

Vanderbilt Historical Review

An Undergraduate Research Journal

FALL 2023 – SPRING 2024



ISSUE VIII

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

DEAR READER,

It is with warm excitement and pleasure to release *Vanderbilt Historical Review's* 100th Author Publication Celebration Edition for our 2023-2024 Issue. Better yet, we are publishing our largest issue to date. These two institutional milestones represent *VHR's* dedicated effort to champion, promote, and uplift the works of excellent undergraduates of history.

When making the decision to mark a celebration for this Issue, it transpired from the belief of *Vanderbilt Historical Review's* core tenet: our dutiful commitment to those who write and engage in the challenging yet rewarding task of history in the pages of this journal — our authors of the past, present, and future.

We commit to our authors in this way because we firmly believe in the astronomical impact history holds in our lives and around the world. Our founder, Robert Yee, puts it best in his Letter from the Fall of 2016: "Everything we say, think, or do affects the historical record. Ultimately, we are the writers and makers of our own history."

Yee's advice to us all is ever more important in today's international battle with historical scholarship and historical narratives. Spanning from the debates in U.S. classrooms to the decrees of the current Russian Federation, it is clear that history is becoming a double-edged sword that has the power to either enlighten or extinguish the narrative of human history.

As undergraduate students, and perhaps future historians, we play an indispensable role in equipping ourselves with the tools of history for the better.

Well then, what does it mean to equip ourselves? It is making a personal commitment to critically challenge our understanding of historical figures, periods, and regions through new — and accurate — lenses. Broadening our understanding of the nation and the human experience from a unit basis to a transnational perspective is one crucial way to prepare ourselves for the evolving world.

It would be an understatement to say that this 2023-2024 Issue sufficiently rises to this call of historical writing.

This is especially the case for The Editor's Pick of this year's issue, *An Speir Bhean (The Spirit Woman) to Ireland: The Forgotten Successes of Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith*, written by Stephanie Harmon Hood, the granddaughter of Jean Kennedy Smith. Stephanie's writing is powerful and admirable, and it is an utmost honor for *Vanderbilt Historical Review* to provide a platform for sharing her grandmother's story.

Additionally, one of the priorities of this year's Issue is recognizing how the Vanderbilt History Department contributes to this necessary historical calling on a professional level. We did so by conducting interviews with Vanderbilt Faculty on their recent historical projects.

Notably, Professor Jefferson Cowie was recently awarded the Pulitzer Prize in History for his book: *Freedom's Dominion: A Saga of White Resistance to Federal Power*. I would like to extend many thanks to Professor Paul A. Kramer, who was the primary inspiration for this initiative, after I took his history course on Writing for Social Change. Kramer's investment in students at Vanderbilt does not go unnoticed, and we want to acknowledge his commitment to the student population through *VHR*.

Because this issue is a celebration, it is also a recognition and continuance of what *VHR* does best historically. We are honoring the 2022-2023 Special Issue in Feminism Topics in History led by Davi Lennon and Desiree Hagg. Specifically, *VHR* is implementing their typesetting font "Mrs. Eaves" as the 'official' go-to *VHR* typesetting font. Robert Lowther and I have continued the new tradition of organizing the pieces thematically in this year's issue: Policy & Presence, Movements & Memory, and Identity & Religion. The Faculty Interviews this year reflect our long-seeded tradition seen in the Summer of 2016 publication of *VHR*. Each year, we continue to award The Editor's Pick as the cover of each year's publication. We hope that when you endeavor on your historical journey within this Issue, you discover and recognize these notable traditions that distinguish and characterize the editorial history of *Vanderbilt Historical Review*. A history that I hope will continue to define and exert influence on the Vanderbilt student

body's contributions to undergraduate historical scholarship in perpetuity.

This all would not have been possible without our intelligent and entrepreneurial Editorial Board, the Vanderbilt History Department, Hayden Davidson, and the advice of Professor Thomas Schwartz and Professor Emily Greble. And this would equally all not have been possible without the many bright minds who were in *VHR* before us. We cannot thank you all enough.

We want to also recognize students listed in this Issue who will be graduating from Vanderbilt this May: Claire Chen, Claire Reber, Alizah Rizvi, Muthoni Kamau, David Mailman, Stephanie Harmon Hood, William O'Neill, & Max Kohn. You will all be missed and I am forever thankful for your contributions to *VHR*.

It is an honor of a lifetime to continue to grow *Vanderbilt Historical Review* as a journal of history and as a student organization, and I will always look back on this moment with extreme joy. I hope that after reading the works of these authors and of our Editorial Team, you too will join me in anticipation of diving into the historical writings of *VHR* that await in our future.

To many more celebrations in *VHR* — Anchor Down!

WARM REGARDS,
William Ledesma
Editor in Chief

ABOUT THE COVER

DEAR READER,

I can hardly express my gratitude to the *Vanderbilt Historical Review* for being the avenue through which the story of Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith, my grandmother, can finally enter the official historical record.

As I learned while researching her tenure as the Ambassador to Ireland, not one scholarly publication has ever included any analysis, however small, of Kennedy Smith's contribution to the Northern Irish peace process. This was quite jarring to me, as I had always heard, from many different people, that she had been deeply involved in peace negotiations. I used a class project as an excuse to look into this discrepancy further, and my research concluded that Kennedy Smith had, indeed, been instrumental in bringing about the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which achieved lasting peace on the island of Ireland. Still, she remains almost entirely absent from the scholarly historical narrative for several sexist reasons.

Thus, my paper is deeply critical of the way the historical narrative is constructed, and in an effort to begin breaking these harmful patterns, the *Vanderbilt Historical Review* has chosen to spotlight *An Speir Bhean*. I hope that Kennedy Smith's story can serve as yet another example of how powerful discrimination (including that based on sexuality, gender identity, race, class, religion, and more) can be in the creation of scholarly histories. I hope that anyone who reads this paper wonders: if the successes of a member of the near infinitely privileged Kennedy clan can be discounted entirely because of her gender, how many other powerhouses of diplomacy, politics,

activism, and history at large have been erased from scholarship?

While my project ended up becoming a much larger commentary on the flawed practice of constructing history, it began as a way to connect with a side of my own grandmother that I had never gotten to know. I was born several years after she returned from Ireland, and she occupied my mind only as Gus, which was my name for her as a baby. To me, Gus' part in the Kennedy family and her exciting stint in Ireland (which I couldn't comprehend in the least) were more like legends in which she was a character, and I was content to enjoy her role as fairy grandmother. Just like the *New York Times* said of her during her ambassadorship, Gus occupied that role with "zeal."¹

When Gus passed away in 2020, my job in preparing for the funeral was to collect photographs of her for a slideshow at the wake. As I gathered photo after photo, a quilt of her life began to take form in my mind that had never before existed with such range and concreteness. It is because of this experience collecting photographs of Kennedy Smith that I know the power of images to bring someone's life into more complete relief. As my paper discusses, historians have reduced my grandmother, and many other people like her (particularly women), to one facet of their identity, and *VHR* has chosen a wide range of photos of Kennedy Smith for their covers to reflect her wholeness.

The front cover image and the central image on the back cover, in my mind, are excellent bookends to this issue of

¹ "Jean Kennedy Smith's Excessive Zeal," *New York Times Late Edition (East Coast)*, March 9, 1996, ProQuest Central.

the review. As the two black and white photographs of the bunch, they stand out as a set and together, they represent the 'before' of Kennedy Smith's diplomatic life. My mother, Amanda, suspects that the back photograph of my grandmother as a child was taken in the first few years of the 1930s when she was around four years old. The front image, which was graciously provided by the JFK Audiovisual Archives, was taken in 1965, nearly three decades before she would get a chance to make a name for herself politically, and it exemplifies her iconic "Kennedy sister look."² While *An Speir Bhean's* main focus is to distinguish Kennedy Smith from her siblings in scholarship, these photos balance that narrative by simultaneously emphasizing her individuality and calling to mind her inherited place in the set of siblings she was so proud to be a part of.

The top photo on the back cover is the most tightly connected to the topic of *An Speir Bhean*. It was taken in the last few years of Ambassador Kennedy Smith's life when she invited members of the Wexford County Council, Eamonn Hore and Tony and Gemma Dempsey, to join her for a meal at her home in New York City. Kennedy Smith was a very proud descendant of immigrants from County Wexford, and the council members kindly brought her a Gaelic Football jersey for the county's team. I was told that she put it on the minute she received it and refused to take it off for the remainder of their visit, which stuck in the minds of those present. In the background of the photograph, you can see a photo of her siblings, which filled every surface of her home, and a picture of my aunt, Kym, hanging on the wall. This

one image combines many of Kennedy Smith's great passions in her life: the Irish people, the family she came from, and the family she created.

The last image is, naturally, my favorite of them all. This is one of the photos of Gus in my own family's home, and it shows my grandmother and me in front of her yellow house (which is mentioned in *An Speir Bhean* as the place the gifted Lough Gur sign found its home) on some anonymous summer day in the 2000s. I am glad that *VHR* decided to include this casual family photo on their back cover because it drives home a message that underlies any discussion of a historical figure. My grandmother, like any other character in history, was a complete human being with loved ones and passions outside of her historically significant ones. Ambassador Kennedy Smith is finally getting some recognition for her historical contributions through this publication, and I think it is only fitting that the other areas in which she excelled get some attention, as well. She was an outstanding negotiator, diplomat, and philanthropist, but she was also a beautiful woman, sister, and grandmother.

I give my sincere and lasting gratitude to the *Vanderbilt Historical Review* for finally presenting Jean Kennedy Smith in a more well-rounded way than ever before. I also thank you, the reader, for taking the time to learn about the Ambassador's forgotten, but formidable, contributions to lasting peace. Gus, I'm certain, would be thrilled.

WARMLY,
Stephanie Harmon Hood

² Arthur Stettner / John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

ABOUT THE ISSUE

DEAR READER,

History is a form of story-telling. The grand narratives of the past can transport one to the temples of Ancient Egypt, the streets of revolutionary France, the double-hulled canoes of Polynesian explorers, and far, far beyond. It is important to remember, though, that these histories are not objective. The act of historical writing requires the interpretation of evidence, an inherently subjective act.

For too long, humanity's stories have been told primarily by and for those in positions of privilege and power. The neglect of diverse stories and storytellers has left a gap in the tapestry of our history and therefore diluted its substantial power. From the distinctive visions of Afro-Latina mystics in colonial Latin America to the displacement of Indigenous communities in the Pacific Northwest, the essays published in this issue of the *Vanderbilt Historical Review* represent a growing endeavor to center the stories and voices of those who for too long have been forgotten by students of the past.

In this period of great change and instability, one may turn to the past both as a guarantee and as a warning. Humans are capable of overcoming great challenges; we've made it this far. However, the journey to today has been marked almost incessantly by atrocities committed in every part of the world. We in the present have a responsibility to study the past to both confront the structures of injustice and to seed the growth of the future.

Therefore, as you read this issue, I ask you to celebrate the hard-earned successes of those in our collective past in addition to recognizing its uncomfortable realities. In doing so, one is reminded that progress is something not only possible but something that has happened before. It is an ongoing process, and one well worth pursuing. We have curated a selection of pieces meant to highlight just this.

WISHING YOU HAPPY READING,

Robert Lowther

Managing Editor

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An Speir Bhean (The Spirit Woman) to Ireland

The Forgotten Successes of Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith

As the Troubles raged on, President Bill Clinton appointed Jean Kennedy Smith as the U.S. Ambassador to Ireland, believing she would be well-received as the sister of the beloved President John F. Kennedy. While many feared that Kennedy Smith would be nothing more than an ineffectual socialite-turned-diplomat thrown into the thick of a relentless conflict, she helped achieve lasting peace on the island of Ireland during her tenure through the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. This accomplishment and others earned her many American and Irish accolades and the title of the second most popular woman in Ireland, but despite these commendations and decades of exhaustive analysis of the Kennedy family by historians, Jean Kennedy Smith continues to be excluded from secondary literature surrounding the peace process. This paper illuminates Kennedy Smith's accomplishments and legacy, something no other secondary source has done, with a dual focus, employing newspaper coverage, obituaries, and interviews. At its core, this paper explores how Kennedy Smith expertly leveraged her family name and its privileges and used her female-coded skills, such as entertaining guests and emotional and social expertise, to achieve significant diplomatic success and popularity in Ireland. Intertwined with this investigation is the analysis of Kennedy Smith's story as a case study of women in diplomacy, as the evidence shows that her exclusion from the historical narrative is a direct result of the sexist biases that minimized her talents and consistently attributed her achievements to the men around her.

STEPHANIE
HARMON HOOD
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION¹

On Saint Patrick's Day, 1993, President Bill Clinton announced that he had chosen a nominee for the Ambassador to Ireland from the United States: a woman named Jean Kennedy Smith.² It would not have been a worthwhile piece of news to the public except for two notable factors. First, Ireland, being the tense neighbor of the war-torn Northern Ireland and a close ancestral friend of the United States, was an ambassadorial appointment that many Irish-Americans and other peace-hungry spectators were watching closely. The U.S. had a long and varied history of involvement in the Northern Irish peace process, and the Irish Ambassador was undeniably a part of such contentious facilitation or interference, depending on one's view. Second, Clinton had chosen someone to hold this position who had absolutely no

diplomatic experience or training and who had never held any political office. Her only qualifier, it seemed, was her maiden name: Kennedy.

While Kennedy Smith's appointment was once steeped in nothing but poetry and sentimentality, by the end of her term, her hard work had led to the unprecedented 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which achieved lasting peace on the island of Ireland. Before she could prove herself, however, the rhetoric surrounding her appointment centered on the idea that Clinton had only appointed her because he believed the move would be a sweet and meaningful one to the Kennedys and, by extension, Ireland.³ Certainly, his choice had not been made because of her personal qualifications, but rather because her brother, the influential Senator Ted Kennedy, was apparently owed a Presidential favor.⁴

¹ Please note that I am Ambassador Kennedy Smith's granddaughter. While I am thankful for the unique opportunity this connection has given me to speak with people who directly experienced the events and patterns analyzed in this paper, I also recognize that my relationship to the subject comes with an undeniable bias.

² *ABC Evening News*, "St. Patrick's Day / New York, Ireland Parades / Ambassador To Ireland," delivered by Peter Jennings, aired March 17, 1993, on ABC, transcript, Vanderbilt Television News Archive; *NBC Evening News*, "St. Patrick's Day / New York City, Ireland," delivered by Fred Briggs, Rick Davis and Margaret Larson, aired March 17, 1993, on NBC, transcript, Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

³ Mary McGrory, "Clinton Is Governing with Glee," *Tennessean* (Nashville, TN), March 16, 1993, ProQuest Historical Newspapers; Amanda Smith Hood (daughter of Jean Kennedy Smith) in discussion with the author, September 20, 2023.

⁴ Ruth Dudley Edwards, "Last of JFK's Siblings Leaves a Contentious Legacy Behind in Ireland After Her Death at 92," *Belfast Telegraph*, June 22, 2020, Opinion, <https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/last-of-jfks-siblings-leaves-a-contentious-legacy-behind-in-ireland-after-her-death-at-92/3930372.html>.

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy, another of Jean's brothers, made a historic visit to his ancestral homeland, and she and other family members accompanied him.⁵ Smitten with the island, he promised to return in the springtime.⁶ This visit entered Irish mythology and left her brother as a "virtual saint,"⁷ filling both the family and their nation of origin with enormous pride.⁸ However, just a few months later, President Kennedy was assassinated, leaving the promise unfulfilled. In 1993, thirty years after her brother's legendary visit, Jean returned to the land for which he held the "greatest affection,"⁹ bringing a copy of her nomination ceremony photo that Ted had signed, "For Jean, who is going back in the springtime."¹⁰

With such an emphasis on her family ties and little to bolster an argument of her diplomatic qualifications for the position, it was natural that her tenure was expected to achieve very little beyond a tear-jerking story of family homecoming. It did not seem to count in her favor that she had founded and run Very Special Arts (VSA), an enormously successful international organization that provided arts programs to people with disabilities.¹¹ Newspaper coverage of the Ambassador hardly ever mentioned her or her personal accomplishments without noting her male siblings, implying that her qualifications were derived exclusively from their successes.

Despite her reputation up until that point as the "quiet Kennedy,"¹² Kennedy Smith soon shocked both Ireland and the United Kingdom next door. Her close friend and legendary historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. said of her, "Jean may well be the best politician of all the Kennedys, but she needed

this position to really show that."¹³ To the surprise of all those watching, except, perhaps, those who knew her personally, Kennedy Smith ruffled feathers with what the *New York Times* called her "excessive zeal,"¹⁴ and she caused alarm in Britain for her unconventional methods.¹⁵ Her strategy included befriending the famous nationalist (but non-violent) Northern Irish politician John Hume, as well as President Gerry Adams and General Secretary Rita O'Hare of the Irish republican party Sinn Féin, of which the violent Irish Republican Army (IRA) was an offshoot.¹⁶ Despite their central role in the conflict, Sinn Féin and its representatives had been labeled as terrorists for the IRA's frequent and deadly attacks, and they were subsequently excluded from negotiations by American, British, and Irish diplomats. While one can easily question the morality of her friendship with Adams, this relationship was what allowed Kennedy Smith to feel confident becoming a fervent advocate for the ultimately successful Adams visa,¹⁷ which allowed the Sinn Féin president to visit New York on a 48-hour trip that he called "pivotal" to the achievement of peace.¹⁸

Kennedy Smith became known for her frequent and blatant disobedience of the State Department,¹⁹ but her rebellion earned her accolades both at home and in Ireland: Honorary Irish Citizenship in 1998,²⁰ the Eire Society's Gold Medal Award in 2007,²¹ the Tipperary Peace Prize in 2010 (whose other winners include Nelson Mandela and Bill Clinton),²² and the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest U.S. civilian honor, in 2011.²³ Her friend and champion of the peace process, Father Alec Reid, nicknamed her *An Speir Bhean* ("the spirit woman" and the personification of Ireland)

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- 5 Nadine Brozan, "Chronicle: [1]." *New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast)*, June 25, 1993, ProQuest; Vincent P. Bzdek, "Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK's Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92: She Was the Last of a Generation of Overachieving, Tragedy-Stalked Siblings Whose Influence on American Political Life and Culture Has Surpassed That of Most Any Other Single Family," *The Washington Post (Online)*, June 18, 2020, Local, ProQuest; "Jean Kennedy Smith Offers Credentials as Irish Envoy," *Chicago Tribune* (Chicago, IL), June 25, 1993, News, ProQuest; "Jean Kennedy Smith Takes Post as Ambassador to Ireland," *Chicago Tribune*, June 24, 1993, News, ProQuest.
- 6 Bzdek, "Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK's Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92."
- 7 Robert D. McFadden, "Jean Kennedy Smith Dies at 92; Sister of Famed Clan Helped Forge Peace in Northern Ireland," *New York Times Late Edition (East Coast)*, June 18, 2020, ProQuest, 3.
- 8 Brian Murphy and Donnacha Ó Beacháin, introduction to *From Whence I Came: The Kennedy Legacy, Ireland and America*, ed. Brian Murphy and Donnacha Ó Beacháin (Newbridge, IE: Merrion Press, 2021), 9.
- 9 "A Journey Home: John F. Kennedy in Ireland," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed October 24, 2023, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/visit-museum/exhibits/past-exhibits/a-journey-home-john-f-kennedy-in-ireland>.
- 10 Bzdek, "Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK's Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92."
- 11 Bzdek; Robert J. Guttman, "Jean Kennedy Smith: America's Activist Ambassador," *Europe* (Paris, FR), no. 358, July 1996, ProQuest, 19; McFadden, "Jean Kennedy Smith Dies at 92," 4; Barack Obama, "President Barack Obama Delivers Remarks to Recipients of the 2010 Medal of Freedom," February 15, 2011, Lanham, MD, transcript, ProQuest, 7.
- 12 Bzdek; McFadden, 4.
- 13 Bzdek.
- 14 "Jean Kennedy Smith's Excessive Zeal," *New York Times Late Edition (East Coast)*, March 9, 1996, ProQuest Central.
- 15 Bzdek, "Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK's Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92."
- 16 Smith Hood, discussion.
- 17 Andrew J. Wilson, "From the Beltway to Belfast: The Clinton Administration, Sinn Féin, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *New Hibernia Review* 1, no. 3 (1997): 23-39, accessed October 4, 2023, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20557419>.
- 18 Mark Simpson, "Gerry Adams: New York in 1994 Visit 'Pivotal to Peace,'" *BBC News NI* (Belfast, UK), February 1, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-47072146>.
- 19 Bzdek, "Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK's Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92"; Dudley Edwards, "Last of JFK's Siblings Leaves a Contentious Legacy Behind"; McFadden, "Jean Kennedy Smith Dies at 92," 3.
- 20 Dudley Edwards, "Last of JFK's Siblings Leaves a Contentious Legacy Behind"; "Edward Kennedy: The Senator; Jean Kennedy Smith: The Ambassador," *Irish America* (New York, NY), November 30, 1999, ProQuest; "Jean Kennedy Smith Retires as U.S. Ambassador to Ireland," *Irish America* (New York, NY), October 31, 1998, ProQuest; Smith Hood, discussion.
- 21 "Eire Society Gold Medalist Jean Kennedy Smith Talks About Being Irish and Being Over There to Help," *Boston Irish Reporter*, June 2007, ProQuest; "Eire Society Selects Jean Kennedy Smith as Its 2007 Gold Medal Recipient," *Boston Irish Reporter*, April 2007, On the Town, ProQuest; Michael P. Quinlin, "Eire Society Honors Jean Kennedy Smith," *Irish America* (New York, NY), September 2007, ProQuest.
- 22 Michael Parsons, "Kennedy Smith Accepts Peace Award," *The Irish Times* (Dublin, IE), June 21, 2010, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/kennedy-smith-accepts-peace-award-1.680962>.
- 23 Obama, "President Barack Obama Delivers Remarks"; Kristin Romano and Sheila Langan, "Jean Kennedy Smith and John Sweeney Awarded Medal of Freedom," *Irish America* (New York, NY), May 2011, ProQuest; Smith Hood, discussion.

in reference to Kennedy Smith's role in the deliverance of the island from conflict.²⁴ A 1996 article even wrote that in a recent poll, Kennedy Smith had been voted the second-most popular woman in Ireland after the Irish President, Mary Robinson.²⁵

Kennedy Smith went far beyond her duties as Ambassador: she made connections with members of the Irish public, achieved diplomatic successes that were regarded as hopeless, and backed countless philanthropic projects. Even the U.S. Ambassador to the U.K., William J. Crowe, who sat on the opposite side of the negotiating table from Kennedy Smith, said, "She's the best ambassador the Irish people ever have had from the United States. Fortunately, that wasn't her job, but she never figured that out."²⁶

There is a somewhat facetious estimate that more has been written about the Kennedys than any other subject besides Christ and the American Civil War.²⁷ This abundance of analysis of Kennedy history, when combined with the fact that Kennedy Smith could not have done more to earn herself a place in the history books, makes it concerning that historical sources still refer to her as an inconsequential bystander or ignore her contributions entirely.²⁸ Perhaps because of the unrelenting expectation that she could be nothing but ineffectual, when historians do mention the Ambassador, they do so dismissively and attribute her victories entirely to Bill Clinton and Ted Kennedy. For example, in a minor (but still unusually detailed) description of Kennedy Smith's involvement in the peace process, historian Andrew J. Wilson notes that she was the one to convince Ted to support the crucial Adams visa.²⁹ However, on the very next page, Wilson includes a quote by Niall O'Dowd, a journalist involved in the peace process, in which Ted is heralded for "single-handedly" pushing the Adams visa to presidential acceptance, all but entirely negating this rare acknowledgement of Jean's role.³⁰ In a similarly detractive mention, historian James Cooper

goes so far as to reduce Ambassador Kennedy Smith to a "romantic appointment" by Clinton.³¹ Of course, Bill Clinton and Ted Kennedy were undeniably, to use Jean's own words about herself, "cog[s]" in the same peacemaking "machine" as she was, but she remains uncredited for her own role in its achievements.³² This disparity is just one of the many things about Kennedy Smith's coverage in the media and historical sources that warrants closer investigation.

The discrepancies between the Ambassador's exaltation in primary documents and her omission from historical analyses, the fact that her name has nearly always been mentioned next to the names of her brothers, and her controversial tactics and goals should also all be examined in greater detail. As the first historical analysis on the subject of Jean Kennedy Smith's diplomacy, this paper will touch on all these points and explore the following questions: what elevated the Ambassador from an inactive, "romantic appointment" by Clinton to the second most popular woman in Ireland, and why did she become an entirely discounted and forgotten figure in the historical record?

By analyzing the evidence, a disturbing pattern emerges: Kennedy Smith, despite being a fundamental part of peace negotiations, was left out of the historical narrative for sexist reasons. While there is extensive literature on the exclusion of women from diplomacy,³³ the changing representation of women in the field,³⁴ the effectiveness of female diplomats,³⁵ and the sexism they face in the media,³⁶ there remains room for significant improvement in the study of how female diplomats, politicians, and activists are remembered in contrast to their male colleagues. Thus, in addition to analyzing how Kennedy Smith achieved her popularity and success, this paper will serve as a case study of the ways in which gender biases obscure the recognition of women's contributions to diplomacy and lead to their erasure from the historical narrative.

24 Gerry Adams, "Adams Extends Condolences on Death of Jean Kennedy Smith," Sinn Féin, June 18, 2020, <https://vote.sinnfein.ie/adams-extends-condolences-on-death-of-jean-kennedy-smith/>; Dudley Edwards, "Last of JFK's Siblings Leaves a Contentious Legacy Behind."

25 Guttman, "America's Activist Ambassador," 19.

26 Bzdek, "Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK's Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92."

27 Amanda Smith, introduction to *Hostage to Fortune: The Letters of Joseph P. Kennedy*, ed. Amanda Smith (New York: Viking, 2001), xvi.

28 James Cooper, "The United States and the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland, 1967–1998," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History* (March 26, 2019), accessed October 3, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.611>; Paul Dixon, "Performing the Northern Ireland Peace Process on the World Stage," *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no. 1 (2006): 61–91, accessed October 3, 2023, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20202645>; Adrian Guelke, "The U.S.A. and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *Ethnopolitics* 11, no. 4 (November 1, 2012): 424–38, accessed October 4, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2012.697654>, 429; William Hazleton, "Encouragement from the Sidelines: Clinton's Role in the Good Friday Agreement," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 11 (2000): 103–19, accessed October 5, 2023, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30001915>; Murphy and Ó Beacháin, introduction to *From Whence I Came: Éamon Phoenix, "How Britain Tried to Stop Gerry Adams Getting U.S. Visa."* *The Irish Times* (Dublin, IE), December 31, 2018, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/how-britain-tried-to-stop-gerry-adams-getting-us-visa-1.3739551>; Steven D. Strauss, *The Complete Idiot's Guide to the Kennedys* (Indianapolis: Alpha Books, 2000), EBSCOhost; Wilson, "From the Beltway to Belfast."

29 Wilson, 29.

30 Wilson, 30.

31 Cooper, "The United States and the 'Troubles,'" 9.

32 McFadden, "Jean Kennedy Smith Dies at 92," 3.

33 Carol Mattingly, "Woman's Temple, Women's Fountains: The Erasure of Public Memory," *American Studies* 49, no. 3/4 (2008): 133–56, accessed December 7, 2023, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40930400>; Patricia Owens, "Women and the History of International Thought," *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 467–81, accessed December 3, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy027>.

34 Karin Aggestam and Ann Towns, "The Gender Turn in Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 21, no. 1 (January 2019): 9–28, accessed December 7, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.1483206>; Helen McCarthy, "Petticoat Diplomacy: The Admission of Women to the British Foreign Service, c. 1919–1946," *Twentieth Century British History* 20, no. 3 (January 1, 2009): 285–321, accessed December 7, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwp029>.

35 Jennie Huang and Corinne Low, "The Myth of the Male Negotiator: Gender's Effect on Negotiation Strategies and Outcomes," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 202 (October 1, 2022): 517–32, accessed December 7, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.07.030>; Kevin J. Lasher, "Madeleine Albright, Gender, and Foreign Policy-Making," *Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 1 (November 2005): 39–83, accessed December 7, 2023, <https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1302&context=jops>.

36 Maria Braden, *Women Politicians and the Media* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); Diana B. Carlin and Kelly L. Winfrey, "Have You Come a Long Way, Baby? Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Sexism in 2008 Campaign Coverage," *Communication Studies* 60, no. 4 (August 10, 2009): 326–43, accessed December 7, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10510970903109904>.

Using newspaper articles, interviews, obituaries, and secondary literature, I show that, while her Kennedy background gained her the job, it was Kennedy Smith's female-coded talents learned as a socialite, her ability to connect with the public, and her expert leveraging of her Kennedy status to do what had never been done before that allowed for her successes both diplomatically and in the public's hearts. Additionally, Kennedy Smith's story serves as an example of how gender discrimination can lead to the minimizing of women's skills and accomplishments, as well as the attribution of their achievements to the men around them. I do not argue that her global historical contribution was comparable to that of any of her politically active brothers, but rather that the ways in which she did excel have been downplayed unjustifiably because of her gender. Kennedy Smith was an undeniable powerhouse in the Irish peace process, and she was able to overcome sexist obstacles to achieve diplomatic success and popularity only to lose her well-earned historical legacy at the hands of those same discriminatory patterns.

A FAMILIAL FOUNDATION

Jean's status as the second to last of the famous Kennedy siblings was central to her initial reception upon being announced as Clinton's pick for Ambassador. While he had taken into consideration the Kennedy family's stellar reputation in Ireland, his choice was not universally well-received in the United States, as it suggested to many, not incorrectly, that Kennedy Smith would be an underqualified, nepotistic appointment.³⁷ This Kennedy element formed both a foundational piece of her reputation, affording her glamor and attention, and, as her mentions in the press show, a shroud of mistrust and dismissal over her.

When her appointment was announced, the American reaction to the news ranged from lukewarm to hostile. For example, when it came time for her to be confirmed by the Senate, Amanda Smith Hood, Kennedy Smith's daughter, recalls that the voting members made their decisions not based on the qualifications she presented, but rather on the fact that she was "Senator Kennedy's sister."³⁸ This association was so concrete that in searching through newspaper archives about the announcement in the United States, not a single one could be located that did not mention her relationship to her brothers.³⁹ This repeated choice insinuated, not incorrectly, that her brothers' reputations were the reason for her selection, but it obscured the qualifications she did possess to the point of invisibility. While the vast ma-

ajority of these news announcements were ostensibly neutral (though, the emphasis on her brothers rather than her own management qualifications was a subtly belittling choice),⁴⁰ other articles were directly critical with a tabloid style. In a *Tennessean* opinion article by Mary McGrory, the author wrote that the *Irish Times* "grumbled that the job was being used as a consolation prize in a 'family psychodrama,'" referring to a rumored fight between Jean and Ted that Ted was attempting to smooth over with this supposed gift.⁴¹ The Kennedys have largely held their spot in the public's attention through scandal, and this language shows that this particular story served as a (notably less salacious) example of this pattern. Thus, in the American arena, Jean's Kennedy connections seemed a reason to ridicule and discount her from the very beginning of her ambassadorial journey, but they did bring a spotlight that stuck with her throughout her tenure that many foreign diplomats are not afforded.

In a manner similar to the way she was tied to her brothers in the news, Jean also carried an association with her controversial but legendary father, Joseph P. Kennedy (Joe Sr.). Despite being Irish-American, notoriously volatile, and a known philanderer, Joe Sr. was appointed Ambassador to the Court of Saint James under President Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁴² There, he was met with an unprecedented amount of media attention, often focused on his young, handsome, and glamorous family.⁴³ This popularity was so intense that it resulted in the Kennedys being invited to rub elbows with the British royal family, solidifying their prowess and respectability despite their beginnings as the descendants of Irish immigrants.⁴⁴ The swirl of popularity and fascination, not with the politics of the Ambassador but instead with the accompanying Kennedy mythology, was something both Joe Sr. and Jean encountered. As the first U.S. Ambassador's daughter to ever be appointed as an ambassador herself (a fact that was noted in the press),⁴⁵ Jean was carrying on decades old legacies from more than one of her close family members.

Joe Sr. battled an already tarnished reputation and anti-Irish sentiment but still succeeded in gaining incredible celebrity in England. Thus, when his daughter, carrying the same family prestige, entered not just an accepting arena but an actively adoring one, it was easy to predict that her reception by the Irish public would be intensely positive. With such a tight association with her brother, John, there was almost no chance that she could be received any other way. President Kennedy, as mentioned, was a "virtual saint" in Ireland, and his picture often hung next to a photograph of the Pope in

37 McGrory, "Clinton Is Governing with Glee;" Yaroslav Trofimov, "Europeans Dismayed by Clinton's Diplomatic Appointments," *Tennessean* (Nashville, TN), April 10, 1993, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

38 Smith Hood, discussion.

39 Brozan, "Chronicle: [1];" "Jean Kennedy Smith Heads to Ireland," *Irish Voice* (New York, NY), March 23, 1993, ProQuest; "Jean Kennedy Smith Offers Credentials as Irish Envoy;" "Jean Kennedy Smith Takes Post as Ambassador to Ireland."

40 Brozan, "Chronicle: [1];" "Jean Kennedy Smith Heads to Ireland;" "Jean Kennedy Smith Offers Credentials as Irish Envoy;" "Jean Kennedy Smith Takes Post as Ambassador to Ireland."

41 McGrory, "Clinton Is Governing with Glee."

42 Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *The Kennedys: An American Drama*, read by Christopher Hurt (New York: Encounter Books, 2021), Audible audio ed., 20 hr., 6 min.

43 Collier and Horowitz, *The Kennedys*.

44 Collier and Horowitz.

45 Guttman, "America's Activist Ambassador," 18.

Irish Catholic homes.⁴⁶ This obvious love for the Kennedy family stuck to Jean, and she was subsequently asked in 1995, two years after beginning her tenure, whether or not she thought her maiden name helped her in her diplomatic role.⁴⁷ She replied, “I think it has been enormously helpful” and “I think [the Irish people] feel we {Kennedys} just left for 150 years, and now we’re back again.”⁴⁸ This feeling of homecoming was, she said, a direct result of JFK’s visit to Ireland in 1963.⁴⁹ There, he symbolically accepted his immigrant roots and, by extension, gave Ireland new prestige.⁵⁰ As a Kennedy returning to reside in her ancestral homeland, the Ambassador carried that Irish-specific legacy with her in an obvious way.

The fervor created by a Kennedy returning to Ireland brings up the question of whether the second most popular woman in Ireland was Jean the U.S. Ambassador or Jean the Kennedy representative. It was, after all, the legacy of those who had entered politics before her that tended to be emphasized when discussing Jean, not her political trailblazing. When she died in 2020, major newspapers published articles commemorating her, and the *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times* and *Washington Post* all placed her status as a Kennedy sister before her own achievements in their obituaries’ titles.⁵¹ In doing so, they collectively declared that her place as one of the iconic set of nine siblings was more important than any part of her identity she had earned herself.

Additionally, her coverage in the press suggests that a closely related reason for her continued dismissal is because she was a Kennedy woman. This category holds a place in the public’s mind as a subordinated, docile group of ladies who stood behind their men through hardships and scandals, but never beside them.⁵² Countless books, movies, and magazine articles have painted the Kennedy women as tragic but tough figures whose beauty and privilege turned them into pawns of their more powerful male family members. While this argument certainly has merit, as Marian Schlesinger (the wife of the aforementioned Arthur Schlesinger Jr.) wrote in her scathing review of Pearl S. Buck’s *The Kennedy Women: A Personal Appraisal*, such narratives erase that these women were “a tribe of extremely human, fun loving, capable, extravagant, competitive, tough, spoiled and often gallant women.”⁵³ Jean was certainly all that. As a result of such an enduring, oversimplified understanding of any member of the Kennedy clan with the

‘woman’ title, Jean’s individuality, her political office (something no other Kennedy woman before her had achieved), and her other successes were all erased in the name of consistency with an antiquated, reductionist, and sexist trope.

It seems, from her own words, that she recognized this association as a political obstacle: her Kennedy name brought her historically loaded and often clichéd attention without any inherent faith. To navigate this hindrance, Kennedy Smith sought to toe a line between recognizing, respecting, and leveraging her familial mystique while still advocating for herself as a capable individual, rather than one of a set. This strategy can be seen in small ways (such as referring to her brother as “President Kennedy” instead of her private name for him, Jack, in public statements), as well as more direct ones.⁵⁴ For example, when describing her appointment and tenure she said, “I never thought of it in the light of history or my brothers. I just felt I had an obligation.”⁵⁵ By separating her family history from her personal achievements, Kennedy Smith took steps to, as the *Today Show* put it in its tribute to her, “carve[...] out her own place in one of America’s most famous families,”⁵⁶ all while still affording appropriate reverence to her loved ones and maintaining enough mythos to keep her name’s advantages.

While the Ambassador’s Kennedy connections set her up for accusations of incompetency and undeservingness, they also gave her a pedestal in Ireland from which she could show her true merits and a certain shield from subsequent scandals (which will be discussed in a later section). In hindsight, after her life has ended and her saga concluded, it is clear that once anxieties about her nepotistic appointment were alleviated by her diplomatic successes, the Kennedy mythos served to elevate her Irish reputation from that of a generic foreign diplomat to a symbol of Irish homecoming and excellence. Her status as such remains, even if she is most often remembered, as one of a set of discounted Kennedy women in historical memory.

SOCIALITES’ POLITICS

Before there was Ambassador Kennedy Smith, there was Jean, whose duties as a female member of the Kennedy clan were to entertain and organize elaborate parties for wealthy donors to fund various causes like her brothers’ campaigns or charities of her choosing. While the connection between

46 Bzdek, “Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK’s Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92.”

47 William Tuohy, “Jean Kennedy Smith; This Kennedy Returned to Ireland,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 26, 1995, Opinion, ProQuest.

48 Tuohy, “This Kennedy Returned to Ireland.”

49 Tuohy.

50 Murphy and Ó Beacháin, introduction to *From Whence I Came*.

51 Bzdek, “Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK’s Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92;” McFadden, “Jean Kennedy Smith Dies at 92;” Valerie J. Nelson, “Jean Kennedy Smith, 1928 - 2020; Last Surviving Sibling of JFK;” *Los Angeles Times*, June 24, 2020, ProQuest.

52 Pearl S. Buck, *The Kennedy Women: A Personal Appraisal* (New York: Cowles Book Co., 1970); Jackie, *Ethel, Joan: The Women of Camelot*, directed by Larry Shaw (2001: NBC); Laurence Leamer, *The Kennedy Women: The Saga of an American Family* (New York: Villard Books, 1994); Marian Schlesinger, “Pearl Buck Views Kennedy Women,” *Boston Globe*, May 11, 1970, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

53 Schlesinger, “Pearl Buck Views Kennedy Women.”

54 Guttman, “America’s Activist Ambassador,” 18; Jean Kennedy Smith, “The American Dimension of the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” *Études Irlandaises* 22, no. 2 (1997): 145–48, accessed October 5, 2023, https://doi.org/10.3406/irlan.1997.1410_148; Martha T. Moore, “JFK’s Sister Jean Kennedy Smith Reflects,” *USA Today* (McLean, VA), September 26, 2010, ProQuest.

55 McFadden, “Jean Kennedy Smith Dies at 92,” 4.

56 *Today Show*, “Tribute to Jean Kennedy Smith, Who Carved out Her Own Place in One of America’s Most Famous Families,” delivered by Craig Melvin, Savannah Guthrie and Andrea Mitchell, aired June 19, 2020, on NBC, transcript, ProQuest.

this kind of experience and diplomacy is not immediately obvious, it is undeniable that Kennedy Smith had acquired considerable ‘soft’ (and female-coded) skills during her life as a socialite. These areas of expertise included the ability to throw lavish parties and use them to forge social connections with other high-ranking and important people. Such talents, this section will argue, contributed greatly to her ability to bring about peace in Northern Ireland, and as a result, her extraordinary popularity.

Kennedy Smith had truly honed her social skills and spent decades throwing elaborate fundraising parties and gatherings, such as one in 1962 that made it into *TIME Magazine*.⁵⁷ The elaborate, multi-stage extravaganza not only raised almost 30% more money than it had planned to for its two family charities, which benefited children with developmental disabilities, but it was also described as “the sveltest, splashiest, most scrambled-after social affair that the nation’s capital [had] seen in many years.”⁵⁸ In fact, the Washington fundraiser, which she threw alongside her sister-in-law, Ethel Kennedy, was so momentous that *TIME* declared that any “New Frontiersman” who was not invited to attend one of the 16 associated dinner parties “might as well start packing his bags.”⁵⁹

When Kennedy Smith was first appointed, articles covering the news often chose to title her a “socialite,” rather than choosing a word more directly related to her traditional diplomatic characteristics.⁶⁰ Kennedy Smith herself even noted the many ways her experience, particularly her work with VSA, was downplayed, saying, “They said I did charity work, but if I were a man, they would have said I ran an international organization.”⁶¹ She had, indeed, done exactly that. “Socialite,” in particular, is a female-specific term carrying connotations of frivolity and out-of-touch privilege which directly contradict the skills necessary for diplomacy (though her socialite talents did ultimately work to her advantage). Words like “charity” and “socialite” are evidence that the assets Kennedy Smith could offer the U.S.’s Irish Embassy, like the management skills necessary to run VSA or her ability to entertain and befriend important people, were present, but because they were woman-held and female-coded, they were minimized and ignored.

The skills Kennedy Smith perfected in her previous life as a socialite and philanthropist, according to Amanda Smith Hood, who lived in the Phoenix Park Ambassador’s Residence with her mother during her breaks from graduate school,

were the steel backbone to her diplomatic successes. Smith Hood recalled, “Being very sociable and throwing parties worked out pretty well [...] for the peace process.”⁶² Politically important parties like the extravaganza of 1962 continued in much the same form in Phoenix Park, but with one unexpected difference. According to Smith Hood, “She had big, big parties with a lot of [...] artists and writers and actors and [...] prominent people around Ireland. And so, people like Gerry Adams and Rita O’Hare got kind of folded into that.”⁶³ The parties were where the highly surveilled American Ambassador could begin her ambitious and controversial plan to forge connections with the peace process’ most contentious adversaries: those labeled republican terrorists.

It was Kennedy Smith’s fully transparent plan to, as she said in her article in the journal *Études Irlandaises*, “listen to all sides” of the conflict.⁶⁴ Her radical strategy for doing so included bringing previously excluded voices like those of Adams and O’Hare into discussions, and these unassuming social settings allowed her to begin this process organically. Smith Hood explained that such parties “provided some cover, in a way, for cultivating and getting to know people like that without attracting a lot of attention.”⁶⁵ Once these semi-clandestine, semi-exposed but entirely non-political meetings occurred in the party setting, Smith Hood recalled that “she [...] was able to [...] start talking to them and be kind of a conduit to the White House, [...] approaching them [saying], ‘Would you be open to some kind of ceasefire or some kind of peace negotiations for Clinton?’”⁶⁶ Andrew J. Wilson also notes in his paper, *From the Beltway to Belfast*, that Kennedy Smith knew to go forward with the Adams visa because she had “contacts with those involved in the Hume-Adams dialogue.”⁶⁷ By gaining the trust of key leaders through these person-to-person connections, the Ambassador earned entry into realms beyond the reaches of usual U.S. relationships and gained unique and crucial insights as a result.

While it may seem somewhat naive to believe that an ostensibly frivolous act like a party could hold such political weight, the role of the personal relationships forged in these settings becomes clear when described in Gerry Adams’ own words. Upon her death in 2020, Adams published a statement thanking Kennedy Smith for her contributions to the peace process, calling her “a wonderful, compassionate, formidable woman,” and “an extraordinary human being,” showing his personal knowledge of her character.⁶⁸ He even reminisced and said, “We exchanged trees one time and I also

57 “Better Than Broadway,” *TIME Magazine*, October 5, 1962, EBSCOhost.

58 “Better Than Broadway,” 19.

59 “Better Than Broadway,” 19.

60 Susan Milligan, “Kennedy Sis Named Ambassador to Ireland,” *Daily News* (New York, NY), March 18, 1993, ProQuest Historical Newspapers; Reuter, “Socialite Named Envoy to Ireland,” *Toronto Star*, March 18, 1993, ProQuest.

61 Bzdek, “Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK’s Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92.”

62 Smith Hood, discussion.

63 Smith Hood, discussion.

64 Kennedy Smith, “The American Dimension of the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 148.

65 Smith Hood, discussion.

66 Smith Hood, discussion.

67 Wilson, “From the Beltway to Belfast,” 29.

68 Adams, “Adams Extends Condolences.”

gave her a puppy dog.”⁶⁹ These underestimated and intimate party settings allowed the Ambassador to begin to forge the friendships that gave her an opportunity to negotiate in a way no American diplomat had before, without the explicit approval of the State Department.

It is also telling that a reader assumes these informal social interactions would be worth less than more classically diplomatic, male-coded ones. However, such reactions are consistent with sociological literature regarding how people view female-coded talents like the ones Kennedy Smith used in her strategy to connect with key political players. *Social Construction of Skill*, a study by Temple University’s Ronnie J. Steinberg, shows that job-related talents that are considered feminine, which often involve emotional or social tact, are regarded as less worthy of compensation, which in this case, would include political recognition and respect.⁷⁰ By exercising her female-coded skills, like party-planning and strategic socializing, Kennedy Smith was able to attain unprecedented results, but any recognition of these successes was lost because of the feminine way they were achieved. This failure to acknowledge Kennedy Smith’s impact has larger implications when examining how women in diplomatic history are remembered, as an acknowledgement that female-coded talents are less championed and recognized challenges historians to re-examine what they consider noteworthy, what they consider diplomacy, and even, most simply, what they consider a skill.

While little can be known at this time about what truly went on in the discussions between Sinn Féin and Kennedy Smith, as public records of the meetings are still unavailable, the friendships she cultivated very likely allowed for a less strained relationship between herself, a representative of the U.S., and the leaders of the paramilitary organization her country so disapproved of. It is undeniable, however, that Kennedy Smith’s risk-taking by engaging with Sinn Féin was a crucial foundation upon which further steps toward peace were built. Jean Kennedy Smith leveraged her interpersonal relationships and female-coded social scene talents to achieve unprecedented successes that benefitted the island as a whole, and these achievements deserve to be acknowledged in the historical record.

A PERSONAL TOUCH

While Kennedy Smith’s social talents found her success in the diplomatic sphere, which, by extension, contributed to her

public approval, those emotional skills more directly fed her popularity through her focus on interacting with members of the Irish public themselves. Her close friend, Sean Reidy, the former head of the JFK Trust and, at times, the unofficial personal assistant to the Ambassador, believes that her diplomatic successes were secondarily important in creating her reputation.⁷¹ Instead, he cites her Kennedy mystique as the foundation upon which her intimate, attentive treatment of members of the public built her glowing popularity.⁷² Reidy believes that the Irish public would not have known, or sought information about, the Ambassador’s work with Northern Ireland, and that they were, instead, much more enamored with how she reached out to them directly.⁷³ While other newspaper sources and Kennedy Smith’s own daughter would insist on more nuance to this point, Reidy’s assessment is corroborated by many primary documents and is worth investigating.⁷⁴

Reidy experienced Kennedy Smith’s focus on the Irish public firsthand. He recalled that “wherever she went, she was endearing herself to the people that she met,” and this pattern was the core of what made her popular among people who may not have otherwise paid attention to politics, let alone foreign dignitaries.⁷⁵ The Irish media does indeed bolster Reidy’s claims on this point, as their coverage of her trends toward the personal rather than the political. There are dozens of articles written in local newspapers about her visits to small and sometimes even “deserted” towns in Ireland:⁷⁶ those forgotten by their own government, not to mention the far off and ultra-powerful United States. She often traveled across the island to do small-scale visits of various kinds, though these were not among her official duties. For example, she inspected a housing project in one of the most remote places in Ireland, Achill Island,⁷⁷ visited a hospice center in Laois,⁷⁸ and launched a successful tourism project in Knockatallon,⁷⁹ a small city near the Northern Irish border. Additionally, she reinforced her reputation as a humanitarian, a philanthropist, and even an activist with true work. *Europe* magazine wrote that she made it standard practice to employ people with intellectual disabilities at the American Embassy,⁸⁰ founded a women-centered program for the achievement of peace called “Making Women Seen and Heard,” fundraised for the Fulbright Award, and began multiple cross-border arts and service initiatives.⁸¹ Reidy added that, as an enthusiastic supporter of the arts, she

69 Adams.

70 Ronnie J. Steinberg, “Social Construction of Skill: Gender, Power, and Comparable Worth,” *Work and Occupations* 17, no. 4 (November 1990): 449–82, accessed December 1, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888490017004004>.

71 Sean Reidy (friend of Jean Kennedy Smith) in discussion with the author, November 19, 2023.

72 Reidy, discussion.

73 Reidy, discussion.

74 Smith Hood, discussion.

75 Reidy, discussion.

76 “Achill House Visits for Jean,” *Evening Echo* (Cork, IE), January 13, 1995, Irish Newspaper Archives.

77 “Achill House Visits for Jean.”

78 “Jean Kennedy Smith Addresses Hospice AGM,” *The Nationalist* (Clonmel, IE), May 12, 1995, General News, Irish Newspaper Archives.

79 Michael Fisher, “Remembering Jean Kennedy Smith,” *Northern Standard* (Monaghan, IE), June 25, 2020, Irish Newspaper Archives.

80 This employment practice is still in place today according to Smith Hood, discussion.

81 Guttman, “America’s Activist Ambassador,” 19.

bolstered many people's careers and was a recognized and popular name among Irish artists of all kinds.⁸² It is obvious why, with all of this easily traceable philanthropic action, the Ambassador was seen not as an aloof foreign dignitary, but as an effective benefactor whose involvement and attention made tangible improvements in many Irish people's lives.

Kennedy Smith's efforts to befriend the Irish people, who she considered her kin, set her in lasting memory as an adopted hero. According to a casual friend of hers, Fergus Finlay, she landed in Ireland with the goal of "meeting people in their homes, befriending ordinary families, that sort of thing."⁸³ While she found it difficult to secure an invitation to be a part of such casual and "ordinary" goings on, Finlay said that she "made it her business to get to know as many people as possible."⁸⁴ As part of this mission, the Ambassador "commandeered" a table at a restaurant across the street from the Embassy, Roly's, and extended an invitation to "anyone and everyone for a one-to-one lunch."⁸⁵ Finlay does not say, however, how many people took her up on this offer.⁸⁶

It was, truly, the Irish people that Kennedy Smith seemed to have a true interest in, much to the inconvenience of those of her political caliber. Reidy accompanied her on many of her visits around the island, and he recalled that "she was impossible to schedule" because she would stand and chat to the people who came to see her for far longer than her tight diplomatic schedule permitted.⁸⁷ These delays would even occur when other officials were there with her, and Reidy described a recurring scene: she would "get out of the car and there'd be a mayor waiting and another politician at the door, and [she'd] turn around and go across the street to the crowd gathered without recognizing [them]."⁸⁸ These crowds were wooed by her, and a Cork journalist, John Murphy, called her "a most friendly and charming lady with a delightfully pleasant personality," and wrote that she "never seemed to tire of [...] introductions" to members of the public.⁸⁹ Whether this eagerness to speak with them was because of a democratic spirit and a desire to hear the concern of the everyman or a love of the glowing attention she received, the Ambassador's success in the very literal popularity polls shows that when these interactions occurred, she connected with members of the public in a genuine way.

On the other hand, Kennedy Smith's disregard for the schedules of others was so strong that she sometimes canceled meetings entirely for things she deemed more worth

her while. One of her former employees at Very Special Arts, Rayna Aylward, recounted one of these instances in her (scathing) tribute to Kennedy Smith entitled, "Jean Kennedy Smith Wasn't Very Nice, but She Made a Big Difference." Aylward wrote that, once, when "she'd blown off another meeting of VSA international delegates in Denmark, she told me: 'Your problem is that you are too nice.'"⁹⁰ How Kennedy Smith chose which politicians to not be "nice" to by keeping them waiting or canceling on them altogether and which to court through the meetings and parties described above is unclear. Regardless, the friends she lost in political circles with her disrespect of their time seem to have been inconsequential in terms of her diplomatic successes, but her blossoming friendship with the Irish public was fruitful as a result of her prioritization practices.

After Kennedy Smith's death, dozens of local Irish newspapers published tributes to her, boasting that they had been visited by the Ambassador during her many trips across the island. One from Lough Gur, the ancestral hometown of Kennedy Smith's mother's family, included that after the "wonderful occasion" of her visit, she sent her guide, local historian Michael Quinlan, a letter on Embassy stationery thanking him for his hospitality and inviting him and his wife to enjoy hers during that year's Thanksgiving dinner.⁹¹ This kind of person-to-person gesture was not unusual with Kennedy Smith, though she never truly made any effort to shrug off her glamor, as shown in a minor way by the stationery she used for the invitation. When she was asked to visit Nenagh to open a photography exhibition, her hosts took her shopping in the town's clothing store, and she sipped a half pint of Guinness that an excited man had burst into the store to offer her in a "humour[ous]" display of hospitality.⁹² While such activities would usually be thought too unpretentious for an international diplomat, Smith Hood recalls that she was delighted to connect with others in these ways.⁹³ The manner in which Kennedy Smith welcomed and appreciated the casual and sometimes unconventional hospitality of those she met during her time as Ambassador clearly left positive impressions in her wake. These memories of her visits were so strong that they lasted for almost thirty years to be recalled after her death, showing that she was able to keep her air of Kennedy magic while strengthening the bond between her pedestalized emigrant family and their communities of origin.

Northern Irish politician and Nobel laureate John

82 Reidy, discussion.

83 Fergus Finlay, "Jean Kennedy Smith: A Friend to Ireland Who Left an Enduring Legacy," *Irish Examiner* (Cork, IE), June 23, 2020, Irish Newspaper Archives.

84 Finlay, "A Friend to Ireland Who Left an Enduring Legacy."

85 Finlay.

86 Finlay.

87 Reidy, discussion.

88 Reidy, discussion.

89 John Murphy, "Ambassador's Winning Ways," *Evening Echo* (Cork, IE), July 20, 1995, Borderlines with John Murphy, Irish Newspaper Archives.

90 Rayna Aylward, "Jean Kennedy Smith Wasn't Very Nice, but She Made a Big Difference," *The Washington Post* (Online), June 22, 2020, Opinions, ProQuest.

91 Áine Fitzgerald, "Lough Gur Visit 'a Moving Experience,'" *Limerick Leader* (Limerick, IE), June 27, 2020, Irish Newspaper Archives; Smith Hood, discussion. What the article's author, Fitzgerald, did not know was that this visit to her ancestral hometown was deeply impactful for the Ambassador herself. Smith Hood recalled that a replica of the Lough Gur town sign was gifted to her mother, and upon retiring to the United States, Kennedy Smith placed it outside her home in Bridgehampton, NY, pointing guests down her driveway and toward her front door until her death.

92 Peter Gleeson, "The Ambassador Who Sipped Guinness in Nenagh," *The Nenagh Guardian* (Nenagh, IE), June 27, 2020, Irish Newspaper Archives.

93 Smith Hood, discussion.

Hume summed up Kennedy Smith's tenure as a "real Ambassador" succinctly in a 2005 interview for the Edward M. Kennedy Oral History Project.⁹⁴ He said, "She became a great friend of all of us. She wasn't an Ambassador that you normally would see in an embassy. She was an Ambassador who came to the people and was with the people and responded to the people."⁹⁵ At a time when so many of the voices in the island of Ireland's two halves felt unheard, Ambassador Kennedy Smith offered them a powerful and mythologized listening ear, whether they were the heads of a paramilitary organization or residents of a west coast town. With her appointment came the expectation not only that she would be ineffectual and merely symbolic, but also that she would be out-of-touch and elite. While she continued to exhibit entitled qualities toward her political equals, she showed a degree of normalcy and intimacy in her interactions with those she aimed to serve. This approach excited the Irish public so significantly that her legacy remains with them, even when it has largely fallen through the cracks of the historical record.

UNCONVENTIONAL AND UNTOUCHABLE

Kennedy Smith's no-rules approach itself may also have contributed to her popularity with the Irish public. Perhaps it was her Kennedy upbringing, full of open doors and bare of 'no's,' that gave her an unstoppable (and sometimes bulldozing) temperament. Regardless of its origin, it was this part of her personality that led her to blatantly defy not only the wishes of the State Department she worked for, but also the fruitless diplomatic norms that had characterized the peace process for decades.

In the 1990s, the Troubles were at a stiff standstill. The Irish Republican Army was clearly not going to succeed in driving the British out of Ireland, but it would not surrender on those grounds, either.⁹⁶ On the British side of the fighting, it was also clear that the IRA could not be squashed militarily.⁹⁷ It seemed that the cycle would never end unless something significant in negotiations between the two sides changed, and it was in this landscape that Kennedy Smith had to find her diplomatic footing.

This context is necessary to understand the excitement

generated by Kennedy Smith's approach to achieving peace. She was doing what had been unthinkable before: bringing terrorists into the conversation who had been sworn off by politicians, including American ones, for decades. As part of this strategy, Kennedy Smith became a "forceful" advocate for the controversial, but ultimately successful, Adams visa, which the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Justice Department, and even some of her own staffers advised against.⁹⁸ Later, she enraged the State Department by crossing the border into Northern Ireland, an area directly hostile toward her and entirely out of her jurisdiction, for vague diplomatic reasons and without any invitation or permission.⁹⁹ When Secretary of State Warren Christopher got wind of her trip to the North, he called her personally as she was driving to the border.¹⁰⁰ When he berated her, the Ambassador avoided the conversation and kept her course by saying, 'Warren you're breaking up. I can't hear you. I'll call you when I get there,' and hanging up the phone.¹⁰¹ In Smith Hood's words, "she was really going rogue."¹⁰² Kennedy Smith was even accused of being "an ardent IRA apologist" by the American Ambassador to the Court of St. James at the time of the Adams visa, Raymond Seitz, in his 1999 memoir, *Over Here*.¹⁰³ However, with her brother as a powerful titan of the Senate back home, she was untouchable and would not be recalled,¹⁰⁴ despite the alarm that arose from her tactics.¹⁰⁵ These are just a few examples of the ways in which Kennedy Smith took advantage of her imperviousness to disapproval, and the uniqueness of her strategies and her 'don't-take-no-for-an-answer' attitude were in stark contrast to the tentative and ineffectual political moves that had been made by American facilitators of the peace process up until that point.

