 1887)

Source: *Emile Louis Vernier* (Commons Wikimedia)

Trading partnerships quickly laid the groundwork for a new kind of relationship between Native tribes and the European colonizers. Over time, and with the battle for colonial territory intensifying, Native American tribes became a welcome military ally for both the French or British against the other.²⁴ French strategy towards Native Americans is fairly simply summarized: they were the lesser of two evils, worth aiding to the benefit of the French, and then easily silenced after a French victory over the British. The French worked, then, to create and strengthen more alliances with Native Americans than their British counterparts by creating closer economic ties to various tribes. Of course, the British maintained a long-standing alliance with the Iroquois Confederacy in the East, a powerful network of tribes that were essential to British predominance in the region. Partly in fear of the influence the Iroquois Confederacy could have on potential Algonquin allies, the French worked closely with tribes in the *pays d'en haut* to create a network to rival the British and Iroquois to the east.²⁵ Scholar Richard White calls this delicate alliance the Middle Ground: a “common conception of suitable ways of acting” by which both French and Indian actors were willing to adhere.²⁶ The cornerstone of this Middle Ground was its diplomatic foundations; neither the French nor the Native Americans could use force to manipulate the other side and still retain their important relationship, so a standard of cooperation naturally developed.²⁷

WAR

This precarious balance was thrown into disarray in 1750, when traditional alliances were challenged as both empires vied for control of the Ohio River Valley, the key territorial connector between New France and the British colonies. Put very simply, the French felt, somewhat justifiably, that their Middle Ground was being threatened by British expansion of its territories and Native American alliances, and control of the Ohio Valley would create a larger buffer between the strategically important French lands and the British territories. In the late 1740s, some of France’s Algonquin allies had begun to trade with the British, much to France’s dismay. The French officials in the colonies, desperate to maintain control over their established trading relationships, responded with “dictation and subordination,” further offending and alienating their Algonquin allies.²⁸ Trade with the British continued, and the French feared that the British would only continue to gain power in the French sphere of influence. After their harsher tactics for bringing the Native Americans back into the fold failed, the French did work to win back Native American favor by reforming parts of the fur trade, but their traditional alliances still remained more precarious than before.²⁹ Fueled by France’s continual fears of territorial and economic loss, tensions between the British and the French in the region intensified. By the early 1750s, both sides were convinced that the fight for the Ohio Valley would



The Battle of Culloden (1746)

Source: David Morier, oil on canvas (*The British Museum*)

determine the outcome of their entire colonial struggle in the New World.³⁰ It was under this pretension that the French ultimately took violent action against their rivals.

The French started a series of minor attacks as early as 1751 after demanding the expulsion of British traders from the Ohio Valley territories in which they had traditionally had a trading monopoly. When the British failed to leave their trading posts, the French began to conduct a series of raids against their villages in cooperation with some Native American allies.³¹ These aggressions continued until 1753, with the French gradually claiming land in the Ohio Valley. However, it was not until 1753 that the British colonists began to politically react to the threat by the French by requesting and subsequently sending British troops into the territory to respond to French aggression.³² Thus began the French and Indian War, which would evolve into the international Seven Years' War.

THE JACOBITE ALLIANCE

The Europe of the eighteenth century was in a near-consistent state of war, giving France many opportunities to create and break alliances with various other actors. In particular, France's strategy in the New World bears striking similarities to its strategy regarding Britain during the War of Austrian Succession in the 1740s. The War of Austrian succession

brought Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and Prussia together on the European stage, with the French facing off against the British.

Meanwhile, and seemingly insignificantly, the French created an alliance with the rebel Jacobite forces in Scotland in 1745. The Jacobite cause dates to 1688, when the Glorious Revolution overthrew King James II in favor of the Protestant, Hanoverian King William III. The Glorious Revolution is a well-known piece of British history, often presented—as the name suggests—as an important and positive change in the British monarchy. Lesser known is the resistance movement that followed 1688; Scottish supporters of the exiled King James II continued to plot the overthrow of the “foreign usurper.”³³ In fact, James Stuart, son of the exiled King, attempted an overthrow of the British monarchy in 1715, with disastrous results; the conflict is largely seen as a pathetic domestic uprising rather than a legitimate invasion or civil war. Notably, the French provided aid in 1715 and were soundly defeated by British troops.³⁴ Their abject failure understandably undermined the legitimacy of the Jacobite cause.