Despite Jean's trailblazing strategies, the historical record oversimplifies her contributions and attributes her subsequent achievements to her brother, Ted.¹⁰⁶ As mentioned above, in the paper *From the Beltway to Belfast* by historian Andrew J. Wilson (which is one of the few academic papers that mentions Jean at all), the author notes that Ted himself said that he had only been convinced to fight for the Adams visa because of Jean's arguments.¹⁰⁷ However, on the very next page, Wilson includes a quote in which Ted is credited with

94 Hume, "John Hume Oral History;" quoted in Fisher, "Remembering Jean Kennedy Smith."

95 Hume, "John Hume Oral History;" quoted in Fisher, "Remembering Jean Kennedy Smith."

96 Hazleton, "Encouragement from the Sidelines," 113.

97 Hazleton, 113.

98 Bzdek, "Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK's Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92;" "Dissent Rewarded," *Irish Examiner* (Cork, IE), June 29, 1996, Opinion Analysis, Irish Newspaper Archives; Dudley Edwards, "Last of JFK's Siblings Leaves a Contentious Legacy Behind;" "Jean Kennedy Smith's Excessive Zeal;" McFadden, "Jean Kennedy Smith Dies at 92," 3; Phoenix, "How Britain Tried to Stop Gerry Adams Getting U.S. Visa;" Smith Hood, discussion. See Wilson, "From the Beltway to Belfast," 30 for "forceful" quote. See Bzdek, "Dissent Rewarded;" Dudley Edwards, "Jean Kennedy Smith's Excessive Zeal;" and Wilson, 30 for information on Kennedy Smith being reprimanded by the State Department for retaliating against dissenting Embassy staffers who opposed the Adams visa. Sources differ in their descriptions of the extent of this retaliation.

99 Reidy, discussion.

100 Reidy, discussion.

101 Reidy, discussion.

102 Smith Hood, discussion.

103 Raymond Seitz, *Over Here* (London: Orion Publishing Co., 1999), 289–90; quoted in Guelke, "The U.S.A. and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," 429.

104 Smith Hood, discussion.

105 Adams, "Adams Extends Condolences;" Bzdek, "Jean Kennedy Smith, JFK's Sister and an Architect of Peace in Northern Ireland, Dies at 92;" "Dissent Rewarded;" Dudley Edwards, "Last of JFK's Siblings Leaves a Contentious Legacy Behind;" "Jean Kennedy Smith's Excessive Zeal;" McFadden, "Jean Kennedy Smith Dies at 92," 3; Smith Hood, discussion; Wilson, "From the Beltway to Belfast," 30.

106 Cooper, "The United States and the 'Troubles,'" 5; Dixon, "Performing the Northern Ireland Peace Process;" Wilson, "From the Beltway to Belfast," 30.

107 Wilson, "From the Beltway to Belfast," 29.

“single-handedly” solidifying President Clinton’s decision to approve the radical move, oversimplifying the story of the visa’s eventual acceptance to such a degree that it negates Jean’s contributions.¹⁰⁸ The Adams visa is remembered as a core breakthrough in a diplomatic stalemate that had lasted for decades,¹⁰⁹ and despite the fact that Ted himself credits her as the very origin of its success, Jean’s role remains insufficiently acknowledged.

This erasure is unfortunate but not surprising. In Patricia Owens’ paper, *Women and the History of International Thought*, she shows that women’s contributions to international relations have consistently been obscured and even actively ignored.¹¹⁰ Additionally, a thoroughly triangulated New York University study entitled *Women are Credited Less in Science than Men* found, through three different methods of study, that there is a “gender gap in attribution” and that “women in research teams are significantly less likely than men to be credited with authorship.”¹¹¹ While Jean wasn’t working in a scientific field, this pattern, coupled with the consistent erasure of women’s contributions to international relations, suggests that one of the reasons she has not received credit for her teamwork with her brother is because of this larger trend in attributions based on gender. Once again, this occurrence is not trivial, as it is an alarming example of how women’s achievements are minimized in the historical record through the reassignment of their earned accolades to men. Through this pattern, a cycle is created in which women in diplomacy, politics, activism, and other collaborative arenas do not have a chance to prove themselves, advance, or be remembered aptly for their contributions to culture and history. When this occurs, it reinforces views that women are ineffectual or ignorable in history’s narrative and begins the cycle anew.

While Sean Reidy believes that the Irish public did not know about her diplomatic risk-taking or her strategies with Ted, some of those daring moves did indeed make the Irish news.¹¹² Extensive archival and interview research would need to be undertaken to determine with more certainty whether the Irish public was indeed paying close attention to Kennedy Smith’s diplomatic dealings, but it can be assumed based on her status as the second most popular woman in Ireland that, whatever the public heard, they were encouraged by it. Enough about her political boldness circulated publicly to suggest that her deviation from the unhelpful status quo, coupled with her imperviousness to governmental disapproval, made her look appealing to a newly hopeful Irish public. It was as if, finally, there might be someone whose moves toward peace could not be halted by the Troubles’ characteristic stalemates.

CONCLUSION

No one aspect of Kennedy Smith’s skillset or strategy, nor her inherent Kennedy shine, can fully explain the popularity she enjoyed in Ireland during her tenure as Ambassador. The near-opposite evaluations of her time in Phoenix Park in secondary literature versus Irish primary documents, in particular, show how understudied a political appointment Kennedy Smith’s was.

This glaring but unaddressed discrepancy is somewhat explicable via sociological understandings of the impact of gender on our evaluations of working women in comparison to their male counterparts. Women’s accomplishments using male-coded skills like negotiation and strategy are often attributed to luck instead of talent, while this is not the case for men, and this appears to have been true for Kennedy Smith.¹¹³ Whether her contributions are recognized or not, the Ambassador achieved popularity and diplomatic success by making expert use of the very attributes she was denigrated for: her Kennedy status, her socialite past and her untouchable, rule-breaking privileges.

The Kennedy family continues to be a favorite topic among historians and laymen alike, and Kennedy Smith, as a fascinating figure herself, would be studied more appropriately if she had been born a brother. Not only would an increased focus on Jean bring more balance to the oversimplified and shamefully gendered beliefs that prevail about Kennedy women, but Kennedy Smith’s decline from a magnet of public popularity to an entirely discounted figure in the peace process is also an informative case study of the erasure of certain groups from history. If a member of the infinitely privileged Kennedy family can be ignored by historians because of her gender, it is jarring to think how the stories of other female and gender minority powerhouses, and members of marginalized races, sexualities, religions, classes, and more, are treated in the official historical record. By becoming more aware of the extent of such inequalities in historical acknowledgements, steps can be taken to remedy them and prevent these cycles from continuing in the future.

President Obama, when presenting her with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, said, “Jean was as vital as she was unconventional.”¹¹⁴ While she may have been unconventional herself, her treatment in historical analyses of the peace process suggests that, if historians were to look more closely at the stories of other women and people of marginalized identities throughout history, they would find that Kennedy Smith’s case of extraordinary impact followed by near complete erasure is not unconventional in the least. 🏠

108 Wilson, “From the Beltway to Belfast,” 30.

109 Cooper, “The United States and the ‘Troubles,’” 9; Nelson, “Last Surviving Sibling of JFK.”

110 Owens, “Women and the History of International Thought.”

111 Matthew B. Ross et al., “Women Are Credited Less in Science than Men,” *Nature* 608, no. 7921 (August 2022): 135–45, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04966-w>.

112 “Ambassador Weighs In,” *Irish Examiner* (Cork, IE), January 25, 1996, Mitchell Report, Irish Newspaper Archives; “Clinton Provides Solace for Kennedy Smith,” *Limerick Leader* (Limerick, IE), March 9, 1996, Irish News, Irish Newspaper Archives; “Dissent Rewarded,” “US Envoy Rebuked in Visa Row,” *Evening Herald* (Dublin, IE), March 6, 1996, News Brief, Irish Newspaper Archives.

113 Kay Deaux and Tim Emswiller, “Explanations of Successful Performance on Sex-Linked Tasks: What Is Skill for the Male Is Luck for the Female,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 29, no. 1 (1974): 80–85, accessed November 27, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0035733>.

114 Obama, “President Barack Obama Delivers Remarks,” 2.

Tugboat Tug-of-War

The Torrijos-Carter Treaties

The Torrijos-Carter Treaties (hereafter “Treaty”), ratified in 1978, formalized the eventual return of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian government in 2000. However, this was no easy task. President Jimmy Carter chose to renegotiate the original Canal Treaty in the middle of the Cold War with an ostensibly leftist government in Panama helmed by a de facto military dictator, General Omar Torrijos. Public opinion in the United States was firmly opposed to the new Treaties at the start of the ratification process, and whether Carter had the necessary Senate votes to successfully ratify the Treaties was uncertain. This paper seeks to address two crucial questions of diplomatic history: why Carter chose to renegotiate the original treaty with Panama, and how the new Treaties were passed despite fierce domestic opposition. Primary sources and archival evidence from the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library indicate that a genuine desire to right a historical wrong despite domestic political opposition motivated Carter to renegotiate. His administration worked cooperatively with Torrijos’ government in the bargaining process to reach a reasonable settlement, a strategy that appears puzzling given public opinion. Afterwards, the two leaders collaborated on a charm campaign to flip “no” votes in the Senate and win the hearts and minds of the American public through public outreach and face-to-face diplomacy.

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Figure 1. “Jimmy Carter and General Omar Torrijos shake hands after signing the Panama Canal Treaty.” 1977. Photograph. Washington, D.C. Source: National Archives, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/176083>.

INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF THE TORRIJOS-CARTER TREATIES

President Jimmy Carter, in the face of a defiant Congress and without the solid support of public opinion, orchestrated the final negotiation and ratification of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties (hereafter “Treaty”). Even so, the Treaty, which required a two-thirds majority to ratify, passed with razor thin margins: 68-32. Critics before and after ratification maintained that a new treaty would only lead the U.S. to relinquish

its control of a vital infrastructural asset with implications for hemispheric security and global commerce. And worse, Carter wanted to formally return the canal to Panama, a debatably leftist government helmed by a *de facto* dictator, Omar Torrijos, during the Cold War. Carter acknowledged that the Treaty process left “deep and serious political wounds that have never been healed” – many of the Treaty’s supporters were not elected again.¹

The decision to move forward with negotiations after Carter came into office was not an obvious one. It is tempting to write off the new Treaty as a natural response to U.S. security concerns. After all, the U.S. viewed Latin American affairs through the lens of security during much of the Cold War. Questions of reform and how best to contribute to Latin American economic and political development were seldom front of mind. Instead, the region was viewed through the potential for crisis and instability. Professor Lars Schoultz articulated two questions that occupied the minds of senior decision-makers: “1) What is the cause of the instability? 2) What are the consequences of the instability for U.S. security?”² When riots engulfed Panama City and the Canal Zone in December of 1964, leaders in the U.S. viewed a crisis brewing.³ They had to weigh the costs of U.S. concessions in any renegotiation against a hypothetical world where the U.S. either lost control of the Panama Canal entirely or had to intervene militarily to preserve its control.

Threats to the security of the Panama Canal (from the

¹ Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press), 184-185.

² Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 26.

³ Jordan, *Panama Odyssey* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1984), 54. The CIA director at the time, John McCone, along with other cabinet officials, held the idea that the riots in Panama were likely orchestrated by communist or ostensibly pro-Castro elements active throughout non-aligned nations in Latin America. Separately, Roberto Chiari, Panama’s president in 1964, used the riots as an opportunity to broach the necessity of a new Treaty governing the Canal. Chiari’s opportunism did little to assuage the concerns of some in Johnson’s cabinet about a larger plot.

perspective of the U.S.) were not insignificant. The 1964 riots caused Cyrus Vance to instruct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “develop contingency plans for U.S. military intervention” after a communist resolution.⁴ Similar security concerns appeared periodically for more than a decade. After meeting with Torrijos in March of 1973, the Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) under President Nixon, John Scali, summarized the situation on the ground. Torrijos was frustrated with the slow pace of negotiations and alluded to the fact that he was the reason “200,000 Panamanians” were ready to “go into [the] Canal Zone and ‘sacrifice themselves’ in confrontation with [Canal Zone authorities].”⁵ Scali also alluded to reputational concerns: if bilateral negotiations did not begin to move forward, the U.S. risked a sharp increase in anti-American sentiment around Latin America. The historical record provides much support for the idea that the Canal Treaty was a national security imperative.

However, the dominant logic in American foreign policy at the time Carter took office complicates the security considerations explanation. Senators opposed to Treaty ratification in 1978 often cited former Admirals and Chiefs of Naval Operations in defense of their position.⁶ High-ranking military officials questioned the logic of renegotiation, claiming that a canal handover would threaten U.S. military interests in the Western hemisphere by rendering the canal vulnerable to foreign influence or sabotage. The security consequences of the new Treaty did not cut one way or another at the time. Carter thought a new Treaty would further secure U.S. national interest regarding the Canal, while his opponents thought the opposite.⁷ It is possible that security considerations motivated Carter’s decision to renegotiate. But the U.S. national security establishment repeatedly complicated the negotiation and ratification process. While security completely describes the *choice* to renegotiate, it certainly does not describe how Carter mobilized domestic political support.

I argue that Carter’s decision to renegotiate reflected faith in preexisting ideas in American foreign policy circles: the original Canal Treaty had aged poorly, and Panama deserved a Treaty that acknowledged its sovereignty and diminished U.S. control. Moreover, Torrijos’ efforts to bring the U.S. to the negotiating table before the Carter administration are perhaps just as important as Carter’s decision. On the road to ratification, both Carter and Torrijos had to convince one another, the American public, fence-sitting senators, and Panama’s own domestic political opposition that the new Treaty was a net benefit for all parties involved. Carter

and Torrijos enlisted the help of friendly senators, former presidents and elected officials, American and Panamanian negotiators, and even John Wayne to get the job done in their two countries.⁸ The ratification of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties was a *competitive and cooperative* effort between the U.S. and Panama to repair a historical injustice and ensure the enduring safety of the Panama Canal – and these twin ends are inseparable.

The paper will proceed as follows. First, theoretical considerations shape the analysis of negotiation and ratification. Foreign policy and domestic politics are interconnected. Leaders must worry about relationships with their own domestic political setting, the leaders sitting across the table from them, and the domestic politics of those leaders. Audience cost and signaling issues are ubiquitous. Second, the logic behind the case selection and research methodology is important to articulate. This is the first study on the Treaty to unite the bargaining strategies of Carter and Torrijos (informed by theory). Additionally, primary (memoirs, press releases, and archival materials from the Johnson and Carter presidential libraries) and secondary source documents tease out the Treaty bargaining dynamics. Finally, the chronology of Treaty bargaining is split into three distinct periods: pre-Carter negotiation (1964-1976), Carter administration negotiation (1977), and Treaty ratification (1977-1978).

More than anything, this paper attempts to highlight the agency of both the U.S. and Panama in bringing about this monumental agreement. What follows is a story of sovereignty recognized (by the U.S.) and sovereignty regained (by Panama).

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION

Foreign policy and domestic politics overlap in mutually constraining ways. This phenomenon is magnified during international bargaining. For Robert Putnam, international bargaining constitutes a two-level game.⁹ At the first level, leaders and officials that speak for leaders hash out an agreement. At the second level, which is populated by voters, the masses, a domestic legislature, or other civil society groups, a body of actors ratifies the agreement reached at the first level. A few issues of theoretical import arise in this process. First, the prospect of defection must be considered.¹⁰ Negotiators must always consider the possibility of voluntary and involuntary defection. If one side overreaches, the other side may willingly walk away (voluntary defection). And even if an agreement is reached, there is always a risk of failed ratifica-

4 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico*, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004), Document 381.

5 *Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1969-1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973-1976*, eds. Bradley L. Coleman, Alexander O. Poster, and James F. Siekmeier (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 6.

6 Letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, Jimmy Carter to Strom Thurmond, 7/20/77, “Panama Treaty 6-7 77” Folder, Box 36, Hamilton Jordan’s Confidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

7 Letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, Jimmy Carter to Strom Thurmond, 7/20/77, “Panama Treaty 6-7 77” Folder, Box 36, Hamilton Jordan’s Confidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

8 Robert Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 7. “Many senators said that Wayne’s was the most crucial endorsement of the treaties.” And according to Pastor, Torrijos liked to remark that Wayne’s acting skills surpassed those of Ronald Reagan (who lambasted the Treaty on the campaign trail). Wayne sent Reagan a letter “showing ‘point-by-God-damn-point in the Treaty where [he was] misinforming people.”

9 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.

10 Putnam, 438-439.

tion (involuntary defection). These two forms of defection can also be weaponized by negotiators. One side may claim that their hands are tied by domestic politics if the other side makes an impossible ask, even if flexibility is possible.¹¹ As a result, uncertainty looms in international bargaining.¹²

This back-and-forth dynamic cuts across all levels of the game. Leaders work to compel each other with incentives, appease their domestic population, and stand ready to capitalize on their bargaining partner's domestic political climate. Putnam's own analysis of Canal Treaty negotiations falls short of completeness. He isolates side-payments to senators and hand-tying rhetoric as bargaining strategies, but he fails to account for relationships between Torrijos and U.S. senators, as well as Carter's own consideration of Panama's domestic political climate.¹³ Torrijos wined-and-dined U.S. senators during crucial periods of the ratification process. American negotiators were receptive to and acted based on Torrijos' self-described domestic political troubles. These unique mechanisms add a more cooperative element to an otherwise adversarial vision of bargaining, where both sides are focused on maximizing relative gain in the ultimate win-set.

The international relations literature on the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, as well as crisis bargaining, contributes several useful analytic categories for the two-level game model. Before substantive negotiations take place, issues must be perceived as worth bargaining over by the respective parties. One way to convey the importance of issues is by sending credible, costly signals.¹⁴ But whether a signal is perceived as credible or costly to the receiver depends on the receiver noticing and interpreting the signal correctly.¹⁵ Katagiri and Min argue that the channel of signal-sending matters. Some channels allow signals to cut through "noise" better than others, which helps the receiver notice the signal and correctly interpret it. In their logic, material actions may be more effective than public and private statements.¹⁶ The signaling argument applies to bargaining more generally. Prior to the Carter administration, Torrijos sought to kickstart stalled negotiations by elevating the canal issue to the U.S. foreign policy agenda.¹⁷ His primary strategy was to

internationalize the issue in a very public setting: a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting in Panama.

Beyond signaling, leaders must consider domestic audience costs in foreign policy decisions.¹⁸ The U.S. and Panama in the 1970s, despite being dissimilar regimes, faced similar domestic constraints.¹⁹ Carter was constrained by democratic institutions that could impose substantial costs on his administration if foreign policy decisions were at odds with elite or public preferences. Torrijos also faced elite and public constraints but had less "agency space" – a concept developed by Susan Hyde and Elizabeth Saunders.²⁰ Hyde and Saunders theorize that autocrats face a higher risk of "triggering institutional or regime change" if they incur substantial audience costs.²¹ The Panama case highlights agency space well. At the start of negotiations, the cards were stacked against the Carter administration in public opinion polls and in Congress. As a result, the final Treaty includes several policy positions that Carter's team initially took a hard stance on but later conceded.

These accounts of domestic politics in international relations indicate two fundamental problems for international bargaining: incomplete information and uncertainty about intentions. However, the inevitability of these concerns does not condemn countries to diplomatic purgatory.²² Repeated interactions between states, especially in two-level games, allow relevant actors to update their own information about the intentions and domestic constraints of their bargaining partners. As Charles Glaser puts it in *Rational Theory of International Politics*, "strategic interactions can lead a state to update its assessment of an opposing state, but only based on the opposing state's actions" – a logic that squares nicely with Katagiri and Min's account of the power of material actions.²³ The U.S. and Panama began negotiations with a shaky grasp of what the other truly wanted and could do. As negotiations progressed, players at all levels of the two-level game became more familiar with each other, and cooperation was easier to accomplish. The diplomatic record is replete with examples of initial misunderstandings, almost-collapsed negotiations, and eventual reconciliation and breakthroughs.

The two-level game model, as an analytic tool, sup-

11 James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997): 68–90.

12 Putnam, 452.

13 Putnam, 440 and 444.

14 Azusa Katagiri and Eric Min, "The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach," *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 1 (February 2019): 156–72, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000643>.

15 Katagiri and Min, 158.

16 Katagiri and Min, 158.

17 Tom Long, "Putting the Canal on the Map: Panamanian Agenda-Setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 431–55, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dto96>.

18 In the U.S. case, domestic audience costs were very pronounced. Carter (1982), Jordan (1984), Sol Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985), and Pastor (2001) all argue that Carter's decision to move forward with Treaty negotiations caused a dearth of political capital that came back to haunt Carter later in his presidency. Audience costs are not only a question of if a foreign policy decision can be made – costs can also be latent and continuously imposed after the success of the decision.

19 Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (2008): 35–64.

20 Susan D. Hyde and Elizabeth N. Saunders, "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space," *International Organization* 74, no. 2 (April 2020): 363–95, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000365>.

21 Hyde and Saunders, 366.

22 Sebastian Rosato, *Intentions in Great Power Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021). Rosato writes extensively on the elusive nature of knowledge about the intentions of another great power. This paper argues that learning is an important part of international diplomacy, and countries routinely update their assessments of partners in bargaining. This may be harder to observe when two great powers are the units of analysis. But accounts of great-minor power interactions, like this paper, provide empirical support against uncertainty as an axiom.

23 Charles Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 33.

ports the case study and highlights crucial bargaining mechanisms in the negotiation and ratification process. The U.S. and Panama at times sought to maximize relative gains, and at others, worked together to pitch a common idea to their constituencies. Leaders met one another in the middle. Some even conceded more than the other on particular issues. Over time, the two sides built trust. The outcome: a new Treaty guided by a belief shared by Carter and Torrijos about what was right but constrained by a domestic audience and the dynamics of international bargaining. This conception of Treaty negotiation and ratification adds a cooperative element (updating information and building trust) to an otherwise adversarial picture of bargaining during the Cold War, accounts for pre-bargaining historical context, and builds on canonical accounts of domestic political constraints and signaling.

CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

Panama's relations with the U.S. from 1964 to 1978 are puzzling against the backdrop of Cold War U.S. foreign policy. Domestic political opposition to a new Treaty was high and vocal while Panama continuously made public and private demands on the U.S. Yet, in 1978, a treaty was ratified that returned the Canal Zone to a military dictator who was labeled a borderline-Communist leftist by the American public, influential media outlets, and congressmen. This paper's principal motivation was to address gaps in the on-face explanation of strategic necessity. The Treaty is also an anomaly in American foreign policy – the importance of respecting the sovereignty of a Latin American country was ignored by Carter's predecessor and lost on his successor.²⁴

The materials synthesized for this project run the gamut of perspectives on the Canal Treaty. In preparing these materials, this analysis has been mindful of potential biases in historiographical accounts and memoirs.²⁵ William Jordan's *Panama Odyssey* is the central account of negotiation and ratification. This paper supplements his account with memoirs from other negotiators, Carter's memoir, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) documents on Panama, digitized Carter library documents, and an archival research trip to the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. This trip yielded several interesting documents that help frame the beginning of negotiations in 1964, assessments of how relevant Panama was to U.S. national security concerns, and transcribed interviews between William Jordan and Panamanian officials on how they viewed the negotiation and ratification process in retrospect. Despite the wide variety of perspectives, there is little divergence in the interpretation of events.

The case is divided into three distinct periods, each with unique bargaining mechanisms to examine. First, the

pre-Carter negotiation period. Negotiations moved slowly and were rarely on the radar of senior U.S. officials. As a result, Torrijos moved to internationalize the issue at a UNSC meeting in Panama and make demands on the United States. This is a mini case-study in how minor powers can bring great powers to the bargaining table. Second, the negotiation period that begins after Carter's inauguration deserves particular attention. Carter desired to right historical wrongs and his negotiating team often met Torrijos' team in the middle on issues that were once intractable. Both sides learned from one another and grew to appreciate their respective domestic political constraints. Finally, the ratification period is host to its own unique dynamics. Carter and Torrijos took their agreement and pitched it to their respective constituencies in a unified manner. There were some bumps in the road (the new Treaty was almost defeated by a controversial amendment and hot tempers), and competitive bargaining reappeared, but the effort was uniquely cooperative.

The decision to renegotiate and the tense ratification fight that followed makes the Panama case a good test of the competitive and cooperative dynamics of the two-level model. After all, the high domestic constraints faced by Carter could have easily caused involuntary defection by the U.S. in the bargaining process. The case expands on the two-level model and Cold War historiography to highlight pockets of cooperation between a great power (the U.S.) and a minor power (Panama) in an era characterized by predatory U.S. involvement in Latin America. Moreover, this argument is applicable to international relations scholarship beyond the two-level model and has implications for the prospect of international cooperation in competitive environments. If audience costs are not fixed and can be augmented by another leader in bargaining through cooperative means, competition need not be the norm between dissimilar regimes.

NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

A Brief History of Canal Issues

Panamanians had been frustrated by the original Panama Canal treaty (the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty) ever since its signing in 1903. A condition of Panama's independence from Colombia was to agree to the construction of a canal built by the U.S. running through the country, which was no small ask. The original treaty established a de facto U.S. colony adjacent to Panama City. During the canal's construction, Panamanian workers were treated as second-class citizens in their own country. Canal Zone authorities even conceived of an explicitly racial worker payment hierarchy.²⁶ They claimed that "skilled" workers would receive payment tied to gold, while "unskilled" workers had their payment tied to silver. Whether a worker was assigned to the gold or silver

24 Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*, 14. Torrijos speaks to the Panamanian Assembly after signing the new Treaty with Carter, crediting the Carter administration with imbuing the negotiations with "morality" and the ability to strike "a balance between the strength of a large nation and that of a small nation..." This view of American foreign policy contrasts with the Nixon and Reagan administrations, which rarely ever thought about Latin American affairs outside of the purported Communist threat to U.S. interests. One of the Reagan administration's first messages to Torrijos was to inform him that "the flabbiness in U.S. foreign policy had been firmed up" (Pastor, 1).

25 Ian S. Lustick, "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias." *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (1996): 605-18. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2082612>.

26 Rebecca Herman, "The Global Politics of Anti-Racism: A View from the Canal Zone," *The American Historical Review* 125, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 460-86, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhaa150>.

role depended on the color of their skin and their position in a Canal Zone racial hierarchy. Non-white workers were routinely treated worse and paid less.²⁷ Grossly disparate treatment of the white and non-white populations in and around the Canal Zone continued well into the Cold War.

When riots forced President Lyndon B. Johnson's hand in 1964, U.S. officials still misunderstood how significant of a historical grievance the original treaty was to Panamanians. Johnson and Roberto Chiari, Panama's president at the time, spoke on the phone after the riots. Chiari was adamant in his characterization of the recent violence as merely an outburst of long-simmering tensions over the unfairness of the original treaty. Johnson dodged the question, claiming that the U.S. could not respond to violence with concessions.²⁸ What Johnson did not acknowledge was the truth of Chiari's statements; Chiari faced significant pressure from the voting public to act on the riots and generate forward momentum on alternative treaty negotiations.²⁹ Johnson's stalling risked igniting a more chaotic crisis that could have potentially jeopardized peace in the Canal Zone. At the same time, Johnson's advisers were urging him to move cautiously on the Canal issue – concessions at that time would have set a precedent for small countries to make impossible demands on a whim and upset congressional opposition.³⁰

In meetings with U.S. officials over the next few months, Chiari laid out Panama's core issues with the old treaty. Panama desired to regain its sovereignty, see more economic benefits from the Panama Canal, a termination date on concessions made in the original treaty (the issue of perpetuity), and put an end to the Canal Zone.³¹ For Johnson's negotiators, these terms were all non-starters. Yet, they remained central points of Panama's negotiating agenda well into the Carter administration. Eventually, Panama and the U.S. agreed on a rough outline of terms to begin serious talks on a new Treaty: a continuing U.S. right to defend the Canal, a U.S. right to build a new sea-level canal³², and the end of Treaty perpetuity (the new agreement would have an expiration date).³³ A treaty draft finalized in 1967 by the Johnson and Chiari administrations fell through due to "pre-mature and hostile publicity in both the United States and

Panama."³⁴ But one thing was certain: the new treaty would have recognized the sovereignty of Panama.³⁵ This recognition remained constant on both sides of the negotiating table and was reflected in President Jimmy Carter's efforts to ratify the Torrijos-Carter treaties in 1978.³⁶

Torrijos Takes the World Stage

Carter's decision to renegotiate the Treaty is incomplete without an account of how Torrijos brought the U.S. to the bargaining table. A fateful 1973 UNSC meeting hosted in Panama put U.S. obstinance on display for the world to see. Tom Long, in his coverage of Torrijos' international strategy, argues that this specific moment should suggest that the 1978 Treaty is more than just "Jimmy Carter's willingness to take political risks."³⁷ Instead, it reflects a carefully calculated strategy by Torrijos and other comparatively small nations in global politics to hold the U.S. accountable in an international forum.³⁸ This paper pushes back against the idea that the 1973 Panama meeting of the UNSC was instrumental in eventual Treaty ratification. The U.S. reaction to Panama's strategy is equally important. Why did Torrijos leverage an international audience to force new negotiations, and how successful was his attempt?

Torrijos was indignant at what he perceived to be U.S. intransigence in treaty negotiations. To some extent, this was justified. However, this was not simply a strategy of the U.S. negotiating team. The Special Representative assigned to represent the U.S. in negotiations, Bob Anderson, might as well have been an outsider to the Nixon administration. Anderson never met face-to-face with Nixon or Kissinger to discuss Panama.³⁹ Without clear marching orders from above, the U.S. team could not answer and resolve specific questions from their Panamanian counterparts. This dynamic persisted for two reasons. First, Nixon recognized that any new treaty which Panama perceived as fair would have a small "constituency" at home. Second, even if an agreement could be reached, Senate backlash would be intense. Nixon was in no hurry to conclude negotiations, and when negotiations briefly occupied the policy agenda in Washington, important figures like Kissinger were advocates for hardline

27 Elizabeth McKillen, "The Panama Canal: Tropical Tropes and Working-Class Realities," *Diplomatic History* 35, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 55–60, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2010.00918.x>.

28 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico*, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004), Document 370.

29 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 59.

30 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 74. Ironic, given that this is exactly how Torrijos reinvigorated Treaty talks following the 1973 UNSC meeting in Panama City.

31 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 95.

32 The seriousness of this proposal should be questioned. At the time, the preferred method in U.S. policy circles of constructing a new sea-level canal was "nuclear excavation" – anywhere from dozens to hundreds of nuclear devices would be positioned to bomb open a new waterway. The proposal speaks to the dynamic between the U.S. and Panama: the U.S. felt comfortable experimenting with nuclear devices on Panamanian soil, and in congressional hearings on feasibility there is almost no mention of Panama's perspective on the issue. See Jorden, 98 and NSF Files, Files of Charles E. Johnson, Box 36, "NUCLEAR – Nuclear Excavation (Sea Level Canal)" Folder, Johnson Library.

33 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 100.

34 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 146.

35 Johnson Statement on Panama Negotiations, 12/18/64, Panama, Inter-Oceanic/Panama Canal Negotiations, Volume 1 (3 of 3), Box 70, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

36 Importantly, Johnson's proposed treaty extracted much more from the Panamanians than Carter's final Treaty document.

37 Long, 435. For this paper's purposes, Long's analytical separation of Torrijos' international campaign and the Carter negotiations paints an incomplete picture. If Carter, a new president, wanted to renege on promises made to Torrijos by Nixon or Kissinger, he very well could have – and the domestic political climate around his inauguration favored such a move. These two policies go together, and the fact that Carter was receptive to good-faith negotiations is worth studying further and in conversation with Long's study of the 1973 UNSC meeting.

38 Long, 434.

39 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 159. Long, 440.

positions espoused by the Department of Defense (DoD).⁴⁰ Anderson simply had no authority to resolve the most crucial sticking points.

However, it should be acknowledged that intransigence was a two-way street. Talks were disorganized and “neither team realized what was happening inside the other’s councils.”⁴¹ American negotiators had a tough time convincing the Panamanians that some of their deal-breaker treaty requirements would be impossible to pass in Congress. In Panama, negotiators faced a similar issue to their U.S. counterparts. Torrijos gave his representatives vague marching orders in the 1971-1972 negotiating sessions. Without specifics, they were to advocate for a fixed expiration date and guarantee recognition of Panamanian sovereignty and “better economic return.”⁴² Moreover, members of the Panamanian negotiating team had to consider the hypothetical impact of a treaty perceived as favorable to the U.S. on their political futures at home. This period of negotiations reflects a fundamental lack of communication between both sides.

The U.S. and Panama were uncommitted to robust negotiations at the highest levels of government, and their negotiators were (out of necessity) merely talking past one another without any chance of ironing out specifics. Domestic political constraints made senior policymakers risk-averse, and in turn, disorganization was misinterpreted as bad-faith negotiation. A CIA intelligence assessment in late 1972 concludes that blame for stalled treaty negotiations should be placed on Torrijos. The Panamanian leader is characterized here as “deeply suspicious of the normal negotiating process” and “unwilling to trust” any proposal from the U.S. if it does not come directly from up top.⁴³ However, Torrijos’ distrust appears at least slightly justified given the Nixon administration’s lack of attention to the entire process. Nixon was focused on the 1972 reelection campaign and “his only interest in Panama at that stage was to assure it did not rock the boat.”⁴⁴ No U.S. proposal could be taken seriously.

As bilateral negotiations were a failure, Torrijos took the issue to the world stage to convince the U.S. of the importance of a new treaty. Torrijos recognized that no action would materialize if the U.S. did not perceive canal negotiations as a problem, so he had to “make it a problem.”⁴⁵ Prior to the 1973 UNSC meeting that would eventually take place in Panama, Torrijos courted the support of his Latin American neigh-

bors to build up regional solidarity. He flew to the capitals of Colombia, Venezuela, and Costa Rica to convince leaders of his plight. This first stage was a great success. “Phase Two” of Torrijos’ international strategy was to invite the UNSC to meet in Panama in March of 1973.⁴⁶ Backdoor diplomacy had pre-arranged the necessary votes for the invitation to succeed. William Jorden, the newly appointed Ambassador to Panama, recalls Torrijos telling him on a private trip through the countryside before the UNSC meeting that the purpose of Panama’s effort was not to “insult” the U.S. Rather, he believed without international pressure, there would be no movement on negotiations.⁴⁷

When Torrijos spoke at the opening session of the UNSC meeting, he warned that if Panama (and the plight of other Latin American countries) was ignored, it would leave the people no choice but “to carry out violent changes.”⁴⁸ Panama worked with other like-minded nations to put together a resolution that called on the U.S. to agree to all of Panama’s preferred treaty arrangements. Although John Scali, who succeeded George H.W. Bush as UN Ambassador, managed to convince many delegations in attendance that any resolution must also recognize the “interests and rights” of the U.S. “in any Panama settlement,”⁴⁹ he could not rally the necessary votes to block the resolution. The U.S. was forced to use their veto power against an overwhelming majority of the world calling for accountability on the Panama issue. Panama, a small nation defying a great power, had won a victory on the world stage.

At first, the UNSC meeting in Panama was interpreted in the U.S. as a significant setback for future negotiations. Those already opposed to a new treaty used the UNSC meeting to display worldwide communist support for Panama (many communist countries backed Panama’s rallying cry). Individuals who wanted to move forward with negotiations assumed that an embarrassed White House would be reluctant to restart talks. Jorden, in contrast, was bearish on the notion of a long-lasting negative impact.⁵⁰ Additionally, Nixon was embroiled in the Watergate scandal and had little time or attention to devote to Panama – positively or negatively. However, Nixon’s report to Congress on foreign policy in May of 1973 indicates a willingness to take a fresh look at a new treaty. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the UNSC meeting generated a feeling at the highest levels of govern-

40 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972*, eds. Douglas Kraft and James Siekmeier (Washington: Government Printing Office), Document 548. Kissinger, against obvious opposition from Torrijos and Panama’s domestic audience, continued to support a treaty without a fixed expiration date.

41 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 161.

42 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 160.

43 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1976*, eds. Douglas Kraft and James Siekmeier (Washington: Government Printing Office), Document 563.

44 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 167.

45 Interview with General Omar Torrijos, William Jorden interviewing, 4/24/79, Box 23, Personal Papers of William J. Jorden, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 11.

46 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 184. The U.S. objection to Panama’s proposal, given by George H. W. Bush (UN Ambassador at the time), was that the UNSC should not intervene in bilateral affairs.

47 Jorden, 188.

48 Jorden, 191.

49 Jorden, 194.

50 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973-1976*, eds. Bradley L. Coleman, Alexander O. Poster, and James F. Siekmeier (Washington: Government Printing Office), Document 7.

ment that international shame may be more important to consider than domestic political opposition.⁵¹ Largely insulated from the Watergate scandal, international embarrassment was enough to catch Kissinger's eye.⁵² Kissinger's first significant move was to sign off on a new chief negotiator to replace Bob Anderson: Ellsworth Bunker, an accomplished civil servant with DoD connections and experience in earlier Vietnam negotiations.

Bargaining in the early 70s collapsed due to mistrust, the perceived impossibility of domestic ratification, and a lack of will on both sides of the table to meet one another in the middle. This sparked Torrijos' bold strategy to internationalize the canal negotiations. It was wildly successful and forced America to reckon with its regional and international image. A minor power stood up to a great power, and the Nixon administration's concern for reputation momentarily outweighed its domestic political calculus. Torrijos' strategy did not destroy negotiations. Instead, he launched a new era of semi-cooperative bargaining that began to make real headway.⁵³

TREATY NEGOTIATIONS UNDER CARTER

The Decision

Carter was convinced by his foreign policy advisors to pursue renegotiation.⁵⁴ However, it was not an easy decision to make. As recently as 1975, a resolution was introduced into the senate with thirty-eight backers. The resolution "opposed any new treaty" as well as the "termination of United States sovereignty over the Canal Zone." Moreover, public opinion polls were firmly against renegotiation.⁵⁵ Carter described the choice to take the fight to Congress and commit to negotiations as informed by the desire to correct an "injustice."⁵⁶ However, he also pointed to looming security concerns, such as the "danger from direct attack and sabotage" without a new treaty. This stance had the backing of senior military officials in his new administration. While political opponents would be sure to prove their anti-communist chops by opposing a new treaty, Carter viewed renegotiation as a fundamentally anti-communist act. If the U.S. could be perceived as fair in treaty negotiations with Panama, many communist dissident groups in Panama would lose rhetorical power.⁵⁷ Finally, he was concerned with driving a wedge between America and its

"best friends and allies" in Latin America with continued intransigence.⁵⁸ Many influential Latin American leaders were entirely convinced of Panama's plea for justice.

These facts motivated a congressional fight when public opinion was against the idea, and it was unclear whether Carter had the votes to get a treaty ratified. He believed that informing domestic political actors about the true facts of the situation would bring them over to his side. Carter's Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, surmised that the hostile majority in public opinion was a shallow majority (and therefore malleable).⁵⁹ Thus, the decision to renegotiate was made in spite of the potential domestic political costs.⁶⁰ Between making this choice and the ratification fight, Carter himself was rarely involved in the negotiation process. He gave great latitude to his negotiating team to reach a reasonable settlement.

Starting Positions

Foreign Minister Juan Tack and Henry Kissinger agreed to a set of eight principles to guide negotiations in 1974 (the Tack-Kissinger Principles).⁶¹ The most important issues therein can be described as follows: the end of perpetuity in any new treaty, a limitation in scope of military activities explicitly in defense of the canal, a just share of the canal's profits secured for Panama, and a guarantee of complete Panamanian sovereignty in and around the canal. The Tack-Kissinger principles bear a striking similarity to the draft Chiari-Johnson treaty from 1967, but these new principles built on earlier negotiations in two important ways: the new treaty would have a fixed expiration date, and there would be a complete handover of the Canal Zone.⁶² However, the principles were only principles. Specifics had to be hashed out between the two negotiating teams, and little progress was made until the Carter administration.⁶³

Carter had two main points which he could not compromise on. First, the U.S. would have to maintain priority access to the Panama Canal. This was important to officials in Washington for commercial and military reasons. The canal improved Atlantic-Pacific military logistics and was a hub of trade in the Western hemisphere. Second, he had to maintain the right of the U.S. to defend the canal (indefinitely). If elements in Washington who opposed the treaty due to security concerns were to be convinced, this assurance was

51 Interview with Nicolás González-Revilla, William Jordan interviewing, 4/23/79, Box 23, Personal Papers of William J. Jordan, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

52 Jordan, *Panama Odyssey*, 197-198. Perhaps Kissinger's attention was also piqued by the Cold War politicization of the Canal issue at the UNSC meeting.

53 Long, 454.

54 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 150.

55 Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 155.

56 Carter, 155.

57 Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 156. This is an extremely important point, as it exposes a fundamental contradiction in the argument of Treaty opponents. Inaction was inviting communist agitation and grassroots support for violent action against U.S. interests in Panama. If Carter moved forward with negotiations in a way that accommodated Panama's interests, these groups could be thwarted without chaos erupting.

58 Carter, 156.

59 Robert Strong, "Jimmy Carter and the Panama Canal Treaties," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (1991): 269-86, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27550717>.

60 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980*, Volume XXIX, Panama, ed. Laura R. Kolar Siekmeier (Washington: Government Printing Office), Document 3.

61 Jordan, *Panama Odyssey*, 204.

62 Jordan, 216.

63 There are many reasons for this. Chief among them is Nixon's resignation and a general opinion in the Pentagon that pursuing further treaty talks would damage President Ford's reelection chances. Linowitz, 148.

necessary.⁶⁴ Sol Linowitz, who served as co-negotiator on the U.S. team with Bunker, broke up the initial 1977 negotiation strategy into three parts.

First (and perhaps most importantly), they had to find an arrangement that appeased the DoD. This matches up with one of the two pillars of Carter's thoughts on negotiations. Second, Linowitz made it a priority to win the trust of Torrijos and the Panamanian negotiators. It was not enough to claim that the U.S. negotiating team had their hands tied – the Panamanian negotiators had to come to understand domestic political dynamics in the U.S. Finally, the finished product had to appease at least sixty-seven senators in Congress. Domestic political constraints, whether they be interagency dynamics or ratification concerns, guided the U.S. negotiating strategy from day one.⁶⁵

On the Panamanian side, negotiators were at first optimistic that Carter's decision to negotiate implied wholesale buy-in to the Tack-Kissinger principles. Torrijos, in an interview after the Treaty had been ratified, expressed an inherent trust in the Carter administration. Carter was a farmer from humble means, like Torrijos.⁶⁶ Torrijos saw Carter's election as the closest thing one could get to a coup d'état in the U.S. – “a coup d'état with votes” against the “immortality of the Nixon administration.”⁶⁷ Panama's negotiating team was led by the new foreign minister, Nicolás González-Revilla, and Rómulo Escobar. When Bunker and Linowitz arrived in Panama and began talks, the position they defended was against many of the eight principles. Most importantly, Bunker had proposed a mutual defense treaty between Panama and the U.S. before the expiration of the new treaty. This would, in effect, maintain the perpetuity of U.S. military forces *inside* Panama. In essence, miscommunication characterized the first round of negotiations. Panama thought the U.S. wanted to move forward quickly (which domestic politics in the U.S. would never allow), while the American team was probing Panamanian flexibility with suggestions that violated the eight principles.⁶⁸ Breaking the gridlock required concessions and cooperation.

Cooperative Bargaining

To credibly signal good-faith intentions in the early days of negotiations, U.S. negotiators differentiated themselves from Nixon-era officials by offering a much sooner expiration date: the year 2000, as opposed to the “at least forty years” option given by Nixon's negotiators.⁶⁹ Despite such headways, Panama reacted negatively to U.S. proposals

that were still not in line with the Tack-Kissinger principles in official meetings. However, before Linowitz and Bunker left for the U.S. after the first round of talks, Escobar pulled Linowitz aside for a private breakfast and assured him that negotiations would simply take time. He promised that the Panamanian delegation understood the Carter administration's commitment to just causes in Latin America, but he also warned that the process could be lengthy. Aggression up front may have just been a Panamanian negotiating strategy, and it was also in the interest of the Americans to not give in immediately. Regardless, this was the beginning of a fruitful rapport between the senior members of both negotiating teams.⁷⁰

A breakthrough occurred in the Treaty language surrounding perpetuity soon after. The U.S. team stood by their position that a lasting right to defend the canal was necessary, and the Panamanians maintained that perpetuity was unacceptable. However, Linowitz's decision to switch to the word “permanent” to describe the defense arrangement was suddenly, and perhaps inexplicably, acceptable to Escobar.⁷¹ The arrangement was amenable to Panama so long as the defense arrangement was meant to maintain the *neutrality* of the Canal. This step allowed the U.S. to solidify support from important officials in the Pentagon. Additionally, since Panama had conceded the perpetuity point, Bunker and Linowitz went to bat for the Panamanians back in Washington. They successfully extracted concessions from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs on Canal Zone control. In a matter of weeks, Panama signed off on a permanent right to defend the canal, and the U.S. finally approved a full handover of the Canal Zone, cementing a fundamental respect for Panama's sovereignty.⁷² This last point was crucial to earn the trust of Panamanian negotiators. They viewed the sovereignty issue as a “litmus test of U.S. intentions.”⁷³

Another important test of U.S. flexibility happened at the worst possible moment: when both sides thought that a conclusion to talks was near. Torrijos was meeting with prominent Latin American leaders in Bogotá, and last-minute changes to the agreement decided upon by Torrijos and the other leaders prompted American and Panamanian negotiators to hold an emergency meeting at the Panamanian embassy in Washington. The Panamanians had received instructions to request an increase in the share of tolls from canal traffic.⁷⁴ Additionally, they wanted the U.S. to abandon their exclusive right to build a new sea-level canal (in return, the U.S. retained a veto power over the construction of a new

64 Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 157.

65 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 153.

66 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 162.

67 Interview with General Omar Torrijos, William Jorden interviewing, 4/24/79, Box 23, Personal Papers of William J. Jorden, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 19.

68 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 350-351.

69 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 156.

70 Linowitz, 354-355 and Linowitz, 158.

71 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 162.

72 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 163.

73 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 371.

74 Unbeknownst to Panama, Carter had already given pre-approval on this issue. When Bunker broached the topic of tolls to Carter, the president deemed the current arrangement unfair and agreed that it should change in the future.

canal until the year 2000).⁷⁵ Bunker and Linowitz made a late call that evening to Carter for approval on these points. Carter approved all of them and hung up. That the U.S. president was willing to bend on Panama's key issues in the late hours of Treaty negotiations displays a genuine willingness to move forward.

Three key factors contributed to the successful conclusion of negotiations in 1977. First, the new negotiating teams in Panama and the U.S. listened to one another and gained a thorough understanding of what was possible given each other's domestic constraints. The negotiations were a learning process that built trust. Second, the U.S. proved extremely flexible on a few key points. If Panama could concede on core U.S. concerns, like continued defense of the canal, then the U.S. would return home and fight domestic political opposition on Panama's core principles. Third, the negotiations were not a zero-sum competition. However, cooperation required a preexisting foundation of trust. Once trust was established, negotiations quickened.

THE RATIFICATION FIGHT

Treaty ratification was the most significant battle of this fourteen-year saga. After the Treaty was signed by Torrijos and Carter, the two worked in tandem to pitch the Treaty to "different sets of customers" in their respective countries. They both acknowledged that pitches to domestic political audiences would look different in Panama and the U.S.⁷⁶ Panama decided much earlier in the negotiation process to ratify via national plebiscite. Even Torrijos, who was essentially a military dictator, initially remarked that the Treaty certainly did "not have the unanimous support of his people."⁷⁷ He would have to work hard to frame the Treaty in favorable terms, and he simultaneously understood the rocky road ahead in the Senate. For the first time in the Panama Canal negotiations, the leaders of Panama and the U.S. worked as a united front to overcome domestic political barriers.

Carter's Playbook

The Carter administration pursued a full-court press at all levels of government. Even before Treaty signing, senior officials planned the public affairs strategy for ratification. Federal agencies were mobilized to pitch the Treaty as it related to their subject matter, the negotiating team went on a tour of the country to meet with interest groups about the Treaty specifics, and President Carter worked tirelessly to call on senators to secure their support.⁷⁸ This strategy to educate the public and Congress was no guarantee of support. The cards were stacked against the Carter administration in

Congress, and public opinion was unfavorable. However, once Carter officials began making the rounds and educating citizens as well as congressmen, it became clear that Treaty opposition was not as solidified as it seemed. For instance, some polls in late 1977 found that once people recognized the U.S. still had the right to intervene to defend the canal, the opposition's majority crumbled, and respondents favored the treaty by a two to one margin.⁷⁹ Voters were primarily concerned with security. As such, once the public affairs campaign shot down security concerns, the Carter administration convinced senators that their constituents would be on board with ratification.

The ratification process gave further evidence that U.S. negotiators had not been lying about the prospects of Senate approval. Escobar told Linowitz that he thought the Americans had been using Congress as a phantom to extract concessions from the Panamanians. However, Carter's struggle at home reinforced Escobar's faith that Bunker and Linowitz had acted in an honorable and trustworthy manner.⁸⁰ To their credit, the hand-tying rhetoric of U.S. negotiators was based on regular consultations with senators prior to Treaty signing. Meanwhile, in Panama, Torrijos' efforts to overcome domestic political opposition were reverberating in the halls of the U.S. Senate. In one speech to Panama's Assembly in August 1977, Torrijos claimed outright that Panama had given the U.S. the right to intervene in defense of the canal. When Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings began in September, many Treaty opponents demanded that the Carter administration reconcile the apparent competing interpretations of the Treaty.⁸¹ Torrijos secretly agreed to the Carter administration's interpretation of the Treaty before Panama's national plebiscite. This was a risky move, as leaked news of Torrijos' move could have backfired and jeopardized the vote. Regardless, Torrijos pushed ahead to hasten the ratification process in the United States.

Carter's team came closest to losing the battle in the Senate when Senator Dennis DeConcini introduced an amendment that granted the U.S. an absolute right to intervene against "any action that impeded the operations of the canal."⁸² Opportunist senators interpreted this as a right to intervene on Panamanian soil under a virtually unlimited set of circumstances. Torrijos was up in arms and ready to disavow the new amendment and the entire ratification process. Carter was aware of how bumps in the road like the DeConcini Amendment made Torrijos' domestic politics difficult to control and knew that this amendment and others like it could not be allowed to pass.⁸³ Even the Carter administration's staunchest allies in the Senate began to pull back

75 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 170.

76 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 170.

77 Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, 455.

78 Hamilton Jordan Confidential Files, Panama Treaty 6-7, 77, 6/17/77, Jimmy Carter Library.

79 Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 162.

80 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 181.

81 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 192.

82 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 199.

83 Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 168.

their support because the DeConcini Amendment was too hostile to Panama. However, a careful campaign to convince “maybe” votes in the Senate over the preceding months enabled the Carter administration to squeak by and defeat the amendment by one vote.⁸⁴

Torrijos’ Playbook

By many primary source accounts, Torrijos was instrumental in generating momentum for treaty ratification in the Senate.⁸⁵ He wined and dined forty-four U.S. senators at the suggestion of his Ambassador to the U.S., Gabriel Lewis.⁸⁶ Many Senators took fact-finding trips to Panama during the ratification process. Torrijos went above and beyond to convince them of his cause. The leader of Panama had famously thin skin when it came to outside criticism from U.S. senators.⁸⁷ However, he withstood the interrogation of Treaty opponents who visited his country and made every attempt to assure them that the Treaty was nothing more than an overdue respect for Panama’s sovereignty that still protected U.S. interests in the canal. Torrijos’ charm campaign allowed U.S. Senators to see Panama in all its glory. Soon after landing, it was apparent to many that fears of communism were overblown and the Treaty would only secure the U.S.-Panama relationship against malicious groups.⁸⁸

Not all visits were beneficial, however Senators in charge of the opposition camp, such as Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms, weaponized visits to Panama to claim that they had an authoritative grasp on events on the ground. Thurmond and Helms spent only a “day and a half” in Panama, mostly sticking to the Canal Zone and meeting with Treaty opponents. They declined offers from Carter officials to be introduced to Panamanian officials or ordinary citizens of the country. Their only request was a meeting with President Lakas of Panama. Unknown to Lakas, the senators “recorded the session on what [Jordan] assumed was a small radio.”⁸⁹ Lakas used vulgar and racist language in his meeting with Thurmond and Helms, which was then sent to news outlets in Washington to paint Panama’s regime as backwards and behind the times.⁹⁰

Torrijos also made several policy concessions to senators in the ratification fight. Some senators were on the fence due to human rights concerns and the illiberal nature of Panama’s government.⁹¹ The General acknowledged these concerns and made concrete promises to correct human rights violations and democratize Panama’s political system after the Treaty had been ratified.⁹² By all accounts, Torrijos wanted to do right by Panama and right historical wrongs.

He was willing to go to great lengths to see the U.S. return Panama’s territory and decrease its presence. At home, Torrijos’ strategy was simple. He sold the Treaty as a win for Panama and a defeat for the Americans. Whether this is a true characterization of the Treaty (from Panama’s perspective) is a separate discussion. In fact, his opponents at home often criticized his regime for giving the Americans too much flexibility in the final version of the Treaty.

CONCLUSION

One must wonder what would have happened if no agreement was reached between Panama and the U.S. Luckily, the historical record clearly displays the counterfactual. Torrijos later admitted that he planned a secret operation to demolish the locks in the canal. His code phrase for the demolition: “*No son potables* (the water is not drinkable).”⁹³ Carter notes in his memoir that Torrijos’ admission was “not inconsistent” with warnings received from U.S. intelligence agencies in the weeks leading up to ratification.⁹⁴ If ratification failed, it is easy to imagine that the worst nightmares of the security concerns crowd would have come to life. Instead, the U.S. and Panama reached an agreement that solidified America’s reputation as a great power that respected the sovereignty of less powerful nations. For the rest of Carter’s administration, the U.S. undoubtedly benefited from the reputational aftershock of ratification.

There is no easy answer such as “strategic necessity” or “security concerns” that explains Carter’s decision to negotiate with Panama. After all, talks were ongoing (albeit haphazardly) for twelve years before he took office. Public opinion was firmly against a new agreement. It was obvious to many observers that the two-thirds majority required to ratify any new Treaty in the Senate simply did not exist, and many senators wrote off Panama as a leftist government with too many ties to Castro and communism.

This paper finds that Carter’s primary motivation was to remedy a tragic, outdated treaty that would continue to degrade U.S.-Panama relations. Moreover, this decision would not have been possible without Torrijos’ efforts in the early 70s to internationalize the canal issue and force America’s hand with international pressure. During negotiation and ratification, officials on both sides of the table built trust and iteratively learned about the domestic political constraints of their opponents. After this learning period, negotiators worked cooperatively to reach mutually beneficial bargains on Treaty language. And in the final hours, Carter made sev-

84 Linowitz, *The Making of a Public Man*, 200.

85 Jordan’s interview of Torrijos, the memoirs of Jordan, Carter, Linowitz, and Pastor’s retroactive analysis all confirm this fact.

86 Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*, 8.

87 “Torrijos later told U.S. Ambassador Moss that while listening to the translation of the Senate debate on Panamanian radio, he broke hundreds of transistor radios.” Pastor, 8.

88 Interview with General Omar Torrijos, William Jordan interviewing, 4/24/79, Box 23, Personal Papers of William J. Jordan, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

89 Jordan, *Panama Odyssey*, 463.

90 This attempt at painting Panama as backwards is ironic given Strom Thurmond’s history of supporting segregation and states’ rights. Jordan, 464.

91 Interview with General Omar Torrijos, William Jordan interviewing, 4/24/79, Box 23, Personal Papers of William J. Jordan, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 4.

92 Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 164.

93 Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool*, 14.

94 Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 178.

eral key concessions. Once a Treaty was finalized, Carter and Torrijos worked together to pitch the Treaty to their domestic audiences. The historical record builds on Putnam's two-level model to add several unique mechanisms of cooperation under bargaining conditions. However, this paper's most important contribution is the argument that Torrijos augmented domestic political constraints in the U.S. to facilitate ratification for his bargaining partner.

A great power and a minor power, in the middle of the Cold War, came together to remedy a historical error that scarred relations between the two countries for decades. Both leaders reached across the table despite high audience costs and domestic political constraints. The case of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties is undoubtedly informative for future scholarship on pockets of cooperation between the U.S. and minor powers during the Cold War. 🏛️

The Start of the Cold War in American Media

The end of World War II (WWII) resulted in a tumultuous time between the Allied powers and the creation of One World Peace ideology — the idea that there would be one peace for the world without dividing the world into multiple parts. Between April through August of 1946, tensions rose between the United States and the Soviets as they struggled to forge peace treaties. American perception of Soviet aggression during Soviet expansion into the Danube and Iran led to some of the first significant breaks in American media’s description of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the failures of multiple peace conferences led to the belief that the Soviets were stalling the pursuit of world peace for their benefit. The result caused the beginning of popular Cold War sentiments in the American public. From March through May of 1947, the Truman Doctrine reaffirmed those sentiments. Through news reporting, the idea behind the Doctrine placed what can be perceived to be the contentious theory of a philosophical clash in policy and ideology between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Likewise, this paper suggests that the Truman Doctrine finalized the descent into the Cold War. It is no surprise then that in September 1947, Walter Lippmann’s “Cold War” essay popularized the term “Cold War.” From Lippmann to today, the Cold War term is used to describe the freezing essence of American-Soviet relations after WWII. At that time, many foreign policy analysts and journalists felt as though it was only a question of when the ice would break into a total Cold War.

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THE END OF WORLD WAR II (WWII) saw an immediate difficulty in creating a lasting peace. The Allies came together out of necessity, and the conflicting ideologies of Western capitalism and democracy against Soviet communism and totalitarianism were a tough hurdle to overcome. The propaganda to accept the Soviets as American allies during WWII despite their differences was crashing. The difficulty of accepting others with polar opposite beliefs made agreement difficult and suspicions abound. However, the world hoped they could surmount the significant challenges and create world peace. The new United Nations (U.N.) formed the basis of people’s belief in the potential for peace. Countries would cooperate and discuss openly to prevent another world war. Meanwhile, the peace conferences were continuously ongoing. The Allies had defeated the “Slave World,” a propaganda term used to describe the Axis during World War II, and people believed the new world needed to be under one banner for peace to prevail.¹ The hope was that by creating “one world” a “permanent peace” would emerge forming the basis of a One World Peace ideology.² During the first year after the Allies won, One World Peace, remained the ever-present goal that Americans were willing to acquiesce some ideological values to achieve. However, American perception of the U.S.S.R. slowly shifted because of Soviet expansionism, their totalitar-

ian ideology, and a sentiment that the Soviets were stalling the creation of One World Peace for their benefit.

This paper utilizes the Sunday issue of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* and the weekly issue of *Time* during several months of 1946 and 1947. In 1946 and 1947, the *New York Times* remained dedicated to remaining unbiased.³ The *Washington Post* was owned by a well known Republican. The Republican Party was split upon remaining isolationist or accepting a larger global role. Despite its owner’s beliefs, the *Washington Post* attempted to publish with minimal influence from its owner yet it frequently sympathized with the Soviets.⁴ Meanwhile, Henry Luce, a conservative, owned *Time* and used it to promote his anti-Soviet ideology.⁵ Fundamentally, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the initial ideology for the Cold War was present by August 1946. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 was an expression of these anti-Soviet values that formed the basis of the America versus the Soviet Union mentality, and by the end of 1947, Walter Lippmann’s “Cold War” essays popularized the idea of a “Cold War.”

PART ONE: THE TURN (APRIL 1946 – AUGUST 1946)

April of 1946 saw optimism for the Foreign Ministers’ Paris discussion, set for April 25th. The failures of the previous conferences invoked unease as the details for peace remained

1 *Why We Fight: Prelude to War*, directed by Frank Capra (20th Century Studios 1942).

2 “Welles Bids U.S. Build ‘One World,’” *New York Times*, May 27, 1946.

3 “New York Times Company records. Arthur Hays Sulzberger papers,” New York Public Library, accessed Dec. 12, 2023, <https://archives.nypl.org/mss/17782>.

4 Chalmers Roberts, *The Washington Post: The First 100 Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977).

5 “Henry Luce and 20th Century U.S. Internationalism,” U.S. Department of State, accessed Dec. 12, 2023, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/internationalism>.

elusive. Anxiety about a possible long-term peace grew as time passed because the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I took less than a year to sign. People viewed the mere organization of the April meeting as a fortuitous sign because of the minimal progress towards any agreement in the previous conferences. An agreement at this conference would pave the way for the world to start moving past WWII. The *Washington Post* reported that it was “encouraging to note” that the other three powers in the Big Four (the United Kingdom, France, and U.S.S.R.) approved the initial suggestion by American Secretary James Byrnes for the meeting in Paris.⁶ However, the article quickly quashed the excessive optimism. It wrote that “It would be indulging in optimism of the rashest sort to assume that because they are to meet, the deadlock will be broken.”⁷ While the *Washington Post* remained optimistic, the *New York Times* was anxious about the conference, writing, “There are many who believe that this is the ‘last chance.’”⁸ Meanwhile, *Time* was the least confident in any productive change occurring, writing, “It was unlikely that next week’s Paris meeting of the Big Four Foreign Ministers would greatly ease or greatly aggravate the chronic competition between Russia and the West.”⁹ With the most conservative and anti-Soviet people pinning the blame solely on the U.S.S.R. for impeding peace. *Time* placed the fault for the previous, and possible upcoming, failures squarely on the Soviets indicting the Soviet consolidation of the Balkans and expansion into the Mediterranean. To *Time*, the U.S. and U.K. fight against the Soviet advance caused the failure of the previous meetings. The struggles for agreement at the peace conferences formed the basis for the belief that the peace conferences were useless. Regardless of these doubts, the issues remained founded primarily on how to divide post-war Europe.

The April 25th meeting had in the background increasing tensions from Soviet expansionism and the U.S.S.R.’s difficulty in the new United Nations. The threat of Soviet expansion existed along the Danube as Soviet troops remained in Romania. The *New York Times* reported that the remaining Soviet troops raised British and American suspicions without arousing an aggressive response. Regardless of the Danube, the media latched onto the more pressing Iran issue. Soviet troops remained in Iran past when they were supposed to leave, causing international concern for Soviet expansion beyond the designated Balkans. The matter made its way to the U.N. docket. Iran removed the complaint, and the Soviets claimed the only legal option was to remove it from the docket. However, the *New York Times* reported that the

“Iranian Government submitted to the Soviet demands that the case be withdrawn.”¹⁰ The American government initially ignored this bullying, but the media ensured the people noticed the Soviet tactic of forceful diplomacy. The *New York Times* argued that Britain and America “hesitated” in accusing the U.S.S.R. because “it would lead to another Big Three row.”¹¹ The concern was that another fight would continue to stall the peace conferences and prevent the goal of creating One World Peace. Despite the initial hesitation, the Iran issue made its way to the United Nations. *Time* reported that the U.S.S.R. protested by not attending and argued that having the issue debated despite both parties withdrawing their claims was “illegal.”¹² The U.S.S.R.’s defiance put the U.N. in a precarious situation, with the news scared of the future effectiveness of the institution. The tenuous situation in the U.N. caused some fear for the possibility of world peace.

The Foreign Ministers’ Paris discussion continued into May when Americans saw their government taking a more prominent place on the world stage and the U.S.S.R.’s continued defiance in creating peace treaties. The peace talks were featured in the news and signaled a turning point in American perception of its future trajectory and its relationship with the U.S.S.R. The *New York Times* specifically mentioned this growing pain: “The United States has broken with its isolationist tradition and yet how stubbornly some isolationist habits persist.”¹³ The change in foreign policy from isolationism was not entirely accepted, but a more substantial role in Europe continued to guide American diplomacy in peace talks. The persistence of isolationism would appear in full force during the push for the Truman Doctrine in the following month, but the larger role in Europe would prevail with the successful launch of the Marshall Plan. Meanwhile, the American presence in Europe meant that America implicitly opposed Soviet expansion and guaranteed dedication to creating one world. Alongside a different perception of American foreign policy, the media notified readers of the deterioration of friendliness between the U.S.S.R. and America during the meeting. The *New York Times* referenced Soviet suspicion of its Western allies.¹⁴ The Soviet suspicion prevented what is presented by both the *New York Times* and *Time* as good-will because America was willing to negotiate. The *New York Times* summarizes the American view as “Moscow is not willing to go halfway” and the Soviet view as “the West refuses to give proper recognition to the Eastern light.”¹⁵ Meanwhile, *Time* says Moscow “cold-shouldered” the American proposal for peace with Germany.¹⁶ This snub

6 “Peace Treaties,” *Washington Post*, April 14, 1946.

7 “Peace Treaties.”

8 “Challenge of Peace,” *New York Times*, April 28, 1946.

9 “The Nations,” *Time*, April 22, 1946.

10 “Refusal to Stop Case Based on Soviet Pressure on Iran,” *New York Times*, April 17, 1946.

11 “Refusal to Stop.”

12 “U.N.,” *Time*, April 15, 1946.

13 James Reston, “Our Foreign Policy Grows More International,” *New York Times*, May 5, 1946.

14 “Growing Issues,” *New York Times*, May 5, 1946.

15 C.L. Sulzberger, “Trieste Becomes a Symbol of a World Divided,” *New York Times*, May 12, 1946.

16 “Potsdam Product,” *Time*, May 20, 1946.

was another example of the U.S.S.R. continuing to impede peace. Readers were aware of the many issues the U.S.S.R. was causing worldwide with its Balkan cronies and expansion in Iran and the Danube. By not compromising, the U.S.S.R. was notifying the world that its goals would be satisfied at the expense of the rest of the world.

The difficulties at the conference caused the news to question if this was the preamble to a split between the East and West. The inability to reconcile the West's and the U.S.S.R.'s views of a satisfactory peace caused the *New York Times* to write that "when one mentions two worlds, it is unfortunately an accurate representation."¹⁷ Other articles in the *New York Times* state that the U.S.S.R.'s "war allies are having trouble agreeing with Russia."¹⁸ With *Time* titling a subsection, "One World or Two?"¹⁹ the fight for one free world, the goal of American entry into World War II, started to shake. Ambassador George Messersmith commented on the tensions and printed them in the *New York Times*. The *New York Times* quoted the Ambassador's sentiment that the international situation was an "armed truce" and summarized his belief that "Russia's policy today was similar to that of Germany during 1933-38."²⁰ The increased tension led to minimal agreement during the Paris meeting. Despite pessimism about future diplomacy, hope still existed for a future One World Peace. While *Time* embodied the pessimistic attitude. Their pessimism is embodied when they reported that, "the clear-cut opposition between Russia and the West made more sense than the former pretense that the conflict did not exist."²¹ The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* took the hopeful view. One article in the *New York Times* states, "One world can live in two divided halves, awkwardly perhaps, uneasily, suspiciously but successfully. But not forever."²² The *Washington Post* continued with its optimistic streak, by including that "Byrnes reportedly is still hopeful that his proposal... [on] Germany will be accepted by all sides."²³ These two views formed the basis of American perception of the Soviets in the following months. The American desire for One World Peace remained despite the turbulence; it only required continued diplomacy with the U.S.S.R.

Following the Paris conference, newspapers started to change their tone slightly. The most significant factor was the new perception that the Soviets were unwilling to create a lasting accord to create One World. Within the lack of Soviet cooperation in peace, Soviet aggression continued, furthering a belief that the divide between the U.S.S.R. and the West was growing. The American government's stronger stance

in diplomacy, especially with the U.S.S.R., furthered this belief. The *New York Times* noted heightened stringency about the Soviets with a piece titled "U.S. Adjusts Attitude on Issues with Russia." The *New York Times* also published public perceptions of anti-Soviet attitudes in a collection of opinions. They reported the American Federation of Labor's (AFL) stance on US-Soviet relations. In the article, the AFL believes that

"the failure of the Paris conference was 'grievously disappointing.' It considered 'dangerous the deep cleavage in policy which has developed between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other.'"²⁴

Even the optimistic *Washington Post* sprinkled in articles that questioned the hopeful attitude with an article that states, "many responsible diplomatic observers do not subscribe" to the notion of considerable progress in Paris.²⁵ The likelihood of a unified peace slowly disappeared following the conference, and the media adopted this sentiment.

Despite growing resentment of Soviet actions, some believed in appeasement that would accept some Soviet aggressive actions in exchange for world peace. June saw more advocates for improving American-Soviet relations in the news. For some, the fear of World War III required improving relations, but others retained a previously favorable view of the U.S.S.R. World War III looked more likely as tensions increased, as war was the only outcome some could imagine with a dispute between the world powers. To try to increase Soviet favorability in American perception, several individuals justified Soviet actions. The *Washington Post* published an article praising the Soviet delegate to the U.N., Gromyko. The article calls him "A Serious Workman," "the center of attention," and a "genial host." Major news sources printed, excerpted, and summarized Soviet media which blamed American and British proposals that prevented the U.S.S.R. from its security aspirations in favor of Western Imperialism.²⁶ Meanwhile, the *New York Times* printed an article titled "Liberals Advocate U.S.-Soviet Unity."²⁷ The media made these attempts to decrease American-Soviet tensions by explaining Soviet actions and recreating the possibility of One World Peace.

June also saw tensions increase to a lesser extent due to Soviet veto abuse in the U.N. and the prevalence of the atomic question and treaties. The veto was the tool the Soviets used in the U.N. to further their expansion agenda. Americans perceived the Soviet liberal interpretation and use of the veto as "the very center of Soviet policy in the United

17 Sulzberger, "Trieste."

18 Edward James, "Russia Eases Tension of Paris Negotiations," *New York Times*, May 12, 1946.

19 "The Nations," *Time*, May 27, 1946.

20 Camille Cianfarra, "Messersmith Sees Soviet Aggression," *New York Times*, May 12, 1946.

21 "The Nations," May 27.

22 C.L. Sulzberger, "Hope of Future Accord Survives Paris Failure," *New York Times*, May 19, 1946.

23 John Hightower, "Byrnes Feels Paris Talks Didn't Fail Completely," *Washington Post*, May 19, 1946.

24 Bertram Hulen, "Byrnes to Speak on Parley in Paris Tomorrow Night," *New York Times*, May 19, 1946.

25 Andre Visson, "Controversy with Russia," *Washington Post*, June 2, 1946.

26 "Peace Tries," *New York Times*, June 16, 1946.

27 "Liberals Advocate U.S.-Soviet Unity," *New York Times*, June 9, 1946.

Nations.”²⁸ The *New York Times* reported that Soviet vetoes led to “a series of heated debates such as even the most serious crises in the Council have seldom aroused.”²⁹ Simultaneously, the atomic bomb treaty became an issue of increasing debate. The lack of a deal on the atomic bomb was a threat to peace and the world because of the amount of power it gave America. When America proposed its plan, the Soviets opposed the atomic bomb proposals and suggested their own. Both proposals were untenable for the other and emphasized the suspicion between the Soviets and the Americans. However, in American media, the American proposal was discussed more favorably, with *Time* saying that the American proposal “affirmed America’s good faith regarding the A-Bomb.”³⁰ However, without an agreement, the populace was concerned about the inability to make a treaty on the use of atomic weapons, fearing their use in a possible upcoming war. A *New York Times* title summarizes this belief: “Atom Secret Cannot be Kept: Dr. Gustavson Asserts Control Must be Used if There is to be Universal Peace.”³¹ Moreover, some Americans were starting to view the U.S.S.R. as an enemy because of their continued inability to make peace deals with America. *Time* reported on an incident of a man in Detroit yelling, “You... are sitting... with enemies of the United States!” at the governor while he entertained a Russian ambassador.”³²

The middle of June saw another conference between the Big Four to create peace, with the atomic question remaining in the background. This conference met to create the drafts before the twenty-one-country summit would meet and hopefully finalize peace treaties. If this conference was unsuccessful, Secretary Byrnes threatened to create peace for America without Soviet input. The *New York Times* wrote that the result would be “the One World for which the peacemakers hoped would again be split – clearly if not irrevocably – into two.”³³ Even the *Washington Post* has an article stating that “should the conference turn out to be a failure, there will for many years be no peace in Europe.”³⁴ The hopes for One World Peace were finally collapsing as America and Britain sought to create peace, even if it split the world. However, minor agreements occurred, and the ambassadors scheduled the twenty-one-country summit for July 29th. Despite progress, any challenges were blamed on the U.S.S.R., with *Time* quoting Secretary Byrnes that the U.S.S.R.’s Foreign Minister has “retreated nowhere.”³⁵ The American people were also getting tired of the continued delay. One person in a letter

to the editor published in *Time* stated, “I, for one, am heartily sick of this talk of Russia and the democracies not being able to understand each other.”³⁶ The amicability from earlier in the year had finally started to collapse as Americans became increasingly aware that the U.S.S.R. would not create One World Peace in favor of its agenda.

Through July, reports from behind the Iron Curtain revealed the immense ideological differences between the Soviets and the Americans. The major reveal came from Brooks Atkinson, the former head of the Moscow bureau of the *New York Times*. He published three articles in the *New York Times*, and *Time* also published his pieces. The first of his articles stated that “we have to abandon the familiar concept of friendship [with the Soviets]” in the initial sentence. The Soviets are a “totalitarian government” with “no freedoms.”³⁷ The Soviet government is difficult to engage with because it is a “machine for generating power inside the Soviet Union and as far outside the power can be made to extend.”³⁸ Effectively, Atkinson states, “Although we are not enemies, we are not friends; and the most we can hope for is an armed peace for the next few years.”³⁹ Moreover, Atkinson advises that the United States needs to “apply equal power in the opposite direction.”⁴⁰ Within the excerpted version published in *Time*, the article highlights the final significant contrast between the Soviets and the United States. The difference:

“**Socialism vs. Capitalism** (emphasis in original).

The most formidable impediment to amicable international relations is the basic fact that the Soviet Union is a socialist state developing and expanding in a capitalist world.”⁴¹

The differences highlighted by Atkinson were not groundbreaking news, but they gave the populace a perspective from someone who lived and dealt with the Soviets. Other ideological differences had been published before, piecemeal, including the U.S.S.R.’s cronies, ‘big power’ diplomacy, and fake democracies. However, Atkinson’s article combines these into the ideological divide Americans perceived as difficult, if not impossible, to overcome in creating one world.

The twenty-one countries finally met at the end of July to discuss revisions and finalize the peace treaties proposed by the Big Four. The perception that the Soviets continued stalling with “incessant delays” to further their interests, again, instead of creating peace shook the acceptance of the

28 “The World,” *New York Times*, June 2, 1946.

29 “The World,” *New York Times*, June 30, 1946.

30 “Conferences,” *Time*, June 24, 1946

31 Albert Gordon, “Says Atom Secret Cannot Be Kept,” *New York Times*, June 30, 1946.

32 “No Bombs,” *Time*, June 24, 1946.

33 “Peace Tries.”

34 Andre Visson, “Crucial Stake at Paris,” *Washington Post*, June 23, 1946.

35 “Conferences,” *Time*, July 8, 1946.

36 C.M. Garland, “Gigantic Fraud?” *Time*, July 15, 1946.

37 Brooks Atkinson, “Russia Bars Amity with U.S., Returned Times Writer Says,” *New York Times*, July 7, 1946.

38 Atkinson, “Russia Bars Amity.”

39 Atkinson, “Russia Bars Amity.”

40 Atkinson, “Russia Bars Amity.”

41 “Not Enemies, Not Friends,” *Time*, July 15, 1946.

Soviets even in the *Washington Post*.⁴² The *Washington Post* started to include some more critical articles, with one article stating that “the objective of Soviet tactics... is nothing less than to undermine America in Europe.”⁴³ Another *Washington Post* article states Secretary Byrnes “continues to hope, perhaps against hope” in creating peace with Soviet cooperation.⁴⁴ The trickle of these anti-Soviet articles indicates the turn in American perception. The dream of one world and Soviet compromise was hope “against hope.” The Soviets had spent too much time delaying peace for their expansionist aims, such as “making a puppet of Turkey.”⁴⁵

Meanwhile, the media was portraying the United States as the only country that could oppose the Soviets. The *New York Times* ran several articles that emphasized American intervention, but by the end of August, the tone shifted to America being the only power that could intervene. One article calls out the weakness of Europe. It states, “Britain is poor, harassed by imperial difficulties, preoccupied with home experiments.”⁴⁶ Meanwhile, about France, the article writes, “France is weak.”⁴⁷ The only power left that is strong enough to oppose the Soviets is the United States. The newspapers also emphasized the ideological differences with the Soviets as the reason that America needed to interfere with Soviet domination in Europe. The same *New York Times* piece exemplifies the essential difference: the “Russians do not understand American democratic methods.”⁴⁸ Another article captures this idea, stating a “fundamental division between the totalitarian East and the democratic West.”⁴⁹ Despite the difference, making peace will necessitate “Moscow and Washington making a deal.”⁵⁰ Making a deal would require the United States to interfere with Soviet goals in Europe.

In the middle of the Paris Peace Conference, American attitudes towards Communism and the Soviet Union deteriorated into Cold War sentiments. A Gallup poll published in the *Washington Post* captured Americans’ attitudes toward the Soviets. The poll identified that “8 in every 10 voters disapprove of the course Russia is taking in world affairs, and the majority believe that she is out to try to dominate the world.”⁵¹ The media captured this sentiment. While *Time* had started April already anti-Soviet, the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*’s deterioration into anti-Soviet language was present by the end of August following the increased focus on the Soviet Union. The leading cause for this deterioration was the Soviet blockade in creating one world and world peace in favor of Communist expansion. The Soviet impediment

appeared in all international relations, but none as telling as the inability to cooperate during peace conferences. Meanwhile, Soviet expansionism also played a significant factor. As the Soviets expanded further into Europe, it became apparent that the United States was the only power that could oppose them. Since the Soviets were ideologically opposed to American democracy and capitalism, it was reasonable, and pushed by some newspapers, for the United States to combat the Soviets in Europe through ideology. However, the Cold War required more explicit American intervention to be fully present in American consciousness.

PART TWO: THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE (MARCH 1947 – MAY 1947)

The announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March of 1947 was the turning point of American international relations with the U.S.S.R. The Truman Doctrine placed America at the ideological pole opposite of the Soviets and pitted America against the Soviet Union in Europe. The idea was to “contain” communism in Europe; however, this implicitly meant impeding the U.S.S.R.’s expansion through cronies and limiting American acquiescence to the Soviets in diplomacy. In contrast to the earlier period of August 1946, the Truman Doctrine reinforced that America would take a stand against communism. The intention of containing communism, and thereby the U.S.S.R., is the start of the Cold War, despite not being called such in American public sentiment.

The announcement of the Truman Doctrine on March 13th, 1947, announced to the world that American foreign policy would stop its isolationist tendencies and take a more significant role in global politics. The Truman Doctrine came as the sentiment that the Soviet Union was pursuing global domination through Europe grew. The continued threat of Soviet expansion endangered world peace and the American hope for a Free World.⁵² America had already started recognizing that it was the only power that could fight Soviet expansion during 1946. While America did not perceive the U.S.S.R. as a military threat, a belief existed that the Soviet Union might “make war on us whenever she becomes able or competent.”⁵³ Since the Soviet Union was not a military threat and had recently been an American ally, some represented the Truman Doctrine by saying that it would “contain Russian expansion” instead of creating a prelude to World War III.⁵⁴ The *New York Times* presented this sentiment: the

42 “Over Peace Treaties,” *New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1946.

43 “Gloom at the Peace Conference,” *Washington Post*, Aug. 18, 1946.

44 Barnet Nover, “Much More of Paris, and Secretary Byrnes Will Have an Accent,” *Washington Post*, Aug. 25, 1946.

45 John Noris, “Reds’ Whole Policy Aims at Bosphorus,” *Washington Post*, Aug. 25, 1946.

46 C.L. Sulzberger, “America and Russia: Opposite Poles at Paris,” *New York Times*, Aug. 11, 1946.

47 Sulzberger, “America and Russia: Opposite Poles at Paris.”

48 Sulzberger, “America and Russia: Opposite Poles at Paris.”

49 Herbert Matthews, “Big Four Disagree on Plan for Trieste,” *New York Times*, Aug. 4, 1946.

50 “America and Russia.”

51 George Gallup, “8 Out of 10 U.S. Voters Anti-Soviet,” *Washington Post*, Aug. 25, 1946.

52 “Truman Doctrine,” *New York Times*, March 16, 1947.

53 “Legion Head Hits Russia,” *New York Times*, March 16, 1947.

54 “Truman Doctrine.”

Truman Doctrine would decrease the chance of war because “Russia might talk in more definite terms.”⁵⁵ However, a more common belief, also presented in the *New York Times*, was that the “new stand would lead to World War III.”⁵⁶ Regardless of whether peace would come from the new American policy, the Truman Doctrine promised to Europe and the American people that the United States would combat the spread of Communism because Soviet expansionism and totalitarianism had become too large a threat to ignore.

Shortly after Truman announced his foreign policy, the media promoted it through American idealism and feasibility. The Truman Doctrine promised the American people a fight against the anti-American ideals promoted by the Soviets. As discussed, the media emphasized the ideological differences between America and the Soviet Union. Discussion of the U.S.S.R. devolved into calling it totalitarian and anti-democratic in 1946, and the Truman Doctrine promised to stop that growth and promote stability. One *New York Times* article articulated the need for the Truman Doctrine for world stability. It states, “The basic point [of the Truman Doctrine] is whether the United States is willing to pay the price of creating world economic and political stability.”⁵⁷ World stability might be far from the initial hope for world peace, but with the threat of Soviet power and expansion, a stable, capitalist world outside Soviet control formed the new American goal. The combination of fighting the U.S.S.R. and stabilizing a fracturing world took the final form of a war for American ideals. The *Washington Post* ran an article that described the ideological battle between the new Truman Doctrine and the Soviet Union. The goal of the Truman Doctrine, the piece states, is to see “that industries are revived and that normal life is restored as quickly as possible to western Europe, including western Germany.”⁵⁸ The emphasis that this is the American goal strikes the readers as implicitly anti-Soviet, especially as other media has portrayed the Soviet Union as impeding these goals. Moreover, the same *New York Times* article summarizes the ideological conflict by rhetorically asking if Congress is willing “to oppose Soviet expansion and to create the kind of world in which we can have jobs and freedom.”⁵⁹

The two major complaints against the Truman Doctrine were its bypassing of the U.N. and its affordability. Some newspapers defended against the complaint that the new policy ignored the U.N. by emphasizing the necessity of the new foreign policy, but most accepted the complaint. The *Washington Post* wrote that going through the U.N. would “build

up false hope” because that hope “would be dashed by lack of U.N. facilities, if not by a veto.”⁶⁰ Meanwhile, media support for the Truman Doctrine argued against the economic concern by saying either that it was economically feasible or that economic feasibility did not matter. An article in the *New York Times* dedicated itself to how the new world bank would fund the aid demands. The world bank, formally the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, formed the financial institution that provided loans to rebuild countries ravaged by WWII. Within this article, there is an attempt to persuade readers that the new bank is a safe venture. The article states that “abuse” of the system “is safeguarded in two ways.”⁶¹ If readers cannot accept this reasoning, they are told to ignore the economic implications and read other arguments for the Truman Doctrine. The economics were of secondary importance because if the Truman Doctrine was “debated in dollars,” it “would be skipping a lot of pretty important things.”⁶² Despite this logic, the article questions whether it would be too expensive to postpone the decision to convince readers still concerned with the economy. Fundamentally, the economic concerns, including all the concerns about the dollar amounts, should be ignored as a headline insists that “HELP FOR EUROPE URGED AS HELP FOR OURSELVES.”⁶³

Moreover, the media argued why the United States could not ignore the Communist threat. *Time* wrote disparagingly of former Ambassador Kennedy’s proposal instead of the Truman Doctrine. Kennedy’s proposal, as stated in *Time*, was to “let Communism spread” because “after the little nations had a bellyful of Stalin’s totalitarianism they would renounce it and rush joyfully to the U.S.” The article states that Kennedy’s “argument had a faint early-1941 ring.”⁶⁴ Though *Time’s* reporting was exceptionally anti-Communist, it does demonstrate that there was a belief that allowing the Soviets to grow unchallenged would recreate the circumstances for war to start later. The belief that the United States could not wait was held even in the less anti-Soviet press. The *New York Times* also argues against Kennedy’s belief, stating it is “a seductive philosophy,” but “there is no evidence in history that any people” in a country that Communists have controlled “were ever able to throw them out and choose another form of government.”⁶⁵ The typical story presented in the media was that if America stalled, it would be too late, and the ideology of freedom would be lost.

American idealism and a desire to protect freedom and democracy, a sentiment from WWII, led to broad support for

55 “Truman Doctrine.”

56 “Great Debate,” *New York Times*, March 23, 1947.

57 James Reston, “The Big Question: What Will Our World Role Be?” *New York Times*, March 16, 1947.

58 Ferdinand Kuhn Jr., “Reds Know U.S. Isn’t Groveling for Peace,” *Washington Post*, April 27, 1947.

59 Reston, “World Role.”

60 Robert Albright, “That ‘By-Pass’ of U.N. Was No Oversight,” *Washington Post*, April 13, 1947.

61 Arthur Krock, “Why Truman Program Requires New Funds,” *New York Times*, March 30, 1947.

62 Reston, “World Role.”

63 Jesse Friedman, “Help For Europe Urged as Help For Ourselves,” *New York Times*, May 18, 1947.

64 “The World and Democracy,” *Time*, March 24, 1947.

65 Reston, “World Role.”

the Truman Doctrine and Truman shortly after its announcement. A week after announcing the new foreign policy, the *New York Times* analyzed the response throughout the country. In its summary of the country-wide response to the Truman Doctrine, the piece states, “a ‘strong’ policy toward Russia has won broad approval,” causing “the President’s foreign policy [to have] the support of the majority.”⁶⁶ The article delves into specific regions with solid support and some hesitation. In the section on Denver, the article writes, “The great majority of the people of this region have abandoned their pre-war, die-hard isolationism.”⁶⁷ Their sentiment that America needed to fight the Soviet Union was identified by The Rocky Mountain News’ endorsement of Senator Henry Lodge Jr.’s statement, “Concessions to the Soviets only encourage new and unreasonable demands at the expense of weaker peoples.”⁶⁸ Senator Lodge Jr.’s comment emphasizes that the Soviets had pushed too far; American people were supportive of “strong” tactics against the U.S.S.R. to protect the “weaker peoples” in Europe. Moreover, since Americans were seeing action on their anti-Soviet sentiments, the Truman Doctrine saw support for Truman increase. In a Gallup poll published in the *Washington Post*, Truman saw an increase in his approval rating from a low of 32% in October 1946 to 60% in March 1947.⁶⁹

The Truman Doctrine shifted the discourse of American-Soviet relations from a widespread sentiment of unease to a policy that put America directly opposed to Soviet actions. The result was the realization that the world would likely remain split in two. This split is commented on in *Time*’s analysis of James Burnham’s book *The Struggle for the World* in a manner influenced by the recent announcement of the Truman Doctrine. *Time* summarizes the book in a series of questions and answers; the answer to the question “Is it one world?” is that every Communist believes “there are only two divisions of mankind: the Communists, and the rest.”⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the response to the question of “Can it become One World?” is that peace can only be achieved with a “monopoly of atomic weapons [which] can be secured only by gaining world domination.”⁷¹ While Burnham finished his book before the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, these sentiments were more present after Truman placed America in opposition to the Soviet Union. The *New York Times* analysis of Atlanta’s response to Truman’s new foreign policy also recognizes the splinter into two worlds. The general attitude, the *New York Times* summarizes, is that “an all-out showdown with the Communists is inevitable, and the sooner the better.”⁷²

PART THREE: THE COLD WAR (SEPTEMBER 1947 – DECEMBER 1947)

In September 1947, Walter Lippmann published a series of essays entitled “Today and Tomorrow: The Cold War” in several newspapers, but most notably the *New York Herald Tribune*. Lippmann’s essays received immense recognition and commentary in multiple newspapers. Lippmann’s argument is a response to a piece in *Foreign Affairs* titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” signed by “X,” who was identified by Lippmann as George Kennan. The essence of Lippmann’s argument is that containment is not enough to solve the Soviet problem; instead, American policy needs to take more decisive action to combat the Soviets through policy and ideology but minimize tensions of a ‘hot’ war starting by withdrawing troops. Whether people agreed with Lippmann or not, the title of the article, “Cold War,” quickly became a part of American recognition of how to describe American-Soviet relations.

The response to Lippmann’s article was nearly immediate, with articles utilizing his thesis appearing as his essays were published. During September, a few articles about international politics in the *New York Times* started to use the phrase ‘cold war.’ One article accepts the phrase but rejects the possibility of a total war. The article states, “Although the United States and the Soviet Union are manifestly engaged in a ‘cold war,’ a more open conflict is not inevitable.”⁷³ Moreover, the September 21st ‘Week in Review’ from the *New York Times* also opens with recognizing the new term. It begins, “For two years a cold war has been waged between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in virtually every arena in which the interests of the two meet.”⁷⁴ The articles accepted Lippmann’s term and used it to describe the old sentiment from the end of WWII when the Soviets stalled in creating One World Peace.

Simultaneously, the media further shifts into accepting that the world has split. One headline in the *New York Times* is “Europeans fear that they must choose sides.”⁷⁵ The article describes the Europeans’ concern about choosing American or Soviet aid, with unknown conditions. While the world was in evident fracture, the media reported on the Cold War similarly to other wars, with media reports on the ongoing Cold War and its developments. One *New York Times* piece states, “The Communists fight the ‘cold war’ on various fronts.... On the labor front... on the diplomatic front.”⁷⁶ The *Washington Post* parallels the stronger war language in the *New York Times*. The *Washington Post* article quotes New York’s Governor Dewey saying the Governor “denounced Moscow launching a ‘world

66 “U.S. World Policy is Widely Debated,” *New York Times*, March 23, 1947.

67 George Franco, “Denver,” *New York Times*, March 23, 1947.

68 Franco, “Denver.”

69 George Gallup, “Truman’s Popularity Soars to 60 Pct. On Foreign Policy Shift,” *Washington Post*, March 30, 1947.

70 “For That or Nothing,” *Time*, March 24, 1947.

71 “For That or Nothing.”

72 George Hatcher, “Atlanta,” *New York Times*, March 23, 1947.

73 “Denies Inevitability of U.S.-Soviet War,” *New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1947.

74 “Big Two Clash,” *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1947.

75 Harold Callender, “Europeans Fear They Must Choose Sides,” *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1947.

76 “Two Fronts,” *New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1947.

war' of lies designed to block American aid to free nations 'so they may fall prey to the cold aggression of totalitarian Russia.'"⁷⁷

By the end of 1947, the Cold War defined the tension between American ideology and Communism. The battle between the United States and the Soviet Union had become impossible to ignore. A *New York Times* piece emphasizes this with the headline, "RUSSIA SEEN AS ISSUE IN ELECTION OF 1948."⁷⁸ The question remained: how involved America should be in saving Europe from the Soviets? The debate centered on whether America should continue a 'cold war,' with fear that it might turn 'hot,' or return to Soviet appeasement, something undesirable as seen through the support for the "strong" stance against the U.S.S.R. in February. Moreover, tensions between America and the Soviet Union continued to grow through continued Soviet expansion, something that was unignorable in the developing Cold War. By the end of the year, a *Washington Post* article reported that Greek communists "set up what it called a provisional government" and that a federation of U.S.S.R. satellites "could recognize the Greek Communists as a de facto government."⁷⁹ Soviet expansionism continued by supporting Communist revolutions in Europe as in 1946. Regardless, by the end of 1947, the Cold War had officially started and been deemed a cold war.

CONCLUSION

The middle of 1946 saw a drastic shift in American perception of the Soviet Union. The desire for One World Peace meant that Americans were willing to accept some Soviet overreaches. However, as the Soviets demonstrated that they were going to continue their expansionist and anti-democratic ideologies by continuously impeding peace talks, American sentiment shifted. Slowly, Americans were more accommodating to any peace. The start of the twenty-one-country peace conference at the end of July was the final straw. Americans had enough of the Soviets impeding peace, as the beginning of the conference seemed to be the same Soviet playbook, and Soviet ideologies were no longer even barely tolerable. This shift started the Cold War in American popular sentiment. American ideology contrasted with Soviet ideology. Even the newspapers that tried to humanize the Soviets, such as the *Washington Post*, saw leaks of anti-Soviet feelings peek into their journalism. Soviet expansion and impeding world peace caused Americans to oppose the Soviet Union.

When Truman announced his new foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine, in March of 1947, Americans were already mostly anti-Soviet and even more opposed to Soviet expansionism. The Truman Doctrine directly opposed Soviet movements in Europe. The Truman Doctrine's goal of containment captured American anti-Soviet sentiment. Americans bought into the Truman Doctrine because it leaned into their beliefs. The desire for One World Peace

had mostly disappeared, but since the world needed peace, it would not have Soviet totalitarianism. The Truman Doctrine was the first major coordinated response to the Soviet problem. The Truman Doctrine was essential to Walter Lippmann's "Cold War" in September 1947. Lippmann's essay popularized the phrase "Cold War" for the public. The world recognized it had fully splintered into the United States and the Soviet Union. The descent into a cold war was complete with Lippmann's essay because it could finally be definitively named the "Cold War." 🏠

77 "Dewey Assails 'War of Lies' From Moscow," *Washington Post*, Nov. 20, 1947

78 "Russia Seen as Issue in Election of 1948," *New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1947.

79 Mark Sullivan, "Greek Communists," *Washington Post*, Dec. 31, 1947.

Festering and Nudging

Navigating American Foreign Policy in Response to the Algerian War

This paper examines the evolution of American policy surrounding the Algerian War for Independence (1954–1962). Prior to World War II, Algeria existed as a colony of France located in North Africa. After the war concluded, Algerian rebels began to seek independence from France. The Algerian War presented a dilemma to the United States, a former colony of a European imperial power in the 18th century but now a resolute ally of France within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO sought to counter communist influence in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The chief rebel organization in Algeria, the Front du Libération Nationale, was perceived as sympathetic to communism and had the support of the Soviet Union. This paper delves into the approaches of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations balancing their commitment to France to oppose communism while adhering to the liberal ideal of promoting self-determination. My analysis reveals a consistent foreign policy ethos that sought the realization of a peaceful settlement through varying tactics of relative inaction and gentle prodding. This policy was entrenched in a broader mission of fostering peace and furthering an end to foreign imperialism. It also flexibly safeguarded its interests in supporting NATO and France by containing communism, despite facing accusations from American politicians of betraying a people seeking freedom from foreign domination.

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IN 1957, SENATOR JOHN F. KENNEDY spoke to defy the status quo. In the aftermath of World War II, the status quo of European domination over foreign lands in Africa and Asia was no longer tenable in the post-war environment. After battling to defeat the aggressive Axis powers of Germany, Japan, and Italy, which sought to conquer and dominate foreign lands for national prestige and lebensraum or “living space,” it was considered hypocritical to advocate and safeguard similar conquests by colonial powers such as the United Kingdom and France.¹ In his speech before the United States Senate, Senator Kennedy called out American unwillingness to stand up for Algerian independence from its overlord, the French colonial empire. He remarked:

The most powerful single force in the world today is neither communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile – it is man’s eternal desire to be free and independent. The great enemy of that tremendous force of freedom is called, for want of a more precise term, imperialism – and today that means Soviet imperialism and, whether we like it or not, and though they are not to be equated, Western imperialism.²

Future President Kennedy saw it as America’s mission to improve the world by using its influence to align the world order based on self-determination and freedom. He was thus perplexed by American diplomats’ unwillingness to condemn French military operations in this North African nation. This was an issue central to the precepts of America’s new role in the world as a global power. But Kennedy would later find upon ascending to the Presidency that the situation was more intricate and problematic than he had initially imagined.

France and the United States share communal bonds dating back as far as the American Revolution. Fifty years after the French intervened in the American War for Independence, France set its eyes on Algeria, then an Ottoman land. This newfound colonial mission developed and grew over the years but was done with the initial limited aim of securing patriotic support for the deeply unpopular Bourbon monarch Charles X in the days before the establishment of a new French Republic in 1830.³ Following this conquest was the arrival of European settlers and by 1875 complete occupation. This French effort resulted in massacres, mass rapes, and famines that killed around 825,000 in what would be called the Pacification of Algeria.⁴ The European settlers that landed in Algeria would be known as *piets-noirs* or *colons*. They comprised about a million people by 1952, ten percent of

1 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Lebensraum,” *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/lebensraum>.

2 John F. Kennedy, “Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy in the Senate, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1957,” transcript of speech delivered at the U.S. Capitol Building, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1957, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/remarks-senator-john-f-kennedy-senate-washington-dc-july-2-1957>.

3 “History,” Algeria, *Britannica*, last updated April 20, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria/Cultural-institutions#ref220552>.

4 Halim Gençoglu, “French colonial legacy in Algeria,” *UWIDATA*, published October 12, 2021, <https://uwidata.com/21460-french-colonial-legacy-in-algeria/>.

the country, and constituted the ruling class, establishing a minority government in the name of stability and democracy.⁵ Algeria was granted official status as a Department of the French Ministry of the Interior, distinguishing it from other colonies and underscoring its importance as an inalienable part of France.⁶

In the aftermath of World War II, Algerian Muslims sought to change this status quo. Operation Torch in 1942, the United States Army's invasion of Axis-controlled North Africa, pointed out the impotence of French colonial authorities and exposed native Algerians to a great power sympathetic to their cries for self-determination. After the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, Algerians rioted in Sétif, a city in Algeria, killing 103 Europeans in four days of violence. The French colonial government restored its authority by shelling the rioters with air and sea power, leaving between three and 10,000 dead. Charles de Gaulle, general and primary liberator of France from Nazi occupation in World War II with his democratic Free French forces, and ironically the man who would oversee Algerian independence, presided over this repression.⁷

The United States thus had a tricky ethical choice in establishing a post-war world order. While a former colony herself and sympathetic to the plight of Algerians for freedom from the French invaders, American politicians and leaders were pulled towards the French position. France was a cornerstone in the newly minted NATO military alliance – designed to serve as a bulwark against a forward Soviet invasion in the event of war – and shared the United States' liberal system of government. Agents of the new French Fourth Republic wanted to re-establish colonial authority after World War II and any challenge to this by the United States might have fractured the alliance, presenting an opportunity for communist influence to grow. At the same time, many American officials sought to gain the sympathy of newly independent nations in the third world where the French pursued an often-savage domination. Despite the clear ethical dilemma and public relations challenge posed by supporting the brutal colonial war, the United States established a principled yet cautious policy towards the Algerian question. This policy consistently advocated for the recognition of Algerian grievances while acknowledging French demands for authority and stability in their sovereign territory. This policy remained steadfast in American objectives, yet it also remained reasonably flexible. It allowed the United States, under both the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations, to present themselves as aligned with France while maintaining enough versatility to eventual-

ly assist in pressuring France towards its long-stated goal of a peaceful settlement.

It is first important to understand the competing motives of the Algerians and the French before analyzing the American response to the conflict. Early in the conflict, a “national consensus existed among the French political class in 1954 on the necessity of keeping Algeria French, and this was supported by a large majority of public opinion.”⁸ The United States never understood the extent to which France's perception of itself as a great power rested on its colonial empire.⁹ The Algerian motive was Muslim nationalism, as espoused by the moderate nationalist Ferhat Abbas, who advocated for equal rights and a grant of autonomy. However, the key player Messali Hadj was a Trotskyist and communist in the interwar period. His successor group, the *Front du Libération Nationale* (FLN) had the support of communist elements and the Soviet Union despite the predominant role of comparatively moderate Algerian nationalism.¹⁰ In April 1959, French Prime Minister Debré, the head of the republic's government, expressed concerns to the U.S. Ambassador in Paris about the potential for totalitarianism stemming from nationalism. He also expressed confusion over the American reluctance to confront a movement that he believed could ultimately pave the way for international communism.¹¹ This illustrates France's effort to present the situation in Algeria as a key front in the Cold War struggle against communism. In Debré's eyes, the United States had a duty to stand by the French in combating and subduing the insurgency of the FLN.

On November 1, 1954, the colony of Algeria exploded. An upswelling of terrorist activity commenced that grew increasingly radical. Ahmed Ben Bella, a socialist revolutionary, took control of the movement, leading to an all-out uprising in 1955. The stated purpose of this insurrection was to establish a sovereign Algerian nation free from European colonialism and in line with Islamic ideals.¹² On August 20, 1955, in Philippeville, a port city in northeastern Algeria, 123 French civilians, mostly miners, were killed along with their wives and children by rioters. The local government instituted brutal reprisals that killed 1,200 Muslim Algerians. The FLN inaugurated a policy of “compliance terrorism” whereupon Muslims found supporting French rule were to be executed and their bodies mutilated.¹³ The Algerian War for Independence had begun.

The initial response by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles – the chief representative of the United States to foreign nations during the Eisenhower administration – to

5 “Colonial rule,” Algeria, *Britannica*, last updated April 20, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria/Colonial-rule>.

6 Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 10.

7 Wall, *France, Algeria and the United States*, 11.

8 Wall, *France, Algeria and the United States*, 13.

9 Wall, *France, Algeria and the United States*, 13.

10 Wall, *France, Algeria and the United States*, 10.

11 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992), 290, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v13>.

12 “The Algerian War of Independence,” *Britannica*, last accessed December 30, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria/The-Algerian-War-of-Independence>.

13 Wall, *France, Algeria and the United States*, 13-14.

the news of French repression was to refuse further furnishing of weapons and impress upon the French how repression of terrorism does not play well if done in a heavy-handed fashion. Dulles stated a “desire [to] continue [to] support France in efforts restore peace and create [a] basis for enduring cooperation with North African peoples in future,” while also supporting French colonial presence.¹⁴ These remarks were the first statements on American policy towards Algeria. This policy demonstrated tacit support for the French while still emphasizing the necessity for cooperation between Algerian natives and *pieds-noirs* to find a peaceful solution. This memo from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Embassy in France established a precedent generally followed until the end of the Algerian War, despite a later rhetorical change in policy by President Kennedy. The United States would not undermine its efforts at strengthening the NATO alliance by supporting a rebel movement that could develop into a potential ally of the communist Soviet Union.

After nearly two years of insurgency, Algeria once again drew the attention of the Eisenhower administration. In January 1957, Secretary of State Dulles announced to President Eisenhower that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ascertained Algeria would inevitably become independent. Despite the French government’s efforts, the era of direct rule was inevitably drawing to a close. Anticipating future events, Eisenhower pondered the fate of the *pieds-noirs* should independence become a reality.¹⁵ In light of this, a meeting between the Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister Pineau in the same month informed the State Department of the French plans to implement a federal system similar to Swiss cantons, a cease-fire, and universal suffrage elections based on equal representation for French and Muslim Algerians after 90 days. This canton system would allow for limited local autonomy for Algerian Muslims while assuring European settlers and the French government’s predominant authority. Self-government would not be an option in Mr. Pineau’s view, to which Dulles agreed that the “appetite for independence had sometimes become excessive.”¹⁶

The events of early 1957 emphasize American partial acquiescence to French aims in the war. The CIA report on the inevitability of a change in status for Algeria reaffirmed the American hand insisting that Algerians have their voices heard. The proposal by French Prime Minister Mollet for a cease-fire and elections provided American officials the leverage to support the French continuation of the war. If the FLN refused to acquiesce to the proposal, it would underscore radicalism already perceived by the public through its policy of atrocity against *pieds-noirs*. The French government could subsequently claim the FLN did not represent the will

of the Algerian people because it rejected a proposal that would ensure a form of self-determination and further justify their colonial rule.

In 1957, the American action in the United Nations General Assembly – a global forum for cooperative policy-making and international dialogue – supported this measure. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. voted for a resolution affirming the right to democracy in Algeria but rejected one calling for immediate independence.¹⁷ Thus, support of France became a framing mechanism to support a critical ally, promote peace in North Africa, promote moderate Algerians’ interests, and support responsible decolonization but had the negative effect of positioning the United States as a hypocritical power. Other recently independent nations might perceive the United States as supporting colonialism and seek support from the Soviet Union, as was the case with Egypt. To domestic opponents of this policy and nations in the process of decolonizing, American politicians had thrown their hat in with repressive imperialists and not with the freedom-seeking, oppressed peoples of Algeria. By taking the middle ground, the Eisenhower administration opened itself up to attack from figures on both sides of the conflict. But the policy remained pragmatically and ideologically secure since it diplomatically supported a critical European ally and morally *all* Algerian people, including the *pieds-noirs*, rather than a radical terrorist organization pursuing at the time unreasonable aims. It sought to remain consistent with American values and strategic concerns through this vein of relative inaction with the eventual goal of responsible decolonization.

While U.S. policy under the Eisenhower administration tactically solidified into one of inaction, or “letting Algeria fester for the time being,” in the words of the U.S. Consulate General at Algiers, support grew for a decisive shift in policy to moral support for the Algerian rebels.¹⁸ On a date chosen for its symbolic meaning, Senator John F. Kennedy on July 2, 1957, 181 years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, gave a fiery speech in support of Algerian rebel forces while introducing a resolution that would recognize the interests of nationalists and seek to further independence for the repressed citizens. A specific part early in Kennedy’s speech underpins his message to the French and Algerians particularly well:

Thus the single most important test of American foreign policy today is how we meet the challenge of imperialism, what we do to further man’s desire to be free. On this test more than any other, this Nation shall be critically judged by the uncommitted millions in Asia and Africa, and anxiously watched by the still hopeful

14 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa, Volume XVIII* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989), 58, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18>.

15 Wall, *France, Algeria and the United States*, 23-24.

16 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa, Volume XVIII*, 81.

17 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa, Volume XVIII*, 82.

18 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa, Volume XVIII*, 83.

lovers of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. If we fail to meet the challenge of either Soviet or Western imperialism, then no amount of foreign aid, no aggrandizement of armaments, no new pacts or doctrines or high-level conferences can prevent further setbacks to our course and to our security. I am concerned today that we are failing to meet the challenge of imperialism – on both counts – and thus failing in our responsibilities to the free world.¹⁹

Kennedy eloquently emphasized a perceived incongruity between not only American values of freedom and self-determination with the strategic support of French repression in Algeria but also Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. In this way, Kennedy appealed to Cold War attitudes not through emphasis on Algerian communist ties, but on opposition to political repression. Interestingly, within the substance of his speech, he referenced the history of the French Revolution's descent into bloody chaos, revolutionary fervor, and guillotine executions to bolster his argument that external antagonization of the FLN by the United States would only fuel radicalism. *Rapprochement*, in his view, would lessen the probability of terrorist operations and increase the safety of French settlers.²⁰

While in line with former U.S. President Wilson's liberal ideals of freedom and self-determination for all nationalities of the world, Kennedy's remarks were perceived as naïve by many supporters of the French military operations. Jacques, a French Algerian veteran of World War II in the navy, condemned Kennedy's remarks as those of someone with "knowledge in the matter strictly limited, poor young fellow, by what [you] heard from the [A]rabian and [T]unisian foxes, who, on the sly, as everyone, except yourself, knows, work for communism and soviet imperialism."²¹ Jacques further likened Algeria to Texas or Alaska in relation to the United States in its relationship while asserting that "every man or woman of our country will fight to death if necessary to remain French subjects and free in this French territory," and that Muslims "want to remain French."²² In his eyes, the segregation of African Americans from white Southerners in the United States was far worse than the situation in Algeria.²³ This *pied-noir* veteran's anger towards Kennedy's perceived foolishness highlights the widespread support for maintaining pacification measures and colonial rule, a sanction that appeared to surpass even the commitment of French officials. Interestingly, the brutality of this repression was either unnoticed or ignored by this observer, as he believed conditions

were worse towards African Americans in the United States than actual military operations in Algeria. In Jacques' view, Algeria must remain French.

In response to Kennedy's speech, the U.S. Embassy in France published a comprehensive report on their perceptions of how key French leaders felt about French prospects on the conflict in Algeria. It pointed out that the French government had resolved to fight to maintain some form of control. The telegram further concluded that the French administration viewed independence to not be preferable in the short term due to the inherent danger of the FLN. However, their long-term goals should be to "encourage democratic evolutionary development."²⁴ This might be attained through a possible monetary union proposal, a self-determination plan sponsored by the Eisenhower administration in a North African federation, or an internationalization of the conflict to fend off communist influence. Unless this was carried out or the rebellion ended there "could be return [of] De Gaulle or coup d'état of [a] right or military group."²⁵

American objectives remained consistent in that they emphasized a peaceful settlement in French favor with appropriate self-determination concessions as necessary to prevent destabilization and a right-wing backlash. While the specifics of the plan are shapelier than "letting Algeria fester," at this point in mid-August 1957, options remained limited. Broad concepts of a federation remained, self-admittedly, in the far future. At the same time, a National Intelligence Estimate cited the 400,000 troops in Algeria, a financial crisis partially caused by the Algerian War, and *pieds-noirs* opinion favoring full-scale war as aggravating factors on the stability of the Fourth French Republic. Nevertheless, American intelligence predicted the survival of the republic, supporting this view with evidence of de Gaulle's relaxed demeanor, and Gross National Product growth as indicators that France would view their position as one of growing strength and continue the conflict.²⁶ This likely confirmed administration support of France in pragmatic terms as the most reliable course of action to prevent even further violence and potential eviction of European settlers in Algeria as well as secure vital Cold War support from the French government.

These predictions would prove false in February 1958. The military situation erupted with an intentional escalation in the city of Sakiet. On February 8th, The French military bombarded a city filled with rebels on the border with Tunisia. This was followed up by a policy of quadrillage, or full-fledged military occupation by the army.²⁷ It was in this context of deliberate escalation on the border between

19 Kennedy, speech.

20 Kennedy, speech.

21 Jacques F. [illegible] to John Kennedy, July 11, 1957, in *Wilson Center Digital Archive*, ed. Cyrus Schayegh, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/291042>.

22 Jacques F. [illegible] to John Kennedy, July 11, 1957.

23 Jacques F. [illegible] to John Kennedy, July 11, 1957.

24 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa*, Volume XVIII, 89.

25 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Africa*, Volume XVIII, 89.

26 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Western Europe and Canada*, Volume XXVII, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992), 50, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v27>.

27 Wall, *France, the United States and the Algerian War*, 99-100.

Algeria and the newly independent Tunisia that the Secretary of State's Special Assistant to NATO Julius Holmes wrote to Secretary of State Dulles imploring him that he "propose as the first step a secret *démarche* at the highest level in Paris designed to persuade the French to modify their thesis that Algeria is an integral part of the metropole and to make a fresh start."²⁸ He further reasoned that such a move would firm up African support for the United States over the Soviet Union upon independence.²⁹

While Holmes' proposal of a *démarche* with Paris was certainly a modification of existing policy, the framework of the initiative was still to be through Paris and on French terms. The way Holmes even frames his proposal was designed to shift French thinking from an absolute rule framework with Algeria as "integral" to the metropole to something less than vital. By no means was this intended to call into question previously determined support for French legitimate interests in North Africa. It instead indicated a tactical switch from passivity to heightened interest in the crisis.

Three months later in May, events moved quickly and swiftly to a state of abject confusion over French colonial governance. Extremist *colons* and the military coalesced in a movement that was tantamount to an insurrection against the officially recognized French government in Paris. These extremists formed "Committees of Public Safety" across cities in Algeria and even into the French island of Corsica demanding the return of General Charles de Gaulle to power.³⁰ The State Department responded by establishing discreet contacts with local officials but maintained a policy of neither support nor opposition to this exclusively internal affair.³¹ De Gaulle was thereafter invited by the National Assembly, the national legislature of France, to reform the constitution as Prime Minister with special emergency powers.³² In the immediate aftermath, U.S. diplomats quickly determined de Gaulle would carefully liberalize rule in Algeria along "paternalistic" lines. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Christian Herter provided the most succinct and comprehensive summation of American policy after de Gaulle's ascension by suggesting the United States "make our position on North Africa quite clear to him," further stating, "we have no basic differences on objectives; until now we have had differences only on the means."³³ He went on to reassure that North Africa was naturally inclined to be close

with France but that military measures were not proper or productive and the government should remain removed to prevent arousing de Gaulle's suspicious nature.³⁴ Notably, this document includes the first statement of unambiguous American political opposition to further military suppression of Algerians since it would inevitably end even positive French influence in North Africa.

For the rest of 1958 and into early 1959, the United States remained relatively detached from the war. The Eisenhower administration occasionally clashed with the right-wing de Gaulle and his anger over Algerian nationalists' ability to gain visas to the U.S. to promote their cause.³⁵ An American abstention in a U.N. General Assembly vote recognizing some interests of the FLN similarly invoked his fury.³⁶ Prime Minister Debré followed up in a letter to Ambassador Houghton in Paris where he accused the United States of beginning to "play with fire and to abandon its oldest and most faithful allies for the sake of movements."³⁷ By late August 1959 President Eisenhower, in a private conference, again upheld American policy by reaffirming sympathy with nationalism and a determination to not support colonialism. However, the administration would support France to garner a peaceful settlement and maintenance of NATO while refusing to lend a "blank check" of support to military actions.³⁸ Despite relative detachment from the war until this point, the Eisenhower administration sought to restrict their sanction for French military actions as it became clear that the war would inevitably end in some degree of independence for Algeria. This degree of independence came to fruition a month later in September. President de Gaulle announced a peace plan that would continue efforts at "pacification" but opened the possibility of Algerian federation, integration, or potential independence with guidance from France after four years and universal suffrage elections.³⁹ President Eisenhower in a press conference made the statement that the plan was "completely in accord with our hopes to see proclaimed a just and liberal program for Algeria," while praising the Frenchman's "statesmanship."⁴⁰ The U.S. still broadly supported French war goals in Algeria.

Yet, the intervention of President Eisenhower into a practice originally controlled by diplomats marked another shift in the urgency to which the administration assigned a peaceful settlement. Eisenhower notably assigned more

28 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 269.

29 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 269.

30 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Western Europe*, Volume VII, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), 6, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v07p2>.

31 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 277.

32 "Return to public life of Charles de Gaulle," Charles de Gaulle, Britannica, last updated November 18, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-de-Gaulle-president-of-France/Return-to-public-life>.

33 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Western Europe*, Volume VII, Part 2, 12.

34 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Western Europe*, Volume VII, Part 2, 12.

35 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 283.

36 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 287.

37 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 290.

38 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 297.

39 U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1959* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 1096-1099, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000009708754&view=1up&seq=1162&q1=Algeria>.

40 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 299.

weight in his public and private statements to liberal principles of self-determination. However, he associated this with the efforts of de Gaulle to restore peace and orderly democracy in Algeria. Diplomatic letters of support Eisenhower and de Gaulle later exchanged indicate this was not just for the public. There existed a real consensus of support over the other's position,⁴¹ indicating that there was broad support in the Eisenhower administration for France's continued attempts to combat the FLN.

While aligned with American, Algerian Muslim, and broadly French objectives, Charles de Gaulle's proposal, with the addition of a plebiscite on the issue of self-determination, faced the potential for massive resistance from the *pièdes-noirs* and the French Army. Eisenhower suggested in November 1960 a "face-saving device" in the U.N. to help a create compromise with the FLN.⁴² A month later, the acting Secretary of State Loy Henderson recommended a vote against a resolution calling the war "a threat to international peace and security."⁴³ He justified this because the resolution only recognized French and FLN interests, rather than all the inhabitants of Algeria.⁴⁴ The decision to vote against the U.N. resolution was an action in support of de Gaulle. While it did not offer an element of face-saving, Eisenhower's directive to the National Security Council – the president's primary national security advisory board – was felt in its design to take pressure off President de Gaulle and fortify the French position on the war. This would thus allow de Gaulle to chart a more cautious path at the U.N. and navigate right-wing and *pièd-noir* resistance.