In the years following the uprising of 1715, the Jacobite network in Europe grew weaker and weaker. King James III fled to Rome under the protection of the Pope, and his followers found themselves dispersed across France and Italy with

few means of communication that could allow for the planning of another rebellion.³⁵ Those Jacobites who were able to maintain a life in larger cities like Paris integrated themselves in European society, but some argue that their social connections did not benefit their cause. Instead, while Scots often became leaders in Enlightenment thinking, they held little political power.³⁶ Gradually, the Jacobite cause faded from the forefront of European affairs.

Eventually, though, plans for the Rising in 1745, often called The '45, grew in popularity and a new generation of Jacobite supporters began the task of amassing political power in Europe. The '45 stands apart from earlier Jacobite resistance due to its relative success and the serious threat it's success could have posed to the British Monarchy. It seems ludicrous to imagine that a long-ousted King could feasibly challenge one of the most powerful Empires of the age and win. Yet, the Jacobites saw a strong start to their rebellion and were able to conquer all of Scotland and a great deal of Northern England before they were finally defeated. The British, distracted by their colonial pursuits, had failed to seriously consider the possibility of mutiny in their own backyards.³⁷ It is in this context that the Jacobite movement garnered international interest in Europe and the French were once again persuaded to work with the Jacobite forces. With the Jacobites determined as ever to invade a distracted Britain, a French alliance with the Jacobites appeared a strategically sensible deal to make.

Given France's prior history with Jacobite alliances and the general weakness of the Jacobite network in Europe, it took years to persuade the French to ally themselves with the Jacobites. After more than a year of communication and demurring, King Louis XV signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau with Prince Charles Edward Stuart in October of 1745, pledging support to the Jacobite cause.³⁸ France's hesitation regarding an alliance with the Jacobite forces was not without reason; they were a small, often disparate group of rebels looking to challenge a world power. Yet, France was ultimately willing to establish ties with them.

TRANSATLANTIC POLICY CONNECTIONS

French alliances with Native American tribes and with the Jacobites may appear unrelated at first glance. Traditional historical disciplines often examine the colonial world in a vacuum, despite the fact that the New World was controlled by the same powers that were in conflict in Europe. When a transnational lens is applied to colonial strategy, a number of consistencies in diplomatic philosophy emerge. Comparing French perspectives on different conflicts across the Atlantic creates a more thorough and overarching picture of French foreign policy strategy.

The term "proxy war," while traditionally used in the context of the Cold War, aptly describes France's actions in regards to their Algonquin allies. However, this strategy in the

New World is not an isolated strategy even in terms of its eighteenth century policy; transcontinental comparisons between the French and Indian war and other lower-profile conflicts in the eighteenth century reveal that French strategy towards Native Americans parallels the approach taken towards other low-profile groups during the same century. Importantly, these comparisons show a lack of French motivation to completely eliminate their rival, Great Britain. Instead, French writings from the time show a concern for maintaining the European balance of power.

CONSISTENCY IN STRATEGY TOWARDS ALLIANCE

Letters sent between French policy makers regarding Native American alliance bear a similarity to those sent regarding the Jacobite forces when examined in the context of France's goals for the alliances. Looking basically at official correspondence, the very language used in regards to Native American or Jacobite forces is similar. The French routinely referred to Native Americans as "sauvages," or savages, the connotations of which carry derogatory implications about the French view of their allies.³⁹ This, combined with the fact that La Jonquiere's 1753 letter to the French ministry makes it clear that the Native Americans are being used as a proxy force to "drive the English from the [Ohio] river" and challenge the British in disputed territory, shows the inequality in the Franco-Native American relationship. The French were willing to partner with Native Americans, to their benefit, but the fact that the French referred to their allies as savages indicates that their alliance certainly was not one between equal parties.

Interestingly, the French took a similar perspective on the Jacobites. Wholly different in background from the Native Americans, the Jacobites were led by royalty and were largely European, often aristocratic men. Negotiations surrounding the Jacobite cause involved the King of France himself and the royal members of the House of Stuart. Yet, the French routinely referred to the Jacobites as "les Pretendants" and to Prince Charles Stuart as "le Pretendant," meaning "the Pretender."⁴⁰ While this term was widely used in Britain to undermine the Jacobite cause, the French also used this derogatory term to describe their treaty-bound allies. Such a term automatically enforces France's acknowledgement that King James III and his son were not actually legitimate heirs to the British throne. The French were simply willing to use the Jacobite cause as a pretension for an invasion of Britain, this time not even seeing the need for direct military action.