On January 20, 1961, John F. Kennedy, the same man who offered a scathing rebuttal of French colonialism just three and a half years earlier, was sworn in as President. He inherited the foreign policy issue of Algeria from his predecessor. Kennedy's Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, campaigned against President Eisenhower in 1956 on a platform of ensuring that developing nations, upon successful industrialization, would structure their society on principles of individual liberty in contrast to the Soviet system. He critiqued American policy towards decolonization as overwhelmingly supportive of imperialism, and that the spread of freedom was dependent on American leadership through assurances of help and independence.⁴⁵

Kennedy subscribed to this school of thought, but this criticism resulted more in a change in rhetoric than a substantial policy shakeup. A referendum in support of de Gaulle's proposals for Algeria passed by a resounding seventy percent in Algeria and seventy-five percent in France fol-

lowed by a "lull" in hostilities just after Kennedy's inauguration. On February 6, President Kennedy called the Tunisian Ambassador to the United States Slim. Curiously, in response to calls for Kennedy to force de Gaulle to negotiate with the FLN and promote arms sales to Algeria, Kennedy replied to the ambassador from this North African nation that, "more progress had been made toward solution of Algerian problem in last three months than in last six years," and further went on to say that events were likely moving to a favored outcome for both Tunisia and the U.S.⁴⁶ This surprising comment on its face underlines Kennedy's clear sympathy for Algerian rebel forces. However, in real terms, his comments reject American involvement and even endorse de Gaulle's policies as moving in the right direction. His remarks draw a striking similarity to earlier ones by President Eisenhower about a hope for a liberal settlement. Despite often differing rhetoric, this similarity underpins a common consensus on practical actions taken by two presidential administrations.

Even with sunny prospects in early 1961, the French government's fear of a right-wing backlash came to fruition and disrupted a potential settlement. Junta leaders in Algeria plotted to continue the war against the aims of the new republic in Paris. This radical decision by the conspirators was in part due to decreasing support for the war and de Gaulle's decision to negotiate with the FLN. While most of the military did not declare their support for the conspiracy, plotters gauged support for an invasion of mainland France to unseat de Gaulle.⁴⁷ The Kennedy administration responded by affirming a policy of "strong support for de Gaulle" continuing into October.⁴⁸ Lacking broad support, these disaffected military officers and conspirators coalesced into the self-proclaimed paramilitary and counter-terrorist *Organisation Armée Secrète* (OAS) with the stated aim of continuing to wage war against nationalist groups and above all keeping Algeria French. American National Security Council staff urged direct U.S. involvement in negotiations to force a peaceful settlement and ward off rising support for the OAS. Officials detailed that while the role of "friendly bystander" was originally necessary because of a lack of recourse, de Gaulle had reached a critical point because of rising opposition from the OAS. The FLN tasted victory and was unwilling to compromise on anything less than ultimate victory, pinning de Gaulle between two equally undesirable paths of quick settlement or escalation.⁴⁹

This communique emphasized American fear of de Gaulle's quick settlement scenario that would either leave Algeria to "chaos," or further escalation that would relegate the U.S. to "the intolerable choice of flouting [de Gaulle] to

41 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 307.

42 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 321.

43 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 324.

44 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, Volume XIII, 324.

45 "Peace is Non-Partisan," 1956 Eisenhower vs. Stevenson, The Living Room Candidate, accessed May 1, 2023, <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1956>.

46 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995), 39, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v21>.

47 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa*, 43.

48 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa*, 49.

49 U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa*, 49.

help the Algerians or leaving a vacuum for the Communists to fill.”⁵⁰ U.S. diplomats, therefore, emphasized an approach that would delineate to the FLN that further conflict had the potential to make Algeria a key battleground in the Cold War, threatening its neutrality and stripping it of true independence. U.S. policy began to take shape in the form of “gentle nudging” by opening discussions with Algeria leaders about an impending economic aid offer after a peaceful independence.⁵¹ This proposal illustrates a noticeable change from the Eisenhower administration. In contrast with earlier inaction, the Kennedy administration elected to intervene in diplomatic negotiations to force a settlement and end the conflict. It further recognizes and showcases that in late 1961, the initiative for peace finally fell at the feet of Algerian rebels rather than France. Paradoxically while speaking softly with the FLN, moral support lay with France more than any previous point because Algerians and the terrorist OAS were perceived as the ones holding back a peaceful settlement, not de Gaulle.

In early 1962, Kennedy’s National Security Council proposal for economic aid was drawn up and prepared for implementation. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, the most senior military advisors to the president, outlined in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara the conditions upon which military aid would be furnished, aiming to “enhance the mobility” of FLN forces. The Joint Chiefs did emphasize however the debilitating effects such aid would have on the NATO alliance by upsetting the French. Aid would be only offered after it was “thoroughly discussed with [France] prior to making a positive or negative determination,” and only after independence.⁵² A month later, the Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs wrote a note predicting an imminent cease-fire and interim Franco-Algerian government preparing the way for an independence referendum. In this light, the U.S. sought to offer congratulations to de Gaulle and support for the peace plan, propose assistance in the imminent subjugation of the OAS, prepare fifty million dollars of emergency aid and technical training to Algeria, and inform the FLN of American willingness to enter into diplomatic relations with an ambassador swiftly selected after independence.⁵³

American actions late in the conflict differed from earlier tactics of tacit support for France. This “gentle nudging” offered favorable conditions of aid to the FLN, yet the forces of liberation still complained about Kennedy’s support for de Gaulle.⁵⁴ In this context, U.S. aims were still primarily a desire for a peaceful settlement along French terms. Aid would only be offered upon an agreement with the French govern-

ment. The concessions the Kennedy administration offered to the FLN thus represented, broadly speaking, a continuation of American aims, only differing now since the initiative belonged to the Algerian rebels to engender a cease-fire.

A month later on March 19, 1962, the guns fell silent. The Évian Accords – a series of peace treaties and diplomatic assurances between the new Algerian provisional government and France – were signed, establishing a transitory period before independence. They contained provisions of protection for European settlers, democracy, and cooperation between the two nations.⁵⁵ Despite this, continuing animosity between Algerian Muslims and unenforceable protections in the weak Évian Accords for the *pièdes-noirs* would result in 150,000 deaths and the mass exodus of 800,000 *colons*. The OAS would continue terrorist attacks in the metropole and Algeria, culminating in the attempted assassination of President Charles de Gaulle in late August 1962.⁵⁶ A peaceful settlement having been concluded, American interest in the region waned, characterized by a routine condemnation of OAS violence and affirmation of the Évian Accords.⁵⁷ Peace had come. The French would temporarily retain basing rights and the presence of troops before ultimately relinquishing these privileges. But most importantly, Algeria was independent. The United States thus saw its role in the crisis at a natural end.

The involvement of the United States in the Algerian war could be easily seen as one of contradictions. The former colonial possession of the Kingdom of Great Britain declared its independence 180 years prior with the resounding condemnation that imperialism must end when governments do not derive their rule from the consent of the governed. As “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness,”⁵⁸ it makes sense to support those who seek to emulate these principles.

How could the United States then possibly justify supporting a power that staunchly supported imperial rule? The answer can be found in American foreign policy that emphasized, across two different administrations, a moral support that stressed a peaceful settlement with concessions of autonomy for Algeria while ensuring French presence as a force for stability. American diplomatic documents articulate that the FLN, after rejecting generous French proposals, was perceived as a force that would quickly trample on democratic rights, especially those of the *pièdes-noirs* settlers. This prediction was proven correct even before 1962 ended with the

50 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa, 51.

51 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa, 51.

52 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa, 57.

53 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa, 59.

54 Alexander and Keiger, ed., France and the Algerian War 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 151.

55 “Algeria: France-Algeria Independence Agreements (Evian Agreements),” International Legal Materials 1, no. 2 (1962): 214-30, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20689578>.

56 Alexander and Keiger, France and the Algerian War 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy, xvii.

57 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXI, Africa, 65, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v21/d65>.

58 Thomas Jefferson, et al., Declaration of Independence, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbjb000159/>.

exodus of *pièdes-noirs* and mass violence in the wake of the Évian Accords. The willingness of the military and settlers to rebel and even support insurgent “Committees of Public Safety” and the OAS showcase the importance of Algeria not only as a representation of France’s prowess and territorial integrity but also the settlers’ fear of radical retribution. There were numerous massacres and a system of “compliance terrorism” that threatened even moderate Muslim Algerians willing to cooperate with colonial rule. The small size of the FLN compared to the population of Algeria indicated that the FLN was not entirely representative of the Algerian people until agreeing to negotiate with de Gaulle in early 1962.

In such a situation, the administrations of Kennedy and Eisenhower supported France’s continuing presence to ensure stability, prevent a massacre of, at the extreme end, millions of “collaborationists,” hold back the potential for communist influence, and keep France in the crucial NATO alliance. While France was often brutal in its “pacification” policies, Eisenhower notably worried about much worse atrocities occurring if a peaceful settlement at France’s initiative did not ensue. Thus, American policy towards the crisis was not only in line with traditional American foreign policy values respecting stability and anti-communism but also with the United States’ inclination to support people fighting for freedom from colonial domination, promoting a sensible and moderate vision of self-determination.

As for the characterization of American tactical changes in its policy towards Algeria, President Kennedy, despite his earlier speech outlining support for Algerian rebels, largely continued the policies of his predecessor. Even in his rhetoric, Kennedy never condemned the French after becoming President. The reasons are likely twofold; there was a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy matters, and second, the rise of Charles de Gaulle and his policy of liberalization allowed him to avoid accusations of hypocrisy. The only prominent policy change was a shift from passive to active measures, which had also been sporadically proposed under the Eisenhower administration. This new push arose mainly because the FLN was the only party holding back a peaceful settlement, and thus the National Security Council intervened, with limited significance, to fulfill its larger policy objective.

Accordingly, American foreign policy over Algeria, despite facing accusations of hypocrisy, support for imperialism, and inconsistency, found itself entrenched in a larger moral mission of peace and responsible local representation. It remained flexible to protect its interests in a strong NATO ally and to sponsor the containment of communism. In this spirit, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State under President Truman, and architect of American Cold War foreign policy, reflected on the role of morality in foreign policy by contending that “the righteous who seek to deduce foreign policy from ethical or moral principles are as misleading and misled

as the modern Machiavelli’s who would conduct our foreign relations without regard to them.”⁵⁹ The story of American involvement in the Algerian War for Independence exemplifies this logic. While President Kennedy and his administration initially sought to rhetorically realign American policy in the region along moral imperatives, he ultimately resumed the line of logic President Eisenhower had espoused. This method sought to ensure moral imperatives such as peace, prosperity, and democratic representation through the more pragmatic channels of lending diplomatic and moral support to an often domineering, imperial colonial apparatus that had previously sought to restrict autonomy only to European settlers. It is in this manner that the American role in the Algerian War illustrates how the United States acted in the early Cold War as a world power seeking to revise the old imperial order along liberal lines while recognizing the limitations that rational pragmatism would place on the U.S. in its role as a NATO member and ally of a colonial state. 🏠

59 Dean Acheson, “Ethics in International Relations Today,” transcript of speech delivered at Amherst College, Amherst, Massachusetts, December 9, 1964, <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/12/10/archives/excerpts-from-achensons-talk-on-maxims-as-guide-to-policy.html>.

Drilling the Dream

The Union Oil Company and the Spark of Western Monopoly 1900-1910

A California oil boom emerged in the shadows of the historical Gold Rush. The discovery of petroleum rendered new migration from wealthy investors and eager prospectors. But the hopes of small prospectors was short-lived in the face of the Union Oil Company and its surging monopoly. Founder and chief executive Lyman Stewart grew Union Oil from a local Santa Paula oil refiner to a global crude giant during the first decade of the twentieth century. Union's expansion over one ten-year period (1900-1910) exceeded 400%. The corporation added twenty-two subsidiary companies and established the Union Steamship Company for global shipping in just one decade. Union's rise presents new information on oil booms of the twentieth century and the side effects of monopolistic growth. I explore the many once-hopeful oil prospectors who were trounced by Union's acceleration to economic superpower status. Union's '76' gas stations still dot all major Los Angeles streets today, and Union Oil founder Lyman Stewart was celebrated throughout company history. However, the true result of his expansion reveals a legacy of stolen profit and the destruction of an individualistic California oil dream.

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CIRCULAR ORANGE SIGNS EMBLAZONED WITH '76' in royal blue spin atop thirty-foot metal poles. '76' is now a 24-hour gas station, but it was once the center of California petroleum. '76' is Union Oil – Lyman Stewart's West Coast monopoly that became a crude oil superpower for over one hundred years until its sale in 2005. Union consolidated more than twenty subsidiary companies, drilled three hundred wells, and launched a global shipping operation between 1900 and 1910. Its stock value grew 400% throughout the decade.¹ Union owned the oil production line from land prospecting to heating buildings. The sudden surge to power may seem reasonable on the surface – Union was backed by millionaires who wielded enough capital to finance massive business transactions. But before 1900, oil markets were spread between more than two hundred local California companies drilling in regional sites.² Refining technologies were limited, and oil shipping was facilitated through flat-bed river boats.

How did Lyman Stewart grow Union Oil to dominate over 40% of California's oil market in just ten years?³ Union Oil smothered the initial kindling of a West Coast oil rush backed by optimism and local success. The sudden rise reshapes past understandings of commodity booms and the side effects of monopolistic growth. The Union Oil monopoly

was not inevitable by way of its gigantic financial backing, but instead used unchecked tactics to overtake a once-competitive market of small regional refineries and family land owners. Small-town land buyouts quickly led to full-scale vertical integration of Union's oil operation. Individual oil refiners often settled for undervalued Union buyout prices and saw no future profit.

Union Oil is not a household name despite its storied success. Its history has been reduced to a small museum in Santa Paula, California today. Scholarly interest on Lyman Stewart and Union is eclipsed by countless articles and monographs about the Standard Oil monopoly.⁴ Much of Union's legacy is defined by its battles with Standard's California branch given John D. Rockefeller inquired about purchasing Union on multiple occasions. Lyman Stewart began his quest for a Union monopoly after becoming the corporation's president in 1894. Sweeping land acquisitions were the initial means of controlling both established and potential oil fields. An expansion into industrialized shipping began in 1905, and Stewart was vigilant in keeping Standard at bay. At its core, acquiring the land and production means of local drilling companies was the crux of Union's business model and set up success in California's richest oil fields. The

1 Frank Taylor, *Sign of the 76: The Fabulous Life and Times of the Union Oil Company* (Whittlesey House, 1976).

2 Lionel V. Repath, *Petroleum in California: A Concise and Reliable History of the Oil Industry of the State* (Los Angeles, 1900).

3 "Oil Stocks Close Year with 10 Percent Gain," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 37, no. 92 (January 1, 1910), 10.

4 The only book entirely on Union Oil is Early Welty and Frank Taylor's *The Black Bonanza*, which was funded by Union itself in 1950 (a second edition was released in 1950 and a third edition in 1976 under titles *The 76 Bonanza* and *Sign of the 76*). One of few modern historians to discuss the Union Oil Company's role in oil history at length is Gerald White in *A History of Standard Oil Company of California and Predecessors through 1919* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962). Most scholarship on petroleum in the American West makes brief mention of Lyman Stewart and Union's powerful hold on the West. For instance, Paul Sabin, *Crude Politics: The California Oil Market, 1900-1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) references John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil 89 times more than Union. The following works center Western petroleum history around Standard Oil alone: Leonardo Maugeri, *The Age of Oil* (Westport: Praeger, 2006); William Rintoul, *Spudding in: Recollections of Pioneer Days in the California Oil Fields* (San Francisco: California Historical Society, 1976); Scott Benjamin and Wayne Henderson, *Standard Oil: The First 125 Years* (Minneapolis: Motorbooks International, 1996); David Whitten, *The Birth of Big Business in the United States, 1860-1914* (Westport: Praeger, 2006); Gilbert Holland Montague, *The Rise and Progress of the Standard Oil Company* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903); Ida Tarbell, *The History of the Standard Oil Company* (New York: McClure, Phillips, and Co., 1904).

young monopoly reached an early peak when a culmination of Stewart's tactics gave way to Union's most profitable wells in Kern County and Santa Maria.

California was home to an oil commodity rush toward the end of the nineteenth century. Oil was utilized by native groups for non-industrial purposes prior to the boom. Yokut indigenous groups across California used "asphaltum" (oil that hardens to tar when exposed to open air) to waterproof baskets and solidify arrow tips in preceding centuries.⁵ The state's largest commodity migration was the Gold Rush of the 1860s, but oil emerged in gold's shadows during the 1870s. The first profit-driven exploration of California oil began just after 1865. A tame California oil rush began in the 1870s and continued into the late nineteenth century. A professor named J.T. Hodges even left New York with his heart set on oil extraction in 1900.⁶ Countless other searches for petroleum were ignited in backyards with a shovel and eyes scanning for bubbling tar. Return on investment was plentiful, and soon "a great many companies were formed for the purposes of petroleum mining, and for distilling crude oil."⁷ Newspapers and journal entries on oil spiked as excitement spread beyond state lines.⁸ Technological shortfalls in the refining process prevented California from becoming a leading oil producer until the late 1880s. Four new fields were discovered in Los Angeles (Newhall, Los Angeles, Whittier, and Puente), establishing Hollywood as a petroleum city. Prominent investors, including future Union president Lyman Stewart, began to travel from eastern states to seize oil opportunities. Stock exchanges were established with the sole objective of moving oil shares between investors, the largest being the Los Angeles Oil Exchange.⁹ California oil output skyrocketed over 280% between 1887 and 1895.¹⁰ Petroleum created a profitable market for refiners in California, and its largest players began to form by the end of the century.

Thomas Bard's Sespe Oil and Torrey Canyon Oil merged with Wallace Hardison and Lyman Stewart's Hardison and Stewart Oil Company to form the Union Oil Company of California in 1890. Union's three founders established a sizable new operation. Yet, competition was ample. Over two hundred oil companies were incorporated in California by 1900.¹¹ Union Oil was respectable – capitalized at \$5,000,000 – but five companies were of equal value. Two companies were double its capital stock size (Pacific Land and Oil Company and San Francisco Consolidation Oil). But by the end of the decade, Union had grown to five times the size

of Pacific Land and San Francisco Oil.¹² What accounted for Union's astonishing success?

Lyman Stewart's seizure of complete internal power within Union was the first step to structuring his personalized corporation. Stewart expanded his dominance as competing voices departed from Union's original executive board. Wallace Hardison was the first co-founder to leave Union. Investments abroad captured his interests and Hardison sold his entire share in the company by 1894. Co-founder Thomas Bard sold his 16% stake in Union in 1900. The *Pacific Oil Reporter* tracked oil developments throughout the early twentieth century and reported \$800,000 of Union Oil stock had been sold to the Edison Electrical Company.¹³ The transaction was later revealed to have been Bard's stake in Union Oil moving hands. There is no evidence to suggest Edison Electrical became an important voice within Union, and the purchase was likely for its own investment return. Bard's exit left Stewart as the last remaining Union co-founder. Union's value doubled after Bard "sold his interest in the Union Oil company," and Union was revalued at \$10,000,000.¹⁴ Investor optimism increased since the number of competing internal voices had been reduced to Stewart alone, a trusted oil investor. Bard was a United States senator with interests outside of oil markets and Hardison liquidated his position six years prior. Lyman Stewart held the title of president since 1894 but used his new status as last standing co-founder to become the company's sole decision-maker by 1900. The twentieth century was marked by Stewart, his sons, and future grandsons at the helm. He was the face, voice, and steady hand of Union throughout an era of sustained growth during the early twentieth century.¹⁵ Future authors recall Stewart as Union's brilliant leader. A 1958 *Los Angeles Times* article on Union praised Stewart as the executive who "spearheaded four generations of Union Oil men" within two decades of Union's establishment.¹⁶

Land control through real estate acquisition was the foundation of Union's oil domination. Stewart moved to purchase gigantic swaths of land that were of potential use to his oil monopoly. He could "smell oil" and aimed to purchase untapped fields before competitors could gather their equipment.¹⁷ Union struck dozens of valuable wells by way of owning the land first and drilling second. Union also used land acquisition to support its future petroleum transportation system to shipping ports. Stewart built an oil kingdom with little sympathy for how land entered company hands.

5 Kenneth Henderson, "A History of Oil Production in California," *Oil Industry History* (Sacramento, 2001).

6 Lionel V. Redpath, *Petroleum in California: A Concise and Reliable History of the Oil Industry of the State* (Los Angeles, 1900), 11.

7 Redpath, 9.

8 Redpath, 11.

9 "The Exchanges," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 2, no. 1 (November 9, 1900), 6.

10 Redpath, 23.

11 Redpath, 23; ("Oil Production in California by Years").

12 Taylor, *Sign of the 76: The Fabulous Life and Times of the Union Oil Company* (Los Angeles: Union Oil Company, 1976).

13 "Sale of Union Oil's Stock," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 2, no. 4 (November 30, 1900), 12.

14 "A New Element," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 2, no. 7 (December 21, 1900), 13.

15 "Society News of the Week," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 36, no. 199 (April 18, 1909), 2.

16 "It Takes Men to Build Union Oil," *Los Angeles Times* (April 1, 1958), USC Special Collections.

17 "It Takes Men to Build Union Oil," *Los Angeles Times* (April 1, 1958), USC Special Collections.

Personal ranches were a common Union purchase, often made without informing sellers of the value beneath their homes. Union owned over 230,000 acres across California by the end of 1910.¹⁸

Union's first significant land purchase was in Kern County. Union was quick to purchase holdings in the field before it erupted with oil and competition. Union installed a 35,000-barrel tanker in the field and continued to expand into the first decade of the twentieth century.¹⁹ Stewart and Union competed with Standard Oil's subsidiary Pacific Coast Oil Company in Kern. Derricks sprung up throughout the oil field and Union was aggressive to be one of the first land owners and drillers in the new development.



Figure 1. Kern County Oil Field, 1900. Oil derricks rose far into the horizon of the Kern County Oil Field in 1900. Union Oil was one of the first corporations to purchase land in the area. Union also installed a 35,000-barrel oil tanker to transport oil from the field to ports and buyers. Lyman Stewart used the success from purchasing land in Kern County to fund future real estate investment throughout the early twentieth century in Santa Maria and Lompoc.²⁰

Union owned 2,500 acres of the Kern County oil field by the end of 1902. Its share was the largest of the major oil corporations.²¹ Some of Stewart's land acquisitions rendered useless, but his goal was to own massive acreages first. Union soon expanded its holdings to Los Angeles and Ventura with the capacity to refine over 40,000 barrels of crude oil per month.

Union's 1903 purchase of "Purisima Rancho" at John H. Wise's personal property helped provide massive financial gain in Santa Barbara County. Lompoc was an untapped oil town in the early twentieth century. Union purchased land in the area after Central California started to show small traces of oil, though Lompoc was dry at the time. Whether Stewart was tipped off or not remains unknown, but Union purchased over 75,000 acres of land in Lompoc in 1903.²² The second largest controlling interest was the local Lompoc Oil drill-

ing company which held just 1,000 acres. Union acquired the land from John H. Wise's "Purisima Rancho" for an undisclosed price. Stewart's acquisition of Purisima Rancho supported his continued interest in purchasing potential oil real estate. Purisima well began to flow with oil after Union's drilling began and was considered "one of the biggest and best in the state of California."²³ Purisima produced steady flows throughout the early twentieth century and its production peaked in the 1950s while it was still Union-owned. There is no indication former landowner John H. Wise was made aware oil was beneath his ranch. Wise was never given royalties on Union's profit made from his former land.

Union Oil expanded operations in Santa Maria by purchasing the coveted Newlove Ranch. Newlove was family-owned but was rumored to hold massive amounts of oil. Corporations were warned to keep off the family ranch as "the Newlove heirs refuse, it was said, to sell any part of the tract."²⁴ Drillers pined for the chance to set derricks on the Newlove property. The ranch continued to receive attention from companies as Santa Maria was abundant with oil excitement in 1903 and 1904. Multiple offers were made on the ranch, but the Newlove owners refused to sell on more than one occasion. The gridlock remained in place until Lyman Stewart proposed an offer that piqued the Newlove family's interest due to the size of the offer. Union Oil acquired the ranch of C.W. Newlove and P.E. Newlove just two years after it was deemed permanently off the market. Stewart and Union purchased the 3,300 acres of "proven oil land that lies in the heart of the Santa Maria oil district" for \$1,500,000 after an offer of \$1,250,100 was rejected.²⁵ The Santa Maria oil fields proved one of the most important Union holdings as Stewart hoarded massive plots of land to ensure regional dominance. Union's most successful lease in Santa Maria was at the Hartnell Ranch, but its ability to overtake Newlove with ease supported Lyman Stewart's aggressive determination to acquire land that had potential to bring profit. A 1910 article considered the Newlove Ranch one of Union's most valuable assets and among its four most important holdings.

Union also used land acquisition to support a secondary oil transportation system which was operated through a series of pipelines. Union's involvement in Santa Maria was increasing by 1905 with multiple wells on purchased land. Union drillers were facing shipping problems in the region since the nearest export location was Port Harford in San Luis Obispo over thirty miles away. The Marre Estate cut through important territory that Stewart and Union leadership were keen on exploiting for a faster route to Port Harford. Union agreed to pay just \$8,000 for the right to use the land for

18 Taylor, *Sign of the 76: The Fabulous Life and Times of the Union Oil Company* (Los Angeles: Union Oil Company, 1976).

19 "The Union's Refinery," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 3, no. 1 (November 8, 1901), 10.

20 Kern County oil field and derricks, 1900, *California State Library*.

21 "Union Oil Company: Largest Handlers of Crude Petroleum in California," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 3, no. 34 (June 27, 1902), 1.

22 "Lompoc," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 5, no. 6 (December 12, 1903), 10.

23 "Lompoc," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 5, no. 6 (December 12, 1903), 10.

24 "News from the Field," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 5, no. 25 (April 25, 1904), 10.

25 "Oil Lands Sell for 1,500,000," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 33, no. 197 (April 15, 1906), 5.

pipeline work.²⁶ A clause within the contract made it “mandatory upon the Union Oil company not to sell, or in any way to dispose of the land to the Standard Oil Company.”²⁷ Competition in Santa Maria was strong, and the Marre family ensured the California-based Union would be the only corporation working under its land. Union also purchased 97 acres of land in the town of Avila to build a new refinery, further expanding its grip on the oil-booming region of California’s central coast. Union’s use of land acquisition created a viable transportation process for its central coast operations through pipelines built beneath the Marre Estate. Marre’s importance increased in future years when Union expanded shipping operations and demand for Santa Maria oil grew. Land purchases remained a prominent and favorite tactic of Stewart that was critical to establish fundamental pieces of the Union monopoly.

Union’s land purchases were often competitive and its ability to win “land races” were key to monopolistic growth. The push to be first on coveted land was often described as an “eleventh hour” race between the Standard Oil Company of California and Union throughout the first decade of the twentieth century.²⁸ No other corporations held the influence of Union and Standard. Both used secondary companies to spread as far as possible and control large areas of land. Pacific Coast Oil Company became Standard Oil’s main subsidiary, which it purchased in 1900.²⁹ Union and Standard fought to overtake Kern County with Union winning the eventual majority. It also outbid Standard’s push for the Newlove Ranch. Standard Oil was a larger and more powerful corporation on a national level, but Union’s dominance of California oil land helped evade its competitor.

Consolidation was the core of Union’s business model and built off its successful land acquisitions. Stewart acquired and controlled small oil companies through financial buy-outs and legal battles. Union purchased land in Santa Maria, Kern, and other regions throughout California. The company’s most valuable growth came through deals and agreements that would allow Union to employ subsidiary workers, which cut costs and spread influence quicker. Union owned over twenty subsidiary companies and used the stream of profit to expand the monopoly beyond land control. Union subsidiaries were essential assets for drilling, transportation, and shipping.

Legal arrangements with the small Home Oil Company was one of Union’s first attempts at controlling a subsidiary company and reducing labor costs. Oil’s immense value attracted investors and local companies formed to ex-

plore their respective regions. There were over two hundred incorporated oil firms in California in 1900 that ranged in values from less than \$10,000 to over \$10,000,000.³⁰ The Home Oil Company was a low-capitalization drilling company based in the Whittier Field of Los Angeles. It was valued at \$100,000 with 100% of its stock issued on public market exchanges for investors to purchase. Union dominated Home Oil in size and value and launched a legal dispute over complications regarding the Hearst Estate in 1901.³¹ Home Oil was soon “forced to make sales to the Union Oil company at a price less than 30 cents a barrel.”³² Union would receive Home Oil’s petroleum without drilling itself or paying market price through the arrangement. In fact, the Home Oil purchase price was a 73% discount below market for Union. Union then turned massive profit on the oil taken from Home Oil. Petroleum sold at 65 cents per gallon, thus giving Union a 35-cent profit margin for each barrel. Union’s approach with Home Oil was an initial means to reduce competition and destroy Home Oil’s ability to succeed in the evolving market since most of their oil was pushed into Stewart’s hands. Home Oil became an established Union subsidiary after 1900. Stewart had boosted Union’s profit and influence. Home Oil’s future gains were seized in the process.

Union acquired the Santa Maria Oil and Gas Company and California Coast Oil Company in 1905 to expand its power in Central California during the region’s oil boom. Santa Maria emerged as a promising new oil region in 1903. Standard Oil began buying oil land in the area at the same time as Stewart and Union. One *Pacific Oil Reporter* author believed Santa Maria was “rapidly assuming the airs of an oil town.”³³ Union ensured it was well positioned to succeed in Santa Maria first through land agreements and second by consolidating regional companies. Stewart purchased two Santa Maria drilling companies. Union organized the acquisition for the Santa Maria Oil and Gas Company and California Coast Company in 1905. Both companies were working on adjacent oil fields next to established Union land. The combined sale price was \$100,000, a meager check for Union which was valued at over \$10,000,000 and rising.³⁴ The purchase of two additional subsidiary companies increased Union’s total Santa Maria holdings to approximately 200,000 acres as it looked to “monopolize the whole district.”³⁵ Santa Maria would soon become one of Union’s most profitable regions throughout the rest of the decade. Millions of dollars of profit were the result of controlling subsidiary drilling companies. Union expanded its

26 “Oil Notes,” *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 6, no. 47 (September 23, 1905), 11.

27 “Oil Notes,” *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 6, no. 47 (September 23, 1905), 11.

28 Taylor, 136.

29 “A New Element,” *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 2, no. 7 (December 21, 1900), 13.

30 Redpath.

31 “Sacrificing their Oil,” *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 2, no. 38 (July 26, 1901), 7.

32 “Sacrificing their Oil,” *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 2, no. 38 (July 26, 1901), 7.

33 “News from the Field,” *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 5, no. 25 (April 25, 1904), 10.

34 “Santa Maria,” *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 6, no. 40 (August 2, 1905), 5.

35 “Santa Maria,” *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 6, no. 40 (August 2, 1905), 5.

operations without employing new labor and captured larger profits than local companies which were unable to compete with its size. Consolidating the two Santa Maria drilling companies allowed Union to expand on land purchased years prior.

Union also acquired subsidiary transportation companies to increase a stake in the transportation of oil from the field to local homes and ports. The acquisition of the Oil and Storage Transportation Company in 1901 and Mission Transportation and Refinery Company in 1902 were key developments in the growth of Union's transportation branch. The Oil and Storage Transportation Company was an oil company that focused on transporting and marketing California petroleum. The deal was a sizable movement of capital and strengthened Union's power in California. The *Los Angeles Herald* considered the acquisition to "have a most important bearing on the oil markets of California" as heavier transactions increased in volume throughout the early 1900s.³⁶ Union's purchase also sparked additional encouragement for investors to enter the oil market as returns on profit jumped. A second early twentieth century Union acquisition was the Mission Transportation and Refinery Company of San Francisco in 1902. The San Francisco-based company managed oil tankers and pipelines throughout Northern California. Union acquired the Mission Transportation Company to solidify its pipeline operations and create a more seamless oil transportation process.³⁷ The sale included an important caveat: Lyman Stewart was installed as the new Vice President of the Mission Transportation and Refinery Company. Union controlled its interests and Stewart led both companies by 1902. Union's interests were now also Mission's. The new Mission board included additional Union Oil executive board members to ensure it trailed Union as the parent company. Mission's acquisition in 1902 expanded Union's network of oil pipelines beyond the bounds of Marre Estate. The control of both Oil and Storage Transportation Company and Mission Transportation and Refinery Company helped Union's oil transportation arm grow in the early twentieth century. Other subsidiary companies continued to be incorporated throughout the decade that expanded Union's share of the market. The Union Tool Company made Union a player in the derrick parts market. Lyman Stewart incorporated twenty-two subsidiary companies by the end of the decade. Each subsidiary helped Union expand its influence in drilling and transportation that was once limited to Union-owned land.

The final piece of the Union monopoly was to control oil transportation from pipelines to homes and buildings. Union purchased land to drill its first wells across Kern County, Lompoc, and Santa Maria. The acquisition of sub-

sidary companies was an important tool to reduce cost while expanding operations. Subsidiary companies were used to grow drilling in Santa Maria and Whittier as well as transportation with Union pipelines. Stewart's next objective was to seize the shipping process. Once it owned shipping means, Union could establish itself as a full-scale monopoly which controlled every factor of the production process.

Oil shipping was a small and unexplored market in the early twentieth century before Union expanded into the sector. Shipping oil began in the late 1800s, although technology was insufficient for transporting large quantities. Flatbed oil barges could load barrels to be pushed downstream in local regions, but national transport was underwhelming and challenging.³⁸ The need for oil across the United States and globe remained high during the beginning of the twentieth century due to expensive coal prices. Oil provided a new source of cheap energy, heat, and power. A letter from Union Oil to W. F. Botsford (a future chairman of Union-subsidary United Petroleum) highlights the energy transition toward oil. A Union representative from Harwood Hall mentioned government officials had "published reports of experiments which they have been making crude oil as fuel" for trains and heating.³⁹ Union began to fill the demand through its expansive ground operations. Union leadership marketed oil as a cheap alternative to coal. Director of Sales John Baker Jr. led Union's advertising and sales campaigns to alter how its product was viewed. Growing interest spread past the nation's borders to buyers in Hawaii, Panama, and South America.

Union overtook the oil shipping process through the incorporation of a new subsidiary named the Union Steamship Company. Steamships owned by the corporation soon dotted dozens of ports. Petroleum shipments to Hawaii were growing in 1902, but Union exponentially expanded its shipping operation through in-state shipping. Oil output increased to over four million barrels per year from Santa Maria pipelines. Stewart created the Union Steamship Company after purchasing four massive steamships from a Brooklyn-based shipyard company. The new ships would be operated under the name of the Union Steamship Company. The subsidiary shipping business was valued at \$5,000,000.⁴⁰ The new ships' larger carrying capacities helped Union transport great amounts of oil to output destinations. Most Union shipments originated from Port Harford and Port Richmond. The Union steamship named *Lansing* could hold 47,000 barrels per trip, the *Washtenaw* held 28,500 barrels, *Roma* carried 27,500 barrels, and *Argyle* moved 25,000 barrels on each trip.⁴¹ The new Steamship Company allowed Union to angle itself to fulfill oil demand beyond California. Union used its pipelines established throughout Santa Maria and

36 "Some Big Deals Pending in the Marketing of Oil," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 28, no. 276 (July 6, 1901), 12.

37 "Important Oil Deal: The Union Oil Company Sells All Its Valuable Property," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 3, no. 13 (January 13, 1902), 5.

38 Hearst Corporation *Los Angeles Examiner* Clippings, USC Special Collections, image of an early oil barge.

39 Letter from Harwood Hall to W.F. Botsford, *Sherman Indian Museum Collection*.

40 Taylor, *Sign of the 76: The Fabulous Life and Times of the Union Oil Company* (Whittlesey House, 1976), 145.

41 "News from the Field," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 7, no. 3 (November 18, 1905), 5.

Southern California to transport oil to Port Harford. The pipeline oil was then loaded onto new Union tankers and left the California coast for Hawaii, South America, and tens of additional destinations across the world that would pay profit-generating prices for Union's petroleum. Union acquired two more ships one year after the new corporation was established, which held 52,500 barrels each.⁴²

Hawaii was the first non-continental location Union Oil began shipping to as it increased its global oil footprint. Director of Marketing and Sales John Baker Jr. helped advertise the advantages of Union's petroleum compared to more expensive coal. Demand surged throughout Hawaii since coal carried egregious import costs and taxes. Petroleum fuel was inexpensive and more efficient for heating and powering homes. Union started its exports to Hawaii with around 2,000 barrels of exports per day, though it was optimistic the eventual quantity would exceed 600,000 barrels.⁴³ The first Union transportation tanker was the *Fullerton*, which had a slim carrying capacity of 17,000 barrels. The creation of the Union Steamship Company allowed shipping quantities to triple throughout the first decade of the twentieth century. Union was prepared to expand its shipping operations to distant locations. One *Pacific Oil Reporter* journalist expressed confidence that Union could "supply oil, by means of its tank steamers, wherever it is demanded. It has every facility to do this with."⁴⁴ Union was considered the pioneer of oil sales in Hawaii and expanded its monopoly through global shipping. Stewart set the company's shipping sights on local regions such as Hawaii but also distant options by the likes of Australia, China, Japan, and Alaska. South and Central America were accessible markets that Union entered within months of establishing new operations in Hawaii.

Union expanded its business to Panama in Chile and further developed the global oil market. Chile and Panama had significant oil demand in 1905. 24,000 barrels were shipped from Port Harford to Panama in immediate response.⁴⁵ Union answered the increased demand by adding *Minnetonka* and *Minnewaska* to its global shipping fleet. The entrance into Panamanian markets exemplified Stewart's goals of creating an international monopoly as foreign nations became dependent on Union's oil. Union provided consistent oil as an alternative to coal. A second enticing market was in South America. Union agreed to begin shipping 25,000 barrels to Chile after it "secured the contract against all competitors."⁴⁶ Trade between Union and Chile spiked after oil shipments began and Port Harford saw exciting increases in international shipping starting in 1905. Union created an interconnected transportation system that used its fields, pipe-

lines, and new steamships to form an oil monopoly. Massive profit was captured along the entire production line. Union was praised for taking the role of a "pioneer in opening up new territory to the use of California fuel oil."⁴⁷ Union's global market expansion did not end after the Chilean contracts in 1905. Future leadership under W.L. Stewart (son of Lyman Stewart) contracted F. Oskar Martin to investigate potential oil fields in Columbia. Union purchased over 400,000 acres of property before any oil was known to be present, an ode to its aggressive land purchasing tendencies of the start of the century. Lyman Stewart and John Baker Jr. developed the Union Steamship Company within the Union Oil monopoly as it evolved from a California prospector to an international oil company in just ten years.

Union Oil owned fields, controlled dozens of drilling and transportation companies, and established a global shipping arm within a decade of its monopolistic expansion. An important feature to its consistent strength was Lyman Stewart's shrewd economic skills. He ensured that Union was able to undergo its vast expansion while maintaining financial stability. Stewart created two core Union-backed companies that would provide capital and expand his own control of the oil market simultaneously. United Petroleum and Union Provident were invaluable pieces of the Union business and helped support the financial needs of the growing monopoly. Stewart restructured Union debt and added new capital through the two companies to ensure Union's growth was unimpeded by economic challenges. United Petroleum and Union Provident both served as financial backbones for Union Oil.

United Petroleum was added to the Union machine during the beginning of its twentieth century expansion. United Petroleum was a San Francisco-based oil company capitalized at \$5,000,000 in 1900. It had a large 54% stake in Union Oil in 1901.⁴⁸ Stewart bought back United Petroleum's stake and reversed the investment structure so that Union could have a new majority share of the San Francisco company. He added United Petroleum as a subsidiary company that would infuse capital to support Union's expansion. The sale of United Petroleum to Union was for just \$125 per share.⁴⁹ It ensured "the smaller holders in the Union will now have a more important voice in its control."⁵⁰ Stewart and other important Union leaders were installed on the United Petroleum executive board and could manage both operations. United Petroleum served to provide capital and relieve Union debt. Stewart began to create a connected web of adjacent organizations that could be controlled from his chair as leader of the whole Union corporation.

42 "To Pipe Petroleum Across the Isthmus," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 7, no. 15 (February 10, 1906), 8.

43 "Union Oil Company: Largest Handlers of Crude Petroleum in California," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 3, no. 34 (June 27, 1902), 1.

44 "Union Oil Company: Largest Handlers of Crude Petroleum in California," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 3, no. 34 (June 27, 1902), 1.

45 "To Pipe Petroleum Across the Isthmus," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 7, no. 15 (February 10, 1906), 8.

46 "Santa Maria Oil for Chile," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 6, no. 51 (October 21, 1905), 7.

47 "Santa Maria Oil for Chile," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 6, no. 51 (October 21, 1905), 7.

48 "Union Oil Reorganized," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 2, no. 29 (March 29, 1901), 11.

49 "United Petroleum Sells Wells at a Good Price," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 28, no. 184 (April 3, 1901), 14.

50 "United Petroleum," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 28, no. 176 (March 26, 1901), 14.

Union reorganized additional capital through the creation of the Union Provident Company in 1905. Union Provident was founded by Stewart and other prominent business figures such as W.T. Botsford, president of the American National Bank. G. Kellogg was a Union Provident founder and served as secretary of Union oil as well. The creation of Union Provident helped Stewart to expand his assets while bolstering Union Oil's available funds. Stewart's common strategy during times of financial strife was to create new companies that he could manage while keeping Union's financial equilibrium in balance. Union Provident alone raised an extra \$5,000,000 that Union soon had at its disposal.⁵¹ Union used Union Provident to expand its oil domination as a method of competing with Standard Oil as well. Provident was able to purchase new oil interests throughout California. Stewart was a Union Provident founder and leader on its new executive board. He made Union and Provident's "interests of the two seemingly almost mutual."⁵² The intertwining of each adjacent Union-operated organization was complex but created a massive financial monopoly that Stewart stood atop. Stewart and his family could use each connected corporation to "dictate the election of the several boards of directors of the Union Oil Company, and thereby control and dictate the management and policies" of United Petroleum and Union Provident.⁵³ United Petroleum and Union Provident provided excessive capital for Stewart to expand his business as well as means to expand his leadership across the state's oil industry. By the end of the decade, Union's primary subsidiaries were the Mission Transportation and Refining Company, Union Transportation, Union Provident, United Petroleum, and Newlove Oil.⁵⁴

Union was forced to evade consolidation by the Standard Oil Company of California to reinforce its monopolistic standing. Standard overtook several major oil corporations and was a powerful force by the turn of the nineteenth century. Even Edward Doheny's Pan American Petroleum and Transportation Company was purchased by Standard for \$38,000,000 in 1925.⁵⁵ Standard's most important subsidiary was the Pacific Coast Oil Company, which held competing assets in both Kern and Santa Maria County.⁵⁶ News surfaced often that Standard merged with Union, which would end Union's run. Reporters were dutiful to dispel potent lies and documented the rumors across publications. Statements like "no proof has been given that a single share of Union stock is held by the Standard" were frequent.⁵⁷ The *Pacific Oil Reporter* expressed backing for Union in its battle against Standard. Union was a California-based company and received support

from locals in its fight with Standard even though it had overtaken multiple regional companies. Avoiding a merger with Standard Oil was a key aspect to cover potential cracks in the new Union monopoly.

Union Oil evolved from a nameless oil company in the field to a full-scale monopoly during the first decade of the twentieth century. Lyman Stewart was the aggressive president whose tactics created an economic market machine. Union controlled the ground, pipes, ships, and money of the oil market. It also evaded Standard and stood strong against large competition. However, much of Union's storied history is centered around just two wells. Hartnell No. 1 and Lake View No. 1 have often defined the Union monopoly due to inexorable success.

Hartnell No. 1 was an oil well in Santa Maria that produced over 1.5 million barrels of oil. In December 1904 "without warning, the oil started to gush, broke loose from everything and kept a streaming up and up."⁵⁸ Local Union drillers nicknamed Hartnell No. 1 "Old Maud" and it steadied to a flow of over 1,500 barrels a day. "Old Maud" became a Union legend when it was struck at over 2,600 feet below the Santa Maria earth. The oil eruption made nationwide news and photos of oil bursting through the top of a wooden derrick were featured across newspapers.⁵⁹ Over 1,500,000 barrels were produced by the end of 1905 as Union affirmed its Santa Maria domination. Union's success at Hartnell No. 1 seemed unexpected to the daily *Los Angeles Herald* reader. The oil explosion was an anomaly and spectacle for all eyes to see. However, Union's strategic consolidation methods led to Hartnell No. 1 and its success. The Santa Maria Gas and Oil Company began working on the Hartnell Family Ranch at Graciosa in April 1902.⁶⁰ Union had accumulated massive amounts of Santa Maria land and pushed against the Hartnell Ranch. Stewart consolidated the Santa Maria Oil and Gas Company as part of its Santa Maria expansion efforts. Union then owned the Santa Maria subsidiary which drilled under Union's name on Hartnell No. 1. Union's tactics led to it being placed at Hartnell No. 1 in time for the largest oil explosion of its time. Although "Old Maud" was a natural phenomenon, Stewart placed his corporation in the perfect position to reap the benefit of over 1,500,000 barrels of oil through Union's land and consolidation strategy.

Union struck millions once again when Lake View No. 1 spouted in 1910. Union's involvement in Kern County began in 1902 and remained consistent for decades. Lake View No. 1 was a well in Union's Kern County territory that burst at 2,300 feet in March 1910. It was the high-water mark of

51 "Oil Fields to be Amalgamated: Union Provident Company Incorporated, May Fight the Standard," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 32, no. 262 (June 20, 1905), 14.

52 "Oil Fields to be Amalgamated: Union Provident Company Incorporated, May Fight the Standard," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 32, no. 262 (June 20, 1905), 14.

53 Taylor, *Sign of the 76: The Fabulous Life and Times of the Union Oil Company* (Whittlesey House, 1976).

54 "Union Prospers," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 37, no. 297 (July 25, 1910), 9.

55 "Doheny Acquired by Indiana Standard," *The New York Times* (April 1, 1925), 1.

56 "Has the Standard Oil Bought Out the Pacific Coast Oil Company?" *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 2, no. 5.

57 "Aims Blow at State's Great Industry," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 6, no. 14 (February 4, 1905), 1.

58 "Oil Notes," *Pacific Oil Reporter*, vol. 6, no. 51 (October 21, 1905), 7.

59 "Oil Spouts Over Top of Derrick," *The San Francisco Call* (December 4, 1904), 25.

60 "Santa Barbara County," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 28, no. 192 (April 11, 1902), 13.



Figure 2. Union Workers pose in front of Lake View No. 1 after it burst through a wooden derrick, 1910.⁶¹

a decade highlighted by Union's surge to become an international oil monopoly. Lake View was considered "the most remarkable oil well in history" as it powered over 400,000 gallons of oil each day.⁶² Images of Lake View No. 1 reached newspapers from Los Angeles to London.

Union petroleum rose into the sky at Lake View and the well continued to produce at astounding levels for months. It stopped fifteen months after March 1910 and poured over 9,000,000 barrels of oil. No Union well rivaled the output level of Lake View No. 1 during the first decade of the twentieth century. Lake View was remembered as Union's most successful well by reporters who touted it as "out of control" and "unbelievable."⁶³ Lake View's output shocked spectators, but Lyman Stewart and his fellow leadership used Union's well-tested consolidation strategy to be waiting at Lake View in March 1910. Union purchased 51% of the Lake View Oil Company just weeks before the explosion and added it to its arsenal of subsidiary companies.⁶⁴ Lyman Stewart ensured the well would be stamped with Union's name. Lake View No. 1 was unexpected to the field driller or newspaper editor, but Stewart placed his company in the proper location through monopolistic consolidation. Lake View No. 1 was the peak of a decade of monopolistic expertise, expansionary success, and inconceivable profit. Union did not own Hartnell No. 1 and Lake View No. 1 by chance or randomness. The wells were Union's because of a culmination of Lyman Stewart's tactics of monopolistic control. Land agreements and subsidiary acquisition prepared Union for new income once more. The profit made from Hartnell and Lake View was destined

from prior years of monopolistic development. Stewart's tactics introduced a consistent cycle of bountiful wealth for over one hundred years.

Union Oil was the largest petroleum producer in California by the end of 1910. Its twenty-two subsidiary companies included the Union Tool Company, Union Steamship Company, Union Provident, United Petroleum and multiple refinery and transportation groups. Its largest four subsidiaries were each valued over \$1,000,000. Lyman Stewart's approach to the oil market was complex and precise. He set a Union Oil monopoly into motion after co-founders Thomas Bard and Wallace Hardison rendered him the last standing founder. Stewart mastered land acquisitions to lay the groundwork necessary to control the oil production system. Aggressive corporate buyouts, consolidation, and legal agreements supported Stewart's next intentions of building profit. The finalized product once again was Union's to benefit from after the creation of its own global shipping company and company-controlled ports. Union continued to explore international shipping markets including Columbia and the Middle East towards the middle of the twentieth century as it increased its size without relent. Union was sold to Chevron in 2005 after over one hundred years in business. Lyman Stewart's seldom discussed legacy is marred with motivational notes of leadership and oil pioneering.

What was made of the ranch owners, independent drillers, and transportation companies that stood in the way of Lyman Stewart's aggressive growth? Their chance at success faded as fast as Union's profit soared. The millions of dollars taken from companies like the Home Oil Company, Santa Maria Oil and Gas Company of Hartnell No. 1, and Lake View Oil Company of Lake View No. 1 remains absent from scholarship. Although the former oil companies did receive buyouts to join Union, they often were undervalued and never captured future profit.

The '76' bubble still towers over gas pumps on Pico, Adams, and Figueroa in Los Angeles. California residents are reminded of the little-known oil company that altered state history each time they start their cars or heat their homes. Topics surrounding Union Oil do not spark debate or anger. The name Lyman Stewart carries association to almost no Californians. Potential for local drilling companies or landowners to share oil success was wiped away before 1910. The value of each small oil company, lease, or even tool manufacturer overtaken by Stewart and Union Oil can never be estimated. Union's rise to power alters the past perception of commodity rushes as an individualistic game with a gambler's chance to make sizable profit. While the gold rush fits such definitions, the race for oil in California was dominated by monopoly instead. An "oil rush" may have been remembered in the same light as the California Gold Rush — a beacon of hope and optimism in the West where

61 Hearst Corporation *Los Angeles Examiner* Clippings, USC Special Collections.

62 "After a Shower of 'Oil Rain': A Great Lake of Oil," *The Illustrated London News* (September 24, 1910), USC Special Collections.

63 "Union Oil History a Series of Firsts," *Los Angeles Times* (April 1, 1958), USC Special Collections.

64 "Lake View Gusher Causes Activity in Union Oil Exchange," *Los Angeles Herald*, vol. 37, no. 174 (March 23, 1910), 13.

any hopeful oil prospector might strike their own backyard well. The Union Oil '76' still stands as a sign too high above thirty-foot metal poles to fight with even the highest of aspirations. Would California's oil history be remembered as a period of personal success and optimism without the rise of its strongest monopoly? Union Oil ensures the question will forever remain a hypothetical. 🏠

Pat Maginnis

“One Woman’s Abortion Crusade” with the SHA and ARAL

Patricia Maginnis (1928–2021) was an early abortion rights activist in the 1960s and early 1970s from California. Her transformation from performing public opinion polling and advocating for modest abortion reforms, to eventually fighting to repeal all abortion laws and establishing an illegal feminist health clinic in San Francisco, was indicative of the tensions surrounding abortion laws of the time. She started advocating for the Knox Bill, an abortion reform bill proposed in the early 1960s, which called for the legalization of therapeutic abortions, i.e. abortions that are deemed medically necessary. Realizing that legalizing therapeutic abortions was not enough, she started the Society for Humane Abortion (SHA) to advocate for the repeal of all abortion laws. Alongside Lena Clarke Phelan and Rowena Gurner, two foundational members of SHA, the trio of activists worked through SHA to distribute information about the taboo subject and lead abortion classes, provoking police to arrest Maginnis and Gurner in 1967. When SHA was not enough to help women in dire need, they created the Association to Repeal Abortion Laws (ARAL), their abortion referral system that provided 12,000 illegal, but safe, abortions to women across the United States. This paper seeks to contribute to existing scholarship on the abortion rights movement by taking a more macrohistorical approach. This is pursued by examining legislation, organization, and the medical field, and engaging in biographical history work with Maginnis at the center. Through Maginnis’s story, this work demonstrates how crucial biographies and experiences are in shaping the feminist ideas that informed women’s activism around reproductive rights. More specifically, this paper argues that the tension between reforms centered on therapeutic abortion and the more radical feminist idea of women’s autonomy was crucial to the struggle for abortion rights in the pre-Roe v. Wade decade, and is depicted in Maginnis’s activism.

CLAIRE REBER

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INTRODUCTION

On the streets outside San Jose College in 1961, a student stood equipped with a newspaper clipping and a petition. Newspapers described her as “slender,”¹ “chestnut-haired”² with “large trusting brown eyes,”³ articulate with a “firm jaw and a soft voice” and likened her appearance to a poet.⁴ But that image of a pleasant, almost naïve, young woman, one well-suited to cultural ideas of womanhood in the 1960s, was at odds with her no-nonsense approach to a topic no one was speaking about: abortion. This newly minted student activist, Patricia Maginnis, was concerned about the 1961 Knox Bill, California’s first proposed reform bill to permit therapeutic abortions⁵ for rape, incest, and congenital fetal defects.⁶ Although initially in favor of therapeutic abortion reform in the early 1960s, Maginnis, through her involvement in political organizing, would soon turn in favor of repealing all

abortion restrictions. The friction between reforms centered on therapeutic abortion and the more radical feminist idea of women’s autonomy determining full access to abortion was crucial to the struggle for abortion rights in the pre-Roe v. Wade decade and is reflected in Maginnis’s story of activism.

The Knox Bill sought to codify a legal loophole that had been used for decades: therapeutic abortions, or medically necessary abortions. To situate Maginnis’s activism and the Knox Bill within the broader context of abortion history in the United States, using the periodization that Leslie Reagan developed in her foundation text, *When Abortion Was a Crime: Women, Medicine, and Law in the United States, 1867–1973*, is useful. Reagan argues that the century when abortion was illegal was a dynamic and fluid interaction between the personal, medical, and legal fields, not a static block of time broken by a reform movement. Reagan divides the decades of illegal

1 Mildred Schroeder, “One Woman’s Abortion Crusade,” September 26, 1966, *San Francisco Examiner* news article, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

2 Eloise Dungan, “Trying to Break Silence Barrier on Abortion Laws,” August 28, 1964, *San Francisco, News Call and Bulletin* news article, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

3 Schroeder, September 26, 1966, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion.

4 Dungan, August 28, 1964, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion.

5 A therapeutic abortion is an abortion that is approved because the pregnancy affects a woman’s physical or mental health, although the definition has a very loose meaning throughout abortion history.

6 Leslie Reagan, “Crossing the Border for Abortions: California Activists, Mexican Clinics, and the Creation of a Feminist Health Agency in the 1960s,” *Feminist Studies* 26, no. 2 (2000).

abortion into four distinct, but overlapping, transitions. These four transitions show how demand, medical practices, and criminalization structured abortions in the era of illegality. The first period, from the statewide criminalization of abortion and subsequent national criminalization from 1880 to 1930, marked the change from widely accepted abortion practices within women's homes and local doctor's offices to the increased crackdown on abortions from medical specialists themselves and the state's interference with abortions.⁷ In the 1930s, during the second period of illegal abortion, abortions became more public as many doctors were consolidated under the growth of hospitals and the Great Depression and economic hardship raised the demand for illegal abortions. The third period, which marked Maginnis's formative years beginning in 1940, was the period of even greater demand with heightened restrictions on abortion, continuing until 1973 when *Roe v. Wade* legalized abortion. Last, the fourth period was the push to legalize abortion, started by a few physicians challenging abortion laws and eventually growing into a mass feminist movement for legal change.⁸

Therapeutic abortions were developed during these first two periods of illegal abortion. Every state that had enacted criminal abortion laws made exceptions for therapeutic abortion that left the decision with the doctor on when to determine that a woman needed a life-saving abortion.⁹ Practitioners who performed therapeutic abortions, especially as the demand for them increased in the 1930s and spread to hospitals, understood that they operated in a legal gray area. Especially as people who performed therapeutic abortions moved from private practice to hospitals in the 1940s and 1950s, hospitals began to define standards and form committees for therapeutic abortions, thus simultaneously establishing which abortions were illegal: those that occurred outside of hospitals.¹⁰ The debate over what constitutes a therapeutic abortion would remain crucial to the abortion reform movement that gained legal steam in the 1960s. As support for the Knox Bill lost steam in the California state government due to a lack of urgency behind the effort, the Beilenson Bill, or Therapeutic Abortion Act, would soon take its place, becoming law in 1967. The Therapeutic Abortion Act granted abortions for the "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother" or if "the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest."¹¹ Maginnis, although originally in favor of the Knox Bill, soon voiced her support for total repeal, as seen in her much-reported opposition to the Beilenson Bill.¹²

The debate between reforming abortion laws and repealing all abortion laws marked a divisive split between the more established medical field—entrenched in state government regulations—and the legal profession. The first conference on abortion reform was hosted by Planned Parenthood in 1955, and due to its medical director, Dr. Mary Steichen Calderone, and the small nationally represented group in attendance, Planned Parenthood decided to publicly call for the medical and legal professions to reexamine and reform abortion laws.¹³ In 1959, the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed a model law on abortion that would allow physicians to perform abortions for physical and mental health reasons, fetal defects, or when pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.¹⁴ Although the Knox and Beilenson Bills were seen by medical and legal professionals as progress, many women activists decided to advocate for complete abortion access as the attention on female bodies and health care grew. Maginnis and the core members of her educational and lobbying organization, the Society for Humane Abortion (SHA), played a crucial role in the early stages of local, grassroots feminist activism that would become important to the successes of the women's movement. This is especially the case in the militant and illegal arm of SHA, the Association to Repeal Abortion Laws (ARAL). Accordingly, the ARAL provided illegal abortions and served as a health clinic outside of the law, becoming a crucial resource in establishing the early stages of feminist activism. Maginnis's adaptive activist tactics supported total abortion repeal, from pamphlets and polls to abortion classes to running an illegal women's health clinic and baiting the police, which all made her and her organizations successful activist fronts from the grassroots.

LIFE BEFORE ACTIVISM

Born in upstate New York in 1928 as the fifth of seven children, Maginnis moved to Oklahoma with her family when she was three years old. Raised in a strict Catholic household and community, Maginnis recalled being reprimanded for her youthful questions towards priests and authority.¹⁵ She was sent away to work and go to school at a convent for a period of time in her early teens and bounced between Catholic high schools and traveling with friends until she joined the Women's Army Corps (WACs) in 1950. She served in WAC for three years, stationed first at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and then in a Canal Zone Army Hospital in Panama.¹⁶

For Maginnis, the years she spent in Panama were formative in her path to becoming a pro-abortion activist, and

7 Leslie Reagan, *When Abortion Was a Crime: Women, Medicine, and Law in the United States, 1867-1973*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2022), 14.

8 Reagan, *When Abortion Was a Crime*, 15.

9 Reagan, *When Abortion Was a Crime*, 61.

10 Reagan, *When Abortion Was a Crime*, 173-174.

11 Brian Pendleton, "The California Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis," *Hastings Law Journal* 19, no. 1 (1967). https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol19/iss1/11

12 Patricia Maginnis, "Patricia Maginnis Oral History Interview About Her Efforts to Repeal Abortion Laws," interview by Jeanette Bailey Cheek, *Schlesinger-Rockefeller Oral History Project*, Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, November 18-20, 1975, transcript, 99-105. Maginnis's opposition to the Beilenson Bill was well reported by many sources; in these pages of her interview transcript, Maginnis explains her opposition in depth.

13 Reagan, *When Abortion Was a Crime*, 219.

14 Reagan, *When Abortion Was a Crime*, 220-221.

15 Maginnis, interview, 18. Maginnis recalls her childhood in her 1975 interview with Jeannette Bailey Cheek as part of the Schlesinger Library Rockefeller Oral History Project.

16 Maginnis, interview, 44.

her time spent in the army is often cited in her contemporary newspaper articles from the 1960s.¹⁷ As an activist, she told a story from her time in Panama about a Colombian woman who was impregnated by someone other than her husband, a Puerto Rican soldier deployed in Korea. The woman threatened to commit suicide when she heard her husband was returning. Instead of providing the woman proper medical care, Maginnis alleged that the hospital put the woman in a straitjacket on a bed with a cage around it.¹⁸ After this moment, Maginnis became set on the path for more radical reform as she witnessed the way women were denied proper medical care, along with the systemic poverty created by the U.S. imperial system.

Maginnis's personal experiences with abortion also catalyzed her emergence as a "pro-choice" political force, a motivation many of her fellow activists involved in the SHA shared. Maginnis became sexually active after she returned to the United States at the age of twenty-seven, in what she describes as a break from the Catholic Church and the restrictive dogma of her childhood.¹⁹ Sexually active women in the 1950s and 1960s had very limited options for contraception, especially unmarried women. The birth control pill, which Maginnis met with distrust, was first introduced in 1961 and increasingly made available in different states until the 1965 *Griswold v. Connecticut* decision codified it nationally legal for married couples. Almost a decade later, the 1972 *Eisenstadt v. Baird* decision made the pill and other forms of contraception available nationally for unmarried couples, which determined that the division of single and married people failed to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.²⁰ Although she used the contraceptive methods of her time, like the diaphragm, Maginnis said that "for a time there, it seemed that my life was a matter of every Christmas, a pregnancy."²¹ For her first abortion, she visited a doctor in Mexico, an unsettling if effective experience. She decided that if she ever got pregnant again, she would take care of her abortion herself and suffer the consequences of the state.²²

Her second abortion resulted from damaging the placenta with a catheter, which led to a horribly painful experience "delivering" the placenta. When Maginnis went to the hospital and told the nurses what was happening, they let her lay on a bed without any pain medicine as the fetus was expelled. Her doctor, who happened to be Catholic, asked to

baptize the baby to which the distressed Maginnis flippantly replied, "Well, please make it a Buddhist."²³ Her third abortion in 1959 induced with a dirty finger and an infection (a method that Maginnis was staunchly against promoting due to its health risks) landed her in the hospital where she again told the nursing staff that she was in the middle of an induced abortion. She aborted the fetus in a hospital bathroom. The next day, while still in the hospital, she underwent questioning by the San Francisco Police Department Homicide Detail.²⁴ Maginnis often recounted her police interrogation in her speeches, characterizing the police as preying on women for what should have been a simple and legal surgery.

FROM REFORM TO RADICALISM

Fueled by her personal experiences with abortion, the inequalities that she had witnessed first-hand, and the stories she would continue to hear from her female friends, Maginnis decided to take to the streets in support of the Knox Bill while she was a student at San Jose State. From petitioning around San Jose alone, she collected a thousand signatures in support of reform and also conducted between fifteen hundred and two thousand public opinion polls with her partner and future SHA treasurer, Robert Blick. Evidently, public support for reproductive healthcare was more popular than not.²⁵ In 1962, building on the momentum of her petitioning efforts and polling, she founded the Citizens' Committee for Humane Abortion Laws (CCHAL), later renamed as the SHA. In the archive of the SHA, the first newspaper clippings on Maginnis that she saved were from local San Francisco papers in the summer of 1964. These articles blended a curiosity about the young activists's appearance with an assessment of her political strategies. An article from that August, which ran under the headline "Trying to Break Silence Barrier on Abortion Laws," first pays homage to Maginnis's poetic appearance before launching a report about Maginnis's effort to speak out on abortion and her educational organizing.²⁶ Maginnis invited the press attention. Employing the media was a central part of her effort to engage the public in talking about abortion repeal. This is because Maginnis believed, and public opinion at that time suggested, that people were ready for a change in abortion laws after the government crackdowns in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1964, CCHAL also wrote advertisements for newspapers, such as the San Francisco News Call Bulletin,

17 Dungan, August 28, 1964, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion and Schroeder, September 26, 1966, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion.

18 Maginnis, interview, 51.

19 Maginnis, interview, 65.

20 *Eisenstadt v. Baird*, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

21 Maginnis, interview, 71.

22 Maginnis, interview, 71.

23 Maginnis, interview, page 73. The burying or cremation of aborted fetal tissue remains an issue today. Ten states have requirements related to the burial or cremation of aborted fetal tissue, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. (Data from the LawAtlas Project's Policy Surveillance Program: <https://lawatlas.org/datasets/fetal-burial-requirements>)

24 Maginnis, interview, 77.

25 Maginnis, interview, 93. The "Public Opinion Questionnaire" forms in the Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion are not dated but say "please mail to: Society for Humane Abortion," indicating that they were used after Maginnis's initial wave of public opinion polling. These forms were likely similar and included a yes or no column asking questions such as, "In the last year, have you heard or read anything controversial about the existing abortion laws?" and "If there is an abortion laws, should it allow legal abortion for: a.) rape? b.) incest? c.) a reasonable certainty of abnormal offspring (Thalidomide babies), d.) hereditary defects? (Rh Factor, hemophilia, mental disease), e.) economic hardship? (family unable to support another child), f.) immature teenager? (where neither she nor family capable of coping), g.) serious mental disorder as a result of pregnancy?"

26 Dungan, August 28, 1964, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion.

calling public attention to abortion law hearings and provided contact information for their organization.²⁷

By 1965, SHA had grown to two hundred members, according to the *San Francisco News Call and Bulletin*.²⁸ The addition of two crucial members, Rowena Gurner and Lana Clarke Phelan, who dedicated themselves fully to SHA and to the illegal medical arm of the Association to Repeal All Abortion Laws (ARAL), transformed these organizations into well-run activist machines. Gurner, a Palo Alto resident who had grown up in New York, had become pregnant at thirty and was referred to a Puerto Rican doctor by her doctor in New York.²⁹ Having seen an advertisement for SHA, Gurner met Maginnis and soon realized that Maginnis was in desperate need of some organizational help. Gurner quickly became the indispensable behind-the-scenes taskmaster of the group.³⁰

Phelan was known for her public speaking skills and for assisting abortion classes in Southern California. Having grown up in Florida during the Great Depression, Phelan was married at fifteen and had her first baby at sixteen, in a physically taxing and painful delivery.³¹ Her doctor advised her not to get pregnant again, though his only advice for achieving this was to “Stay away from your husband.”³² When she inevitably became pregnant again, she sought out someone who could give her an illegal abortion—and told no one. She left her first husband and eventually became happily pregnant with her second husband. Thereafter, Phelan divorced the second and married her third. With her third husband, Phelan moved to California.³³

Phelan’s life experiences did not initially spur her to activism. What drew her to the abortion rights movement was a mix of frustration and happenstance. In 1964, she began preparing a manual for young high school women that explains the importance of financial independence: something she had learned through her previous marriages and taught her daughter. While researching, she realized there was very little information on financial independence for women, and a complete lack of healthcare information for women. This influenced Phelan’s views in a powerful way: “probably the most important thing that we needed in the feminist movement was body custody because until women

had a chance to control whether or not they had children, or how many, or when, they couldn’t control anything else.”³⁴ After attending a “population control” conference, Phelan left frustrated by the focus on birth control for women in Asia, Africa, and South America (rhetoric that was part of the dubious eugenics movement of the era that propagated birth control for women of color³⁵). On her way out, she stumbled across a woman handing out a “little scruffy mimeographed leaflet” that belonged to SHA, and she decided to contact them.³⁶ When SHA was still in its early stages with only a handful of members, Maginnis asked Phelan if she could give a speech for her at a local southern college. The advent of this speech started Phelan’s status as the skilled orator of the group alongside Maginnis.³⁷

The addition of Gurner and Phelan coincided with both the flourishing of SHA as an organization and the transition of Maginnis and the organization to advocate for the repeal of all abortion laws. The Beilenson Bill, or Therapeutic Abortion Act, was gaining steam in Congress during hearings from 1963 to 1967.³⁸ Although Maginnis herself does not cite a specific moment in which she knew that she needed to abandon reform efforts in favor of action towards repeal, by 1965, SHA had publicly opposed the Beilenson Bill. In a recorded speech given to the Cameron House Young Adults Presbyterian Group on August 8, 1965, Maginnis addressed the failure of the Beilenson Bill and the reform agenda. In a satirical and humorous manner that appealed to the students in the crowd, she called attention to the fact that no other surgical procedure is in the penal code or under the observation of a full panel of specialists; one would not need a full panel of doctors to certify an appendix needed removal.³⁹ She talked about her and Gurner’s visit to Beilenson wherein they shared their main problems with the reform bill, namely the barriers it still created for women seeking abortions, the amount of time the legal process took, the unfair stain it would leave on women’s medical records seeking a mental health related abortion, and the ability of the police officers to still question women who had abortions. Although Maginnis said Beilenson was a “very charming man” and sympathetic to their cause, he refused to put stronger language into the bill,

27 “Group Seeking Change In State Abortion Statute,” September 1964, *San Francisco, News Call and Bulletin* news article, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

28 Dungan, August 28, 1964, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion.

29 Katherine Seligman, “3 Women’s Crusade for Legal Abortions Changed the Nation,” *San Francisco Examiner* news article, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

30 Maginnis, interview, 87, 89.

31 Lana Clarke Phelan, “Lana Clarke Phelan Oral History Interview Concerning Her Involvement in Campaign to Repeal Abortion Laws,” interview by Jeanette Bailey Cheek, Schlesinger-Rockefeller Oral History Project, Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, November 21, 1975, transcript, 4-5.

32 Phelan, interview, 5.

33 Phelan, interview, 15.

34 Phelan, interview, 17-18.

35 For more information on eugenics and forced sterilization within the birth control movement see Dorothy Robert’s foundational book, *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997).

36 Phelan, interview, 19.

37 “Society for Humane Abortion Newsletter January/February 1967,” SHA newsletter, Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

38 Maginnis, interview, 100.

39 Patricia Maginnis, “Speech given at Cameron House Young Adults Presbyterian Group, August 8, 1965,” Records of the Society for Humane Abortion. Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

and saw his bill as an unquestionable victory if passed.⁴⁰ In the speech, she also details the ridiculous nature of the abortion exception for rape, as women had to fill out forms that were nearly impossible to complete and corroborate. For instance, a surviving “Affidavit of Application for Abortion (Rape)” application asked for the name of the rapist, his residential address, his business address, how long the woman applying had known him, two people who know about the incident, and an in-depth description of the rape itself.⁴¹ Maginnis also mocks male critics that claim that women would falsely claim rape or mental illness to get an abortion, a notion that Maginnis dismisses as ridiculous fearmongering created by men who do not want women to employ their rights as citizens.

Public interest in abortion reform in California was on the rise in the mid-1960s. Maginnis recalled the change in interest from the Knox Bill to the Beilenson Bill through the number of people who attended the hearings. Where the Knox Bill hearings had little over a dozen attendees, the Beilenson hearings had a full hearing hall of those in support, and against abortion reform.⁴² Maginnis and SHA in their public-facing enterprise employed their most salient strategy, garnering media attention, to spread their message of repeal. Newsletters were essential to providing their support base with information and reaching new audiences. The first SHA newsletter was dated May 9, 1965, and the publication remarks on the heightened public awareness of abortion, seen in newspapers with “enlightening articles,” alluding to the recent press coverage of SHA itself.⁴³ Within the newsletters, both national and international abortion news were quoted, and SHA events were reported on such as radio programs that featured either Maginnis, Phelan, Gurner, or Blick. Progress reports were also sent to members of SHA and described SHA’s progress within the months issued. For instance, the May/June 1966 progress report tells of showings of the films that SHA would loan out including “Abortion and the Law,” alongside Maginnis’s lobbying attempts with local politicians.⁴⁴

This public attention did come at a cost. Even though media attention on abortion reform and repeal was on the rise, abortion was still a taboo subject, and the dissemination of abortion materials was illegal. As noted in the May 9, 1965 newsletter, Blick and Phelan were both fired from their jobs for speaking their opinions on abortion on television and the radio.⁴⁵ Phelan recalled how after her first television speech with Louis Lomax on abortion, the city

attorney’s office in Long Beach, where she was employed for six years as a secretary, fired her because the city manager was Catholic.⁴⁶ Described in the January/February 1967 newsletter, Maginnis’s first of her three arrests occurred on June 16, 1966, when she distributed lists of abortion specialists in the street outside of a restaurant where the manager called the police on her, which highlighted both the danger of spreading information on abortion, and also Maginnis’s willingness to court the police for a potential legal case.^{47, 48}

A turning point for SHA and its ability to draw media attention and national figures in the early abortion rights movement was their January 9, 1966, Conference on Abortion and Human Rights. As reported by the *San Francisco Chronicle*, those in attendance included Sherri Finkbine, a woman who had gone to Sweden for an abortion after her doctor told her that taking pills containing thalidomide would likely result in a physically impaired fetus; Maginnis; W.J. Bryan, an ex-abortionist who spent two years in prison for providing abortions in his local community; Dr. Lucille Newman, a research anthropologist; Dr. Leslie Corsa, Director of the Center for Population Planning at the University of Michigan; and Paul Krassner, editor of *The Realist*, a political satirical magazine.⁴⁹ This diverse group of scholars, doctors, and media personalities demonstrate the widening influence of the early abortion rights movement on many aspects of American life. Also in attendance, according to Maginnis, was Marshall Krause from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). He served on a legal panel and represented the legal view of many lawyers at the time that the abortion case was not a civil liberties debate, but a privacy debate. *Roe v. Wade* would be argued as a right-to-privacy case, a decision that feminists feared was tenuous.⁵⁰ Nearly five hundred people attended the conference, and although it did not provoke any police backlash as Maginnis and her organizers may have hoped, it did acknowledge SHA as a force in the early abortion rights movement. This undoubtedly emphasizes the public educational side of the organization. Maginnis’s speech strongly portrays the government as participating in an “archaic tradition” perpetrating “silence, coercion, self-exile and a philosophy of sin” and shame against women. After the conference, her views morphed into radical action, disseminating lists of abortion providers and establishing the Association to Repeal Abortion Laws (ARAL) as a women-run health clinic whose abortion referrals and

40 Maginnis, Cameron House Young Adults Speech, August 8, 1965.

41 “Affidavit of Application for Abortion (Rape),” Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

42 Maginnis, interview, 100.

43 “Society for Humane Abortion Newsletter, May 9, 1965,” SHA newsletter, Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

44 “Progress Report – May/June 1966,” Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

45 “Society for Humane Abortion Newsletter, May 9, 1965,” Records of the Society for Humane Abortion.

46 Phelan, interview, 22.

47 Maginnis, interview, 121-123.

48 “Society for Humane Abortion Newsletter January/February 1967,” Records of the Society for Humane Abortion.

49 Mildred Schroeder, “Abortion and Human Rights: Public Conference Tomorrow,” January 8, 1966, *San Francisco Examiner* news article, Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

50 Maginnis, interview, 96-98.

accountability towards their doctors would assist 12,000 women in receiving abortion care.⁵¹

RADICAL ACTION

During the 1930s, as the need for abortions was rising, women traveled to American cities they knew were hubs for illegal abortion providers, such as Chicago.⁵² However, in the 1940s and 1950s, the increased crackdown on abortion providers who advertised their services led to a steep decline in doctors willing to perform abortions within the United States.⁵³ International travel overseas was expensive and created a clear class divide between those who could and could not afford safe abortions, with the most expensive locations being in Sweden or Japan.⁵⁴ For American women with less money, those on the East Coast traveled to Puerto Rico with cheap flights from New York to San Juan, and those on the West Coast traveled to Mexico.⁵⁵ Even for legal abortions within the United States, activists acknowledged that wealthy women were more likely to have access to therapeutic abortions, even in the case of rape, incest, or in the poor health of the mother, and that therapeutic abortions carried harmful consequences for future medical care and employment. Women were not willing to jeopardize their livelihoods for a chance at a legal abortion, a reality that male legislators and male doctors in favor of reform could not realize. Maginnis, Gurner, and Phelan, spurred on by this injustice, took direct action in the latter half of the 1960s.

Before 1966, SHA had held conferences and disseminated educational materials on abortion repeal. When these tactics did not provoke any sort of legal action from the state, Maginnis and the core members of SHA started a new, more drastic course of action. In 1966, Maginnis and Gurner first started distributing leaflets with names of Mexican and Japanese doctors who performed abortions alongside information on lenient abortion policies in Europe.⁵⁶ Knowing that they were approaching a new level of illegality by providing references to abortion providers, Maginnis, Gurner, and Phelan established the Association to Repeal Abortion Laws to keep the legitimate and incorporated SHA out of legal trouble and to maintain its tax-exempt status. After pamphlet distribution, Maginnis, Gurner, and Phelan developed classes on do-it-yourself abortions which were meant to educate the public on abortion and highlight the pervasiveness of self-induced

abortions. The classes only advocated self-induced abortion as a last resort method, something Maginnis was adamant about clarifying in later interviews.⁵⁷ The class curriculum began with diagrams and a discussion of female reproductive anatomy, progressive for the time as doctors were hesitant to provide real information on female anatomy to women patients.⁵⁸ After the anatomy discussion, Maginnis would discuss after-abortion care and contraceptives, before providing information on the various types of abortions performed by a doctor, and finally, ways to self-induce an abortion.

Maginnis, Phelan, and Gurner traveled to other cities within California and several states such as Wisconsin and Ohio to host classes which garnered national attention and increased opposition from the communities they entered. In Marin County, California, nuns and a group called Mothers Outraged at the Murder of Innocents (MOMI), picketed Maginnis's abortion classes in December 1966, carrying signs stating, "Protect the Right to Life" and "Where is the Law?"⁵⁹ The picketers recited the Hail Mary prayer and continuously prayed as more people arrived. Even though there were police outside, the officers told those present that they were there as observers only, and that no arrests were contemplated.⁶⁰ Besides protests, Maginnis also received letters from people condemning her work across the country. For instance, Linda Scharf from Oregon wrote that she "already turned [Maginnis's] literature over to the postal authorities and will attempt to take it further if [she] continues to receive such garbage."⁶¹

The opposition that ARAL especially wanted, however, was police opposition so they could use an arrest to challenge abortion laws nationally through the courts. Maginnis drew upon tactics long utilized by activists during the Civil Rights Movement of provoking arrest for a challenge to existing law. Although in late 1966, Gurner told news outlets that "'The first people we invite are the police.'"⁶² The abortion classes did not garner police retaliation until February 1967. For instance, Maginnis and Gurner were arrested in Redwood City by two plainclothes sheriff's deputies. One sheriff (?) was a woman who had attended the abortion class herself and stated she had "loved every minute of it," according to the local San Jose newspaper *The Mercury*. They were charged with violation of Section 601 of the state business and professions code which prohibited the advertising of medicine or offering ser-

51 Reagan, "Crossing the Border for Abortions."

52 Leslie J. Reagan, "Abortion Travels: An International History," *Journal of Modern European History: Special Issue: Reproductive Decision-Making in Comparative Perspective* Vol 17 no. 3, (2019): 340.

53 Reagan, "Abortion Travels," 340.

54 Reagan, "Abortion Travels," 344.

55 Reagan, "Abortion Travels," 344.

56 "Are you Pregnant?" Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

57 Maginnis, interview, 109-110.

58 "Abortion Classes." Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

59 Pat Perry, "Pickets, Prayers and How to Abort," December 2, 1966, *Independent Journal*, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

60 Perry, December 2, 1966, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion.

61 Letter to Patricia Maginnis from Linda Scharf. Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

62 "'Do-It-Yourself' Abortion Class Draws Attention of Law Enforcement Agencies," November 6, 1966, *Sacramento Bee*, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

vices to produce miscarriages or abortions.⁶³ Maginnis and Gurner had prepared the right materials for a challenge to the law: abortion supplies that included “a list of instructions, a hair-net, an emery board, a little bottle of dilute Phisohex, and a fever thermometer, and maybe some gauze pads neatly packaged in baggies.”⁶⁴ Maginnis and Gurner were released after their arraignment on bail for \$250, and spent six years in litigation over the case. The two wanted their case to be a test to overturn bans on disseminating abortion material. Maginnis believed her legal case was challenging an unconstitutional law and she firmly stated that abortion was not a crime of violence.⁶⁵ The ACLU took on her case and the litigation eventually ended with the State Court of Appeals declaring the law unconstitutional.⁶⁶

Circulating during the time of these classes was material that would become the crux of ARAL’s activism, “The List.” “The List” began with the “Are You Pregnant?” fliers, but developed into an ever-changing resource that thousands of women used to receive safe abortions. Rowena, Maginnis, and Blick had doctors from Mexico, who once they had heard of the referrals, visited them in California and vice versa. In her interview with Jeanette Bailey Cheek as part of the Schlesinger Oral History Project, Maginnis also explained that even if a doctor was very skilled at performing abortions, if their clients told them that they were mistreated, they would investigate and remove doctors from the list.⁶⁷ ARAL’s “Information on Specialists” pamphlets would ask for details about the abortion such as how much one paid, the condition of the office, any problems crossing the border, and to elaborate on anything they might have experienced.⁶⁸ Maginnis recalled hearing stories from two women that a doctor from Agua Prieta, Mexico who came with excellent references had raped them; Gurner wrote a scathing letter to him demanding their money back. The physician returned the money and was immediately removed from the list, demonstrating the effectiveness of the information on specialists’ feedback forms.

Because of their dedication to women’s healthcare outside of the law that prioritized safety and strongly condemned sexual violence, Maginnis, Gurner, and Phelan ran a highly effective feminist healthcare organization that provided abortions to thousands of women denied by United States medicine. By taking this radical approach, they demonstrated to themselves and feminists nationally that reform was no longer enough. In her article on the history of the SHA and

ARAL, Reagan argues that ARAL was a forerunner of the women’s health movement and that the organization acted as a feminist health agency that provided critical information on abortion and women’s reproductive health to women and thus shaped the feminist perspective on abortion law and practice.⁶⁹ ARAL was radical because of its “commitment to the transformation of the healthcare system” and was a precursor and inspiration to a more militant women’s movement of the 1970s. As Reagan expresses, and as Maginnis’s interview and ARAL’s papers demonstrate, Maginnis, Rowena, and Phelan knew that women’s demand for abortion would never cease and sought to destigmatize the practice and provide care to thousands of women under their protection.

The people who wrote into the referral system illustrated how varied and wide-reaching the need for abortion was in the 1960s. From husbands writing on behalf of their wives, to mothers writing in for their daughters, to young women themselves in desperate need of help, Maginnis made it known that all races and economic positionalities, particularly the working class, sought her help. Handwritten on the letters kept in the Records of the Society for Humane Abortion are all the notes from Maginnis marking the letters received and sending them along to ARAL. ARAL and SHA touched thousands of lives, and the burden of being the only referral service in the state of California took its toll on the activists involved. Phelan called it a “referral service and suicide line,” saying she did not “have the intellectual capacity to cope with this.”⁷⁰ Although many of the women in SHA, including Maginnis and Phelan, would continue to stay active in the women’s liberation movement, their years of work before *Roe* were marked by all-consuming activism that had repercussions on their personal lives.

THE FATE OF REPEAL AND INFLUENCE OF SHA AND ARAL

Women’s healthcare and abortion would become crucial to the Second Wave feminist movement that emerged in the latter half of the 1960s. While Maginnis was referring women through ARAL to doctors in Mexico, other abortion groups such as the Jane Collective were also taking the matter of abortion into their own hands. The Janes, based out of Chicago, ran their abortion service within the United States, using one specialist and eventually teaching themselves how to perform abortions.⁷¹ Outside of abortion, the women’s liberation movement internalized wholeheartedly the concept of “the personal is political.”⁷² SHA and ARAL knew the importance

63 Keith Walker, “Two Freed on Bail In Abortion School,” February 22, 1967, *Redwood City (California) Tribune*, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

64 Maginnis, interview, 127.

65 Maginnis, interview, 129-131.

66 Maginnis, interview, 135-136.

67 Maginnis, interview, 135-136.

68 “Information on Specialists,” October 7, 1968 form, Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

69 Reagan, “Crossing the Border for Abortions.”

70 Phelan, interview, 25-26.

71 *The Janes*, directed by Tia Lessin and Emma Pildes (2020; HBO Max, 2020), streamed on hboamax.com.

72 Wendy Kline, “The Making of *Our Bodies, Ourselves*: Rethinking Women’s Health and Second-Wave Feminism,” in *Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States*, ed. Stephanie Gilmore (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 64.

of self-education within the reproductive health sphere, and so did women across the country—by 1974, there were over twelve hundred women's groups providing health services.⁷³ Historian Wendy Kline highlights one of the most impactful works of feminist health literature: *Our Bodies, Ourselves*, by the Boston Women's Health Book Collective. *Our Bodies, Ourselves* provided women with critical information about their own anatomy, often ill-discussed by medical professionals much like Maginnis's abortion classes and her own 1970 publication *The Abortion Handbook for Responsible Women*.⁷⁴ The SHA and ARAL, and other feminist organizations, aimed to destigmatize female anatomy and abortion, fundamentally changed the language surrounding women's healthcare.

Beyond serving as a precursor to women's health organizations, SHA and ARAL also helped usher in the national abortion rights movement, which was most active from 1969 to 1973. Formed in 1969, the National Association to Repeal Abortion Laws (NARAL), took its name and some membership from ARAL, including Phelan and Maginnis, to serve in various regional capacities. Another more radical national organization formed in 1971, The Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC). WONAAC was a national coalition for abortion that included socialists, emphasized the inclusion of self-proclaimed "Third World women" (Women of Color), and hosted conferences, protests, and tribunals—sharing personal, harrowing experiences of abortion and finding the government guilty of the deaths and hardships of women.⁷⁵ Maginnis herself attended WONAAC's conference on November 20, 1971, and spoke to abortion rights supporters at the subsequent demonstration.⁷⁶

When *Roe v. Wade* declared that the right to privacy included "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" the landscape of abortion rights was forever changed. The question of reform versus repeal came to an end as the Supreme Court authorized abortions through the "viability" of the fetus and the companion decision of *Doe v. Bolton* decided that hospital therapeutic abortion committee systems were unconstitutional as they restricted the rights of women to healthcare and of physicians to practice.⁷⁷ Although activists viewed *Roe v. Wade* and *Doe v. Bolton* as successes, they did not go as far as feminists wanted, as the right-to-privacy argument seemed a tenuous connection, rife for a future in which that decision could be overturned. In the years after *Roe*, Maginnis remained steadfast in asserting that the right to an abortion would be a continuous fight for access, freedom

of and from reproduction, humanizing women, and prioritizing women's healthcare.⁷⁸

Maginnis would remain a regional force within NARAL but receded from public life as an abortion activist after *Roe v. Wade*. She continued her activist streak to campaign for various causes such as gay rights, animal rights, and environmental issues.⁷⁹ She also used political cartoons as a creative method for channeling her disillusionment with the government during and after the abortion rights movement. One of her cartoons depicted a woman asking for a "U.S. Supreme Court Approved Political-Sanctioned-Clergy-Counseled-Psychiatrist-Rubber-Stamped Residency-Investigated Abortion-Committee-Inspected-Therapeutick-Public-Health-Dept. Staisized-Contraceptive-Failure-Religious Sect-Guilt Trip Surmounted Abortion."⁸⁰

In the last minutes of her interview with Cheek, Maginnis reflected on the "present situation" of 1975 as concerning. She correctly interpreted the future as a debate of semantics, with anti-abortion activists only growing stronger. She concluded, "Hopefully, the forces that are now at work which would have us go back to the necessity of peddling lists can never, never gain an upper hand."⁸¹ Maginnis died on August 30, 2021, at the age of ninety-three, two days before Texas banned abortions beyond six weeks of pregnancy, ushering in the beginning of another era of criminalized abortion.

CONCLUSION

Patricia Maginnis was a crucial actor in the abortion rights movement. She transformed a small organization that performed public opinion polling and advocated for modest reforms into two expansive organizations, SHA and ARAL, that fought to repeal all abortion laws and served as an illegal feminist health clinic based out of San Francisco. In an era where asking for therapeutic abortion reform was the more accepted route to discuss the issue of abortion, she advocated for radical action based on her personal experiences with abortion, and her observations of the women's health crisis that was gripping the nation. Through Maginnis's biography and activist story, a narrative of tension between reforms centered on therapeutic abortion, and the more radical feminist idea of women's autonomy deepens the history of the broader arc of the abortion rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. This tension and Maginnis's role in the abortion rights movement are crucial to understanding the struggle for abortion rights in the pre-*Roe v. Wade* decade. 🏠

73 Kline, "The Making of *Our Bodies, Ourselves*," 64-65.

74 Patricia Maginnis and Lana Phelan, *The Abortion Handbook for Responsible Women*, 1970, Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

75 Katherine Parker, "The Women's National Abortion Action Coalition & The Abortion Tribunals, 1971-1972," *Journal of Family History*, 47 (4), 367-400. <https://doi-org.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/10.1177/03631990221107092>

76 Photo of Maginnis, November 20, 1971. Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

77 Reagan, *When Abortion Was a Crime*, 244.

78 Maginnis, interview, 157-158.

79 Harrison Smith, "Early Activist Helped Set Stage for Modern Abortion Rights Movement," *The Washington Post*, September 9, 2021.

80 Patricia Maginnis, Political Cartoon, 1967, Patricia Maginnis Papers, Additional Records of the Society for Humane Abortion, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts.

81 Maginnis, interview, 162.

No Trophies for Second Place

Most Americans know the story of Jackie Robinson, the first African American to break the color barrier in Major League Baseball. Few, other than avid fans of baseball, know about Larry Doby, the second African American to break the color barrier just eleven weeks after Jackie did. By nearly every statistical metric, Doby was a superior player to Robinson. He was a man of impeccable character, making strides for desegregation both on and off the field. The careers of Robinson and Doby are strikingly similar, yet while Robinson is one of the most iconic figures in American history, Doby is seldom remembered. Using newspaper accounts and other publications from the mid-20th century, this paper offers a reappraisal of Larry Doby's career. These newspapers uncover how an altered political climate, media representation, and different franchise leadership relegated Doby to a perpetual second place. Doby's story offers an opportunity to investigate how historical narratives are created and why this process can lead to an inexact and incomplete telling of the past.

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THE DAY IS APRIL 15, 1947. Thousands stare in awe, hurl insults, and witness history as Jackie Robinson takes the first swing in Major League Baseball history by an African American. Robinson is regarded today as one of the greatest, most iconic, most influential athletes of all time, and for good reason. Over a ten-year career with the Brooklyn Dodgers, Robinson boasted a .313 batting average, over 1500 hits, and 200 stolen bases. He made six all-star appearances, won Rookie of the Year in his first season, and won a World Series with the Dodgers. Of course, Robinson's legacy goes beyond his on-field talent. He was the first ever Black baseball player to play in Major League Baseball (MLB), the once all-white league, breaking down the color barrier and officially integrating the Negro League and MLB. Throughout his career and beyond, he endured racialized violence and was an extremely outspoken symbol of the Civil Rights Movement. He was an icon, a hero for all African Americans who fought for their rights in a highly segregated period. All that being said, however, Robinson was far from alone in his fight.

The second Black player to break the color barrier, just eleven weeks later, was a man by the name of Larry Doby. Other than avid fans of baseball, very few people have ever heard of Doby or are aware of his tremendous impact. MLB is divided into the American and National Leagues, the winners of which face each other in the World Series. Doby signed with the Cleveland Indians in July of 1947, making him the very first Black player to break the color barrier in the American League. Over a career that began just a few months after Robinson's and lasted a year beyond his retirement, Doby had more home runs, runs batted in, and just three fewer hits than Robinson and made seven All-Star

Game appearances compared to Jackie's six.¹ He won a World Series with the Indians in just his second season, and a statistical analysis of the two players would suggest that they had objectively very similar levels of baseball ability, if not Doby having the slight edge.² Both players faced immense adversity in desegregating the sport, with Doby facing even more scrutiny playing in Cleveland. Today, however, there are hundreds of books, movies, and a Broadway play dedicated to Jackie Robinson, whereas books and films about Larry Doby are scarce. The discrepancy in their legacies, despite their similarly outstanding statistics, is extreme. Baseball was more than just a popular sport in the twentieth century; it was a deeply ingrained institution of American culture and a trigger for social change.³ The best players in the game were more than just athletes, they were national icons who had legitimate influence. Thus, for two players with extremely similar levels of on-field success and obstacles, an analysis of how their legacies became so drastically different may uncover not only how certain athletes are remembered more than others, but how society as a whole constructs narratives of its most impactful figures.

Based on these observations, the question that must be answered is the following: Considering their similarities in ability, career timelines, and adversity faced, why is there such a stark disparity between the legacies of Jackie Robinson, one of the most iconic athletes in the history of sports, and Larry Doby, a forgotten star of the game and pioneer in desegregation? This paper will argue that the specific circumstances related to the players' careers, as well as the media's impact on Doby, Robinson, and baseball players in general, created a significant discrepancy between how both players' legacies

1 Douglas M. Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows: Larry Doby and the Integration of the American League* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 241-242.

2 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 240.

3 Joseph Thomas Moore, *Pride Against Prejudice: The Biography of Larry Doby* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 2.

were formed, illustrating the ways in which historical legacies both inside and out of the game can be built up or destroyed.

Doby signed with the Indians at the end of the 1947 season, and despite this partial season that left a lot to be desired, Larry Doby more than proved himself in his first full season in 1948. He batted .301, with fourteen home runs and sixty-six runs batted in, exceptional statistics especially considering it was his first full season. For reference, in Jackie Robinson's first season, which gave him the Rookie of the Year award and put him in the national spotlight, he batted .297, with twelve home runs and forty-eight runs batted in. While these are also incredible statistics, Doby was better in each category in his first full season with the Indians. In a critical Game Four of the 1948 World Series, Doby hit a home run to win the game and the Indians went on to win the overall series 4-1 over the Boston Braves. Doby was the star of the series, capping off an incredible season and cementing himself among the elite players of the game.⁴ The impact of Doby's 1948 season on the racial integration of baseball cannot be overstated. He had proven that Black players could not only be instrumental in winning games, lead their team statistically, and be a key piece to a championship title, but also overcome immense adversity. The leap he made from his first to second season exemplified his talent and courage in overcoming the hate and general backlash he faced upon entering the league. Doby's impact went far beyond his talent, however, and one picture in particular is representative of this. Following the critical Game Four in which Doby hit the winning home run, he and his teammates went into the locker room to celebrate, giving birth to one of the most impactful photos in the history of Major League Baseball. The photo shows Doby alongside Steve Gromek, the man who pitched in Game Four and sang the praises of Doby following the game, stating that he could not have won it without him.⁵ When the picture was released to the public, it was evident that this game was far more than just a victory for the Indians.

In 1948, a picture showing a Black man and a white man embracing one another with such genuine elation was not just surprising, it was completely unheard of. The 1948 World Series was the most viewed World Series in history, and this picture was printed millions of times and spread across the country. This image of Doby and Gromek, two teammates who together had led their team to victory, was enormous for baseball and for desegregation as a whole. The pure joy both men exude told the nation a new story of race, one in which a Black man and a white man worked together for a common goal and succeeded.⁶ Doby himself saw this picture as more rewarding than hitting the winning home run. He was met with harsh criticism and alienation from members of

the Indians organization when he first arrived in Cleveland. His teammates didn't support him, and when he struggled to succeed, the pushback only increased. This picture, as Doby remarked, was indicative of his teammate showing real emotion and connection to him, which meant more to him than the game itself.⁷ For both Black and white Americans, this picture exhibited the beauty that could exist in a desegregated world. As an article published by the *Pittsburgh Courier*, a highly popular African American media outlet, stated: "We can talk equality, we can legislate equality...but we are most convincing when we can arrange for many people to see equality in action. That's why the Doby-Gromek picture is great."⁸ The camaraderie and mutual appreciation the men had for one another in this picture not only showed that people of different races could succeed and celebrate with one another, but set an example for all Americans. Despite the immense attention it initially received, this picture and story, as with Doby's entire career, have faded into the background of baseball history. Considering the initial impact of this picture and moment, how could this have happened?

TWO DIFFERENT CAREERS

This section will delve into the baseball careers of both Doby and Robinson, articulating the specific differences that elevated Robinson and cast Doby into the shadows. For one, the two owners of the Dodgers and Indians respectively, Branch Rickey and Bill Veeck, had very different plans to introduce their players to MLB. Rickey sent Robinson to the Montreal Expos, a minor league team that was relatively receptive to a Black player, for over a year and a half before he made his Dodgers' debut.⁹ Rickey's philosophy from the beginning was to slowly acclimate Robinson to the daunting new atmosphere he was about to face, whereas Veeck threw Doby straight into the fire.¹⁰ Doby was also only twenty-two years old when he first stepped up to an MLB plate, a full six years younger than Robinson was when he did. This undoubtedly contributed to the fact that Jackie had a stellar first season, winning Rookie of the Year, while Doby had a terrible start and was initially bashed by the media. In addition, at the start of his career, Doby was used almost exclusively as a pinch hitter, which means that he was not actually in the game but merely substituted in for occasional at-bats. After signing a contract for the 1948 season with the Indians, Doby spoke on his shortcomings. A report stated:

"Doby attributed his failure to click at the plate to nervousness. He seemed unable to completely rid himself of stage fright the remainder of the season...had Doby been inserted into the regular lineup and kept there

4 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 55.

5 Marjorie McKenzie, "Pursuit of Democracy: Doby-Gromek Picture Treated Eyes to Sight of Equality in Action," *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 23, 1948.

6 McKenzie, "Pursuit."

7 Moore, "Pride," 4.

8 McKenzie, "Pursuit."

9 Christopher J. Schutz, *Jackie Robinson: An Integrated Life* (Blue Ridge Summit: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2016), 25.

10 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 218.

like Jackie Robinson with the Brooklyn Dodgers, he would have 'found' himself and made good."¹¹

Doby also emphasized the fact that at first, the hostile environment was extremely hard to overcome. In 1950, in another article by the *Pittsburgh Courier*, he reflected on the start of his career. Doby stated that one of the worst things a baseball player can do is let the fans in their head, and yet, "every time he was booed he became hurt."¹² Doby articulating the pain he experienced at the onset of his career shows that he was not put in a position where he was mentally prepared to take on such an enormous task. Despite the talent he showed that got him signed in the first place, the situation Doby was put in by the Indians owner made it extremely difficult to showcase his skills. Bill Veeck himself acknowledged that he regretted not having taken Rickey's approach with Robinson, and felt that Doby would have been far more capable of success had he been given more time.¹³ There was no question that the more experienced, mature Robinson was put in a far greater position to succeed from the start.

The rough start for Doby as a result of this managerial error resulted in a blowback from the media and fans. In the mid-20th century, it was very common for professional baseball players to be drafted and called to serve in the military in the middle of the season, returning when their service was complete. When they returned, they would have to prove that their abilities were still strong enough to maintain their spot on the roster. If they were no longer skilled enough to compete with the new players who had taken their place, they would be cut from the team. Many white fans were upset at the idea that the racial integration of baseball would prevent white servicemen from returning to their positions. Doby's poor initial performance only made them angrier, as it caused them to feel that he was taking a spot away from a white player who deserved it more.¹⁴ White players and fans alike both cited Doby's place on a team as an example of reverse discrimination. In their eyes, Doby's talent in the Negro Leagues did not equate to success in MLB, and he was unjustly being favored over white players who knew "white baseball."¹⁵ While Robinson was quickly able to garner a fanbase by immediately demonstrating his ability to contribute to the team, Doby was initially seen as a liability and received hate for both his race and performance, which made it more difficult to get comfortable in an already hostile environment. He had neither the support from other players that Jackie had nor the appropriate integration plan from the organization, which

kept Jackie in the spotlight at the onset of Doby's career.

New York City was the baseball capital of the United States in the 1940s. Baseball was at its most popular as World War II came to an end and servicemen returned home to restart their playing careers; the sport embodied the American spirit and unified the country. New York had two of the most iconic and successful franchises in the sport, the Dodgers and the Yankees. These teams had all the best players, were always expected to make a World Series run, and were the center of the baseball world.¹⁶ In Cleveland, Doby, unlike Robinson, was not allowed to live with the team during the season. While his teammates stayed in a hotel in the middle of the city, Doby was forced to stay isolated in the outskirts of the city.¹⁷ While Robinson was able to stay in the same hotel as the rest of his team for home games, when the team traveled, many cities would force Robinson to stay in the outskirts of town by himself. In May of 1947, when Robinson was still the only Black player in the league, one sportswriter deemed Robinson the loneliest man he had seen in all of sports.¹⁸ Doby had to experience this loneliness not just in certain cities his team traveled to, but during every home game as well. Not only did this separation make transportation to and from games more challenging, but Doby was unable to build as strong of a connection to the rest of his team as Jackie was able to do.¹⁹ The connection to his white teammates was a massive propellant in Robinson's early success, which can be best exemplified by Pee Wee Reese's iconic gesture during Robinson's rookie season. As slurs, taunts, and general hatred were being spewed at Robinson from fans, Pee Wee Reese, a white player for the Dodgers, called timeout and went over to Jackie and put his arm around him. The crowd was stunned, and this was a huge moment highlighting that the team wasn't divided at all; they were one. This started a new culture in the Dodgers' organization. The more hate that was directed at Robinson, the more his teammates stood up for him.²⁰ As his teammates continued to stand up for him, his fan base grew, and Jackie quickly became a popular player even among many white fans. At the start, no one stood with Doby in the way that Pee Wee Reese had for Jackie, in fact, it was quite the opposite. When Doby was first told to play in the field, he was assigned to first base, a position that required a specific glove. Because of how quickly this assignment was made, there was only one first baseman's glove in the entire Indians dugout. The first baseman whom Doby replaced was angered by the change and refused to give it to him, forcing Doby to play with a glove not fit for the position.²¹ The player was so angered

11 "Larry Doby Signs 1948 Contract with Cleveland Indians: Terms Not Disclosed," *Philadelphia Tribune*, January 10, 1948.

12 Bill Nunn, Jr, "Change of Pace ... Remarkable Larry Doby," *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 17, 1950.

13 Moore, "Pride," 62.

14 Louis Moore, "Doby Does It! Larry Doby, Race, and American Democracy in Post-World War II America," *Journal of Sport History* 42, no. 3 (2015): 364.

15 Moore, "Doby Does It," 367.

16 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 102.

17 Moore, "Pride," 52.

18 Schutz, *An Integrated Life*, 76.

19 Schutz, *An Integrated Life*, 72.

20 Patrick Henry, "Jackie Robinson: Athlete and American Par Excellence," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 73, no. 2 (1997): 194-195.

21 Joseph Wancho et al., *Pitching to the Pennant* (U of Nebraska Press, 2014), 80.

by Doby's presence that he was willing to disadvantage him at the expense of the entire team. Doby stated that up until the beginning of his World Series winning season in 1948, he felt completely alone within his organization.²² Robinson was not only able to garner more attention playing in the baseball capital of the world, but also able to receive from his teammates facilitation in his transition far better than Doby, making Robinson more popular and welcomed into Major League Baseball.

Playing for the Brooklyn Dodgers gave Robinson a significant advantage in the media just by virtue of the organization itself. As mentioned previously, Doby had a poor 1947 season due to difficulties acclimating to the new environment he was thrust into, yet in the following season, he found his stride. Doby had established himself in preseason training and continued his quality batting performances in the first few weeks of the season. He also was put in center field, a position in which he was comfortable and excelled.²³ In a newspaper article from midway through Doby's incredible first full season, a reporter asked several fans if they thought that Doby could potentially overtake Robinson if he kept up his current pace. One man responded by saying: "Doby is a fine ballplayer but he lacks the background and experience to make him the outstanding player that Jackie Robinson is today. Then too, Jackie is with a ball club that is colorful within itself."²⁴ By "colorful," the respondent is not referring to race. He is articulating the fact that the Dodgers, unlike the Indians, were a franchise that naturally drew the headlines and overall attention from the media, fans, and the rest of the league. The respondent represented the fact that the Dodgers organization being "colorful in itself" may have led spectators to believe that Robinson was better than Doby, simply because of the team he played on. This was a foreshadowing of what was to come in terms of the perception of both players' careers. It is clear that the respondent generally believed at this point that Robinson was a better player than Doby. While he recognized the impact that the organizations in which they played may have formed his opinion, he didn't explicitly say that this recognition had changed his opinion. In large part, this is a microcosm of the ways in which playing for the Brooklyn Dodgers elevated Jackie's notoriety. Regardless of how good Doby ever became, Robinson's playing for the Dodgers made him seem to be a better player compared to others who were just as good if not better.

The American League as a whole was far more difficult to integrate into than the National League. In 1955, eight years after Doby's debut, eight of the sixteen teams in MLB had entirely white rosters. Seven of them were American

League teams, Doby's Indians being the only exception.²⁵ While some may argue that this would cause Doby to stand out more in the media than if he were playing alongside more Black players, the opposite was in fact true. The National League's quicker integration caused the media to direct their attention towards Black star players in the National League. The All-Star Game, which is a game played every season between the best players of the National League and those of the American League, was dominated year after year by the National League, in large part because of their increased integration that brought in more talent. This caused Doby to be further cast aside in the media, which fawned over the Black stars that represented the National League.²⁶

THE MEDIA'S IMPACT

This section will discuss how the media had a tremendous impact not only on how Robinson became the face of racial integration, but how the general coverage of baseball players at the time was such that Doby's notoriety was diminished from the onset of his career. The ways in which the media operated in the mid-20th century put all Black players at a disadvantage, but Doby had it especially bad compared to Robinson. New York had a much larger media presence than Cleveland did, and the coverage that teams like the Indians received paled in comparison to the likes of the Dodgers. Many of the most popular newspapers at the time had editorial offices in New York City, and players like Robinson, Mantle, and Willy Mays were consistent features in these major outlets because they played for New York teams. Doby, on the other hand, appeared rarely, and mostly in outlets catered to a specifically African American audience.²⁷ In addition, both Robinson and Doby were hindered by the fact that MLB preferred to highlight their white star athletes such as Mickey Mantle, who played during the same era as Doby and was seen as the "golden boy" of Major League Baseball. He was constantly given nicknames and descriptions as if he were the embodiment of America itself. Despite Mantle's obvious talent that garnered attention, his rise to the spotlight always seemed to have an underlying racial component.²⁸ Even today, but much more so in Doby's time, certain characteristics were linked to the race of athletes that placed white athletes in a far more positive light. It was believed for a long time that Europeans were the dominant race of athletes, however, this was eventually overtaken by the "black brawn vs white brains" narrative. This construction paints Black athletes as animalistic, primitive creatures who use their brute alone in athletic competition, while white athletes are seen as morally and cognitively superior.²⁹ Mantle's "golden boy" status had more than just to

22 Moore, "Pride," 62.

23 Moore, "Pride," 75.

24 J. Bowler, "Inquiring Reporter: Do You Think Larry Doby Will Become as Colorful as Jackie Robinson?" *New Journal and Guide*, May 22, 1948.

25 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 115.

26 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 119.

27 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 111.

28 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 150.

29 Matthew W. Hughey and Devon R. Goss, "A Level Playing Field? Media Constructions of Athletics, Genetics, and Race," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 661 (2015): 184.

do with his incredible play. He benefited from his blonde hair, good looks, and whiteness, all of which made him both an athletic and moral hero that the entire country wanted to get behind.³⁰ The fact that Mantle played in the American League alongside Doby, and separate from Robinson, meant that he cast a greater shadow over Doby than Robinson. As a whole, the mania that surrounded Mantle throughout his career detracted from Doby's attention. While Mantle's physical appearance and aura added to his recognition, Doby's did the opposite, making it seem as if their talent level and impact on the game were further apart than they actually were.

Larry Doby not only had to struggle against media favoritism for white players but also against the shadow cast by Robinson. In Jackie's first year, he was not only the first player to break the color barrier, but he won Rookie of the Year in a stellar debut season for the Dodgers. This made him an instant media icon and, to Doby's detriment, established Jackie as the point of comparison for other Black baseball players. Being compared to someone else versus being the point of comparison was an immediate and persistent dynamic in discussions of both Doby and Robinson. In 1949, the Associated Negro Press, a national and international media service that catered to the interests of Black people around the world, published an issue with an article specifically related to Doby and the ways in which he and the other Black players on the Cleveland Indians lived in their separate home in the outskirts of the city. In just his second full year, Doby had "full custody of the keys of the car provided for transportation", was seen as the "house mother", and caused the room the players stayed in to be referred to as "Doby's Dormitory."³¹ Whether it is due to the fact that he was the first to racially integrate the team, his natural leadership skills, or a combination of both, this article makes it clear that Doby was the established leader of a group that included players much older than him. The year of this article's publication is highly relevant, as it was just a year after Doby's incredible 1948 season. He was now the first African American to win a World Series and had established himself as one of the best players in the entire league regardless of race.³² However, at the end of the article, Moses states: "Men like Larry Doby, Jackie Robinson, and Roy Campanella seem to be born leaders of men. This I believe would hold true were their chosen profession other than baseball."³³ While this further emphasizes the point that Doby was indeed a strong leader, the mention of Robinson is one to note. When there was a portion of an article that was about Doby's character and leadership, Jackie Robinson's name was mentioned alongside his, even though he was completely unrelated to the story. This was far from the only time that Doby was discussed in comparison to Robinson, yet the opposite was rarely true.

Newspapers from across the country covered Doby's debut, as it was a massive story both in sports and the Civil Rights Movement as a whole. In an article posted just five days after Doby's first appearance in MLB, the *Los Angeles Sentinel*, another popular African American newspaper at the time, introduced Doby to the world. It discussed his incredible statistics, information about his play style and position, and the Indians owner's belief in him. There is one bit of text in the article, however, that tells an entirely different story. The title of the article, written in large, bold text at the top of the page, was "Thanks Jackie."³⁴ While the article itself was not at all about Robinson, the fact that "Thanks Jackie" was the headline is critical to an understanding of how Doby's legacy was formed. It was before Doby had even completed a full week of Major League Baseball that the attention he received seemed to revolve around Jackie. The media, fans of baseball, and people across the country could not hear Doby's name without subconsciously also thinking about Robinson, an association that made it extremely challenging from the beginning for Doby to create his own legacy. Despite Doby's stellar season and World Series title, mentions of Jackie Robinson far outnumbered Doby's in both mainstream and African American media in the late 1940s. In African American catered media, Robinson had become an icon. In 1947, he was featured on the cover of *Ebony Magazine*, an influential lifestyle magazine directed towards an African American audience. On the cover, Robinson is smiling with his wife and child, and in large text at the bottom of the image, it says "Family Man."³⁵ After breaking down racial boundaries and excelling in his rookie season, Robinson had established himself as a major face of the African American community before Doby had even started his first official season. His portrayal as a family man is important to note, as Robinson was no longer just a trailblazer and star athlete, he was a role model for African Americans across the country. Because the media portrayed Robinson in this way, it was exceedingly hard for another player like Doby to take over the spotlight, especially considering that Robinson's exceptional play continued beyond his rookie year.

Larry Doby and Jackie Robinson were similar in many ways. Doby was a model citizen; he served in the military, had a strong belief in God, and was married to his high school sweetheart with whom he had two children. He had a calm demeanor, which served him well in his first years when Black players in MLB were advised to stay quiet and out of trouble.³⁶ Robinson too was a family man and consistent churchgoer, also serving in the military. Like Doby, he was seen as a model citizen in virtually every aspect of his life.³⁷ He too remained relatively quiet in his first years with the Dodgers, but unlike

30 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 150.

31 Al Moses, "Beating the gun. Baseball highlights, efforts to free the Ingram family from prison, and other news releases for and about black Americans," *Associated Negro Press*, April, 1949.

32 Moore, "Pride," 102.

33 Moses, "Beating the gun."

34 "Larry Doby .458 Hitter Joins Indians: Newark Star is Slated for Cleveland Infield Spot 'Thanks Jackie,'" *Los Angeles Sentinel*, July 10, 1947.

35 "Jackie Robinson Family Man." *Ebony (Jet) Magazine*, September 1947.

36 Moore, "Doby Does It," 366.

37 John Vernon, "Beyond the Box Score: Jackie Robinson, Civil Rights Crusader," *Negro History Bulletin* 58, no. 3/4 (1995): 17.

Doby, this was not by choice. Upon Robinson's arrival in Brooklyn, Dodgers owner Branch Rickey was adamant that Robinson stay quiet and avoid any form of altercation. Rickey believed that with the backlash Robinson was going to receive as the first and only Black player in the league, it was best for him to focus on his game and not get wrapped up with the players, fans, and others trying to get in his head and break him down. If Robinson did engage in conflict, Rickey asserted, more people would be inclined to believe that Black and white players were simply unable to play with one another, and the push for integration could be put in danger. It was not just Robinson's success, but potentially the future success of integration itself, that hinged upon his ability to maintain his composure.³⁸ While Robinson remained reserved at the start of his career, further integration of Black players into MLB allowed for Robinson's true colors to be revealed to the world.

By 1949, not only were there many more Black players in MLB than just Robinson and Doby, two African American men, Roy Campanella and Don Newcombe, had joined Jackie in the Dodgers' organization. Robinson was no longer burdened with the responsibility of being the only Black player in MLB, and he and Rickey agreed that he need not hide his true colors any longer. He began to respond to heckles, call out poor officiating, and speak his mind in front of reporters and the media.³⁹ His fiery personality had fully come out, and this went beyond the game of baseball. He was an outspoken advocate for the rights of all African Americans, and became involved in several charitable organizations in New York City, leading him to star in a movie about himself in 1950 called "The Jackie Robinson Story." At this point, he had become one of the most prominent individuals in the entire country.⁴⁰ Unlike Robinson, it became evident that Doby's reserved nature at the start of his MLB career was not due to the demands of Indians owner, Bill Veeck, but rather his actual personality. Robinson was put in a position where all eyes were on him and he embraced it, whereas Doby was far less inclined to take that role. Doby even told Veeck that he didn't want to be a symbol, rather he just wanted to play baseball.⁴¹ Robinson was very pronounced with his push for racial equality and his overall presence as a pioneer, while Doby was far more comfortable taking a back seat. Many believed that Doby was jealous of the attention Robinson got in spite of his own success, however, this was certainly not the case. The two players were friends, frequently calling one another to bond over the challenges they both had to face.⁴² The "jealousy" perceived by fans and the media had to do with the fact that Robinson enjoyed being a symbol and icon, whereas Doby

preferred to stay quiet and just play the game. This narrative contributed to Robinson being pushed further into the spotlight and Doby going further into the shadows.

Despite Doby's generally calm personality, he did not stay inside his shell throughout his entire career. Eleven years after Jackie Robinson first broke the color barrier, Doby broke down a wall of his own, becoming the first Black baseball player to throw a punch at a white player. An article was published the following day with the title "The Jackie Robinson Era in Baseball Ended by Larry Doby's Punch."⁴³ The title alone suggests that Doby's act was one of legitimate significance. Using language that suggested that the "Jackie Robinson era had ended" showed that at the time, a Black player punching a white player was a monumental event. Certain language throughout the article further indicated how Doby's punch had ushered in an entirely new layer to the role of the Black baseball player. For eleven years, a Black player had never physically fought back against a white player. The author states: "...the Negro in baseball after eleven years has reached a new position in the national pastime."⁴⁴ Using phrases such as "reached a new position" shows the transformative nature of Doby's action. He had broken down a wall of his own, redefining what it meant to be a Black player in MLB and showing that every player had an equal ability to exercise their free will on the field. Doby was a pioneer in his own right, working alongside Robinson to continue to push for racial equality in Major League Baseball. Due to Robinson having established himself as an icon and symbol for Black empowerment in the league, however, the story of Larry Doby's Punch has largely been forgotten.

The immense pressure put on Robinson by the media also worked against Doby's ability to create a similar legacy. Prior to Robinson's debut in 1947, some suggested that the best way to combat segregation was with large public events, and baseball games were a perfect example. Here, Black and white fans could stand in unison, rooting and cheering for a common cause.⁴⁵ Of course, Doby was under a great deal of pressure entering his debut, but there was a different level placed on Jackie's shoulders. In an article published just before Robinson's debut, an author stated: "He will be haunted by the expectations of his race. To 15,000,000 Negroes he will symbolize not only their prowess in baseball, but their ability to rise to an opportunity... And Lord help him with his fellow Negroes if he should fail them."⁴⁶ This is where the impact of being the first rather than the second truly comes to light. For Robinson, the stakes could not have been higher. He had an entire race of people depending on his success, and if he hadn't succeeded, it is uncertain what could have

38 Vernon, "Beyond," 17-18.

39 Vernon, "Beyond," 18.

40 Vernon, "Beyond," 18.

41 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 234.