Other comparisons between Franco-Native American alliances and the Jacobite treaty come through French treatment of Native Americans as a legitimate political actor. While Native American tribes were substantially more organized than the Jacobites, the French saw them as "sauvages," a weaker power, easily manipulated by the French and with no chance of defeating the two major European forces with which they had allied; by no means did the French view the Algonquin

The Underdog Strategy

tribes as equal to European powers.⁴¹ With such a negative perception of Native Americans, the French had precedent, as many European countries did in colonized territories, to simply conquer the native people and take the land as their own. Yet, despite their diminutive view of native tribes, the French established formal alliances with Algonquin tribes, working with their chiefs and often negotiating terms of their economic interactions, as in the case of the fur trade negotiations before the Seven Years' War.⁴² The French thereby demonstrated some political need for the Algonquin tribes as separate actors in the New World, rather than as complete subordinates. In Europe and in the New World, then, the French sought out and agreed to partner with forces they thought would be easily manipulated to French advantage.

By allowing the Native American tribes to maintain some degree of autonomy, the French were able to use their allies as proxy forces against the British. While the French conducted their own military raids against British trading villages in the Ohio Valley, they encouraged native tribes to take matters into their own hands. Given the potentially incendiary nature of their actions, though, the French had little patience for what they perceived as Native American weakness against the increased British presence in the area. In a 1753 letter to Paris reporting on the state of affairs in New France as France attempted to maintain and grow their hold in the Ohio Valley, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, a high-ranking diplomatic official in New France, talks about his plan to "drive the English from the [Ohio] river and punish the Savages who let them win."⁴³ La Jonquiere references the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, after which the British began a more active trading relationship with Native Americans in the Ohio Valley, but denies that the treaty allowed the British any claims to sovereignty in the area.⁴⁴ From the French perspective, though, Native American cooperation with the British encouraged British settlement in their territory and was unacceptable from an Algonquin tribe meant to be their longstanding ally.

La Jonquiere goes on to discuss an upcoming meeting between the French and the Native Americans in which tribes would be given "their orders and instructions."⁴⁵ He makes it clear that there will be no discussion of strategy, but that the Native Americans will receive their orders from the French and be expected to act accordingly; he likewise exhibits no doubt about whether the Native Americans would agree to follow French orders, despite their earlier "failures," or, more likely, apathy towards the growing French paranoia.⁴⁶ From the perspective of the French officials, then, the Native Americans are subordinate soldiers, rather than strategic allies, regardless of their official autonomy from French command.

Importantly, the French did not change their orders to their Native American allies after commanding that they drive the British from the Ohio River. They instead remained content to allow their Native American allies to conduct raids against British traders, and it was in fact the British that escalated the conflict, starting the official French and Indian War.⁴⁷ French letters from Duquesne to the French Ministry suggest that they simply wanted to expel the British from the Ohio Valley and, by extent, prevent them from moving into the strategically valuable *pays den haut*.⁴⁸ In this sense, the French were simply looking to maintain a balance they had long maintained in the New World, and they were relying on their Native American allies to do so.

This strategy towards their possessions in the New World mirrors French strategy in Europe surrounding the Jacobite rebellion. France never sent troops to Britain to support the Jacobite forces, and political correspondence from the time suggests that this decision derived from the same concern for maintaining a balance of power rather than gaining true advantage over the British. The French had signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau in October of 1745, and some French soldiers had already volunteered to assist the Jacobite cause in Scotland. At the same time, the War of Austrian Succession raged on and France and Britain remained locked in conflict. Just weeks after the treaty was signed, though, the French gained an upper hand over Britain in Flanders. Letters between ministers suggest that the French abandoned their plans to invade after their victory in Flanders.⁴⁹ With the British checked but not outright defeated, the French were content to continue the status quo and maintain the delicate balance of imperial power that so characterized the eighteenth century, just as they would in the New World ten years later.