42 Branson, *Greatness in the Shadows*, 90.

43 Claude Harrison, Jr., "The Jackie Robinson Era In Baseball Ended By Larry Doby's Punch," *Philadelphia Tribune*, July 02, 1957.

44 Harrison, Jr., "The Jackie Robinson Era."

45 Jonathan A. Lanning, "Productivity, Discrimination, and Lost Profits During Baseball's Integration," *The Journal of Economic History* 70, no. 4 (2010): 965.

46 E. T. Rouzeau, "Robinson's Signing Brings Mixture of Joy and Trepidation to Harlem," *New York Herald Tribune*, October 24, 1945.

occurred. Words and phrases used in the media such as “haunted” and “Lord help him” signify the extent to which Robinson’s failure would have had extreme consequences. For Doby, the success of Robinson was already apparent, and thus the level of pressure was decreased dramatically. The fascination and levels of attention in which Robinson had received for being the first were miles ahead of that for Doby. As a result, Doby’s success in the eyes of history would never have eclipsed Robinson’s unless he was a far superior player; being just as good under far less pressure left Robinson in a better light. In this way, the immense credit that must be given to Robinson for succeeding under pressure naturally overshadows Doby who, while still under significant pressure, never bore the burden of being the first and thus never got the credit he deserved.

There is no question that Jackie Robinson was under a lot of pressure to perform, especially from the media, yet Larry Doby had a whole other level of expectations resting on his shoulders. He had exceptional statistics in the Negro League, and at just twenty-two years old, he was one of the most promising prospects of all time. Robinson was a fantastic prospect in his own right, but he paled in comparison to the potential many saw in Doby. As an article in the *Pittsburgh Courier* stated at the tail end of Doby’s career, “Some experts had tabbed Doby as potentially the greatest player of his time. Because of their own exuberance, they were inclined to pick every little flaw.”⁴⁷ The title of the article itself is “Larry Doby - They Expected Him to Win Pennants All by Himself,” and it articulates the fact that Doby was expected, as a twenty-two-year-old in a new, hostile environment, to virtually carry his team on his back. At the time of the article’s publication, Doby had won a World Series and made seven all-star appearances, an incredible resume for any baseball player. Even still, the article stated that Doby had “never fulfilled his glowing expectations.”⁴⁸ While Robinson faced high expectations in terms of integration, Doby had the additional burden of being expected to become one of the greatest baseball players of his time.

THE BIGGER PICTURE

This section will discuss how uncovering the career of Larry Doby doesn’t just reveal the story of a forgotten star, but can teach broader lessons of historical analysis. As a society, we place tremendous value on those who were the first to do something. Many people are aware of the fact that Neil Armstrong was the first person to walk on the moon, but fewer people can name the two astronauts who did the exact same thing just minutes after Armstrong. When someone is the first to do something of importance, they are often the one true pioneer and face of the paradigm shift they caused in the eyes of history. Becoming the face of a particular movement isn’t all about being first, however. On December

1, 1955, Rosa Parks was arrested for not giving up her bus seat to a white man. In the eyes of history, Parks is seen as a pioneer, a woman brave enough to do what no one could do before her. What many people aren’t aware of, however, is that fifteen-year-old Claudette Colvin did the exact same thing nine months prior. In the mid-20th century, the Montgomery NAACP was searching for a case to bring to trial in order to challenge the segregated bus laws. They believed that the young Colvin was not prepared to face the pressure and trauma that bringing her case to trial would cause her, so they decided to instead use the case of long-time NAACP member Rosa Parks, forever ingraining her name into the list of pioneers of the Civil Rights Movement and leaving Colvin’s story forgotten.⁴⁹ Despite Colvin being a true pioneer, she did not fit the bill to be recognized as such, which diminished her legacy.

Robinson was a lot more than the pioneer of baseball’s racial integration; everything about him made him an ideal symbol for the advancement he initiated. Like Doby, his close connection to his family, religious ties, and military background made him a role model for all Americans. What Doby didn’t have, however, was the level of outspokenness and will to be in the spotlight that made Robinson a sensation. It was not enough that Doby was just as, if not more, talented than Robinson was, he could not compete with the aura Robinson had created. Robinson checked every box for what was needed to be an icon and thus absorbed the vast majority of the attention, which detracted from Doby’s spotlight throughout his career. Does Robinson deserve the amount of respect he has received for being the first? Absolutely. Should he be commended to the extent he has for taking it upon himself to be the symbol of an entire race? Of course. This does not mean, however, that Doby’s efforts should be taken for granted and forgotten by history to the extent that they have. For Doby, much of what he was able to accomplish on the field and for the Civil Rights Movement has been forgotten, and despite what he was forced to overcome as the second person to break down the color barrier, the credit he deserves has been transferred to Robinson. Doby’s story reflects a larger issue with the ways in which history is viewed as a whole. The ways in which society functions are always changing, and it takes certain individuals to step up and initiate these changes through intellect, bravery, and leadership. While there are heroes we remember for their contributions to certain changes that have benefited society, there are far more that have been forgotten. Some may argue that those who are forgotten are forgotten for a reason, and the legacy of individuals is naturally proportional to the impact they had and the hardships they faced. At the same time, however, through an analysis of the career and legacy of Larry Doby, the correlation between legacy and impact/hardship overcome is far from proportional. When we look into the past, we cannot

47 Bill Brower, “Larry Doby: They Expected Him to Win Pennants all by Himself!” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 02, 1958.

48 Brower, “They Expected.”

49 Michael Schudson, “Telling Stories about Rosa Parks,” *Contexts* 11, no. 3 (2012): 23.

help but associate aspects/moments of historical change with specific individuals. Not only does the historical spotlight cast a shadow on other involved actors who deserve more credit, but the abundance of attention centered on one individual creates a historical narrative that, while embedded in the minds of the masses, is incomplete and inaccurate.

Professional sports are microcosms of the ways in which society functions, and this was especially true with baseball in the mid-20th century. For many individuals who were in favor of segregation, seeing their favorite players smile and embrace the likes of Robinson and Doby was the beginning of a realization that people of all races could love each other and work with one another to achieve a common goal. Acknowledging that a Black man could lead their favorite team to victory may have been the first step for many white Americans to understand that it's not just white men who are capable of leading in any particular job or industry. The literature discussing Larry Doby's career and influence allows for his legacy to live on, despite forever being in the shadow of Jackie Robinson. Joseph Moore's "Pride Against Prejudice" gives a detailed account of Doby's impressive and challenging life, shedding light on a tremendous career that has largely been overlooked. Douglas Branson's "Greatness in the Shadows" goes a step further, detailing Doby's career in addition to illustrating the many ways Doby was at a disadvantage due to circumstances he had to contend with. What is missing from the limited existing literature on Doby, however, is why his story truly matters. Doby's legacy was formed not from his statistics that outshined Robinson's, not from the hardships he faced as the first Black player to integrate the American League, but from unfortunate factors out of his control and the power of the media to construct narratives and decide who gets the spotlight. This essay is intended not just to give a

highly successful player his due credit, but also to highlight the fact that those who are deserving of such credit often do not receive it due to uncontrollable circumstances. Just as baseball taught so many the benefits that desegregation can bring to the world, it can also represent how and why certain actors of social change can either be cemented in history or forgotten.

CONCLUSION

In no way does Jackie Robinson deserve any less credit than he received for transforming the world of sports and society as a whole. His talent, bravery, and spirit to be the first to break down such a massive wall should never be discredited; he is one of the most important figures in all of United States history. That being said, I believe that an analysis of his career alongside Larry Doby's sheds light on an important issue with historical thinking. Doby made his debut as the second Black baseball player in MLB history just eleven weeks after Robinson in an entirely different and harsher environment. Statistically speaking, he was just as good if not better than Robinson, and made significant strides throughout his career for the Civil Rights Movement as a whole. We commemorate Robinson for overcoming a variety of obstacles on his way to creating social change, yet we have largely forgotten another, equally talented player who contended with the same obstacles. It is an example such as this one that makes us realize that many important historical figures known for their bravery are not necessarily the most well-known people because they were the most brave or overcame the most obstacles. It could well be argued that Doby, having started his career in a much harsher environment with less preparedness, had to overcome even more than Robinson in his path to greatness and should receive far more credit than he is given today. Remember the name: Larry Doby. 🏆

Abolitionist Artifacts

How Objects Helped End the Slave Trade within the British Empire

As abolitionist Thomas Clarkson traveled across Great Britain in search of information to use against the slave trade, he encountered the *speculum oris*. This instrument of torture forced open enslaved people's mouths when they refused food in an effort to end their lives, so that enslavers could "throw in nutriment, that they who had purchased them might incur no loss by their death."¹ Clarkson bought the instrument so that he could use it to advocate for the end of the slave trade, and it became a part of a cabinet of artifacts Clarkson employed across Britain. Alongside other objects, the cabinet speaks to the use of artifacts as a method of abolitionism. In this essay, an artifact is an object with both important physical and visual attributes, excluding images, pamphlets, and books. Artifacts reached wide audiences of British people and provided, through their physicality, a novel method of promoting abolition to many people who were blocked from other avenues of activism.

THE HISTORICAL STUDY OF BRITISH abolitionism began almost alongside the movement itself, with Thomas Clarkson's writings providing reflections as early as 1808, yet the literature has paid little attention to artifacts. Some historians have considered certain items and the movements surrounding them to have had little tangible impact upon the abolition movement.² Recent works have attempted to rectify this belief but have focused on objects in disparate fields, rather than comparing them and examining their physicality. For example, previous scholars explored how abolitionists employed artifacts that had been used on slave ships.³ Other historians have analyzed artifacts as a feature of consumerism, as a range of visual activism that includes written works, or even as a way to understand the role of manufacturers in abolitionism.⁴ However, the literature has neglected to examine artifacts, whether consumer products or antislavery campaign pieces, as an abolitionist method alongside one another, united in their materiality. Artifacts provided an important avenue for stirring the public to action through their physicality, adding a dimension to the antislavery argument beyond words and images. This is especially true given that the same group of core activists often employed abolitionist artifacts. Through surveying artifacts themselves, this essay seeks to fill an important gap in the historiography.

Eyewitness writings, legal documents, petitions, and pamphlets of the period are vital in contextualizing the artifacts. It is also important to note that such sources carry their own biases. Thomas Clarkson's writings may be slanted to-

ward his continued push for abolitionism; thus, he may have somewhat overstated certain claims to make the abolitionist movement appear more popular or favorable. Additionally, the artifacts align with certain biases, as Mary Guyatt discusses in her piece on the Wedgwood antislavery cameo's reinforcement of eighteenth-century notions of race and hierarchy.⁵ Guyatt notes that the object was likely designed using ideas of the period to quickly win viewers' sympathies; the enslaved figure on the cameo is kneeling, which made him unthreatening and helpless to secure his own freedom. Thus, these artifacts capture the complexities of ideas about race in the period they were made.

Abolitionist artifacts influenced large swaths of people and provided a means of activism to women and lower-class British people in particular. Though abolitionism continued until the end of slavery of the Empire, this paper focuses on the end of the slave trade. It begins by providing a brief outline of abolitionism within Great Britain, sketches key moments in the movement's history, and details major methods used by abolitionists. The essay then focuses on three key artifacts used by abolitionists in Britain, beginning with Wedgwood's "Am I Not a Man and a Brother?" cameo before turning to Thomas Clarkson's campaign chest and ending with the "East India Sugar Not Made by Slaves" sugar bowl. While abolitionists used other objects, these three were the most prominent, were widely proliferated, and were used as an arm of the abolitionist movement. Through these sections, the paper demonstrates how these objects, through their material na-

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1 Thomas Clarkson, *History of the Rise, Progression and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade by the British Parliament*, vol. 1 (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1808), 377.

2 Clare Midgley, *Feminism and Empire: Women Activists in Imperial Britain, 1790-1865* (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 43.

3 Jane Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom: the parliamentary history of Thomas Clarkson's chest," *Slavery and Abolition*, 38, no. 1 (2017), 135-154. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2016.12660378>.

4 Martha Katz-Hyman, "Doing Good While Doing Well: The Decision to Manufacture Products that Supported the Abolition of the Slave Trade and Slavery in Great Britain," *Slavery and Abolition*, 29, no. 2 (June 2008), 220. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01440390802027871>.

5 Mary Guyatt, "The Wedgwood Slave Medallion: Values in Eighteenth-Century Design," *Journal of Design History*, 13, no. 2 (2000), 93-105. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3527157>.

ture, reached wide audiences of British people and helped mobilize the population against the Atlantic slave trade.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

To begin, it is vital to understand the world of British abolitionism. From the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries, Great Britain dominated the slave trade, aided by the Royal African Company which was funded by the British Crown, the aristocracy, and other wealthy Britons.⁶ The earliest movements against the slave trade came from the enslaved Africans themselves who revolted on slave ships and resisted in ways that ranged from small acts of defiance to outright rebellion. Later, upper- and middle-class white Britons became involved, working through the courts and Parliament to achieve their goals. A watershed moment was the foundation of the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787, headed by a group often known as the London Committee. The Society was made up of nine Quakers in addition to Thomas Clarkson, Granville Sharp, and another Anglican man.⁷ Many early abolitionists targeted the slave trade first, rather than the institution of slavery itself.⁸

In their movement against slavery, the abolitionists needed to inform the public about the horrors of the slave trade and popularize their cause. Disseminating information was a crucial aspect in garnering public support and attaining the number of votes needed to end the slave trade. Recent scholarship has shown that most members of Parliament were neither staunchly for nor vehemently against slavery and could be persuaded using knowledge about the slave trade that was not widely available.⁹ Thus, abolitionists needed to collect and spread facts and first-hand accounts. Additionally, when the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade formed its committee, political associations outside of Parliament were rare, and the Quakers, who made up the majority of the organization, were unpopular, as they dressed and spoke differently.¹⁰ Making the cause popular for all Britons may have seemed difficult, yet within just a few years, petitions with thousands of signatures poured into Parliament. Artifacts played a particularly important role in these efforts. British society was changing, and everyday Britons were able to buy and own more objects than before. The middle class expanded, and even those on the lower levels of society were able to lead better lives.¹¹ It is in this world that abolitionists turned to artifacts, beginning with Josiah Wedgwood's "Am I Not a Man and a Brother?" cameo in 1787.

WOMEN AND THE WEDGWOOD COME

In late eighteenth-century Great Britain, cameos were must-have items for the increasingly consumerist population. Cameo is a method of carving an item, and typically the raised relief image contrasts starkly with the background in color. Josiah Wedgwood and his partner Thomas Bentley were leaders in the field of cameo production. Beginning in 1771, Wedgwood sold cameos fit for rings, writing tables, and bookshelves.¹² Cameos were considered collectibles, and by the late 1770s, the Wedgwood firm offered 1,735 options of different cameo styles and depictions.¹³ At a July 1787 meeting, the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade decided to have an official seal to advance the movement and commissioned three members to create a design.¹⁴ They turned to Josiah Wedgwood, and by the end of the year, the Committee had an image that would leave a lasting impression on the imagery depicting slavery to this day. The physical nature of the Wedgwood Antislavery Cameo allowed for a great proliferation of abolitionist imagery and furthered the cause, particularly among women.

Josiah Wedgwood was a leader in his field of ceramics, and his abolitionist leanings made him an important contributor to the cause. He innovated both in his pottery methods and as an entrepreneur. By his death in 1795, his work was used by European nobility and so beloved by the Emperor of China that he had the pieces copied at his Imperial factory.¹⁵ Wedgwood already possessed abolitionist sentiments by the time he was approached about creating a seal for the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade. As early as 1760, Wedgwood's factory manufactured teapots printed with the lines "Health to the sick/Honor to the brave/Success to the lover/And freedom to the slave."¹⁶ Though it is unknown who exactly designed the famous antislavery cameo, Wedgwood's earliest biographer points to William Hackwood, a Wedgwood employee, as the artist.¹⁷

The surviving cameos dated to 1787 are all fairly uniform, though their settings can vary, as some have gold, black, or silver bands around the edge as part of a chain or a mount. They also came in different colors—blue and white, or cream and brown—all of which are in the traditional cameo style of a contrasting foreground and background, and the words "AM I NOT A MAN AND A BROTHER?" curve across the top.¹⁸ In contrast to the white background and lettering, an enslaved African man kneels, his hands clasped in supplication with chains trailing from his wrists to his ankles as only

6 Lisa Lindsay, *Captives as Commodities: The Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008), 34.

7 Leo d'Anjou, *Social movements and cultural change: the first abolition campaign revisited* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996), 198.

8 Marcus Rediker, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 317.

9 William Hague, *William Wilberforce: The Life of the Great Anti-Slave Trade Campaigner* (London: HarperPress, 2007), 146.

10 Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire's Slaves* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 106.

11 J. R. Oldfield, *Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The Mobilisation of Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade, 1787-1807* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 8.

12 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 157.

13 Guyatt, "The Wedgwood Slave Medallion," 94.

14 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 156.

15 Robin Reilly, *Josiah Wedgwood 1730-1795* (London: Macmillan, 1992): x-xi.

16 Patricia A. Matthew, "Serving Tea for a Cause," *Lapham's Quarterly*, February 28, 2018, <https://www.laphamsquarterly.org/roundtable/serving-tea-cause>.

17 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 156.

18 "The Wedgwood anti-slavery medallion," The Victoria and Albert Museum, <https://www.vam.ac.uk/articles/the-wedgwood-anti-slavery-medallion>.

a loincloth covers him, all in black. The image's plea proved to be extremely popular, though several historians have noted how the image served to reinforce European notions of racial hierarchy.¹⁹ Despite its flaws, it became a major symbol of the abolitionist movement.

The cameo was originally distributed for free among antislavery societies, and its usage quickly spread. Thomas Clarkson wrote that Wedgwood donated the cameos among his friends and Clarkson himself received five hundred to give away.²⁰ In 1788, Wedgwood sent the cameo to antislavery advocate and United States Founding Father Benjamin Franklin. In reply, Franklin said that the impact of the image "was equal to that of the best written Pamphlet."²¹ Scholar Mary Guyatt notes that Wedgwood likely financed the production and distribution of the cameos himself, arguing that other mentions of coins being sold were from imitation versions.²² Yet J.R. Oldfield writes that Wedgwood quickly produced thousands of cameos and, in time, sold them and marketed them through his trade catalogs, showrooms, and traveling salesmen.²³ The historical records are largely silent on when or if Wedgwood transitioned to selling the cameos, though they were spread wide and far and adapted by others to be sold. If given away and spread among antislavery activists, the cameos would have reached many true activists, rather than elites who bought them merely for fashion. No matter how they were first acquired, they spread rapidly. It is a testament to the cameo's ability to capture the public's imagination that it was reproduced in many different forms and sold so quickly.

The Wedgwood Antislavery Cameo, sometimes called a medallion, popularized abolitionism and used fashion to take a stand against pro-slavery sentiments, introducing many people to the movement as consumerism and standards of living rose. Thomas Clarkson noted that the cameo was "instrumental in turning the popular feeling our favour" and that the objects spread across Great Britain.²⁴ He also described the many ways the cameo could be used and shared, saying:

Some had them inlaid in gold on the lid of their snuff-boxes. Of the ladies, several wore them in bracelets, and others had them fitted up in an ornamental

manner as pins for their hair. At length the taste for wearing them became general; and thus fashion, which usually confines itself to worthless things, was seen for once in the honourable office of promoting the cause of justice, humanity, and freedom.²⁵

Importantly, the late eighteenth century was a period of economic growth. The middle class was expanding and experiencing increased standards of living.²⁶ Due to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, more people could purchase objects than before, and there existed a wider range of goods available. Relatedly, material items became increasingly decorated with political statements and messages.²⁷ In this era, fashion was particularly important as material goods took on status, and objects' importance often lay more in their aesthetic and meaning rather than utility.²⁸ At the same time, British society grew more urbanized and literate, and by 1800, between sixty and seventy percent of adult males could read.²⁹ Increased literacy and standards of living meant that more people could play a role in political and social movements through petitions and objects than before. The antislavery cameo was both a product of its time and the perfect way to capitalize on these advancements.

Many people wore the cameo, and such popularity could help the cause. This popularity continued, seen in how Wedgwood's factory made new batches of the cameo to coincide with the petition campaign of 1792 and in 1807 to match the Parliamentary debates.³⁰ The abolitionist movement began organizing in 1787, and by 1788, newspapers that had never before mentioned slavery or the slave trade were writing about it, such as the *Gentleman's Magazine*, which mentioned slavery sixty-eight times in the year.³¹ Debating societies provided cheap entertainment for hundreds of people from different classes, and though slavery was generally never a topic, in February 1788, half of all recorded public debates focused on slavery.³² The cameo was the image that propelled these discussions, with historian Adam Hochschild noting that the object was "probably the first widespread use of a logo designed for a political cause."³³ Even if not everyone who wore or saw the antislavery cameos became abolitionists, the image became a powerful piece of fashion and an almost inescapable reminder of the horrors

19 For a more in-depth discussion, see Guyatt, "The Wedgwood Slave Medallion," and Wood, *Blind Memory*.

20 Thomas Clarkson, *History of the Rise, Progression and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade by the British Parliament*, vol. 2. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1808), 191.

21 Benjamin Franklin as quoted in Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 129.

22 Guyatt, "The Wedgwood Slave Medallion," 97.

23 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 156.

24 Clarkson, *History of the Rise*, vol. 2, 191.

25 Clarkson, *History of the Rise*, vol. 2, 192.

26 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 9.

27 Guyatt, "The Wedgwood Slave Medallion," 98.

28 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 9.

29 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 10.

30 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 159.

31 Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 129.

32 Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 129.

33 Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 128.

of slavery. The cameo was a strong way for abolitionists to popularize their cause and share information on the truth of slavery. It brought the issue of abolition into polite society and everyday life, as it was a noticeable, physical method of highlighting the horror of slavery. If a person did not read antislavery literature or engage with speakers, imagery, and other forms of abolitionism, the Wedgwood cameo could be an avenue to share the cause by being worn around a lady's neck or in her hair.

The cameo's image proliferated in other ways. Thomas Clarkson brought the piece on his tour of southern England in 1788, and activist William Dickson took the cameo with him on an abolitionist campaign across Scotland in 1792.³⁴ There was no attempt to copyright the image, and it quickly spread beyond Wedgwood.³⁵ The piece was so popular that imitation versions were made by competitors, such as the potters T. and J. Hollins, whose replica version from around 1790 exists today, even if it is more roughly made than Wedgwood's fine piece.³⁶ The idea of a copied version speaks at once to popular support of antislavery both in that producers sought to fill a major demand and a copied item may have been less expensive than an original. In 1787, Wedgwood's smaller cameos were sold for around three guineas, or 478 USD in 2023.³⁷ Thus, there was likely a demand for a somewhat cheaper piece. The abolitionist image was spread in other ways, too. Cufflinks, a clay pipe, and a medal from the period all bear the image, and these artifacts have been found from the Isle of Wight to Derbyshire.³⁸ In these many ways, the cameo reached wide audiences of Britons and spurred discussions of abolitionism where there had been none before.

Abolitionist conversations were deeply important because, just as abolitionists targeted rising ranks of Britons, so too did pro-slavery advocates. These supporters aimed their rhetoric at the urban public and the quarter of English society made up of what might be termed the upper middle class, who provided a new audience for the arts. Pro-slavery activists used emotional as well as logical arguments, and they too spread their work through images and prints.³⁹ Additionally, anti-abolitionists had precedent on their side and appealed to order and stability, using everything from religion to science to support their cause.⁴⁰ Therefore, it was vital that abolitionists popularized their cause and saturated their culture with antislavery imagery.

The Wedgwood Antislavery Cameo also gave women a place in promoting the cause. Women were targets and influencers of the cameo. One abolitionist noted that he gave a young boy a cameo for himself and "any lady he chose to give it to."⁴¹ Women and their importance in the world of fashion made them the obvious target audience of the fashionable cameo. In 1787, 68 individuals on a public list of 302 abolitionist subscribers were women, and in London in 1788, around ten percent of subscribers were women.⁴² Women were interested in the abolitionist cause, yet they were blocked from key methods of abolition; they were rarely speakers for abolitionist societies and were barred from signing petitions to Parliament.⁴³ It was at this moment that the Wedgwood Antislavery Cameo became vastly important. Women, who dictated fashion, could advocate for abolitionism not by their political participation but by what they wore. In a time when standards of living were rising and fashion was important for more people than before, an object of fashion was of great significance. When women were shut out from other means of abolition, fashion became an even more powerful statement. They could support their cause by wearing its symbol everywhere they went.

The Wedgwood Antislavery Cameo extended beyond mere imagery. The cameo's tangibility, as with the objects within Thomas Clarkson's chest and the "East India" sugar bowl, was vital. The medallion was something to be collected and touched and was made by the widely popular Wedgwood company. It was something to be displayed in the home or on the body in a world where material culture was increasingly available and important to more social classes. The physical nature of the cameo was forging a new method to be used by abolitionists, that of the artifact.

THE CHEST OF THOMAS CLARKSON

In a July 1787 visit to Bristol, Thomas Clarkson hoped to acquire goods from Africa and begin forming a "cabinet or collection."⁴⁴ Clarkson noted that upon his arrival to the city, "I began now to tremble, for the first time, at the arduous task I had undertaken, of attempting to subvert one of the branches of the commerce of the great place which was then before me."⁴⁵ Clarkson braved death threats and attacks and quickly learned of the horrors of the slave trade from those who had experienced it firsthand.⁴⁶ Over seven years,

34 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 158.

35 "Am I Not a Man and a Brother?," Birmingham Museum of Art, <https://www.artsbma.org/am-i-not-a-man-and-a-brother-medallion/>.

36 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 159.

37 Wedgwood Society of New York, *Catalog of cameos, intaglios, medals, bas-reliefs, busts and small statues* (New York, Wedgwood Society of New York, 1980), 29, <https://library.si.edu/digital-library/book/catalogofcameosioowedg>.

38 Elliot Carey, "Kneeling Slave": Imagery of the Abolitionist Movement," Portable Antiquities Scheme, March 22, 2021, <https://finds.org.uk/counties/blog/kneeling-slave-imagery-of-the-abolitionist-movement/>.

39 Paula E. Dumas, *Proslavery Britain: Fighting for Slavery in an Era of Abolition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 90-91.

40 Dumas, *Proslavery Britain*, 13.

41 William Dickson as quoted in Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 158.

42 Seymour Drescher, "Public Opinion and Parliament in the Abolition of the British Slave Trade," *Parliamentary History* 26, no. 51 (June 2007), 42-65, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-0206.2007.tb00679.x>.

43 Seymour Drescher, *Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 78.

44 Clarkson as quoted in Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 143.

45 Thomas Clarkson as quoted in Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 112.

46 Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 119.

Clarkson traveled 35,000 miles, largely on horseback, to seek information on the slave trade, promote abolitionism, and connect activists in a unified network.⁴⁷ Through these challenges, Clarkson collected physical objects that were of vital importance. Clarkson's samples came from disparate sources, including the masters and captains of ships or merchants, while other pieces were donated by abolitionist allies.⁴⁸ Clarkson traveled to five ports across Britain where he sought testimony from slave ship sailors and items for his chest.⁴⁹ The physicality of the objects he collected greatly furthered abolitionism and allowed lower-class Britons to participate in the movement.

The chest itself is a point of interest. It is made of polished wood, and on the inside, the box has four levels of trays which are subdivided by partitions, compartments, and boxes.⁵⁰ When writing about showing his chest to a Privy Council in Parliament, Clarkson provided his reasoning for the creation of the chest: "I wished the council to see more of my African productions and manufactures, that they might really know what Africa was capable of affording instead of the Slave-trade... The samples which I had collected had been obtained by great labour, and at no inconsiderable expense."⁵¹ It was a direct contradiction to pro-slavery arguments that focused on economics, and he used tangible objects to make his point clear.⁵² Some of the first items he collected were samples of wood and gum copal from a shipbuilder and ivory trader named Sydenham Teast, who later testified in Parliament about the slave trade.⁵³ Clarkson's chest included both raw goods and artifacts: the spice melegueta, hardwoods and resins, ebony and ivory, beeswax, dyes, amulets, cloth, daggers, a quiver with arrows, and more.⁵⁴ Many of the items were in high demand in Britain and were used in everything from medicines to furniture making.⁵⁵

Thomas Clarkson's campaign chest significantly aided the abolitionist cause by spreading information to a range of Britons. Clarkson brought the cabinet to lecture halls and public forums across the country.⁵⁶ When he met with William Wilberforce to discuss abolition, Clarkson used the items in his chest to make his point, and Wilberforce agreed to advocate for the abolition of the slave trade in Parliament.⁵⁷ In 1788, Clarkson met with Prime Minister William Pitt and

showed him the contents of the campaign box. When writing about the encounter, Clarkson noted the physicality of the objects, describing how the prime minister was

"astonished at the various woods and other productions of Africa, but most of all at the manufactures of the natives in cotton, leather, gold and iron, which were laid before him. These he handled and examined over and over again. Many sublime thoughts seemed to rush in upon him at once at the sight of these..."⁵⁸

The artifacts were illustrated and put in a pamphlet entitled *An Accurate Account of that Horrible and Inhuman Traffic the Slave Trade* to be spread to the masses. The pamphlet features Clarkson's detailed descriptions of the way the instruments of torture were used.⁵⁹ Clarkson even featured the campaign chest in his portrait, painted by A. E. Chalon. The chest is open and displays the many goods inside, including musical instruments, grains, seeds, and knives.⁶⁰

One of the most significant uses of the chest was in Parliament. In 1788, Clarkson brought the campaign chest to a Parliamentary Privy Council which had been called to look into the state of the trade to Africa, especially the slave trade.⁶¹ Clarkson showed the council objects in a way that one historian describes as being like "an artefact handling class."⁶² At a later meeting, Clarkson used the chest to advance his points and visualize the data he had collected on British trade with Africa.⁶³ Historian Marcus Wood notes the element of horror in Clarkson's bringing the instruments of torture to the Privy Council when he writes of these "objects of gruesome fascination to be held, fingered, and fantasised in the hands of Britain's leading parliamentarians."⁶⁴ The physicality of the objects was quite important. It brought to life the statistics that Clarkson had gathered as he traveled across Britain.

Thomas Clarkson's campaign chest and the testimony and data he collected alongside it opened another avenue to abolition for lower-class Britons. When describing in his writings how he collected information on the slave trade, Clarkson notably prioritized learning about the state of enslaved people; he described how he had six key topics about which he sought to ask, and five were focused on the enslaved

47 Ellen Gibson Wilson, *Thomas Clarkson: A Biography*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 29.

48 Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 143-144.

49 Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 145.

50 Wood, "Packaging Liberty," 218.

51 Clarkson in Marcus Wood, "Packaging Liberty and Marketing the Gift of Freedom: 1807 and the Legacy of Clarkson's Chest," *Parliamentary History* 26, no. 51 (June 2007): 217.

52 Wood, "Packaging Liberty," 218.

53 Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 143.

54 Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 139-140.

55 Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 140-141.

56 Wood, "Packaging Liberty," 219.

57 Wood, "Packaging Liberty," 219.

58 Thomas Clarkson as quoted in Jane Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 146.

59 Wood, "Packaging Liberty," 220.

60 Wood, "Packaging Liberty," 220.

61 Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 135.

62 Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 146.

63 Webster, "Collecting for the cabinet of freedom," 147.

64 Wood, "Packaging Liberty," 222.

with the final section being on slave ship sailors.⁶⁵ Late eighteenth-century British society often focused on the stories of and statistics on sailors, rather than the enslaved, yet sailors were considered coarse and lower-class. Clarkson's sources testify to support of abolitionism from a range of individuals, despite other abolitionists' dislike of these lower-class figures. As one activist described it, he wanted more respectable sources than "the lowest class of seamen."⁶⁶ Nevertheless, Clarkson also told the stories of the sailors. Of the 5,000 sailors on slave ships in 1786, 1,130 died and 1,470 had been discharged or deserted in the West Indies.⁶⁷ He could speak about sailors' mangled bodies he had seen with his own eyes or recount stories of their gruesome deaths.⁶⁸ This was especially important because pro-slavery arguments perpetuated the idea that the power of the British Navy stemmed from sailors who had learned to sail aboard slave ships.⁶⁹ Clarkson provided evidence to the contrary. Eventually, abolitionists in the House of Commons used his data and information on the dimensions of slave ships to pass the Dolben Act in 1788, which limited the number of enslaved people who could be put on a ship.⁷⁰ However, the Dolben Act was not the goal of abolitionists, and Clarkson wrote that "survivors, however their sufferings might have been little demised, were reserved for slavery."⁷¹ He needed to continue to utilize his campaign chest.

Through Clarkson's ongoing mission, he allowed lower-class Britons into the world of abolition. As Clarkson collected objects, he collected stories, too, and invited merchants and sailors alike into the abolitionist cause. In his writings, Clarkson blended his artifacts with the testimony he collected. He described how among the devices he carried, one instrument was known to have killed a sailor, Charles Horseler.⁷² Clarkson measured slave ships waiting in docks, witnessed the exploitative recruitment practices of slaving merchants, and interviewed doctors aboard slave ships.⁷³

The stories brought the terror of slavery to life and allowed the stories of lower-class Britons to play a role in abolition, yet it was their tangibility that gave them power. The horror of a story was made real with the instruments of torture held in Clarkson's hands. Unlike the Wedgwood Cameo and "East India" sugar bowl, which were made expressly for an abolitionist audience and marketed toward women,

Clarkson's chest included objects that originated in different continents, and his audience was often men, whether sailors or members of Parliament. Yet, as with each of the other abolitionist artifacts, the objects in Clarkson's chest had great power in the movement and were able to physically present a better way forward. In one meeting with the privy council, Clarkson provided a hopeful vision for the future using the objects while condemning the present. With the artifacts from Africa, Clarkson demonstrated what a prosperous trade with Africa might look like.⁷⁴

SUGAR BOWLS AND BOYCOTTS

In 1791, William Wilberforce introduced the first anti-slave trade bill in Parliament, and with it, came a wave of abolitionist pamphlets.⁷⁵ Around the same time, abolitionists began refusing to consume sugar produced on plantations in the West Indies by enslaved individuals. Thomas Clarkson wrote in 1808 that in the winter of 1791 and early 1792, approximately 300,000 men, women, and children in Britain were boycotting West Indian—Caribbean—sugar.⁷⁶ Some instead used sugar from "East India," Britain's colonial holdings in India. Many abolitionists advocated for abstention from sugar altogether, noting that sugar in India could have been unethically sourced, as well.⁷⁷ With the increased prominence of the abolition movement came increased opposition, and in 1792, the House of Lords reversed a House of Commons decision to gradually abolish the slave trade.⁷⁸ It took many Britons, including everyday people, to advocate for the end of the slave trade despite opposition; a perfect example of this fact is the "East India Sugar not made by Slaves" bowl. The sugar bowl, as with other abolitionist artifacts, opened a new dimension to the antislavery movement. In this instance, the bowl placed the cause at the all-important British tea table.

A series of sugar bowls printed with the words "East India Sugar not made by Slaves" were material reminders of the antislavery movement. The bowls came in a variety of colors and styles, ranging from blue glass with gilt lettering to simple ceramics. Many of the bowls that survive to modern times are from a second period of sugar boycotts in the 1820s during the movement seeking to abolish slavery itself, though this paper focuses on the earlier sugar boycott.⁷⁹ The sugar bowl and boycott have often been dismissed as being of

65 Clarkson, *History of the Rise*, vol. 2, 3.

66 Currie as quoted in David Turley, *The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780-1860* (London: Routledge, 1991), 63.

67 Gibson, *Thomas Clarkson*, 40.

68 Gibson, *Thomas Clarkson*, 40.

69 Wood, "Packaging Liberty," 222-223.

70 Gibson, *Thomas Clarkson*, 47.

71 Thomas Clarkson as quoted in Gibson, *Thomas Clarkson*, 47.

72 Clarkson, *History of the Rise*, vol. 2, 16.

73 Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 114-115.

74 Gibson, *Thomas Clarkson*, 41.

75 Hague, *William Wilberforce*, 193.

76 Clarkson, *History of the Rise*, vol. 2, 350.

77 Midgley, *Feminism and Empire*, 61.

78 John Oldfield, "Abolition of the slave trade and slavery in Britain," *The British Library*, February 4, 2021, <https://www.bl.uk/restoration-18th-century-literature/articles/abolition-of-the-slave-trade-and-slavery-in-britain>.

79 "Sugar-bowl; box," *The British Museum*, https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/H_2002-0904-1.

little relevance to the end of the slave trade.⁸⁰ Yet, the bowls demonstrate that the abolitionist movement had wide support, particularly among women, that stretched across class lines. Though it is difficult to trace the exact origins of the “East India” sugar bowls, there was a history of ceramics and the slave trade. From 1760 to 1806, pro-slavery punch bowls that encouraged success for specific slave ships were manufactured in England.⁸¹ An example from 1760 depicts the “success” of the vessel the *Friendship*, complete with a scene of enslaved people harvesting tobacco in the West Indies.⁸² Yet, the Wedgwood teapots with the line “And freedom to the slave,” as mentioned above, were produced beginning in the same year. Both the teapot and the punch bowl highlight the way pro- and anti-slavery advocates used objects to advance their causes. It seems natural for the continued use of objects by abolitionists. When the sugar boycott arose, so too did the opportunity to connect slavery with the actual sugar bowl.

The creation of the “East India” sugar bowls is one aspect that shows their wide audience. It can be difficult to know who created some of the earlier pieces. For example, the creator of one sugar bowl dated to the first sugar boycott is unknown.⁸³ However, the bowls created for the second sugar boycott provide a fascinating portrait of the abolitionist base. The members of Birmingham’s Female Society for the Relief of Negro Slaves could purchase “East India” sugar bowls from people like Herbert Minton as well as Sarah Bedford and Son, highlighting women’s role as creators of abolitionist artifacts.⁸⁴ Additionally, a woman known as “B. Henderson” sold her version of the bowls from a warehouse in Peckham, near London.⁸⁵ The creation of the bowl mobilized men and women alike, particularly working-class individuals who created ceramics for a living. Bowls created in both the first and second periods speak to an involvement of Britons of multiple classes ranging from entrepreneurs who supported antislavery through their craft to those who were willing buyers.

The sugar bowl was a way for women, in particular, to promote abolitionism. Despite a limited role in government, women helped grow the abolitionist movement rather than hinder it. Elite or poor, women of all classes in eighteenth-century Britain were central to the increasing consumption of sugar, as they ordered sugar for lavish parties or bought goods for their families.⁸⁶ Sugar was no longer a

luxury item but a staple of British life.⁸⁷ As one contemporary writer described it, “a country grocer’s wife” could participate in tea-drinking and other activities in the same way that “a countess” would.⁸⁸ Women’s prominence in the domestic realm poised them to play a vital role in sugar boycotting, and female abolitionists used this advantage. The Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade had thousands of copies of the pamphlet “A Subject for Conversation at the Tea-Table” printed on fine paper. Yet instead of containing suggestions for small talk, the pamphlet featured William Cowper’s poem, “Pity the Poor Africans.”⁸⁹ The poetry, the bowls, and, ultimately, the boycott were all methods women could use to advance the end of the slave trade. The tea table, in particular, was an important target for abolitionists. Tea parties became an important place for respectable socialization for women.⁹⁰ Abolitionists were thus calling attention to slavery in a very prominent way. At the heart of the tea table sat a reminder that the production of what made life sweet for many Britons was the cause of death for thousands of enslaved people.

The sugar bowls’ usage also introduced wide audiences to abolition. Middle- and upper-class women were not the only groups boycotting West Indian sugar. Thomas Clarkson documented cases of servants emulating their employers and boycotting sugar.⁹¹ The bowl itself carried great importance. Most of the surviving bowls lack their lids, indicating usage rather than being mere display pieces.⁹² The sugar bowl was a tangible means of reminding Britons of slavery. How much more real did the slave trade become when a person realized the sugar sitting on the table was harvested, produced, and handled by enslaved individuals? Importantly, Thomas Clarkson noted in January of 1792 that the sugar revenue for the quarter decreased by £200,000, which equates to 46.7 million USD in 2023.⁹³

The sugar bowl was part of a larger boycott that involved all levels of society, yet its physicality was vital. William Fox’s 1791 pamphlet encouraging a boycott of West Indian sugar was very popular.⁹⁴ Even children were part of the movement and could be ardent supporters of abolition. While touring Scotland, the abolitionist William Dickson noted that the ten-year-old grandson of a reverend “won’t touch sugar since he read Fox’s tract.”⁹⁵ Katherine Plymley, whose diaries provide insight into the period and the major

80 Midgley, *Feminism and Empire*, 43.

81 Matthew, “Serving Tea.”

82 Daniel Sousa, “Anti-Slavery Ceramics at Historic Deerfield,” The Decorative Arts Trust, <https://decorativeartstrust.org/anti-slavery-ceramics-historic-deerfield/>.

83 “Anti-slavery sugar bowl,” Age of Revolution, <https://ageofrevolution.org/200-object/anti-slavery-sugar-bowl/>.

84 “Sugar-bowl; box,” The British Museum.

85 “Sugar-bowl; box,” The British Museum.

86 Midgley, *Feminism and Empire*, 45.

87 Matthew, “Serving Tea.”

88 Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 8.

89 Midgley, *Feminism and Empire*, 49.

90 Midgley, *Feminism and Empire*, 46-47.

91 Midgley, *Feminism and Empire*, 49.

92 “Sugar-bowl; box,” The British Museum.

93 Clarkson as quoted in Sam Margolin, “‘And Freedom to the Slave’: Antislavery Ceramics, 1787–1865,” *Ceramics in America* 2002. <https://chipstone.org/article.php/39/Ceramics-in-America-2002/%E2%80%9CAnd-Freedom-to-the-Slave%E2%80%9D:-Antislavery-Ceramics,-1787%E2%80%931865>.

94 Margolin, “‘And Freedom.’”

95 William Dickson as quoted in J. R. Oldfield, *Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The Mobilisation of Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade, 1787-1807*, (London: Frank Cass, 1998): 158.

abolitionist figures whom she met, wrote that her nephew refused to have his shoes blackened due to sugar being used in the polish. She highlighted the passion children could have for abolition, saying that they could be more willing to give up sugar than adults.⁹⁶ However, it was the tangible nature of the sugar bowls that would have had a jarring effect at the tea table. In a way, abstaining from sugar was quite shocking, as it was associated with political protest and radicalism. The boycott was a way for women to act and make a tangible difference when Parliament was doing nothing.⁹⁷ The shock of abstention or the replacement of sugar was made more prominent with the use of an artifact emblazoned with the words of the movement.

Many people were involved in the creation and the usage of the “East India” sugar bowl. Thomas Clarkson later wrote that those boycotting sugar “were all ranks and parties. Rich and poor, churchmen and dissenters.”⁹⁸ In contrast, a critic of the movement noted the existence of “antislavery tea parties” and described the prominence of the movement as being “antislavery in so many shapes and ways that even if your enemies do not in the end destroy you by assault, those who side with you must give you up for the weariness of the subject and resentment of your supineness.”⁹⁹ Both writings elucidate the wide base of support of the abolitionist movement and highlight the particular importance of sugar in the movement. The proslavery writer’s description of the different methods of abolitionism speaks to the significance of objects, as they would have made the movement inescapable. The Wedgwood Cameo brought antislavery to fashion and everyday dress. Clarkson’s chest brought abolitionism to towns across Britain and to Parliament. The “East India” sugar bowl brought the cause to the quintessentially British tea table. Together, the objects formed a new front against slavery; through their physicality, the objects promoted abolitionism and allowed different members of society to participate in the movement.

CONCLUSION

Artifacts had a twofold role in abolition: they were used to reach wide audiences of people and provided an avenue for people otherwise blocked from activism. Abolitionists reached men and women, middle- and working-class using artifacts. These acted as physical reminders of the importance of the cause and drew attention to abolition in a variety of ways, whether at abolition speeches or around the tea table.

The employers of these artifacts were all connected to the Society of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, highlighting abolitionists’ planned use of objects. It is not a coincidence that Thomas Clarkson was involved in the existence of each artifact.

The abolition of the slave trade was finally achieved with the passage of the Slave Trade Act of 1807. Activists endured great struggles and a period of drought in the movement following the Haitian Revolution, the Maroon Wars, and Britain’s wars with France.¹⁰⁰ But the groundwork abolitionists laid had been invaluable, and after a few years of renewed efforts, the slave trade within the British Empire was abolished. The Society had a mission to educate all Britons about the horrors of slavery, regardless of a person’s age, gender, or education level.¹⁰¹ They greatly achieved this. Though the activists were vital in bringing about the end of the slave trade, and though only 300 men, including the king, decided on its legal termination, it was the wide base of support across the country that was vital for abolition. One man described the Britons’ enthusiasm for antislavery by comparing the people to “Tinder which had immediately caught fire from the spark of Information which has been struck upon it.”¹⁰² During the Parliamentary elections of 1806, abolitionism was a campaign issue in certain places.¹⁰³ When British people realized what the slave trade and slavery truly entailed, many active abolitionists arose.

The importance of Britons’ involvement in abolition is perhaps best exhibited through petitions to Parliament. Until the 1830s, petitions were presented to the floor of Parliament and guaranteed MPs a chance to call attention to an issue.¹⁰⁴ Hundreds of petitions with thousands of signatures poured into Parliament from across Britain, featuring both wealthy and upper-class Britons as well as everyday people.¹⁰⁵ Some small towns sent petitions signed by almost every literate inhabitant, and one petition from Edinburgh stretched the length of the floor of the House of Commons. More people signed antislavery petitions in the first campaign that lasted until 1792 than they had on any subject between 1765 and 1784, and more people had signed than could vote for Parliament.¹⁰⁶ These actions are directly correlated with artifacts like Clarkson’s chest, the sugar bowls, and the Wedgwood cameo. Once the Slave Trade Act of 1807 was passed, the *Edinburgh Review* wrote that “the sense of the nation has pressed abolition upon our rulers” rather than being imposed upon the people.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, it is important to note that

96 Katherine Plymley as quoted in J.R. Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 147.

97 Midgley, *Feminism and Empire*, 57.

98 Clarkson as quoted in Margolin, “And Freedom.”

99 Matthew, “Serving Tea.”

100 Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 304.

101 Wood, “Packaging Liberty,” 205.

102 Joseph Woods as quoted in J.R. Oldfield, *Popular Politics*, 7.

103 Seymour Drescher, *Capitalism and Antislavery*, 90.

104 Turley, *The Culture of English Antislavery*, 63.

105 Gibson, *Thomas Clarkson*, 43.

106 Wood, *Bury the Chains*, 220–231.

107 *Edinburgh Review* as quoted in Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 307.

petitions could not be used by all Britons to promote abolition, hence why artifacts are important in providing another avenue for activism. Only adult men were allowed to sign petitions, and different localities would exclude the illiterate, paupers, or those not regarded as principal citizens.¹⁰⁸ Women in particular were blocked from being signatories, and as late as 1814, a newspaper reported that a woman shed tears of frustration over being denied the ability to sign an antislavery petition.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, abolitionists would advocate for women, and in later decades, female-led petitions helped abolish slavery within the British Empire.¹¹⁰

The developments in this period of abolition of the slave trade helped end slavery itself within the British Empire. Activists revived the West Indian sugar boycott and produced more abolitionist sugar bowls. The Wedgwood family continued to manufacture their famous cameo, and women were more engaged in abolitionism. Thomas Clarkson took to the road once again, pushing past debilitating illness and threats of violence to achieve his goals. More Britons wrote petitions, formed committees, and attended antislavery meetings. Antislavery petitions in Parliament became so commonplace that even the multiple enormous rolls of the ladies' petition of 1833, which were so large that four members of Parliament were needed to carry them all, were "soon and very unceremoniously dragged away again."¹¹¹ The wide usage of these artifacts also fed into an increasingly wide and diverse base for the abolition of slavery, like women's increasing role in the movement.¹¹² The plans of protest established in this era were foundational for the activism that ended slavery in Britain altogether.

These groundbreaking forms of protest can inform activism of the present. Many modern activists employ the same methods as the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, including boycotting, using imagery, and advocating for ethical consumption. Those working on human rights issues in the twenty-first century often face the same challenges as early activists, too. Spreading facts and firsthand accounts of human rights abuses is still vital. The use of artifacts highlights a successful way to create change. Many clothes and items of food are unethically sourced, so modern activists often face the same issues as previous ones. They too need to popularize the cause among the public and inform people about the truth. Perhaps more boycotts of unethically sourced items are needed, and perhaps artifacts could once again be used to make the cause inescapable, whether stickers on water bottles or the promotion of high-quality, ethically made objects. All these years later, activists could wear clothes emblazoned with the words "not made by slaves." 🏠

¹⁰⁸ Drescher, *Capitalism and Antislavery*, 78.

¹⁰⁹ Drescher, *Capitalism and Antislavery*, 85.

¹¹⁰ Drescher, *Capitalism and Antislavery*, 85.

¹¹¹ Priscilla Buxton in Turley, *The Culture of British Antislavery*, 67.

¹¹² Midgley, *Feminism and Empire*, 58.

The Sound of Silence

Inundation of Celilo Falls

In 1957, the construction of the Dalles Dam in the mid-Columbia River inundated a prominent fishing village and indigenous community known as Celilo Falls. The inhabitants of Celilo, who today mostly comprise the Yakama, Warm Springs, Umatilla, and Nez Perce Indigenous communities, lost more than the village they once knew. Alongside the physical loss, these groups also experienced the loss of gathering, their livelihoods, and sense of identity. As expressed through numerous videos and recordings of tribal elders who endured the flood, the silence present where Celilo once stood acts as a reminder of the life that once was, and invokes recollection of their lively past. This research paper argues that through using a lens of physical and metaphorical silence, the inundation of Celilo Falls invoked a detrimental sense of loss and displacement to the Indigenous communities of the Pacific Northwest. Despite the physical disappearance of Celilo, in recalling their history using oral tradition and history, the memory of these tribes stays ever present and alive.

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DIRECTLY IN THE MIDDLE OF the Columbia River along the border of Washington and Oregon lies the Dalles Dam, which acts as a prominent resource today for hydroelectricity, fishing commerce, and tourism. However, before the construction of the dam in 1957, there once stood Celilo Village, a prominent Indigenous fishing ground and meeting post for economic and cultural exchanges for the native people of the region. In the 1800s, this village stood at an ideal location for gathering resources and tribal unification, with the rapid waters supporting salmon populations and centralizing a meeting location for these tribes. While Celilo was significant to the everyday life of the Natives of the region, this was not the case for the United States, who viewed the Columbia River as a potential source of economic growth. In the mid-to-late 1880s, the United States government negotiated treaties with the Indigenous people who resided alongside the mid-Columbia river. With these decisions and treaties also came the relocation of the majority of Columbia River inhabitants and the creation of the Yakama, Warm Springs, Umatilla, and Nez Perce reservations in the surrounding inland regions. Doing so inspired a myriad of decisions by the United States regarding expanded fishing rights, land holdings, and more importantly modernization – leading to the consideration and eventual construction of the Dalles Dam.

The Dalles Dam was built alongside the mid-Columbia river valley, approximately thirteen miles downstream from Celilo.¹ While the decision to build the Dalles Dam attempted to consider the voices of the Indigenous people – who would lose an economic, social, and cultural space – construction began in 1952. Within a few years, the closing of the Dalles Dam gates in 1957, which halted the water flow of the Columbia River and stagnated the roaring waters, resulted

in the complete inundation of Celilo Falls. With the destruction of prominent indigenous fishing grounds, depletion of salmon populations, and erasure of the environment once known as Celilo Falls, the lives of these Pacific Northwest tribes would be altered forever. This environmental transformation would thus invoke an economic and cultural shift for the Native people who resided alongside this section of the Columbia River, forcing them to reconstruct their means of everyday life and survival.

When listening to the oral stories of the individuals and descendants of those who once inhabited Celilo Falls, one recurring comment was the deafening silence that came as a result of the closing of the dam gates. As a member of the Nez Perce who grew up in Celilo, Allen Pinkham Sr. expresses, “I have stopped at Celilo over the years, and the silence is a terrible thing to experience. There are no sounds of mothers and grandmothers cooking or washing dishes... no sounds of men chopping wood...no sounds of children running...no sounds of nets going into currents.”² The absence of sound, when considered in relation to the lively community of Celilo Village, contributes to the remembrance of what life was once like for the Indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest.

The physical silencing of Celilo was not the only means of silencing for the inhabitants of the mid-Columbia River valley. The construction of the Dalles Dam also resulted in the silencing of various aspects of Indigenous life, from their livelihoods and economic prosperity to their cultural heritage to the means of gathering and habitation. The various connotations of the word silence – both the auditory experience and act of being quieted or diminished – are applicable to the lasting effects of the Dalles construction. The still waters and painful memories associated with the Indigenous experience

1 John Caldbrick, “Celilo Falls disappears in hours after The Dalles Dam floodgates are closed on March 10, 1957,” History Link, last modified February 10, 2012, <https://www.historylink.org/file/10010>.

2 Allen V. Pinkham, “Childhood Memories of Fishing at Celilo Falls,” *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 108, no. 4 (2007): 592, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20615798>.

are presently evident in the memory and stories of the elders of the four Pacific Northwest tribes, whose legacies remain alive through their ancestors and oral tradition. The physical and emotional silencing of Celilo Falls in 1957 acts as a means to interpret the impact of the building of the Dalles Dam on the Pacific Northwest Indigenous communities. Silence, in conjunction with memory, plays a role in the remembrance of Celilo Falls and provides insight into the detrimental effects on Indigenous communities following the construction of the Dalles.

The biggest difference between the secondary literature and this paper is my intention to use silence as the lens to analyze the impact of the inundation of Celilo Village onto the Indigenous people. The attempt to correlate the economic, cultural, and sociological silencing through an interdisciplinary lens separates this thesis from prior research done on Celilo Falls. In the past twenty years, scholarship on Indigenous populations expanded to grasp the complexity of native struggles across the United States. With minimal literature covering the direct issues of Celilo Falls, it is essential to develop this argument based upon other sources, such as videos and podcasts, to strengthen my interpretation of Indigenous culture, relationships, and livelihood. However, this also demonstrates the need for more scholarship surrounding Celilo Falls, to which this research and analysis contributes.

Katrine Barber, a historian with a concentration on Indigenous survival in place-based studies, established various lenses as to how one may approach looking at the inundation of Celilo Falls. One of her texts, *Death of Celilo Falls*, examines the planning, construction, and aftermath of the building of the Dalles Dam and the effects on both the community of Celilo and the city of Dalles, Oregon. Barber argues, “The dam is a tangible reminder of the complexity of Indian-white treaties and their ongoing negotiation, the simultaneous promise and destruction of progress, the loss of a natural river and the life it sustained, and the transformative power of the market economy,” noting the lasting effects of industrialization on the people of the mid-Columbia river.³ Barber’s intentionality towards presenting a historical narrative of both the people of Celilo Village and the Dalles offers an empathetic and informative perspective on the various economic, social, and political challenges endured in the aftermath of the dam.

Barber’s other book, *In Defense of Wyam: Native-White Alliances and the Struggle for Celilo Village*, uses the lives of two women – Flora Thompson, a member of the Warm Springs tribe, and Martha McKeown, a daughter to an affluent white family – to explore indigenous and non-indigenous relationships throughout the history of the Celilo Falls in the mid-twentieth century. As she examines the lives of these two women based upon previously unknown letters, she builds upon *Death of Celilo Falls*, with the intention to present the alliance across

native and non-indigenous communities. While looking at the way in which these two women worked together to protect Celilo, she argues that Celilo, and other sites like it, “became spaces of entrenched indigeneity, creating a regional landscape that was both non-Native and Native,” to demonstrate the complex ties both communities had to Celilo.⁴ In combining their individual perspectives and upbringings, Barber provides insight into the debate of Native sovereignty, goals of environmental movements, and interactions amongst these communities. Through using governmental sources and interviews with those who lived in Celilo at the time, these texts help to establish the background of my analysis through demonstrating how the dam impacted the people who relied on Celilo.

Publications from the *Oregon Historical Quarterly* also contributed to this research with the number of collections, interpretations, and analyses of first hand accounts of individuals who endured the changing physical and cultural landscape following the building of the Dalles Dam. The *Oregon Historical Quarterly* is an ongoing journal which publishes historical research regarding Oregon and the Pacific Northwest. With these accounts presenting both native and non-native perspectives, these journals are beneficial to viewing the varying interpretations of the stories of Celilo Village. With the intention to base a majority of this research on the Indigenous experience of the inundation of Celilo, these journals present other attempts to better grasp the realities of the aftermath of the dam construction. Some of these publications vary from timelines created by the editors of the *Oregon Historical Quarterly* to acknowledgements of the Indigenous voices in studying Celilo. This journal has presented various lenses in which to look at this historical event.

Other journal articles have been used to build the argument of the lasting effects of silence upon the Indigenous peoples of Celilo. All take first hand accounts from Columbia River natives with the intent to understand and reconcile with their loss and experience of the indigenous communities following the construction of the Dalles. One source, written by Historian Andrew H. Fisher, “Tangled Nets: Treaty Rights and Tribal Identities at Celilo Falls,” provides an analysis on the complication of fishing-rights using analyses of first-hand accounts and interviews with both indigenous and non-indigenous sources. Speaking on the complicated nature of water rights surrounding the Columbia River, Fisher writes: “At Celilo Falls, where an ever-growing gauntlet of nets swept the current, fishing rights became tangled in a confusing web of racial, tribal, and residential affiliations.”⁵ While presenting insight on the complication of sovereignty near the river, it also presents new understandings of the lives of those dependent on the river for survival.

Another significant source to this research was Professor Charles Wilkinson’s “Celilo Falls: At the Center of

3 Katrine Barber, *Death of Celilo Falls* (University of Washington Press, 2005), 13, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvcwn61x>.

4 Katrine Barber, *In Defense of Wyam* (University of Washington Press, 2018), 23, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvcwn57c>.

5 Andrew H. Fisher, “Tangled Nets: Treaty Rights and Tribal Identities at Celilo Falls,” *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 105, no. 2 (2004): 181, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20615419>.

Western History.” In using interviews, poetry, and oral histories of indigenous members of Celilo, he both emphasizes the destructive nature of human progress and prioritizes shedding light on the voice of those who were directly impacted. Wilkinson, when considering how to best explain Celilo, writes, “I kept reflecting on how Indian people talked about, and felt, their tribal histories. The detail. The precision. The care. The respect. The determination to get it right.”⁶ Wilkinson’s intentionality to focus on Indigenous narratives and prioritize telling their stories in a respectful manner has prompted a deeper understanding of ways to approach this research. Respect, alongside careful observation and analysis, crucially influences the interpretation of the experiences of those who were impacted by the inundation of Celilo.

The rest of the secondary literature used involves the interdisciplinary fields of psychology and sociology. These texts, while more overarching and not directly tied to Celilo, help contribute to the understanding of the tumultuous effects of the inundation on the native people of Celilo. “Unpacking the Unspoken: Silence in Collective Memory and Forgetting” assists in establishing the psychological correlation between sound and recollection of memories. Silence plays a major role in the recollection and memory of Celilo, as the absence of the roaring waters evokes memories and an emotional response from those who experienced the village before its inundation. Another source, “Indigenous Resurgence: Decolonization and Movements for Environmental Justice,” is a thematic text concerning the Native struggle of maintaining space in a modernizing world and their aspirations to move towards a decolonized future with more Indigenous voices being prioritized. The sociological approach assists in developing the complicated nature of settler colonialism and discusses the harmful effects experienced by the environment and those individuals who are reliant on said environment. These two texts, while not necessarily historical, contain pertinent information to understanding the significance of silence and having aspects of one’s life be silenced.

Silence is a multifaceted word, one that pertains to the absence of sound or refers to the concept of suppression. The duality of meaning and interpretation of silence is complex, but can be applied to the experience of the Pacific Northwest tribes who experienced the closing of the gates of the Dalles Dam. From a psychological understanding, “acknowledging that silence is often tightly coupled with forgetting and talk of memory ... silence can also be used to facilitate recollection.”⁷ When considering this to Celilo, this suggests that quiet waters that overlay what once was Celilo Village can also stimulate memories of the life and environment that has since been lost. Throughout various Indigenous accounts, the silence presiding near the Dalles acts as a monument to the realities

of life following the inundation of Celilo.

By invoking memory, the silence of the water today contributes to the way in which elders and people of the Columbia River recall the life of Celilo. Not only does the silence contribute to recollection of past memories, but it also prompts the desire to share the truth and understandings of the people who endured the loss of Celilo. Robert Conner, who spent his formative years in the Umatilla Indian Reservation, described the importance of oral tradition in speaking to the truth of Indigenous experience surrounding the Dalles. While the dam inundated Celilo Village, the silence almost acted as marker of the disappearance of Celilo, but as Connor expresses, “For our elders and ancestors, it is a very real place. [They] experienced the mist and the roar and the fishing and the trading and everything that went on there.”⁸ The experience of the elders does not disappear with the physical disappearance of Celilo, as their lives and stories are everlastingly present through the remembrance and sharing of their memories.

In the same manner silence can evoke memory, the presence of memorable sounds, such as roaring waters, can also contribute to the recollection of the past of Celilo. Wilbur Slockish, an elder from the Confederated Tribes of the Yakama Nation, expresses the way in which the sound of rapid waters acts as a reminder of Celilo Village. In an interview describing his experience sitting by a waterfall in the Pacific Northwest, he stated, “I heard the sound of that water falling, it wasn’t as loud as Celilo. I spread a blanket out and I just layed there listening to it... And now we find places like that to remember the sounds. That is a sound I will never forget.”⁹ Slockish speaks to the restorative nature of the sound of water. With Celilo Falls having been stilled by the dam gates’ closure, the sounds of the roaring waters that once engulfed the surrounding areas have disappeared. The remembrance of roaring waters is a commonality amongst those brought up along Celilo. Umatilla, Nez Perce, and Cayuse member Ron Halfmoon remembers that “the roar of the river was everywhere: the roar and the mist, the roar of the falls. [He didn’t] know how many hundreds of yards of falls there were, but they raised a big mist everywhere” prior to the inundation.¹⁰ The roars, heard daily at Celilo prior to the closing of the dam gates, became a memorable sensation and auditory presence. Thus, the elimination of these roars with the inundation of the falls would contribute to the painful and emotional recall of the life that came before 1957 when the dam gates closed.

The silence of falls was only a physical marker of the change in lifestyles for the Indigenous communities of Celilo. As Barber explains, “The closing of the gates of The Dalles Dam changed everything and nothing. The river took on a new and different shape and the falls fell silent. The very

6 Charles Wilkinson, “Celilo Falls: At the Center of Western History,” *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 108, no. 4 (2007): 533, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20615791>.

7 Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Chana Teeger, “Unpacking the Unspoken: Silence in Collective Memory and Forgetting,” *Social Forces* 88 (2010): 1104, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645884>.

8 “Roberta Conner,” May 16, 2019, in *Confluence Podcast: Indigenous Voices of the Columbia River*, podcast, audio, https://soundcloud.com/confluencenw/confluence-story-gathering-roberta-conner?utm_source=clipboard&utm_campaign=wtshare&utm_medium=widget&utm_content=https%253A%252F%252Fsoundcloud.com%252Fconfluencenw%252Fconfluence-story-gathering-roberta-conner

9 Woodrow Hunt, *Stories from the River: Celilo*, 2019, Confluence Library.

10 Wilkinson, “Celilo Falls,” 535.

sound of the world changed.”¹¹ According to Barber, ‘nothing’ changed in reference to the inundation being parallel to the Indigenous displacement occurring simultaneously across the country. However, ‘everything’ changing is in reference to the various facets of Indigenous life that were forced to adapt and change with the disappearance of Celilo. As silence can also refer to hindrance and restriction, Indigenous identity, culture, livelihood, and sense of community were silenced in the aftermath of the construction of the Dalles. Thus, the memories of Indigenous members who lived in Celilo provide insight into the sense of loss, displacement, frustration, and silencing that occurred following the inundation of Celilo in 1957.

With the destruction of the physical landscape of Celilo Falls and the depletion of vital resources, the identity of the people of Celilo was silenced. Indigenous culture is significantly rooted in their relationship to the Earth, with a majority of their rituals, belief systems, and artwork being dependent upon natural resources. As tribal leader Johnny Jackson explains, “all our traditional values are along the Columbia River.”¹² Denoting the importance of the spiritual connection to that of the space they inhabit, Jackson demonstrates the manner in which the loss of Celilo would contribute to the hindrance of cultural identity and sense of self. Celilo Falls, prior to the inundation, was known for its rapid waters, populous salmon runs, and massive rocks, all of which played major roles in the heritage of each respective tribe of the region. Whilst the various tribes had their own significant connections to the different resources, they all endured the loss of these natural elements that were key to their cultural identities.

Physical changes to the environmental landscape of the mid-Columbia River impose harm to not only the livelihoods of the native people, but also harm the identities of those who inhabit the land. As Professor of International Relations Wilfrid Greaves describes, “because Indigenous identities are ontologically connected to specific territories, changes to the land itself—particularly environmental damage that negatively impacts the health or viability of existing ecosystems—also affect Indigenous peoples’ collective identities.”¹³ With Indigenous identity being so closely tied to their environment, it makes sense that the inundation of Celilo would result in a sense of loss. Aurelia Stacona, member of the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs, explains, “the river itself means a lot to us because we are a part of that connection to the water. We consider ourselves part of the Wy’am.”¹⁴ Stacona implicates the significance of the human connection to the natural resource of the falls, not

only through its naming but the sensation of a tie directly to the water. Wy’am, the indigenous term for ‘echo of falling water,’ was another name for the water of Celilo Falls, and the connection to Wy’am contributes to the sense of identity of the Indigenous people.¹⁵ This relationship between the waters and the members of the various tribal communities, when considered post-inundation of Celilo, demonstrates the displacement of identity based upon the stagnation of the waters of the Wy’am.

With the loss of identity, another element of Indigenous culture silenced by the inundated waters was the loss of the presence of rocks as they were important in cultural practices of those who lived in Celilo Village. The rocks, used for both ritual practices and artwork, demonstrate the environmental tie of the Columbia River to the identity of the inhabitants of Celilo. As written in her poem, “She-Who-Watches, The Names Are a Prayer,” member of the Confederate Tribes of Warm Springs Elizabeth Woody demonstrates the importance of rocks in their culture, writing: “There is Celilo, / dispossessed, the village of neglect / and bad structure. / The falls are faint, rocks enrippled / in the placid lake of backwaters. / With a sad, stone grief and wisdom / I overlook the railroad.”¹⁶ Woody’s reflection on the loss of Celilo mentions the ‘enrippled rocks,’ prompting the understanding of its significance within the community of Celilo. With using words such as dispossessed and neglected, Woody emphasizes the means as to which their community and sense of self has been overlooked by the construction of the Dalles. With the still waters and flooded over rocks, a pivotal aspect of their lives has been stripped away. Whether the loss of rocks is significant due to its importance regarding ritual, this demonstrates the loss of culture with the inundation of Celilo.

Celilo residents, having a deep connection to the fishing in the waters of the Columbia River, developed a ritual involving the rocks of the region. As best explained by Barber, “Many of the Indians who fished at Celilo prayed at a large stone they called Skuch-Pa. They filled a naturally occurring hole in this rock with mud, small rocks, and grasses to assure good weather before they ventured onto [fishing] scaffolds.”¹⁷ Ritual, for many Indigenous communities, involves the natural world in which the respective members have formed deep connections with. As United States Historian David Rich Lewis explains best, the relationship held between Indigenous communities and the environment stems from their intentional understanding of the land and experience with their environment. He writes, “[Indigenous people] acknowledged the earth’s power and the reciprocal obligation between hunter and hunt.”¹⁸ Although his comment

11 Barber, *In Defense*, 190.

12 Fisher, “Tangled Nets,” 181.

13 Wilfrid Greaves, “Damaging Environments,” in *Indigenous Resurgence: Decolonialization and Movements for Environmental Justice*, by Jaskiran Dhillon (Berghahn Books, 2022), 119, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2vr8tmo.10>.

14 Hunt, *Stories from the River*.

15 Lillian Pitt, “Celilo Falls (Wyam): Fishing Since Time Began,” Lillian Pitt: Giving Voice to My Ancestors, website accessed Fall 2023, <https://lillianpitt.com/celilo-falls-wyam/>.

16 Woody, “She-Who-Watches, The Names Are a Prayer,” lines 1-7.

17 Barber, *Death of Celilo*, 183.

18 David Rich Lewis, “Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of Twentieth-Century Issues,” *American Indian Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1995): 423, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1185599>.

was not directly written about the people of Celilo, this idea is applicable to their ritual involving rocks as it pertains to their fishing culture. Going back to Lewis's comment on the acknowledgement of the 'hunter', the prayers to Skuch-Pa at the rock demonstrate the intentionality to connect with the environment in which they take life and sustenance from. Moreover, the Celilo prayer ritual highlights how Indigenous practices connect to their environment, a very important component to their cultural heritage.

Besides the use of rocks for ritual, petroglyphs – rock carvings – were also a means to honor the protectors and gods of the Indigenous peoples. Similar to the Skuch-Pa rock, these petroglyphs were used to ask for protection from “water monsters who swept victims into the currents of the Columbia.”¹⁹ With their understanding of the spiritual elements of the environment, the people of Celilo prioritized their relationship with the rocks in which they used to scaffold and the water in which they used for sustenance and fishing, as represented through these petroglyphs. In fact, prior to the inundation of Celilo, rock petroglyphs were removed from the area during archaeological digs near the Dalles, and thus a few of these rocks remain protected in museums. Unfortunately, as resident of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation George W. Aguilar explained, “Most petroglyphs are now viewed only by the few surviving salmon, which are also struggling for life. A ghastly silence has reigned at this place for half a century.”²⁰ The inundation of Celilo forced a significant number of petroglyphs and visual representations of tribal artwork and ritual to disappear into the now stagnant waters of the Columbia River. With the physical drowning of rock shrines and petroglyphs as a result of the dam, one could argue that the construction of the Dalles Dam resulted in the drowning of Indigenous livelihood, through the loss of ritual and visual culture.

With Celilo Village being a prominent fishing location in the Pacific Northwest, the livelihood of the Indigenous peoples of the region was heavily dependent on the resources accessible via the falls. Salmon was a plentiful resource within the Columbia River which enabled Celilo to become a hub for fishing and trade for surrounding tribal communities. However, according to the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, “more than 40 percent of the spawning and rearing habitat once available to salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River Basin is permanently blocked by dams.”²¹ Speaking on the importance of salmon for Indigenous groups of Celilo and surrounding regions, Nez Perce tribal member Josiah Blackeagle Pinkham also explains: “With the salmon bringing such riches – of sustenance and spirit – it is no wonder that the mid-Columbia became the

trade and social convening place for a whole region, out to the basin and range country, to the Rockies, and to the plains beyond.”²² The changes in environmental landscapes, post-inundation of the falls, would alter salmon runs and populations, forcing tribal members to alter their traditional fishing methods, a crucial component of their livelihoods.

Salmon was a pivotal resource for all of those who resided alongside the Columbia river, not only as a source for sustenance but also as a means to provide income. With salmon being essential to both the economic and cultural prosperity of the people of Celilo, fishing was crucial for survival. Member of the Yakama Nation, Virginia Beavert, reflected on the manner in which the loss of Celilo resulted in the loss and deterioration of fishing accessibility. With decreased salmon populations and forced removal from the area, the Indigenous peoples of Celilo no longer had an easily accessible source of income. As Beavert comments in an interview:

I think a lot of the Indian elders died with a broken heart losing Celilo. And the compensation they received, some of them wouldn't even accept it. A lot of it was turned away. They said this does not make up for what we're losing. The amount each individual was paid was, I guess, even less than what you make in one weeks wages. It didn't go very far.²³

Having accustomed their livelihoods around fishing and selling salmon, the finalization of the dam hindered the accessibility to a common source of sustenance and financial gains.

Fisheries and canneries attempted to take advantage of the once plentiful salmon populations of the Columbia river. Indeed, the people of Celilo recall the competitive nature of fishing and the need to adapt post construction of the dam. For Louie Pitt, a member of the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, competition defined the harsh realities of fishing along the Columbia River: “Pretty much the story of Indian people on the River was just getting displaced all the time. All up and down the River. The best fishing spots were taken over by non-Indians. Fish wheels wiped out whole runs of fish, whole runs – they call them ‘races’ too – never be seen again.”²⁴ Pitt's commentary on the impact of commercialized fishing alongside the Columbia, even without the construction of the dam, sheds light on the challenges to arise with the completion of the dam. In her recalling of the prior fishing methods of the Indigenous people, Beavert commented, “when I got a little older that's where I remember watching the fisherman spear the fish. And it was shallow, so they could wade out there and fish, you know, in the rapids. It was before

19 Gallery: *Rock Art*, photograph, <https://www.confluenceproject.org/library-post/gallery-rock-art/>.

20 George W. Aguilar, “Celilo Lives on Paper,” *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 108, no. 4 (2007): 613, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20615800>.

21 “Dams: impacts on salmon and steelhead,” Northwest Power and Conservation Council, <https://www.nwcouncil.org/reports/columbia-river-history/damsimpacts/>.

22 Wilkinson, “Celilo Falls,” 537.

23 Virginia Beavert, “Elders Died with a Broken Heart,” *Because of Loss of Celilo*, Confluence Library, 2019.

24 Louie Pitt, interview, *Many Celilos*, Confluence Library, 2019.

there was a dam there.”²⁵ With Celilo Village lying directly on the banks of the Columbia River, spearfishing was a common method to capture salmon within the flowing rapids. However, as she notes, the construction of the dam ultimately altered the means of the environment, placing a limitation on not only the habitat of the salmon population but the means of which the native people could attain salmon.

In the aftermath of the closing of the dam gates, the native people who depended on fishing for survival were still given rights to fish in the Columbia river. However as Beavert expressed in her interview, she notes the hostility and resistance towards Indian fishing methods developed to benefit the new water currents. Beavert recalls how indigenous people “had to turn to commercial fishing, dip-netting. And when the public was complaining about Indians dip netting, well, it was their way of fishing. They couldn’t fish on a platform anymore, Celilo was gone.”²⁶ With Celilo inundating and the rapid waters now flattened, the natives of the region found means to adapt their traditional fishing techniques to best suit the new environmental landscape. This resilience, evident in adjusting fishing methods to secure resources, speaks to the nature of the Indigenous peoples of the region. Rather than let industrialization take the reins of their livelihoods, their adaptations to change became a pivotal factor in ensuring their prosperity.

The final means of silencing faced by the Indigenous communities of Celilo involve the loss of a location of gathering and community. With the closing of the dam gates came a forced removal from the physical location of where Celilo Village once stood, which not only displaced the tribes who relied on the falls but also caused shifts in their communal relationships. For those who resided in Celilo, their memories are significantly built upon the connections made with those who visited Celilo. When retelling the stories of her relative Nettie Showaway, who grew up visiting Celilo, Roberta Conner describes how “Nettie would talk about mostly her fond memories of being on the river with all the other people there... she loved going where there was gambling and dancing and racing and having weddings and having feasts and it was this huge, huge amount of commotion.”²⁷ Despite the destruction of Celilo, the memories associated with physical relocation and recollection of community pertain to the overall concept of the loss of a place of gathering post-inundation.

Physical relocation, both prior to and following the construction of the Dalles, contribute to the living memory of Celilo Falls. Indigenous peoples of the Columbia river experienced initial relocation in 1855, with the signing of treaties by the U.S. government and indigenous peoples of the mid-Columbia river, stripping them of their landownership

and forcing them onto reservations.²⁸ These reservations intended to limit the fishing, gathering, and overall accessibility to the Columbia River, yet this did not discourage Indigenous members from Celilo. Aurelia Stacona recalls “when they decided to move us, move us back this way, they found places for us to – which they called the reservations. But we know where we came from. We know what we’re about, we know who we are, and what we’re going to stand for.”²⁹ Stacona’s acknowledgement of not only the relocation but to the continual perseverance of the people of Celilo speaks to the resilience of Native people. Their resilience during the attempts of relocation would endure throughout the rest of the twentieth century all the way through the construction of the Dalles.

In the 1940s, when conversation surrounding the construction of the Dalles dam commenced, the fear of relocation and displacement arose amongst Indigenous residents of Celilo. Many residents voiced their concerns on removal, especially Wy’am Chief Tommy Thompson who stated, “When the canal was built by the white man – by the Government – our shacks were all done away with; we were made to move [...]. We have been moved here and there [...]. And I am continually afraid that I will be chased out entirely.”³⁰ Thompson’s commentary on the constant displacement, even prior to the inundation of Celilo, indicates the constant fear of losing a place the Native people have always known to be theirs. Ultimately, the inundation of the falls would confirm his greatest fears, as the construction of the Dalles Dam would inundate Celilo Village and force the removal of thirty-six families from the area.³¹ When the dam gates closed on March 10, 1957, it symbolized the loss of not only the physical Celilo, but also the loss of a community who relied on Celilo for its ability to bring together tribes and peoples of the Pacific Northwest.

Celilo was crucial to connectivity amongst Indigenous peoples, not only because of fishing but also for recreational purposes. Cascade Indian Chuck Williams described the prominence of Celilo Village as a point of connectivity amongst Indigenous tribes. When remembering the bustling nature of Celilo, Williams recalled, “Trails radiated out from the Narrows and from Celilo Falls, and thousands of Indians from the surrounding countryside gathered every year to fish, visit, meet friends and lovers, trade, sing, compete in games, gamble, and party.”³² Williams’s comment emphasizes Showaway’s remembrance of Celilo being a hub for interaction amongst individuals as their memories recall the pleasures of building relationships with those who visited and resided in the village.

Celilo, as described by resident George W. Aguilar, was a lively place with memorable interactions amongst those

25 Virginia Beavert, interview, *Fishing Before the Dam*, Confluence Library, 2020.

26 Beavert, interview.

27 Bobbie Conner, interview, *Stories of Nettie Showaway*, Confluence Library, 2020.

28 “Significant Events in the History of Celilo Falls,” *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 108, no. 4 (2007): 721, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20615818>.

29 Aurelia Stacona, interview, *Wy’am*, Confluence Library, 2019.

30 Barber, *Death of Celilo*, 127.

31 Barber, *Death of Celilo*, 127.

32 Wilkinson, “Celilo Falls,” 541.

who came in and out of the village. When recalling the fishing seasons of Celilo, Aguilar recalls the nature of the gambling that occurred in the village:

Card sharks of the Indian game wa-luc-sha (two-card Monte) preyed on unsuspecting bettors. Most experienced high-stakes bettors – especially those older, sophisticated ladies who came from the Nez Perce Reservation in Idaho – detected these cheaters. High-stakes gambling stick games were held every night during the fishing season. Kaiutus Jim, from the Yakama Indian Reservation, ran the poker table, and his percentage rake made him a very good profit.³³

Aguilar's description of the gambling that occurred in Celilo demonstrates the intertribal connections formed as a result of the convening that occurred during fishing season. Although the village was an ideal location to attain resources and barter, descriptions such as Aguilar's demonstrate the connections formed separate from means of fishing and survival. Unfortunately, with the inundation of Celilo also came the inevitable loss of these opportunities for connectivity growth amongst the residents and visitors of Celilo.

Through the recollection of memories from various Indigenous communities, it is evident the inundation of Celilo imposed forced changes on those who resided there. The loss of identity, through the silencing of the Wy'am, holds significant weight on the memory of elders whose Indigenous roots are tied to the waters and land of Celilo. Cultural heritage, as represented through rituals and art associated with the rocks and environment, drowned alongside the village and disappeared into the waters of the Columbia River. Indigenous means of fishing and resourcefulness were altered as a means of the stagnated waters, deteriorating the livelihoods of those who relied on salmon for survival. Finally, Indigenous means of gathering and community were halted with the construction of the Dalles Dam forcing relocation of the residents of Celilo and removing a centralized location for connectivity. All of these facets, when looked at through the memories of Indigenous peoples, demonstrate the way in which silence – or silencing – provides insight into the experiences of the residents of Celilo as a result of the construction of the Dalles Dam.

While silence is a lens through which one can look at the aftermath of Celilo Falls, it is important to note the constant theme of resilience present in the oral histories of the Indigenous people who endured the inundation. With Celilo having been flooded over by the closing of the Dalles, the stories and experiences of the Indigenous people remain ever present and alive, and deserve constant retelling. Elsie

David, a member of the Yakama nation, brings forth the point of recognizing Indian people by exclaiming, "I read a lot in books, you know, that they used to do this or they used to do that or they had this – a lot of wording is in past tense and I just think, geez, do they think Indians just fell off the face of the earth or what? You know, we're still here," honing in on the necessity to acknowledge the Indigenous presence.³⁴ While the falls are now silent, this does not equivocate to the silencing of their stories and presence in history.

Over the course of the last few decades, more oral recordings of the memories of the Indigenous communities of Celilo have become shared publicly. *The Confluence Project*, a group which intends to connect the history of the Columbia River to the Indigenous communities who inhabit the region, began a project to commemorate Celilo. When working on the project, lead historian and supervisor Maya Lin made note of the original silence from tribal elders saying: "a few of them said we know this is the most powerful and the most sacred of our sites. And it might be something that should be done but it might be too painful. This is not a story we're ready to share with the world."³⁵ The pain associated with the memories of Celilo originally halted the sharing of the memories of those who lived prior, during, and after the inundation. However, over time, more residents and elders of the tribes who resided in Celilo began to recognize the importance of sharing their experiences. As Wilkinson writes best: "The mist is now clamped down, the roar is stilled, the salmon have no current to fight, no falls to surmount, both of which they need, and the old fishing rocks lie in still, deep water. We must keep telling people about it. We must not relent."³⁶ Even with the silent waters, a change has occurred in which the Indigenous peoples of Celilo no longer want to remain silent like the waters of the Wy'am currently are. Through the sharing of their memory with the future generations of their tribes and vocalization of their experiences, they allow for the stories of Celilo to remain ever present in our current world.

As Yakama member Ted Strong expressed, "Celilo still reverberates in the heart of every Native American who ever fished or lived by it. They can still see all the characteristics of the waterfall. If they listen, they can still hear its roar. If they inhale, the fragrances of mist and fish and water come back again."³⁷ For those who experienced Celilo, it still continues to be a part of their lives through their memory and holds such a pristine image in their minds. Despite the inundation of the falls, which resulted in displacement and loss, the Indigenous peoples who experienced Celilo remain strong in their identity and firm in their knowledge that those memories will never abandon them. Their resilience, as told through the sharing of memories, allows the Wy'am to live on, roaring as though the dam was never built. 🏞️

33 Aguilar, "Celilo Lives," 610.

34 Katrine Barber and Andrew H. Fisher, "From Coyote to the Corps of Engineers: Recalling the History of the Dalles—Celilo Reach," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 108, no. 4 (2007): 526-527, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20615790>.

35 *Confluence Project at Celilo Park*, Confluence Library, 2019.

36 Wilkinson, "Celilo Falls," 541.

37 "Celilo Falls: The center of trade and heart of the region's salmon culture for thousands of years," Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, <https://critfc.org/salmon-culture/tribal-salmon-culture/celilo-falls/>.

The Segregationist's Scalawag

Reconstruction Memory, Public Pedagogy, and the Rhetoric of Reaction in the Civil Rights South

Following the Civil War, opponents of Republican Reconstruction popularized the term scalawag as a pejorative to refer to native white Southerners who joined freedmen's and carpetbaggers' coalition. In the Civil Rights Era of the mid-twentieth century, segregationists resuscitated the epithet to police the boundaries of Southern nationhood, although its meaning remained slippery in Southern political discourse. Scalawag ultimately achieved neither the semantic clarity nor the rhetorical salience its Lost Cause propagandizers had hoped for. This paper discusses how the Virginia Textbook Commission (1950-1956) created a politicized and racialized historical identity for scalawags in grade school textbooks. Further, the memory of Reconstruction and scalawags' place in it illuminates how political actors contested Southern white identity during desegregation.¹

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INTRODUCTION

Political actors from many ideological stripes have exploited the radical potential of Reconstruction memory. Most famously, the Dunning School produced a corpus of academic literature in the early twentieth century which discredited postbellum Republican governments in the South and particularly freedmen's role in them. Although William Archibald Dunning and his protégés were based at Columbia University, their work provided an academic basis of the Lost Cause and a justification to disenfranchise Black Southerners.² W.E.B. Du Bois published *Black Reconstruction* in 1935 to counter the dominant conservative, racist historiographical trend. Du Bois's work thoroughly defends the importance of Black political action during Reconstruction and argues a class analysis of the failure of Reconstruction.³ The memories of the 1860s and 1870s continue to imbue contemporary political discourse, as the symbolic call of the modern reparations movement, "forty acres and a mule," harks back to radical Reconstruction.

The Reconstruction era saw perhaps the most organized, militant opposition to racial and class domination in

all of Southern history. In much of the South, Confederates were temporarily disenfranchised and freedmen played substantial roles in state legislatures.⁴ Radicals sought, albeit ultimately without success, a comprehensive land redistribution program in the years after the Civil War.⁵ Du Bois hardly exaggerated when he deemed that Reconstruction South Carolina, a state where freedmen represented the majority of the legislature in 1868, "showed certain tendencies toward a dictatorship of the proletariat."⁶

Reconstruction radicals disrupted Southern power structures so effectively, even if temporarily, that descendant power structures found it necessary to control the memory of Reconstruction. As the Civil Rights Movement mounted an increasing challenge to segregationist Southern states in the mid-twentieth century, conservative Southern writers renewed a general commitment to white supremacy as the primary criterion of legitimate political action and therefore membership in the Southern nation. The historicity of scalawags – white Southerners who supported Reconstruction – presented an anomaly which Southern writers were never able to address with the ideological consistency or rhetorical

1 This research was completed during Summer 2023 with the support of the Charles Center at the College of William & Mary. Special thanks to my advisor Melvin Ely, professor of history, as well as Graham Canaday, Tyler Goldberger, Christopher Walker, Emma Chun, Andy Shufer, and Grant Rose. This work would not have been possible without the resources of the Virginia Museum of History & Culture Research Library and William & Mary Swem.

2 The Lost Cause is the mythological historical narrative defending and martyring the Confederate cause and minimizing slavery's role in the Civil War. It became the normative Southern account of the Civil War and Redemption in the postbellum era. See W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Propaganda of History," in *Black Reconstruction in America*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Oxford, 2007), 582-597, and especially 591-595; Fred Arthur Bailey, "Free Speech and the Lost Cause in the Old Dominion," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 103, no. 2 (1995): 237-266. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4249508>.

3 Bruce E. Baker, *What Reconstruction Meant: Historical Memory in the American South*, (University of Virginia Press, 2009); Bernard A. Weisberger, "The Dark and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction Historiography," *The Journal of Southern History* 25, no. 4 (1959): 427-47, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2954450>.

4 Eric Foner, "Blueprints for a Republican South," in *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution*, (New York, NY: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2014), 281-333.

5 Foner, *Reconstruction*, 309.

6 W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. (Oxford, 2007), 321. See "The Black Proletariat in South Carolina," 313-535.

aplomb they had hoped. To suggest that the past is politicized is not only self-evident but cliché. By analyzing the ideological and rhetorical elements of Lost Cause propaganda and Southern nationhood, to probe deeper into the mechanics and effects of propaganda to sketch out the practical, latent role of white supremacy in Southern life. The Lost Cause, by promising white Southerners a form of mythical redemption narrative, can be seen as a wage of whiteness; this paper asks who pays those wages, how, and why. Although *de jure* segregation eventually became a losing cause in the South, the rhetoric of reaction never died with it.⁷

Scalawags – “native [white] Southerners who cast their lot politically with the freedmen”⁸ – seem particularly fruitful candidates for analysis. *Scalawag* existed in the Southern lexicon long before the Civil War, denoting “an idle, impish rascal, or rogue.”⁹ Southern conservatives’ imagination of scalawags reveals not only what they deemed legitimate political action but also whom they deemed to be legitimate political actors. In his classic work *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson defines *nation* as an “imagined political community,” a model that Southern writers modeled in their nationalistic writings.¹⁰ Specifically, elites may imagine nationhood to instill racial solidarity, justify repression and exploitation, or to protect themselves from political threats.¹¹ Southern writers set out to construct a Southern nation according to their own political needs. Conservatives hoped to look back at Reconstruction and find a solid white South, a nation set on redeeming the levers of the state from heathens and interlopers. (Indeed, some writers found exactly that.) However, scalawags represented an obstacle to the construction of a Solid South. Lost Cause propaganda could easily delegitimize other elements of the Southern Republican coalition – freedmen on account of their race and carpetbaggers on account of their regional origin – but it had to develop more complicated rhetorical mechanisms to counter scalawags, the South’s native white sons. The scalawag figure, because of its anomalous nature, elicits precisely where conservatives drew the boundaries of their imagined nation. The effort to discredit the scalawag reveals that it is not whiteness itself but rather the commitment to white supremacy that earned one the privilege of legitimacy in the Southern political system.¹²

In this investigation, I use the state of Virginia as a case

study for Southern nationhood for both practical and historical reasons. To thoroughly analyze a body of literature that embodies the entire South is beyond the scope of this paper. As such, the applicability of my conclusions is unfortunately limited. Yet in important ways, Virginia represents the South generally in its experience and memory of Reconstruction, Redemption, and Civil Rights. Although the South is hardly monolithic, Virginia always saw itself as a foremost member of the Southern “nation,” with all the mythic white-supremacist grandeur that term implies.¹³

Although I discuss the use of *scalawag* in a variety of primary sources, textbooks lie at the heart of my analysis. School textbooks present a distilled, orthodox, officially prescribed version of national history. Textbooks are designed to appeal to masses of children and present a basic knowledge of national citizenship. (In other words: “If a citizen knows nothing else, they should know *this*.”) Additionally, textbooks are state-sanctioned; if not directly written by the state, then at least bureaucratically approved. There is no such thing as an “alternative” or “underground” textbook. Textbooks present an aura of infallibility, especially to their young readers. For these reasons, textbooks as a medium are perhaps the quintessential manifestation of Andersonian nationhood. The bias of American history textbooks has been a popular subject of recent study, most notably in James Loewen’s *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong*. Virginia’s sordid history of racist textbooks has also garnered attention.¹⁴ In recent years, history textbooks continue to stir national controversy, and greater segments of the public contest these texts. In particular, the American right wing has heightened its calls for “patriotic education” and “pro-America curriculum,” largely in response to race-conscious curricula like the New York Times’ *1619 Project*.¹⁵

“THE PROPAGANDA OF HISTORY”: DU BOIS AND THE RECONSTRUCTION PARABLE

W.E.B. Du Bois provided one of the earliest, most thorough critiques of Reconstruction textbook bias in 1935. To Du Bois, over the prior half-century editors had created “The Propaganda of History”: a reductive, racist version of the Reconstruction Era that minimized slavery, presented the North as “magnanimous liberators,” and reduced the agency

7 This paper studies the form and rhetoric of mid-twentieth century reaction. I use the admittedly vague and loaded term “reactionary” to describe works whose primary emphasis serves to discredit, distract from, or counter modern social, political, and economic progress and build consensus in support of the status quo. Reaction builds not only its own character but its own world; it is a perennial force which actors across the American political world frequently wield and appeal to, with sweeping political and social consequences. For clarity and fairness, I prefer to discuss *reaction* as a political-rhetorical concept. The adjective “reactionary” must be cautiously applied to texts and rarely, if ever, applied to authors.

8 Foner, *Reconstruction*, 294.

9 James Alex Baggett, “Introduction: In Search of the Scalawags,” in *The Scalawags: Southern Dissenters in the Civil War and Reconstruction*, 2.

10 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised edition (London New York: Verso, 2016), 5-7. The nation is “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”; it is *political* in the sense that nations seek to be represented by a “sovereign state”; and it is “imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived of as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”

11 Anderson, “Patriotism and Racism,” in *Imagined Communities*, 141-153, 205. Nations summon identity from memory: the “[a]wareness of being embedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, ‘forgetting’ the experience of continuity ... engenders the need for a narrative of ‘identity.’”

12 As an inherently political concept, the “nation” can also be interpreted as the imagined community of legitimate political actors. Full and genuine nationhood is *citizenship*: entitlement to complete political rights and to the resources and protection of the state. To deprive one of citizenship is to deny them fair and equal access to the political process and their stake in the sovereign state.

13 Bailey, 237-245.

14 Carol Sheriff, “Virginia’s Embattled Textbooks: Lessons (Learned and Not) from the Centennial Era,” *Civil War History* 58, no. 1 (2012): 37-74, <https://doi.org/10.1353/cwh.2012.0030>; Adam Wesley Dean, “Who Controls the Past Controls the Future: The Virginia History Textbook Controversy,” *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 117, no. 4 (2009): 319-56.

15 Alana Wise, “Trump Announces ‘Patriotic Education’ Commission, A Largely Political Move,” *NPR*, September 17, 2020.

of freedmen. According to Du Bois, the Dunning fiction presented “all Negroes” as “ignorant,” “lazy, dishonest, and extravagant,” and “responsible for bad government during Reconstruction,” which Du Bois chalks up to the writers’ inability “to conceive Negroes as men.”¹⁶ In his analysis, Du Bois naturally prioritizes how writers diminish the political identity of freedmen, but he also denounces writers’ neglect of “poor whites and their relation to the planters and to Negro labor after the war.” The postbellum competition of white and black labor factors heavily into Du Bois’s class analysis of Reconstruction throughout *Black Reconstruction*. He rightly points out that the historiographical neglect of poor whites provides students with a classed heritage, only allowing them the opportunity to identify with slaveholding whites and therefore form conclusions of white supremacy’s universality. “The Propaganda of History” only ever mentions “poor whites,” with no indication that Du Bois intended that term to be conflated with *scalawag*. In other words, Du Bois considers only the class of the non-slaveholding white community, and not the scope of their political action.

THE VIRGINIA TEXTBOOK COMMISSION

In the 1950s, Virginia’s Byrd organization – the state Democratic party machine led by Harry F. Byrd – commissioned a new set of textbooks designed to monopolize pedagogy behind its segregationist, conservative principles. Adam Wesley Dean writes that the “General Assembly first authorized the publication of new history textbooks in response to President Harry Truman’s civil rights program and stayed involved in the process until their distribution in 1957 at the beginning of the Massive Resistance. Although the textbook created by the legislators avoided outright references to the present, civil rights activists saw them for what they were—attempts by segregationists to promote the history that supported their racial ideas.”¹⁷ The Virginia History and Government Textbook Commission, after six years of work, produced three texts ahead of the 1957 school year: *Virginia’s History and Geography* for fourth grade, *Virginia: History, Government, Geography* for seventh, and *Cavalier Commonwealth* for eleventh. Prior to this, schools selected history textbooks at the local level; legislative-led standardization of textbook materials was unprecedented in the state’s history.¹⁸ Black Virginians and civil rights activists roundly criticized the books from the start. In 1972, the Linwood Holton administration (Virginia’s first Republican governor after a long line of Democrats) pulled the books, but they reportedly remained in use in some districts into the late 1970s.¹⁹

The Commission textbooks, like others from the

mid-twentieth century, placed freedmen precisely within the stereotypes that Du Bois decried decades earlier. *Cavalier Commonwealth* reported that “[s]ome of Virginia’s most acute problems were created by emancipation,”²⁰ while *Virginia: History, Government, Geography* wrote freedmen “were confused by the freedom thrust upon them.”²¹ These texts politically and intellectually infantilized freedmen, taking every opportunity to depict them as vagrants and idlers, and to allege their ignorance and susceptibility to white Republicans’ manipulation. These mid-century textbooks not only essentialize and diminish Black political action, but also seek to mold students’ attitudes against progressive social action. If students are meant to scoff at the “general strike by Virginia Negroes” in 1865, they are meant to do the same with the civil rights movement a century later. If they accept that the Freedmen’s Bureau failed when it “realized it could not play Santa Claus forever,”²² so too were the New Deal and Great Society doomed to fail.

As political tools (“Propaganda,” as Du Bois called them) these textbooks set out to discredit Republican ideology and policy during Reconstruction in service of the Lost Cause. In a stunning reminder of the political, subjective nature of textbook composition, the Commission fired Marvin Schlegel, an original author of *Cavalier Commonwealth*, when he failed to accept the “Virginia spirit.” As the Commission explained, “if he had consulted the Dunings’ [sic] School in the matter of reconstruction, his book would probably have been more acceptable to the group.”²³ Lacking “Virginia spirit,” meaning the values of the segregationist conservative Textbook Commission, provided sufficient grounds for removal from the project. Thus the Commission purged itself of threatening ideological variance.

THE SCALAWAG ANOMALY

Within a Lost Cause narrative which imagined a monolithic white nation set on redeeming the South, scalawags presented an inconvenient liability. Indeed, the scalawag figure remains distinctly slippery, especially when contrasted to freedmen or carpetbaggers. The authors’ efforts to repudiate Black Republicans proved relatively simple: the authors remained fully conscious of the racial world that their narratives operated within, and the time-honored stereotypes that effectively belittled Black people and Black political action. For white Republicans, the authors needed to formulate a different political-rhetorical strategy. In the “morality play”²⁴ of Reconstruction, the carpetbagger takes a prime role as an invader, aggressor, and dominator. Where the freedman is only politically inept, the carpetbagger is hyper-effective and

16 Du Bois, “The Propaganda of History,” in *Black Reconstruction*, 582-591.

17 Dean, “Who Controls the Past Controls the Future,” 320.

18 Sheriff, “Virginia’s Embattled Textbooks,” 45-55.

19 Sheriff, “Virginia’s Embattled Textbooks,” 65-69.

20 William Edwin Hemphill, Marvin Wilson Schlegel, and Sadie Ethel Engelberg, *Cavalier Commonwealth: History and Government of Virginia*, (McGraw-Hill, 1957), 334.

21 Francis Butler Simkins, Spotswood Hunnicutt, and Sidman P. Poole, *Virginia: History, Government, Geography* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957), 455.

22 Hemphill, Schlegel, and Engelberg, *Cavalier Commonwealth*, 344.

23 Sheriff, “Virginia’s Embattled Textbooks,” 62-63, quoting Textbook Commission minutes from February 17, 1954.

24 Sheriff, “Virginia’s Embattled Textbooks,” 45.

ruthless. To serve the Lost Cause, the textbooks embrace the rhetoric of invasion; carpetbaggers are enemy foreign operatives laying waste to the homeland.

Textbook authors needed to get even more crafty when it came to dismissing Southern White Republicans' role in Reconstruction. In his article "Creating 'the Propaganda of History': Southern Editors and the Origins of *Carpetbagger* and *Scalawag*," Ted Tunnell convincingly argues that postbellum Southern editors "quickly discerned *carpetbagger* was a far more effective propaganda tool than *scalawag*," chiefly because *carpetbagger* achieved a "higher clarity of meaning and breadth of appeal" than *scalawag*.²⁵ Scalawags presented something of an anomaly to the Lost Cause version of a "Solid South." Authors tested a variety of strategies in regard to the scalawag as they curated a spot for him in the Reconstruction drama: (1) Authors subsume the scalawag figure into the carpetbagger, lending credit to Tunnell's assertion that *carpetbagger* proved a more effective rhetorical tool than *scalawag*. This strategy essentially casts the scalawag as a worse version of the carpetbagger. (2) Authors present scalawags as purely cynical and opportunistic. (3) Authors appeal to mere contempt, insulting the conjured image of a scalawag without attempting to explain him. (4) Authors ignore scalawags altogether. This can be seen in the Reconstruction chapter of a 1936 American history textbook:

Immediately after the passage of the reconstruction acts, Northern adventurers, seeing the opportunity of securing for themselves the higher offices in the reconstructed state governments through the control of the negro voters, began their invasion of the South. They were called "carpetbaggers" because they were said to have brought all of their possessions with them in carpetbags but many of them returned years later loaded with the wealth they had extorted from their enemies. Even more despised by the white people in the South were the "scalawags," Southerners who joined the "carpetbaggers," either in the hope of sharing in the booty or else in the belief that it was the best way to protect their people against misgovernment.²⁶

The passage exhibits unselfconscious ideological ambiguity in its treatment of scalawags. A student may leave this section with no clear takeaway on scalawags' identity. Although one hardly expects textbooks as a genre to meet the highest standards of argumentation, this author makes scant attempts to substantiate his claims, lending a fanciful quality to the work. This is a performance rather than an argument, and it is designed to operate at face value.

Chiefly, the text denies scalawags any sense of unique

political heritage: they opportunistically "joined the 'carpetbaggers,'" an enemy invasion force. The text also mentions that while many carpetbaggers held upper offices, most "of the lower offices were held by negroes and 'scalawags,'" thereby presenting carpetbaggers as the masterminds of Republican organization effectively exercising advantage over the other two elements of the Republican coalition.²⁷ In order to effectively display the Republican administration of the South as a foreign invasion, writers associated it with carpetbaggers, the only subgroup of the Republican coalition that can truly be seen as outsiders.

Scalawags are particularly "despised by white people in the South" because scalawags have the highest capacity for betrayal. If nineteenth-century "white people in the South" particularly despised scalawags, then the twentieth-century audience of white people in the South should also particularly despise scalawags. The reader is not supposed to grasp the contradiction that scalawags *are themselves white people in the South*. In this reading, "white people in the South" excludes those who supported Reconstruction. In this one phrase, the author produces a subtle, implicit formulation of Andersonian nationhood: an "imagined political community" limited by not only race, but adherence to the race line.²⁸ The author supposes that the reader will seamlessly identify with the non-scalawag white people of the South, thereby inducting themselves into the Southern nation.

In the suggestion that scalawags may believe that joining the carpetbaggers "was the best way to protect their people against misgovernment," the author attributes more sympathy and political agency to the scalawags than to freedmen or carpetbaggers. Scalawags inhabit an odd in-between state in terms of Southern nationhood. Scalawags belong to "their people," clearly meaning white people of the South, yet earlier in that very sentence the reader learns that white people of the South despised scalawags. Although scalawags joined the enemy, supposedly some of them may have done it for the right reasons. (*If you can't beat 'em, join 'em.*) As partial-members of the Southern community, the literature occasionally privileges scalawags relative to freedmen or carpetbaggers.

THE UNION LEAGUE

Textbooks view Union Leagues, Republican-affiliated Unionist organizations, with a conspiratorial eye. According to Foner, in the years after the Civil War, Union Leagues served as one of the freedmen's main modes of political organization in the South by prioritizing political education, assisting Republicans' electoral efforts, and furthering "freedmen's economic interests." The Leagues also appealed to "Unionist whites in the Southern hill country." While some chapters remained segregated, Foner argues that others

25 Ted Tunnell, "Creating 'The Propaganda of History': Southern Editors and the Origins of 'Carpetbagger and Scalawag,'" *The Journal of Southern History* 72, no. 4 (2006): 789–822, <https://doi.org/10.2307/27649233>, 789, 803.

26 Fremont P. Wirth, *The Development of America* (American Book Company, 1936), 413.

27 Wirth, *The Development of America*, 414.

28 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Introduction.

“achieved a remarkable degree of interracial harmony.”²⁹ Textbook editors in the mid-twentieth century, however, largely perpetuated Democrats’ paranoia toward the Leagues. The 1957 textbook *Virginia: History Government Geography*, one of the Virginia Textbook Commission’s creations, wrote that the Union League “was a secret society” that manipulated naive freedmen into voting Republican and “encourag[ed] them to feel bitter toward the white people.”³⁰ In the chapter, the Union League merely accompanies the Freedmen’s Bureau, which the author not only gives a larger role in the federal administration of the state, but also treats as a manifestation of carpetbag overreach into “local affairs,” perpetuating the narrative of Northern invasion. The author treats the Union Leagues’ membership with far less clarity than the Freedmen’s Bureau. Behind the Bureau, there’s an unwise, meddling Northerner; behind the League, there’s no Southern counterpart, no treacherous scalawag. Who exactly are the Union League operatives? De-personalizing Union League membership deprives the audience – twentieth-century Virginia schoolchildren – of any knowledge of white Southerners’ organized opposition to white supremacy. The text is a product of the Byrd Machine. By discrediting interracial political action toward Black citizenship and defending Democratic hegemony in the Reconstruction era, the text does the same nine decades later. It suits Byrd’s interests to engender fears in Virginia’s youth of activist-inspired racial bitterness, federal civil rights overreach, and Republican manipulation.

“THE PROBLEM OF WEST VIRGINIA”

In the textbook literature, West Virginia essentially acts as the geographical avatar of scalawagism. Virginia textbooks present West Virginia’s creation as illegitimate and an economic loss to the state of Virginia. *Virginia: History, Government, Geography* complains that the “Constitution of the United States says very plainly that a state cannot be divided without its consent. Virginia had never consented to the creation of West Virginia. The United States government, however, refused to listen to Virginia’s arguments when she protested against the recognition of West Virginia as a separate state.”³¹ The memory of West Virginia’s creation, displaying puzzling longevity, remained a thorn in the side of Virginia textbook writers nearly a century after the split. After all, West Virginia is seen as the political-geographical manifestation of Unionist dissent, a mutant outgrowth of Virginia’s long-planter domination and the brainchild of Francis Pierpont, the archetypal Virginia scalawag. The supposed illegitimacy of West Virginia’s creation implies Virginia’s historical claim to its antebellum boundaries. The text makes a typical states’ rights appeal, pitting the state of Virginia against the federal government, but the treatment of West Virginia displays a contradiction to

this states’ rights ideology: devolution is only deemed a legitimate political tool when used in service of white supremacy. Although West Virginia was hardly a bastion of progressivism in the Civil Rights era, it continued to represent an alternative political model to Virginia into the 1950s, possibly explaining the authors’ decision to make such a point of West Virginia’s supposedly illegitimate founding. For instance, following the *Brown vs. Board of Education* ruling in 1954, West Virginia’s governor William C. Marland “pledged to obey the Supreme Court edict and foresaw no serious difficulty in integrating West Virginia schools.”³² Despite predictable local opposition, the desegregation experience in West Virginia proved far more expeditious than its eastern neighbor.

WOODROW WILSON, TRUE SON OF VIRGINIA

In the textbook literature, President Woodrow Wilson acts as a foil to scalawags in terms of Southern nation-building. Despite distant ties to the state of Virginia, textbooks celebrate Wilson’s imagined Virginian identity, a privilege he earns by his longstanding commitment to segregation. Wilson’s treatment illuminates that segregationist editors’ mental rule for determining Southern nationhood is not based on heritage but rather on racial politics. Virginia textbook writers express clear resistance to scalawags’ inclusion in the imagined Virginian nation, which they do not apply to Wilson, a

Virginian in habits and thoughts. He said that he could speak out among Virginians because they were men of his “own race and breeding.” Nowhere else, he believed, have the American traditions and ideals been kept so unbroken as they have been in Virginia.³³

Wilson was born in Staunton, Virginia in 1856, his father an Ohio native, and his mother a British immigrant, but the family moved out of the state in Wilson’s infancy. Wilson returned to attend the University of Virginia School of Law, but dropped out in his second year. One of Virginia’s so-called “greatest statesmen,” he never held political office in Virginia and built his academic and political career entirely outside of the state. Prior to his presidential run, Wilson served as governor of New Jersey.³⁴ Despite his dubiously Southern background, Wilson’s longstanding commitment to white supremacy as a Democratic Party leader seems to earn him Virginia credentials to the authors of *Virginia: History, Government, Geography*. The “habits and thoughts,” “traditions and ideals,” of Virginia are nothing more than obvious dogwhistles for white supremacy. “Race and breeding” shrouds the dogwhistle even less.

Wilson’s enthusiastic inclusion in Virginian (and Southern) nationhood stands in stark contrast to Virginia’s

29 Foner, 283-285.

30 Simkins, Hunnicutt, and Poole, *Virginia: History, Government, Geography*, 450.

31 Simkins, Hunnicutt, and Poole, *Virginia: History, Government, Geography*, 450.

32 Sam F. Stack, “Implementing ‘Brown v. Board of Education’ in West Virginia: The ‘Southern School News’ Reports,” *West Virginia History* 2, no. 1 (2008), 60.

33 Simkins, Hunnicutt, and Poole, *Virginia: History, Government, Geography*, 511.

34 John Milton Cooper, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 13-139.

scalawags, in many cases men with far deeper familial, professional, political, and economic ties to the state. Adherence to the racial status quo privileged Wilson in the historical memory.

SCALAWAGS IN DISCOURSE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA

As the Civil Rights Movement mounted a formidable challenge in the 1950s and 60s, segregationist politicians continued to utilize the rhetorical currency of *scalawag* against their rivals, continuing the tradition from their Democratic forebears a century earlier. However, the segregationists used the term increasingly vaguely, and *scalawag* lost much of its specific historical meaning.

In the first campaign speech of his 1962 gubernatorial run, George Wallace called Judge Frank M. Johnson, one of the most powerful anti-segregation figures in Alabama, an “integrating, scalawagging, carpetbagging, bald-faced liar.”³⁵ In the preceding years on the federal bench, Johnson had not only ruled in favor of civil rights in some of Alabama’s most famous cases, such as those deeming segregation unconstitutional in buses and bus depots, but also personally directed criminal contempt proceedings against Wallace. By insulting Johnson, “Wallace made the federal judiciary in general and Frank Johnson in particular the central target in a campaign in which he demonstrated for the first time his unsurpassed capacity to stoke the anger of working-class whites,” as Johnson’s biographer put it.³⁶ The historical meaning matters less than Wallace’s intended effect: to unify his base around the disparagement of Johnson. Wallace’s words are interchangeable and semantically uniform to each other; he could have called Johnson an “integrating, scalawagging, carpetbagging son of a bitch” to much the same effect. In a literal and historical sense, the meanings of *scalawagging* and *carpetbagging* should be mutually exclusive. Additionally, Wallace’s conflation of the two terms represents the continued association between the two, the reduction of two separate political identities into one. Wallace’s choice of words indicates that the Reconstruction terms *carpetbagger* and *scalawag* still hold rhetorical weight as insults in Alabama during this time. In a grammatically creative twist, Wallace produces the participial *scalawagging/carpetbagging*, which implies a verb *to scalawag/carpetbag*. This effectively turns Johnson, the target of the insult, from an object into a subject. If the federal anti-segregationists are indeed subjects (scheming, politically ruthless), then the “Solid South” may fulfill the Lost Cause trope and play the victim.

By the same token, Lyndon B. Johnson’s detractors imagined him, a Texan and a Civil Rights supporter, as a highly dangerous scalawag. In a December 1963 *National Review*

editorial, James Jackson Kilpatrick of the *Richmond News-Leader* worried about conservative Barry Goldwater’s chances in the upcoming 1964 election. In Kilpatrick’s estimation, Johnson, the presumed Democratic nominee after Kennedy’s assassination, faced better electoral chances in the South than Kennedy due to his greater relatability to Southerners.³⁷ That Johnson’s ruse might appeal to Southerners in light of his progressive Senate career seemed particularly worrisome to this conservative writer in this conservative rag. While “Southerners might have overlooked their brother Lyndon’s votes in 1958 against the bill of rights for labor” and “they might have forgiven his votes for Hell’s Canyon Dam, the Youth Conservation Corps, and for continued high levels of foreign aid,” they could not stand that in the Senate Johnson killed the states-rights bill of “Virginia’s venerable” arch-segregationist Howard Worth Smith, nor his support of civil rights bills of 1957 and 1960. Johnson’s legislative record led Kilpatrick to portend “[t]o a South that scarcely can abide the carpetbagger, the native scalawag is worse. This is the most unkindest [sic] cut.”³⁸ Brother Lyndon, imposing federal power on the South, has betrayed his Southern family, and Kilpatrick openly admits that he finds most objectionable Johnson’s failure to adhere to the Southern racial status quo. Fearful of Goldwater’s defeat in this important election, Kilpatrick deems Johnson a genuine threat to the GOP’s chances. (Johnson’s landslide victory validates his worry; Goldwater carried only six states, five of which lay in the Deep South.) Kilpatrick could have provided the same account of Johnson’s record and left it there; he employs *scalawag* to ensure that he and his Southern audience are on the same page in regard to Johnson. The use of *scalawag* in one of the most popular national conservative periodicals speaks to the continued viability of the term to attack Southern whites who opposed segregation. On the other side, Carl Degler, a historian whose scholarly record reflects a clear sympathy for labor and minority rights, dedicated his 1974 book on *The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century*.³⁹ Although Fitzgerald and Degler professed opposing political views, they both understand Johnson as a continuation of the nineteenth-century scalawag and a subversive figure in Southern politics.

Segregationist writers in the *Farmville Herald* dramatized their desegregation experience by resuscitating memories of Reconstruction overreach. As Prince Edward County reeled from *Brown I* and *II*, completely shutting down its public school system between 1959 and 1964 in its own drastic Massive Resistance efforts, *scalawag* and *carpetbagger* appeared in the *Herald*’s editorial columns. For instance, Charles R. Brown, re-

35 Jack Bass, *Taming the Storm: The Life and Times of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., and the South’s Fight over Civil Rights*, Doubleday, 1993, 194. For more detail on Wallace and Johnson’s longtime feud, see “The Break with Little George.”

36 Bass, 193.

37 James Jackson Kilpatrick, “The South Goes Back Up for Grabs,” *National Review*, December 17, 1963, 523-524, 527. “The President and his Ladybird are not young, super-rich, handsome, and Yankee. They are middle-aged, well-to-do, a little bit ordinary, and they come from Texas. This President does not go around quoting Shakespeare and such; he is a teller of tall stories; he can get off some real knee-slappers. Mr. Johnson is not known to have read a whole book, all the way through, in the past 20 years. When he reads, he does not read the *New Yorker*, *Harper’s*, or even *National Review*: he is said to read the *Beagle Journal*. You would be amazed at the circulation of the *Beagle Journal* in the Southern States. Mr. Johnson cannot be ranked among the patrons of the arts; it is generally believed that his musical tastes tend to peak at ‘Home on the Range.’” p. 524.

38 Kilpatrick, 523.

39 Carl N. Degler, *The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century*, 1st edition (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), vii.

tired history professor and former dean of Roanoke College, curiously posited in a February 1960 editorial: “[t]he Negro people have been subjected to exploitation by prejudiced and narrow-minded leaders ever since Mr. Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation and much of it has come from people who profess much but give little. No, all the carpetbaggers and scalawags are not dead; they continue to exist and disturb.”⁴⁰ In this twisted interpretation, the true threats to Black potential are those manipulative, disingenuous leaders who claim to help them. The main thrust of the editorial argues for segregation, imploring the Black community to pull itself up by its own bootstraps, and criticizes the disturbing, ugly, ill-advised methods Civil Rights leaders employ. Brown can imagine neither Black political agency nor white folks’ reasons for opposing segregation, which is why Civil Rights must be explained as modern “carpetbaggers and scalawags” manipulating the illiterate Black. Brown signifies to his modern audience that any sympathy towards the Civil Rights struggle acts against Black folks’ best interest; nothing less than a return to slavery would satisfy this argument’s logical conclusion. In November 1954, the *Herald* quotes an address of Francis Simkins, co-author of the Textbook Commission’s seventh-grade text, critiquing anti-South historiographical bias, in which he claimed the “true tragedy of the South was ‘not the defeat at Appomattox’ but the yielding of ‘both scalawag and Bourbon, both materialist and idealist, to alien values,’ meaning secularism, political democracy, unionist nationalism, urbanism, anti-monopolism, and racial equality.”⁴¹ In the wake of *Brown v. Board*, Southern conservatives such as Simkins imagined the federal government imposing these Yankee values on the helpless South. Yielding to alien values makes those Southerners betrayers of their homeland, or at least partially alien. Simkins deems Bourbons (conservative Democrats) also susceptible to subversion, thereby becoming scalawag.