Comparative examination of both conflicts allows for the construction of some common thread in French foreign policy towards smaller political forces during the eighteenth century. Where both Native American tribes and the Jacobite rebels were concerned, the French decided to manipulate their smaller allies into proxy aggressors against the British whenever they felt that their strategic position was weakened. In the case of the Jacobites, they withdrew their support when they once again felt they had the upper hand; they never completely followed through on their challenge. In the case of the Native Americans, the French attempted to use a proxy force to maintain an extension of the same traditional alliance when they felt it had become too precarious. The language of the French communication on both subjects suggests that their support for either cause was only a means of maintaining the delicate balance they had with the British throughout the century. 

Endnotes

- [1] Two terms are used throughout this paper to identify different iterations of the same conflict. The Seven Years' War refers to the international conflict between powers once it reached the European stage, while the French and Indian War refers to the specific piece of that war fought between the French and British with their respective Native American allies in the New World.
- [2] Vera Keller, "The 'Framing of a New World': Sir Balthazar Gerbier's 'Project for Establishing a New State in America,'" *William and Mary Quarterly* 70.1 (2013): 152.
- [3] Ibid.
- [4] Michael Witgen, "The Native New World and Western North America," *The Western Historical Quarterly* 43.3 (2012): 294.
- [5] Catherine M. Desbarats, "The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric," 610.
- [6] For more details on the French and Native American alliance, see Section Four.
- [7] Voltaire, *Candidte* (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1918) in Project Gutenberg, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19942/19942-h/19942-h.htm>.
- [8] John Shovlin, "Selling American Empire on the Eve of the Seven Years War: The French Propaganda Campaign of 1755-1756," *Past and Present* 206.1 (2010): 131.
- [9] Shovlin "Selling America," 131.
- [10] Ibid.
- [11] Witgen, "The Native New World," 296-297.
- [12] Ibid.
- [13] Avril 1753 "Resumé des dépêches de Marquis de la Jonquière au Ministre" p. 229, image 683, published in the file "Nouvelle France: Correspondance Officielle," in the *Library and Archives of Canada*.
- [14] Shovlin, "Selling America," 132.
- [15] Ibid., 124-125.
- [16] Ibid.
- [17] Ibid., 124.
- [18] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in The Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 50.
- [19] White, *The Middle Ground*, 50-55, with citations from Roy Wagner, *The Invention of Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), presents a thorough description of the complexities of creating this new cooperation between the French and the Native Americans.
- [20] Witgen, "The Native New World," 296-297.
- [21] Ibid.
- [22] Ibid., 295.
- [23] Ibid.
- [24] Desbarats, "The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances," 609.
- [25] Witgen, "The Native New World," 296-297.
- [26] White, *The Middle Ground*, 50.
- [27] Ibid., 52.
- [28] Ibid., 206-207.
- [29] Ibid.
- [30] Ibid., 223.
- [31] Ibid., 233-234.
- [32] Ibid., 234-235.
- [33] James Stuart, "His Majesty's Most Gracious Declaration," (speech, Rome, December 1743).
- [34] Frank L. McLynn, *France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1981), 94.
- [35] Daniel Szechi, "Cam Ye O'er Frae France? Exile and the Mind of Scottish Jacobitism, 1716-1727," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 30.4 (1997): 372.
- [36] Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, "Une élite insulaire au service de l'Europe: les jacobites au XVIIIe siècle," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 28.5 (1973): 1114.
- [37] Geoffrey G. Plank, *Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
- [38] "Treaty of Fontainebleau," printed in Frank L. McLynn, *France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1981), 239-240.
- [39] "Resumé des dépêches de Marquis de la Jonquière au Ministre."
- [40] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris: Archives Etrangères, Mémoires et Documents, Angleterre, vols 52-54, 75-93.
- [41] "Resumé des dépêches de Marquis de la Jonquière au Ministre," 229.
- [42] Witgen, "The Native New World," 296-297.
- [43] "Resumé des dépêches de Marquis de la Jonquière au Ministre," 229.
- [44] Ibid.
- [45] Ibid.
- [46] Ibid.
- [47] White, *The Middle Ground*.
- [48] Lettre de M. Duquesne au Ministre, 20 Août 1753
- [49] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris: Archives Etrangères, Mémoires et Documents, Angleterre, vols 52-54, 75-93.



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