While segregationists used *scalawag* freely to castigate their opponents, a corresponding judicial impulse emerged to preserve the aura of neutrality. Consider Justice Willis D. Miller’s instructive footnote to a Virginia Supreme Court opinion:

It is well established that the convention of 1869 was largely composed of non-Virginians and of freedmen. The avoidance of the terms “scalawag” and “carpetbagger” is to be commended.⁴²

In the 1959 case *Harrison v. Day*, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled some of the state’s Massive Resistance policies unconstitutional under Article IX of the state constitution. The

question before the court was whether Article 129, which calls for the establishment and maintenance of “an efficient system of public schools throughout the state,” could be observed after *Brown v. Board of Education* rendered inoperative Article 140, which establishes educational segregation. In his dissent, Justice Miller argues that, unlike the Constitution of 1902, the Constitution of 1868 failed to include a provision on racial segregation because the “public policy of the Commonwealth was in eclipse.” When the 1902 Constitution was adopted containing the segregation provision, “[t]he eclipse had passed. The native public policy had supplanted the alien. This accounts for the absence in one Constitution of the requirement of racial separation and its presence in the other.” Like his Byrd allies, Justice Miller disparaged Virginia’s Reconstruction constitution in order to defend and maintain segregation. His legal case stands on the assertion that Virginia’s Reconstruction Constitution cannot be legitimate, but rather is an “alien” imposition. In a stylistic move, Justice Miller avoids *scalawag* and *carpetbagger* altogether, perhaps out of fear that using such base epithets would besmirch the prestige of the state’s highest court. However, he seemingly makes a semantic error: there are no “scalawags” in the group comprised of “non-Virginians and freedmen.” Thus, the segregationist justice quietly combines scalawags with the Republican figures he deems outsiders, subverting the scalawag’s political profile during Reconstruction.

REACTIONARY WORDS, REACTIONARY VIOLENCE

The tradition of reactionary violence in the South since Reconstruction lends credence to the idea that *scalawag* and related epithets are not empty words. During Reconstruction, the Klan and similar organizations – the Knights of the White Camellia, the White Brotherhood – acted as a paramilitary force in service of the Democratic party and white supremacy across the South, employing terrorist methods and attacking Black Republicans as well as white.⁴³ Whiteness did not protect Southerners from reactionary violence. An infamous 1868 political cartoon in the *Tuscaloosa Independent Monitor* showed a carpetbagger and scalawag hanged, a warning of “the fate in store for those great pests of Southern society – the carpet-bagger and scalawag – if found in Dixie’s land” after Democratic presidential candidate Horatio Seymour’s presumed victory.⁴⁴ A Democrat donkey marked with the letters “KKK” provides the threat. A 1931 American history textbook defends the Klan thusly: “Unable to offer open resistance to the Union Leagues because of the presence of United States troops throughout the South, the Southern whites, too, formed secret societies for their own protection,” If Union Leagues and any freedmen or scalawags in-

40 C. R. Brown, “Brown Urges Negroes Create Own Wealth,” *Farmville Herald*, March 8, 1960, p. 4A. Originally published *Roanoke World-News*, February 16, 1960.

41 *Farmville Herald and Farmer-Leader*, “Standards That Judge South Are Questioned By Historian,” November 23, 1954, pp. 1, 6. See p. 1, “Concrete Dogmas.”

42 *Harrison v. Day*, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959)

43 Foner, 425-444; Degler, 249-253. I do not mean to compare the extent or type of violence faced by Black and white people in the South in any way, or suggest that the Klan chose its targets without consideration of race.

44 Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, Jean Blackwell Hutson Research and Reference Division, The New York Public Library Digital Collections. “From the Independent Monitor, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, September 1, 1868: A prospective scene in the City of Oaks, 4th of March, 1869.” <https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47dd-f3e8-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99>. The *Independent Monitor*’s prediction proved incorrect when Seymour lost to Grant in the 1968 presidential election.

volved with them are accepted as an alien invasion, then any white-supremacist violence is only defensive and retaliatory.⁴⁵

Throughout his career, Frank M. Johnson received threats from the Klan. On April 26, 1967, the Klan bombed his mother's home, shortly after his ruling in favor of rapid school desegregation in Alabama. Lurleen Wallace, current Governor and wife of George Wallace, officially condemned the attack.⁴⁶ Although the Democratic apparatus distanced itself from the Klan during the Civil Rights era, the Klan continued to act on the segregationist rhetoric of the Democratic Party. The tradition of using violence against opponents to the white supremacist order continued during the Civil Rights era.

CONCLUSION

Scalawags presented a persistent inconvenience to segregationist historians, a liability to Lost Cause ideology, and a contradiction to the Solid South, all by virtue of their support of federal Reconstruction and disloyalty to white supremacy, thereby disavowing the fundamental criteria of Southern nationhood. However, even if *scalawag's* precise meaning remained slippery, the epithet remained a rhetorically useful propaganda tool in Southern political discourse as segregationists used it to sanction political activities they considered threatening to the racial status quo. Segregationists could never convincingly or consistently identify a place for the scalawag because they were never able to truly understand him. The Lost Cause constructs itself upon a monolithic white South defending the legitimacy, universality, and sanctity of white supremacy. Within this monolith, historical class disparities are unimportant, and political disparities are nonexistent.

The legacy of Reconstruction remains ever relevant in the twentieth century, as the South and the nation as a whole navigate the political struggles of the contemporary era. More broadly, as whiteness, constitutive rhetoric, and reaction continue to energize Southern politics after the dusk of outright segregationist politics, it suits Northerners and Southerners alike to bear in mind how segregation's defenders used commonplace propaganda tactics in service of their political agenda.

EPILOGUE: TOWARDS A SCALAWAG IDENTITY?

For its entire lexical lifetime, *scalawag* was a designation applied by a political opponent, not an identity that anyone intentionally assumed. There was no effort to identify with the term, much less "reclaim" it. Real-life "scalawags" of the nineteenth century shared little ideological or biographical

cohesion: a mishmash of opportunists, hill country yeomen, Unionists, antebellum Whigs, and German immigrants whose dedication to racial justice remained dubious and inconsistent.⁴⁷ Eric Foner, in the most authoritative, celebrated, popular modern book on Reconstruction, defines *scalawag* in perhaps the only way possible: "native [white] Southerners who cast their lot with freedmen," a nebulous definition I opted to accept for the purposes of this paper with mild reluctance.⁴⁸ Scalawags "cast their lot with freedmen," not in the sense that they universally supported Black rights, nor in the sense that they necessarily opposed white supremacy, but in the sense that they supported Republicans to varying levels.⁴⁹ In other words, "scalawagism" never existed. During the Civil Rights era, white Southerners who supported Black aspirations engaged in no effort to don the label.

However, in recent decades Southerners have identified with *scalawag* as a progressive, antiracist label. The 2014 autobiography of Richmond civil rights activist Edward H. Peeples bore the term as its title, because, as Nancy Maclean describes in the introduction, Peeples' activism "made him a 'traitor' to his race. A term that once stung, it eventually became a badge of pride. He embraces that identity in his title, taking on the term of abuse which former Confederates used to defame southern whites who cooperated with black voters and officeholders in the Reconstruction era."⁵⁰ By a similar token, the Durham-based alternative magazine *Scalawag* began publishing in 2015, its motto "Reckoning With the South," focusing on prison abolition, queerness, education, and organizing.⁵¹ To face twenty-first-century challenges, Southerners continue to fight for the "other South," and some identify with radical Reconstruction to those ends. Although the term *scalawag* was invented to alienate, it is now claimed in order to empower. Conservatives never found a completely comfortable or salient spot for scalawags in their canon, but modern scalawags are beginning to claim their own sense of historical-political heritage. As we negotiate our relationship with the past, the terms we use, much like the stories, shift meanings to suit the present situation. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot indicated, "[h]istory is always produced in a specific historical context," a process which cannot be understood without a corresponding critique of power and the historical silences it creates.⁵²

In the South – where historically race has been paramount, hierarchies militantly enforced, and reaction often vociferous – the legacy of dissent becomes particularly valuable. In his book *The Other South*, historian Carl Degler argued that the tradition of white Southern dissent "illustrates that the South is not and has never been a monolith."⁵³ While

45 Wirth, *The Development of America*, 415.

46 Bass, 124-127.

47 Baggett, 4-6, 14; Degler, 191-263.

48 Foner, 294.

49 Degler, 196.

50 Edward H. Peeples and Nancy MacLean. *Scalawag: A White Southerner's Journey through Segregation to Human Rights Activism*. University of Virginia Press, 2014. Page XV.

51 Richard Fausset, "In Southern Magazines, Easy Pleasures and Hard Questions," *The New York Times*, September 5, 2017. See also *Bitter Southerner* magazine.

52 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, "The Power in the Story," in *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*, 2nd edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 2015), 22.

53 Degler, 2. To Carl Degler, "the effort of white Southerners to escape or to prevent" the interaction between white and black comprised the "central theme of Southern history."

white Southerners “have had a double history” due to their unique experience of defeat and occupation, Southern white dissenters “might be said to have had a triple history.”⁵⁴ Despite its efforts, the white South never fully monopolized racial backwardness, and some white Southerners remained disloyal to white supremacy. The South’s essence must not be mistaken as a mystique; as Howard Zinn suggested, doing so limits political imagination.⁵⁵ The South is under constant negotiation, especially by those who call it home. 🏠

54 Degler, 5. I wonder if Degler realized the similarity of his idea of “double history” to Du Bois’s “double consciousness.”

55 Zinn, *The Southern Mystique*. Although Zinn was mostly criticizing Northern liberals’ Southern mystique, the Lost Cause also presents a mystique which also limits political imagination. Based on his time at Spelman College in Atlanta between 1956 and 1963, Howard Zinn suggests that the US creates a mystique around the South because non-Southerners prefer to distance themselves from the supposedly backward South, as “[i]t contains, in concentrated and dangerous form, a set of characteristics which mark the country as a whole,” namely racism, provincialism, fundamentalism, and militarism. Zinn sought to disprove the limiting notion central to the Southern mystique that Southern racism and Southern whites are entrenched and irredeemable and different from Americans in other sections of the country.

Infiltrating the Enemy

Police, Military, and Internal Colonialism in the Black Power Movement and Vietnam

With the Vietnam War blazing in the background, the late 1960s saw the exponential surge of the revolutionary Black Power Movement in the United States. Led by groups like the Black Panthers and the Revolutionary Action Movement, this movement both recognized and rose against an increasing tide of police power. While there is no dearth of existing scholarship comparing the Vietnam War and the Black Power movement, this article instead uses the framework of internal colonialism to specifically compare and make an argument about the infiltrative, psychological colonialism both at home and in Vietnam. Using U.S. government documents as well as personal testimonies to the lived experience of colonialism in Vietnam and the U.S., this article ultimately comes to demonstrate how the policing boom was a boomerang effect, resulting from both movements embodying two identical arms of American imperialism. Further conclusions are consequently made on the US police's role as a domestic, colonizing military, what this means about modern policing and military practices, and the applicability of internal colonialism still today.

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INTRODUCTION

In his 1967 “War Crimes Tribunal” article criticizing the Vietnam War and the Russell Tribunal, James Baldwin wrote, “before the Americans decided to liberate the Southeast Asians, they decided to liberate me . . . The assumptions acted on at home are also acted on abroad, and every American Negro knows this, for he, after the American Indian, was the first ‘Viet Cong.’”¹ Here, James Baldwin aptly speaks to the deep connection underlying U.S. resistance in the 1960s – the relationship between the Vietnam War and the domestic war against Black radicalism.

Largely beginning in 1964, predominantly Black urban ghettos began to erupt in social unrest against the police and other forms of structural social injustices – by 1967, these riots had spread to 128 cities.² At the same time, the federal carceral and military infrastructure were expanding. Between 1895 to 1975, and most heavily starting in the 1960s, federal prisoners increased “from 2,500 to 25,000,” state prisoners increased “from 50,000 to 200,000,” “and incarceration rates in local jails more than tripled.”³ This rise was directly linked to changing mechanisms and technology meant to predict, surveil, and target high-crime areas and populations – largely Black Americans.⁴ Similarly, the Pentagon’s

counterinsurgency weapons program, Project Agile, tripled its budget from \$11.2 billion in 1962 to \$30 billion in 1965, in correlation with increasing military expenditures abroad.⁵ Throughout the 1960s, the Defense Department (DoD) gave contracts to multiple military defense think tanks to further develop counterinsurgent tactics and products.⁶ Founded in 1962, the Office of Public Safety (OPS) sent U.S. police and military assistance abroad to fifty two nations throughout the decade in areas of high insurgency risk (primarily South Asia, Africa, and South America) to train local law enforcement in U.S. counterinsurgency tactics.^{7,8} The 1960s also saw increasing domestic police budgets; the police adoption of militarized, riot-control tactics and weapons; and the widespread influence of OPS training.⁹ Simultaneously, the U.S. abroad was embroiled in a war against the Viet Cong for Vietnamese control.¹⁰ As the military and the police began to share training, weapons, and motivations, both at home and abroad, activists also began to notice the same thing that Baldwin did, connecting the U.S. treatment of domestic Black Ghettos to that of international warzones.

These simultaneous conflicts speak to the “boomerang effect,” the widely studied tendency of imperialism in which colonial empires adapt their power structures and colonial

1 Christine Hong. *A Violent Peace: Race, U.S. Militarism, and Cultures of Democratization in Cold War Asia and the Pacific*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2020: 165.

2 Tracy Tullis. “A Vietnam at Home: Policing the Ghettos in the Counterinsurgency Era.” Order No. 9930265, New York University, 1999.

3 Elizabeth Hinton and DeAnza Cook. “The Mass Criminalization of Black Americans: A Historical Overview.” *Annual Review of Criminology* 4 (2021): 273.

4 Hinton and Cook, “The Mass Criminalization of Black Americans,” p. 273.

5 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home,” 32.

6 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home,” 32.

7 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home,” 51.

8 Stuart Schrader. *Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019: 6.

9 Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 172.

10 Martha Hess. “Introduction” in *Then the Americans Came: Voices from Vietnam*. N.p.: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993.

methods of rule abroad to work at home.¹¹ By understanding the methods of colonization in Vietnam and how these methods boomeranged home to the U.S., it becomes clear how the policing of Black radicalism is a method of colonialism adapted from U.S. military actions abroad. Thus, this similarity is a premier example of the issue of internal colonialism – the belief that a state enacts oppressive and exploitative rule against certain groups within the state, leading to an unequal distribution of resources – as it contextualizes internal colonialism with an example of global colonialism that highlights the ways that they are similar to the extent that the colonizers even share the same weapons, training, and commanders. By specifically connecting the Black Power movement to a colonial understanding of the Vietnam War, this paper uses this connection to make an argument for the theory of internal colonialism. As this theory has predominantly been evidenced in examples of imperial methodology and institutional structures within the US, this paper hopes to further this research by instead juxtaposing the infiltrative, psychological, civilian-level manifestations of colonialism and counterinsurgency illuminated by leaked and declassified U.S. military and paramilitary documents, juxtaposing this against the lived experience and trauma of imperial rule, both in urban Black ghettos and in Vietnam.

THE COLD WAR ROOTS OF U.S. COLONIALISM

Following the end of World War II and the U.S.'s clear victory over the Axis powers, the post-WWII military state led to an American culture of permanent, total war. Total war is defined as a state of war that demands economic and military involvement from all civilians, where “everyone appears as a productive factor,” and “any member of an adversary’s population counts as a legitimate target.”¹² In the U.S., this could be seen in the Cold War political and economic policy of military Keynesianism, which claimed that robust U.S. war and defense industries would “[stimulate] universal prosperity, expanded social welfare, and democratization at home” – between 1939 and 1969, U.S. military expenditures increased from 2.6% to 12.6% of the GNP.¹³ Due to this focus on military industries, the consequential technological advancements of the American military led to a newfound global military dominance. For instance, in Asia, the presence of U.S. soldiers in areas still recovering from wartime destruction easily allowed for an American policy of

“domination without annexation,” an authority and policy that would set the stage for American interventions globally throughout the Cold War.¹⁴

In 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) filed a paper entitled, “The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security.”¹⁵ In this paper, the CIA argued that following World War II, an irreparably damaged Europe would no longer be able to retain their colonies, “creating ‘a power vacuum in the Near and Far East.’”¹⁶ However, due to the military successes of Japan, the concept of white supremacy held less currency (especially with global disapproval for the U.S.’s treatment of Black citizens), thus compelling former colonies to ally with each other on shared principles of “the growing economic nationalism of the ‘underdeveloped’ areas and the underlying racial antagonism between white and native peoples.”¹⁷ The paper thus concluded that the U.S., in light of this growing unpopularity in the face of collective anti-colonial solidarity, had to be careful to not be overtly aggressive in aligning former colonies to itself.¹⁸

The U.S., however, ignored the CIA’s recommendations that it not intervene in former colonies by almost immediately joining wars, setting up bases, and intervening in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Guam, Cuba, the Congo, Nicaragua, and Haiti, among others.¹⁹ However, in the years after 1948, the U.S. also began to internationalize their police force (OPS) and employ counterinsurgency tactics such as the CIA Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). These programs were based on the CIA’s previous recommendations, and were started by CIA analyst Robert Komer, one of the analysts in receipt of the 1948 paper.²⁰ Ultimately, the practice of fighting small wars, of sending U.S. “aid” in the form of military and police training, as well as U.S. police forces, created a “discretionary empire.” An empire where the U.S. ruled through distant and decentralized means and relied on local proxies, but still held the power of political, social, and economic enforcement through overseas police, military, and their influence.²¹ This style of discretionary, proxy colonization through regulation and surveillance would soon set the stage for the boomerang of colonization at home.²²

The CIA’s prediction proved right, and in the years following WWII, Europe’s colonies across the world began to win their independence.²³ In an effort to keep these col-

11 Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 43.

12 Paul K. Saint-Armour. “On the Partiality of Total War.” *Critical Inquiry* 40, no. 2 (2014): 420. <https://doi.org/10.1086/674121>.

13 Hong, “Introduction,” in *A Violent Peace*, 6; James Cypher. “Capitalist Planning and Military Expenditures.” *Review of Radical Political Economics* 6, no. 3 (October 1974): 4. <https://doi.org/10.1177/048661347400600301>.

14 Hong, “Introduction,” in *A Violent Peace*.

15 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security,” Declassified 2013. CIA-RDP78-01617A003200020001-3.

16 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires,” p. 11.

17 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires,” p. 2.

18 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires.”

19 Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 31-32.

20 Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 31-32.

21 Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 43-44.

22 Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*.

23 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home,” 14-15.

onies from falling to communist, un-American influence, the U.S. military developed counterinsurgent tactics and tools suggested by the 1948 paper, as well as widespread social propaganda, and other “political strategies for winning popular allegiance in rapidly modernizing societies.”²⁴ Nations in Asia proved the most fruitful in this vein, as their vulnerability following WWII promised easy wins and uncomplicated indoctrination, especially in the face of socialist influence from China and the U.S.S.R. Just five years after WWII, the U.S. joined the Korean War, which allowed the U.S. to construct several bases in Korea and elsewhere in East Asia (creating a 40% increase in U.S. overseas military bases over the course of the war). Doing this enabled the US to establish a permanent Western infrastructure in South Korea that would “promote US strategic and economic interests,” thus creating an American colonial rule through influence and proxy.²⁵ This was just one of the first interventionist examples during the Pax Americana, the post-war peace in Asia thanks to the American military – however, many scholars instead consider this to be the post-war control of Asia due to the widespread, discretionary, American colonial empire.²⁶

This proxy war practice occurred throughout the Pacific Theater during the Cold War, notably in Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s, where throughout the Vietnam War, the American military implemented unprecedented counterinsurgency tactics and forms of modern warfare. The Vietnam War came after the communist League for Vietnamese Independence, also called the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong (VC), formed to fight for independence during their colonization by Japan in World War II.²⁷ By the time France regained the territory in 1945, backed by the anti-communist financing of President Truman, the Viet Minh won their freedom, leading to a temporary partition of the country into North Vietnam as Viet Minh territory, and South Vietnam for France. However, after years of U.S.-appointed dictators, repression of elections, and stationing secret soldiers, the U.S. entered into the war against the Viet Cong in 1964. Despite the dismal outlook of the war, the U.S. remained in combat until 1972, sending around 2.7 million soldiers.²⁸ In 1975, the Viet Minh successfully reunited the country.²⁹

Under the raining of more bombs in Vietnam than

were ever dropped on Europe in World War II, an unknown number of millions of Vietnamese and other Indochinese populations died. During the war, soldiers would enter into villages and make mass arrests of anyone deemed a possible threat, where they would then be tortured in prisons for information.³⁰ Soldiers were also assigned to live in villages in order to win people’s trust. This allowed for the military to control the population on a rural level, while also maintaining constant surveillance of the locals. The military also began instituting civic training programs, where U.S. soldiers would pick villagers with the most potential for leading, and the least likely to have communist sympathies, and train them for public service jobs.³¹ Additionally, the Pentagon launched surveillance programs and psychological studies of the locals in order to create databases for individuals who were the most likely to become insurgent. Likewise, the Pentagon created new weapons intended for counterinsurgent purposes, such as stealth weapons, radio signal tracers, and chemical weapons like tear gas to flush out villagers.^{32,33} Lastly, OPS sent overseas police to insurgent areas of Vietnam, who trained local law enforcement and soldiers in American riot control, counterinsurgency, and policing tactics.³⁴ In effect, Vietnamese citizens often referred to U.S.-backed South Vietnamese forces and government as the “puppet army,” or “puppet government.” Ultimately, the Vietnamese were speaking to what many others were arguing regarding US imperialism in the Cold War – through American aid, forces, and training, the U.S. government was infiltrating foreign, indigenous life and establishing puppet, proxy regimes across East Asia, creating a political, social, and economic colonial empire.³⁵

COLONIALISM AT HOME

On the home front, the idea of internal colonialism was not a new one, especially among Black Americans; since the 19th century and possibly earlier, Black Americans acknowledged and put forth scholarship on the subjugated, colonial status of Black people in the U.S.³⁶ However, the concept only gained widespread prominence in the 1960s and 70s, particularly among Black radicals and other leftists due to its controversial, global nature.³⁷

Specifically, the theory of internal colonization posulates that Black Americans are marginalized and treated

24 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home,” 14-15.

25 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home,” 14-15.

26 Hong, *A Violent Peace*, 3, 8.

27 Hess, “Introduction” in *Then the Americans Came*

28 Hess, “Introduction” in *Then the Americans Came*; “Vietnam: US Department of Veterans Affairs Military Service History Pocketcard.” n.d. Veterans Affairs. Accessed March 30, 2022. <https://www.va.gov/oa/pocketcard/m-vietnam.asp>

29 Hess, “Introduction” in *Then the Americans Came*

30 Hess, “Introduction” in *Then the Americans Came*

31 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home.”

32 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home.”

33 Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 23.

34 Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 74-75.

35 Hess, *Then the Americans Came*.

36 Robert L. Allen. “REASSESSING THE INTERNAL (NEO) COLONIALISM THEORY.” *The Black Scholar* 35, no. 1 (2005): 2.

37 Kevin F. Steinmetz, Brian P. Schaefer, and Howard Henderson. “Wicked Overseers: American Policing and Colonialism.” *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 3, no. 1 (January 2017): 70.

as a colonized group by the imperial force of the U.S. government. This process of colonization is evident through the legal and economic subjugation, aggressive surveillance and repression, and geographic segregation of Black Americans from the white population of the United States.³⁸ By this theory, just as the United States' Cold War imperialist interventions could be seen as colonialism through proxy rule, so too could the aggressive policing, repression, and marginalization of Black America be seen as the actions of a colonial, internal oppressor. By comparing tactics of internal colonialism to colonialism abroad, specifically methods of covert counterintelligence programs from Vietnam to the U.S., internal colonialism becomes an active example of the boomerang effect. This comparison becomes especially critical in demonstrating how the changing methods of post-war, U.S. colonialism (proxies, police, unofficial colonialism) still boomerang and adapt abroad and at home.

Though the idea of internal colonialism is applicable to all areas of Black American history, the theory was mostly popularized amongst academics in the 1960s, due to discussions on the Black Power movement, and how largely white U.S. forces responded to Black radicalism and rioting.³⁹ Specifically, the 1960s saw an unprecedented era of rioting and social unrest, especially among Black Americans in predominantly poor, Black areas, that had been segregated due to the effects of the Federal Housing Administration in the 1940s and 50s.^{40,41} However, only during the increase of nationwide riots from 1964 to 1970, largely known as Ghetto Riots, did the government begin deploying militarized police forces and commissioning investigations into such outbreaks. For in this period, specifically 1964 to 1968, saw an estimated "329 important riots in 257 cities, with 52,629 people being arrested for riot-related offenses, 8,371 injured, and 220 killed—mostly Black civilians."⁴²

Both these protests and the escalation of the Vietnam War grew around the same time of the birth of several communist, radical, armed Black Power groups, such as the most well-known group, the Black Panthers Party (BPP) founded in 1966. Other groups included the more underground and nationalistic Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), founded in 1963, and the conservative, armed Black separatist religious movement, the Nation of Islam (NOI), founded in 1930.⁴³ Hence, the colonial relationship between the U.S. and Black radicals could be seen through the actions, motiva-

tions, and responses of these riots, especially in how the police and government officials responded to populous, leftist, Black Power groups (the Black Panthers boasting 68 chapters across the U.S., along with several international connections at its height) that both agreed with aspects of internal colonialism and advocated for revolutionary change.^{44,45} Though RAM, NOI, BPP, and countless other groups are all critical in understanding internal colonialism, this research will focus largely on sources from the Black Panthers, in an effort to achieve as much specificity as possible within the confines of this paper.

WEAPONRY AND TACTICS AGAINST DOMESTIC RADICALISM

The Viet Cong and Black radicals were similar both in their lack of resources, equipment, and international authority, as well as in their engagement with similar methods of guerilla warfare. These methods included tactics of smaller, lesser trained and equipped local forces that are typical among revolutionary conflicts.⁴⁶ This meant that the US government faced similar styles of fighting across fronts, further pushing them to group Black and Vietnamese covert, infiltrative counterinsurgency tactics together. While the military had long been referring to colonial revolutionaries as guerillas, police, government, and military forces alike began to co-opt this language to refer to Black radicals as "urban guerrillas," thus rationalizing the need to adapt anti-guerilla tactics learned from Vietnam.⁴⁷

Thus, the tactics and weapons deployed in Vietnam, especially through OPS forces, came home, exemplifying the more concrete applications of the widespread boomerang effect on this period. The director of OPS, Byron Engle, recommended to the federal government in 1967 several tactics that he had found effective from his time fighting guerrillas in Asia. Engle advocated for preventing riots through the identification of loyal figures and insurgent ones, moderate chemical warfare for "nonlethal" riot control, and "that local police establish dedicated intelligence units and employ undercover agents and informants to gather and disseminate information on emerging urban threats."⁴⁸ The police thus adopted the tactics of preemptive, counterinsurgency strikes (often done against "suspected" Black radicals through mass arrests, over policing of ghettos, and widespread surveillance), and the usage of weapons like tear gas and signal tracing against riots and radical leaders, weapons that had been

38 Allen, "REASSESSING THE INTERNAL (NEO) COLONIALISM THEORY," 4.

39 Steinmetz, Schaefer, and Henderson. "Wicked Overseers," 70.

40 Hugh Davis Graham. "On Riots and Riot Commissions: Civil Disorders in the 1960s." *The Public Historian* 2, no. 4 (1980): 8.

41 Steinmetz, Schaefer, and Henderson. "Wicked Overseers," 71.

42 Graham, "On Riots and Riot Commissions," 8-12.

43 Nivi Manchanda and Chris Rosedale. "Resisting Racial Militarism: War, Policing, and the Black Panther Party." *Security Dialogue* 52 (2021): 473 - 492 ; John Jones. "A History of the Revolutionary Action Movement." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2019. Page 15 ; Edward E. Curtis. "The Nation of Islam." In *Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements*, pp. 658-672. Brill, 2021.

44 FBI Files on Black Extremist Organizations, "Cointelpro Black Extremist 100-448006, Section 1 [August 1967-April 1968]." Accessed on ProQuest History Vault.

45 Manchanda, Rosedale. "Resisting Racial Militarism," 477.

46 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home"; Aaron M. Young, and David H. Gray. "Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its Application for the Future." *Global Security Studies* 2, no. 4 (2011).

47 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home".

48 William Rosenau, "Our Ghettos, Too, Need a Lansdale: American Counter-insurgency Abroad and at Home in the Vietnam Era," in *The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective*, eds. Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and M.L.R. Smith, Rethinking Political Violence series (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 10 https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137336941_6.

created for Vietnam to combat guerrilla insurgents who were well-hidden in their communities.⁴⁹ For example, during this period, LAPD Inspector Daryl Gates called America's streets "foreign territory," and began to study and implement tactics from Vietnam in his own policing, while also creating a force largely composed of war veterans.⁵⁰ In 1968, Gates created a civil disturbance plan, distributed to police nationwide, that "proposed that urban police departments should adopt a military-style general staff plan, prepare mobile command posts, and recruit special units for anti-sniper patrol and 'unusual occurrences.'" Gates also recommended reading on global insurgency and guerrilla warfare tactics.⁵¹ The director of riot planning for California, William Herrmann, also advocated for an extensive and controversial database of potentially insurgent residents, as he believed the key to stopping riots was segregating cities. Herrmann claimed "activists bent on destroying the system must be separated from the vast bulk of the people in the middle," and requested more efforts from Governor Reagan to win over the people, similar to propaganda tactics in Vietnam.⁵²

As the U.S. boomeranged between their war abroad and their war at home, "the main tenets of counter-revolutionary warfare — the critical role of the police in curbing rebellion, the importance of winning the political loyalties of the population, and thorough intelligence gathering — were all re-imported to American soil in order to combat black militants in the ghettos."⁵³ The legislative and operational arms of this boomerang effect permeated throughout into deep recesses of domestic, civilian society. A federal law passed in 1968 granted more federal funding "for state riot-control projects," such as preemptive surveillance databases.⁵⁴ Increasing budgets also allowed police departments to acquire helicopters and other aerial technology for patrolling and mapping topographic advantages, as well as other advanced military technology like "laser-beam fences, infrared intrusion detectors, spectrum analyzers for detecting audio-surveillance bugs, and voice and heat-wave sensors."⁵⁵ In 1968, the federal government also mandated nationwide, riot-control training for domestic forces that covered "methods of control — such as 'rapid mobilization planning,' communications, and cooperation with the military," and "the sociology of racial disorder, including lessons on 'tension detection,' rumor control, the 'psychology of frustration,' and 'interpersonal communications.'"⁵⁶ Additionally, the military-research firm, the Research Analysis Corp, devel-

oped programs that aimed to predict riots and insurgencies in communities, inspired by the psychological experiments conducted in Vietnamese villages.⁵⁷ Premier military think tank RAND's social science division also began to develop non-military, domestic-policy programs with the goal of social pacification, such as police-community programs. These programs were designed off the similar propaganda initiatives employed in Vietnam, as RAND believed "that those same techniques could help solve the racial crisis in the United States."⁵⁸ In the army intelligence command in Baltimore, the military sent thousands of agents undercover into ghettos and "develop[ed] counterinsurgency information on black communities similar to that collected on Vietnamese guerrilla organizations."⁵⁹

Meanwhile, the military armed local police stations with weapons, equipment, and tactical training. Simultaneously, military think tanks, using observations from Vietnam, studied phases and prevention of domestic unrest, developed non-lethal methods of riot control (such as airborne sedatives and itch-powders, insect-attracting aerosols, and pain-producing drugs, all inspired by weaponry from Vietnam), and pinpointed areas of needed military assistance among police forces (such as providing military equipment that would aid in controlling civilian movement, protecting security forces, and "obtaining and disseminating intelligence").⁶⁰ Ultimately, the structures and innovations constructed in this period directly reflected the level of counterinsurgent control levied against the Vietnamese people by US forces. As the war boomeranged internationally and domestically, Black militants began to take the face of new Viet Cong for domestic, US counterinsurgent operations.

PENTAGON PAPERS, COINTELPRO, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The above mentioned tenets of counter-revolutionary warfare, the role of the police, psychological persuasion, and intelligence, are thus the subject of this paper's analysis and comparison. The year 1971 saw the official publication of the Pentagon Papers in the *New York Times*, a leaked series of documents detailing the corruption, secrecy, and lies of the U.S.'s involvement in Vietnam from the 1940s to 60s, which were later declassified. That same year, a group of activists stole and leaked the COINTELPRO documents, a covert, FBI counterinsurgency operation, which were also later

49 Jordan T. Camp, "The Bombs Explode at Home: Policing, Prisons, and Permanent War." *Social Justice* 44 (2017): 17; Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 23.

50 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 105-117.

51 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 161.

52 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 105-117.

53 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 16.

54 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 105-117.

55 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 146-151.

56 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 156.

57 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 107.

58 Tullis, "A Vietnam at Home," 112-113.

59 Joan M Jensen. 1991. *Army surveillance in America, 1775-1980*. N.p.: Yale University Press.

60 Rosenau, "Our Ghettos, Too," 16-17.

declassified.⁶¹ While there is no shortage of historical scholarship on the comparisons of these two programs, it is those specific tenants of counterintelligence underlying both events that must be highlighted in recognizing the psychological and civilian levels of colonial dissemination.

The Pentagon Papers, officially called the “Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force,” was written by a group of military insiders on the U.S.’s involvement throughout Vietnam.⁶² Thus, the documents frequently allude to illegal, or at least completely secretive acts, that revealed a much greater role that the U.S. had in Vietnam than made known to the public. In an excerpt that specifically refer to counterinsurgency tactics, the authors speak of infiltration of both government and civilian spaces, clandestine deals and operations to maintain power and leverage in the Vietnamese government, as well as tactics of psychological persuasion. For example, the authors repeatedly refer to the U.S.’ undeniable facilitation of the 1963 coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem in order to establish a more favorable and controllable government for U.S. influence. One author confesses that “For the military coup d’etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility. Beginning in August of 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government. In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green light to the generals. We maintained clandestine contact with them throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans and proposed new government.”⁶³ This admission of guilt is mentioned throughout all documents as just one example of “cooperation” between both governments. This largely speaks to policy of proxy control.

However, infiltration did not stop at the government level. Rather, domestic surveillance tendencies are most directly reflected in the local, civilian policies in Vietnam. In the documents, the authors refer to policies such as the Strategic Hamlet Program and follow up strategies that focus on securing and maintaining areas of local control to win the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people.⁶⁴ The Strategic Hamlet Program is described in one document as “sequential phases which, beginning with clearing the insurgents from an area and protecting the rural populace, progressed through the establishment of GVN infrastructure and thence to the provision of services which would lead the peasants to identify with their government. The strategic hamlet program was, in short, an attempt to trans-

late the newly articulated theory of counterinsurgency into operational reality.”⁶⁵ In this policy, U.S. or U.S.-trained Vietnamese soldiers and paramilitary were placed into small communities, an addition to the construction of intelligence programs to root out potential insurgents. Ultimately, it was a system of infiltration that was built on a psychological approach to counterinsurgency, an approach that took proxy control over civilian and rural life.

Not only did the government act on civilian infiltration, but the means through which the insurgents were cleared reflects complex methods of counterinsurgency and intelligence collection. Declassified CIA documents speak to the details of the Phoenix Program, a covert, intelligence-sharing and surveillance program against the Viet Cong.⁶⁶ Documents report operations to infiltrate and interrogate suspected VC locations and agents. One early passage outlines action items to better address problems of VC resisting interrogation or identification, such as to “identify rapidly significant sources wherever they enter the system,” “facilitate the prompt identification and transfer of selected sources to the interrogation facility best equipped to exploit their knowledge fully,” and “ensure that a central record is maintained on a continuing basis of particularly knowledge and cooperative sources who should be readily recoverable for reinterrogation.”⁶⁷ These methods of target identification and interrogation were critically juxtaposed against the policies of proxy rule and infiltration over Vietnamese daily life in general, and thus speak to a blending of military occupation into daily life, a tenet of the imperialist arm. Furthermore, these action items belie much more aggressive and violent practices that ultimately led to accusations by the Vietnamese government of abuses such as “illegal arrests, torture, corruption and abuses of authority.”⁶⁸ A summary of a hearing of the Lower House reports that “several deputies strongly protested instances in which American troops detained suspects during military operations without the presence of Vietnamese authorities (which is illegal) and did not immediately turn them over to local authorities.”⁶⁹ Taking into context the psychological tactics of the Hamlet program and subsequent policies, as well as the violent method of intelligence collection, reflects a deeper policy of wartime social control and influence tantamount to proxy imperialism.

Ultimately, documents such as the Pentagon Papers primarily focus on the utilization of intelligence gained from such practices like the Phoenix program in conducting overtly militaristic campaigns, such as bombing campaigns and military coups. However, the tactics of counterintelligence

61 Christopher M. Collins, “Nixon’s Wars: Secrecy, Watergate, and the CIA,” Masters thesis (Eastern Kentucky University, 2001), p. 27, 43.

62 “Pentagon Papers,” National Archives, accessed January 14, 2024, <https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers>.

63 United States Department of Defense, “Pentagon Papers, Part IV.B.5,” p. VIII, accessed January 14, 2024, <https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers>.

64 United States Department of Defense, “Pentagon Papers, Part IV.B.3,” p. II, accessed January 14, 2024, <https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers>.

65 United States Department of Defense, “Pentagon Papers, Part IV.B.2,” p. I, accessed January 14, 2024, <https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers>.

66 William Rosenau and Austin Long, “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” RAND Corporation, 2009, p. vii.

67 “Latham Action Program July 67,” in *Phoenix Program Documents*, Internet Archive, p. 11, accessed January 14, 2024, <https://archive.org/details/PhoenixProgramDocuments/Phoenix%20Program/6%20Latham%20Action%20Program%20July%2067/page/n19/mode/2up?view=theater>.

68 “Bunker Lower House Phoenix, June 1969,” in *Phoenix Program Documents*, Internet Archive, p. 1, accessed January 14, 2024, <https://archive.org/details/PhoenixProgramDocuments/Phoenix%20Program/10%20Bunker%20Lower%20House%20Phoenix%20Jun%2069/mode/2up?view=theater>.

69 “Bunker Lower House Phoenix, June 1969,” in *Phoenix Program Documents*, p. 3.

buried within these reports can be critically linked to the tactics of counterintelligence wielded at home. Though the public products of imperialism and warfare in the Vietnam War and Black Power movement may look different, the counterintelligence methods at the root of both conflicts, specifically psychological persuasion, infiltration, and violent methods of identification and interrogation, are distinctively similar, as evidenced through the internal documents both written and leaked in the very same years. While much of the highly militarized police response to Black Power was public and construed as basic riot control, a specific, colonial, war-like relationship between the U.S. government and Black radicalism can be seen clearly through COINTELPRO. This was an FBI counterinsurgent surveillance program that illegally targeted, infiltrated, and monitored anyone seen to be a threat to the American way of life, which were mostly Black radicals.⁷⁰

In a selection of COINTELPRO files from 1967 and 1968, the FBI clearly acts on prior, counterinsurgent recommendations from the infiltration of organizations, the dissemination of false information, and the tagging of individuals seen to be high risk. In another letter sent to every US city with major risks of Black radicalism, the FBI outlined the five primary goals of the counterintelligence program:

“1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups ... An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real ‘Mau Mau’ in America ... 2. Prevent the rise of a ‘messiah’ who could unify, and electrify the militant black nationalist movement ... 3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups ... Through counterintelligence, it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence. 4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community ... 5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth.”⁷¹

In this letter, the FBI presents the same suggestions as the 1948 CIA letter for US interventions – despite the domestic versus foreign differences, both the FBI and CIA utilize the same type of colonial, counterinsurgency theory. The FBI even makes a comparison between Black activists and Mau Mau, Kenyan independence rebels who fought and died against British colonial officials in the 1950s.⁷² They were feared and villainized by the British and Americans as an example of the threat of anti-colonial revolution. By using the Mau Mau as an example threat, rather than the various

other protests or civil wars happening at the same time, the FBI directly compares Black inner cities to a colony, Kenya, and the U.S. to the colonizer, Britain. Doing so reflects the CIA letter’s very frank reference to the U.S.’s foreign colonial interests, particularly in alignment with former colonial empires. Even more so, by pointing out the need to prevent anti-colonial uprisings like Mau Mau, the FBI recognized that COINTELPRO’s goal was to retain their colonial subjects. Though the Mau Mau was not an American conflict, the FBI’s usage of it as a comparative threat to U.S. citizens demonstrates how widespread and international the US’s colonial presence was, and thus how widespread the boomerang of internal colonialism became.

Furthermore, FBI files show how police and FBI agents acted on these suggestions in the same way as police and military did on the CIA’s. In a report from agents in Philadelphia, agents reviewed and recommended successful measures they had taken, specifically in following a RAM member returning to the city to hide from police attention. The files detail full-time police surveillance of the house of this member, as well as frequent car stoppages, where occupants of the car were “identified. They then became the target for harassment.”⁷³ Later, police arrested a man handing out RAM literature “as a narcotic user on the basis of alleged needle marks. He was fingerprinted and photographed. He was subsequently released by a magistrate. Any excuse for arrest was promptly implemented by arrest. Any possibility of neutralizing a RAM activist was exercised.” Later, “legal searches of the home of [redacted] and other RAM members produced a volume of literature of such a nature that the District Attorney authorized the arrest of [redacted] and five other RAM members ... Other RAM activists were arrested and released on bail, but were re-arrested several times until they could no longer make bail.” Later in the file, the agents report:

The above action by local police units is cited as an example of an effective disruptive counterintelligence technique. In other cities where close police cooperation exists, it may be possible to suggest similar operations and to supply to police officers interested in such a violence-prone organization not only information concerning it but ideas relative to its vital or weak sections and profitable points of attack.

Finally, the agents clarify that they have identified RAM members in prison that they will question, as well as RAM members, found through the private address book of a redacted name, taken during his arrests, that they have further singled out for questioning.⁷⁴ Not only does this file directly report the deliberate re-arrest of individuals with no evi-

70 Hong, *A Violent Peace*, 9.

71 FBI Files, “Cointelpro Black Extremist 100-448006, Section 1 [August 1967-April 1968],” Accessed on Proquest History Vault, pp. 66-70.

72 Daniel Branch, “THE ENEMY WITHIN: LOYALISTS AND THE WAR AGAINST MAU MAU IN KENYA,” *The Journal of African History* 48, no. 2 (2007): 291-315. doi:10.1017/S0021853707002812.

73 FBI Files, “Cointelpro Black Extremist 100-448006, Section 1 [August 1967-April 1968],” Accessed on Proquest History Vault, pp. 4-7.

74 FBI Files, “Cointelpro Black Extremist,” pp. 4-7.

dence, but does so in language that reflects wartime rhetoric – a counterintelligence operation for the purpose of neutralizing an enemy. In forgoing basic rules of citizenship, such as the principles of lawful arrest, the U.S. directly relates these operations to that of colonial measures abroad.

In another file, the FBI responds to a request from a Boston Branch asking to expose well-known Black Panther Stokely Carmichael's travels in the *Boston Globe*, writing

“The Bureau very much appreciates Boston’s suggestion for counterintelligence activity designated to thwart Stokely Carmichael’s plan to form a united front of civil rights and black nationalist groups. The exposure of Carmichael’s secret machinations might well disrupt his plan. However ... because of the sensitive nature of this program it must be handled most discreetly. If possible, Boston should resubmit this suggestion using another newspaper or other news media source as the vehicle for exposing Carmichael.”⁷⁵

Much of these files also focus on sowing dissent within Black radical groups and discrediting Black radical leaders. In a file for the Cincinnati office, the FBI recommends “analyz[ing] this situation to determine if it might be possible to hamper this unification by causing trouble between [redacted] and Carmichael. This might be done through an anonymous letter to [redacted] alleging that Carmichael was far too friendly with [redacted].”⁷⁶ Another file reads that “it is felt that an effort should be made to enlighten the NOI membership as to how well their leaders live on the hard-earned cash of the followers. If it can be pointed out to the membership that they are being swindled by these men, it would undoubtedly cause the NOI leaders a great deal of concern and might even shake the foundation of the organization.”⁷⁷

While policies of target identification and community manipulation remain similar from Vietnam to the U.S., there are of course obvious differences in the manifestation of imperialism in a publicly declared, foreign war, versus at home, such as the usage of torture or coups. Yet, in following the logic of internal colonialism as a separate nation within the colonial power, the FBI's arrest, targeting, and surveillance of Black leaders does directly act as a proxy for wartime detention, intelligence gathering, and even overthrow. For example, the highly controversial police murder of Fred Hampton, a leader of the Black Panther Party, while he slept in his home in 1969 can be understood in the comparison of the assassination of an increasingly successful revolutionary by a stifling colonial force.⁷⁸ The murder was a part of the FBI goal to bring down the Black Panther Party by height-

ening tensions between the Black Panthers and local gangs, placing an informant, William O’Neal, in the BPP, passing on information to local police, and then conducting a raid where fourteen police shot and killed Hampton, killing and wounding other Panther members as well.⁷⁹ In a correspondence between the Black Panthers’s lawyers regarding the case, the lawyers make clear that the FBI’s illegal surveillance and racially motivated goals are of common knowledge – lawyer G. Flint Taylor mentions that the poor relationship between the Black Panther Party and gangs was “fanned by O’Neal and COINTELPRO” by asserting that the fake telephone truck outside of the murder had actually “belonged to State’s Attorney,” that a memo about the raid claimed it was a “counterintelligence action being effected,” and that the Panther Squad of the Gang Intelligence Unit had planned the raid.⁸⁰ Ultimately, both sides were fully aware of the illegality of the action, but the FBI justified their actions by contextualizing them within an ongoing war with the Black Panthers. This was a preemptive strike against a revolutionary leader, just one found within the U.S. as opposed to abroad.

Those five principles outlined in that letter, actualized in the tactics of random arrests, over-policing, heightened surveillance, propaganda, assassination, and other efforts to crumble the foundations of revolutionary sentiment, were also suggestions made by the CIA, actualized on the battlefield of Vietnam. Just like the militarization against the Viet Cong, COINTELPRO proved a targeted desire to crush Black radicalism from the federal government itself, and thus repositioned the actions of police as not protectors of the people but targeted forces sent to control insurgent populations (much like the military).

THE EXPERIENCE OF AND RESISTANCE TO U.S. COLONIZATION IN VIETNAM AND AT HOME

Ultimately, while these operations and institutional practices demonstrate manifestations of colonial ideology, it is the more general, chauvinistic prejudice that is critical in understanding U.S. postwar colonialism. In 1968, the Pentagon created a “highly classified, civil disturbance plan, which prescribed riot operations for the entire county,” nicknamed the “Garden Plot.”⁸¹ The militarized plan outlined strategies to preempt insurgency by segregating and patrolling cities by race, socioeconomic standing, perceived social unrest and felt injustice, and weapons proliferation. As historian Christine Hong argues “through the lens of counterinsurgency doctrine, so-called high-crime areas were thus interpreted as ‘enemy territory’ where armed combatants could ‘blend into the civilian population ...’ making it difficult for ‘the pursu-

75 FBI Files, “Cointelpro Black Extremist,” 38.

76 FBI Files, “Cointelpro Black Extremist,” 50.

77 FBI Files, “Cointelpro Black Extremist,” 53.

78 Susan Rutberg, “Nothing but a Northern Lynching: The Death of Fred Hampton Revisited,” Publications, Paper 153, (2009).

79 Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Inc. collection, Mo864. “Chicago - Peoples Law Office - Correspondence 1978/1978,” Series 2, Box 1, Folder 4. Dept. of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California; Rutberg, “Nothing but a Northern Lynching.”

80 Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation Inc. “Chicago - Peoples Law Office - Correspondence 1978/1978.”

81 Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home,” 127

ing army to distinguish between the enemy and the civilian population.”⁸² Hong connects this finding to a study from the 1960s, claiming that “as in the war in Vietnam, where an American soldier finds it difficult to distinguish among Vietnamese ... so the white American policeman finds it difficult to distinguish among Negroes, the predominant population in high-crime areas.”⁸³ Ultimately, both in Vietnam and in the ghettos at home, colonialism struck not just in the state enforcement of populations, but in the racialized segregation and demonization of these “unruly” populations at home and ‘enemies’ abroad.”⁸⁴

While newly declassified documents like the Pentagon Papers and COINTELPRO memos reflect the deep similarities between imperialism abroad and at home on the part of the arms of the state, it is the personal reports from both colonized parties that remain more hidden in the historical record. To truly prove the theory of internal colonialism, is it not just the similarities in imperial methodology that must be compared, but the similarities of the perspective of the colonized people in resisting such colonialism and deep, imperialist infiltration. The firsthand perspective of both populations, the urban, Black American and the common Vietnamese citizen, reflects this indiscriminate terror, and also fights back against the U.S. colonial empire in similar ways, further exemplifying the similarities in their colonial role. Black Panther chairman Huey Newton testified to this himself, writing, “Black people desire to determine their own destiny. As a result, they are constantly inflicted with brutality from the occupying army, embodied in the police department. There is a great similarity between the occupying army in Southeast Asia and the occupation of our communities by the racist police. The armies are there not to protect the people of South Vietnam, but to brutalize and oppress them in the interests of imperial powers.”⁸⁵

Voices from Vietnamese citizens also speak to this brutalization by U.S. forces. In a series of interviews in Vietnam in 1990 and 1991, Vietnamese citizens remember being widely arrested, interrogated for information, and indiscriminately rounded up on suspicion of allegiance with the Viet Cong, despite a lack of any evidence.⁸⁶ One man, Mr. Bao, recalls being “arrested four, five times. I spent years in prison,” and another woman, Truong My Hoa, testified that “Thousands of women were imprisoned. Some were suspected V.C., some were real fighters, many were just ordinary people who were arrested and jailed for no reason.

There were prisons all over the South.”⁸⁷ Survivors also remembered the community resistance – a woman named Nguyen Thanh Mai said that “we did everything we could to liberate the South ... if a bridge was destroyed, the families who lived near the bridge would take everything from their house – beams and everything, to patch the bridge, for the army to pass ... We were all ready to give.”⁸⁸ Another, Cau Ngoc Xuan, concurred that “Everyone helped.”⁸⁹ Many of their stories also center around rage for American atrocities – one man said that “The Americans came to Vietnam to conduct a war, and to kill Vietnamese people. That means they were the aggressors ... To this day we think of the Americans as the enemy,” while another, Mr. Chu, agreed that “The Americans had all kinds of chemical weapons. They just wanted to kill.”⁹⁰

In the U.S., stances like Newton’s regarding internal colonialism were also widely shared. In 1965, Eldridge Cleaver wrote “blacks in Watts and all over America could now see the Viet Cong’s point: both were on the receiving end of what the armed forces were dishing out.”⁹¹ In 1967, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. famously wrote “the bombs in Vietnam explode at home.”⁹² In 1966, in “A Report from Occupied Territory,” James Baldwin wrote “the citizens of Harlem who, as we have seen, can come to grief at any hour in the streets, and who are not safe at their windows, are forbidden the very air. They are safe only in their houses—or were, until the city passed the No Knock, Stop and Frisk laws, which permit a policeman to enter one’s home without knocking and to stop anyone on the streets, at will, at any hour, and search him... Occupied territory is occupied territory...”⁹³

In actions, groups like the Black Panthers fought back in similar ways as a communal army such as Vietnam, organizing self-defense police patrols, arming themselves and their community, and providing community programs such as free meals, transportation, healthcare, and medical and legal services in an effort to survive occupation as a community.⁹⁴ Tension also broke within Black radical groups regarding the timing of revolution – in a briefing following the defection of Eldridge Cleaver from the Black Panthers, Huey Newton defended the ten-point plan of the Panthers that advocates for a more gradual revolution, claiming “Many times people say that our Ten Point Program is reformist; but they ignore the fact that revolution is a process,” as opposed to groups like RAM, who believed in more extreme and underground

82 Hong, *A Violent Peace*, 7.

83 Hong, *A Violent Peace*, 7.

84 Hong, *A Violent Peace*, 9.

85 Manchanda, Rossdale. “Resisting Racial Militarism,” 475.

86 Hess, *Then the Americans Came*.

87 Hess, *Then the Americans Came*, 161, 84.

88 Hess, *Then the Americans Came*, 29.

89 Hess, *Then the Americans Came*, 42.

90 Hess, *Then the Americans Came*, 56, 78.

91 Manchanda, Rossdale. “Resisting Racial Militarism,” 475.

92 Camp. “The Bombs Explode at Home,” 11.

93 James Baldwin. 1966. “A Report from Occupied Territory.” *The Nation*. <https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/report-occupied-territory/>.

94 Manchanda, Rossdale. “Resisting Racial Militarism,” 481-82.

methods of revolution.⁹⁵ However, despite this opposition, RAM still defended the community along similar lines as the Black Panther Party, organizing programs like their summer Liberation School, which provided Black youth with better education, and Soul Sisters, which promoted the well-being and education of Black women, as well as teaching them self-defense.⁹⁶ Ultimately, despite the factions regarding the nature of revolution, the experience of colonization was still felt similarly across Black radical groups, as can be seen by their methods of community defense and organization.

Black Panther newspapers also display the warlike animosity of Black radicals towards the government and police. A Black Panther newspaper from 1968, largely centered around the trial of Huey Newton, features a large cartoon of Black radicals killing a police officer, drawn like a pig, as a threat if Huey Newton is not freed. Another cartoon features a similar portrayal of three police officers as pigs, while the language throughout the paper refers to police and other officers of the government as pigs. These images are grim and provocative, and certainly were not meant to appease white nerves – ultimately, the images present the Black Panthers as an army firmly against the U.S. government, not just as a domestic protest group.

Headlines center on tensions with police, such as “Government Grants \$8,750,000 to Kill Blacks,” and “Pigs Plotted Murders of LA Panthers,” while articles celebratory declare the organization as “hope-to-die political revolutionaries. BLACK REVOLUTIONARIES!,” or argue “Among us we have 120,000 Black guerilla warfare fighters ... we must not sit back and allow the best of our people to be murdered or to wait until a member of our own family is the victim. We must waste no time: unite and resist.”⁹⁷ Altogether, this newspaper demonstrates how many Black people were mobilized towards armed self-defense, with increasingly warlike language, against the white United States police state. Even more specifically, in his publication *The Crusader*, RAM International Chairman Robert Williams published several outlines for guerilla warfare, such as “USA: The Potential of a Minority Revolution,” in which Williams suggests explicit, region-specific tactics, targets, weapons, and timelines for guerilla units (strategies that would be adopted by RAM) to argue that “Yes, a minority revolution could succeed in racist America. ... It could triumph because the Afro-American struggle is part and parcel of the universal liberation struggle.”⁹⁸ These quotes and testaments from Black revolutionaries towards the government, in context with the responses of Vietnamese citizens, reflect a

similarity in the felt experience of such colonial conflicts as a colonized population. However, the community actions and bold statements also prove a shared spirit of resistance, thus centering these conflicts as ones of revolution rather than just domination.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, over the course of the Cold War, the reactions of the U.S. government towards domestic Black radicalism and the Viet Cong did not just follow or influence each other but were simultaneously modeled and militarized in tandem with each other, all under the context of matching CIA and FBI colonialism policies. Here, the boomerang effect is not found in their mere adoption of certain foreign, colonial policies to domestic U.S. governance, but rather the domestic adoption of colonialism itself. Even if U.S. colonial rule might not be done through traditional governmental means, its discretionary, proxy empire can still be found in the domestic boomerang, as American cities have begun to be controlled in the same infiltrative way as foreign territories. Specifically, the boomerang effect can be found in the proxies themselves – the military and the police. Ultimately, the police and the military are not just two separate bodies with a transfer of tactics. Rather, their similarities run much deeper, in both of their purposes, at least since the end of World War II and the 1948 CIA report, to be proxy governments. One, a government abroad, and the other, a government in the domestic areas of the U.S., areas that have never really been considered an equal part of the colonial empire. An occupying military of a foreign territory (such as Vietnam) can be seen not as an occupying military, but a proxy ruler. Thus, in this analogy the police are not the occupying military of the U.S.’s internal colonies, but instead also their proxy ruler controlling their own citizens.

“The meek shall inherit the earth, it is said. This presents a very bleak image to those who live in occupied territory. The meek Southeast Asians, those who remain, shall have their free elections, and the meek American Negroes—those who survive—shall enter the Great Society.”⁹⁹ These are the last lines of “A Report from Occupied Territory,” written in 1966. It would be nine more years before U.S. withdrawal in Vietnam.¹⁰⁰ Still, the U.S. has over 1,000 military bases across 140 countries.¹⁰¹ It would also be eight more years until the dissolution of the Black Panther Party, and only two for RAM (which was widely agreed to be a result of COINTELPRO).¹⁰² By the 2000s, the U.S. would have 2.3 million people in prisons and 7 million under carceral control.¹⁰³ The military

95 “On the Defection of Eldridge Cleaver from the Black Panther Party and the Defection of the Black Panther Party from the Black Community,” Black Panther Party news sheets, Collection no. 7116, Regional History Collection, Special Collections, USC Libraries, University of Southern California.

96 John Jones. “A History of the Revolutionary Action Movement.”

97 The Black Panther Party, *The Black Panther: Black Community News Paper*. September 7, 1968.

98 Jones, “A History of the Revolutionary Action Movement”; Robert Williams, “USA: The Potential of a Minority Revolution Part II,” *The Crusader*. Vol. 7, No 1, August 1965. <https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/1960-1970/crusader/7-1.pdf>

99 Baldwin, “A Report from Occupied Territory.”

100 Hess, *Then the Americans Came*.

101 Camp, “The Bombs Explode at Home,” 19.

102 Rossdale Manchanda. “Resisting Racial Militarism,” 475; Jones, “A History of the Revolutionary Action Movement,” 89.

103 Camp, “The Bombs Explode at Home,” 18.

and carceral regime of the U.S. is just that – a regime. One that has grown so much larger than any other body of the U.S. government, that it is hard to deny its ruling power over the world. As the capacity for U.S. proxy rule grows wider, it is hard to imagine a place that is now not occupied territory, both across the globe and at home. 🏠

Land, Labor, and Education

The Emergence of the Savannah Ghetto

Scholars tend to describe the American ghetto as a strictly Northern phenomenon of the early 20th century brought about by racial zoning covenants, and argue that the brutal social segregation of Jim Crow laws made physical segregation unnecessary in Southern cities. This paper calls this normative understanding of ghetto formation into question by tracking the emergence of the Black ghetto in Savannah, Georgia immediately after the Civil War. In the wake of the war, Congress established the Freedmen's Bureau and tasked it with protecting the basic needs of the freedpeople so that they could build empowered, self-sufficient communities and thus fully reap the promises of emancipation. In Savannah, the Freedmen's Bureau unequivocally failed to do so — especially in regard to crucial aspects of community building such as land ownership, labor rights, and education — leaving the Black community crowded into a ghetto. Therefore, due to the failures of the Freedmen's Bureau, rather than zoning covenants or Jim Crow laws, a ghetto arose in Savannah decades before the Great Migration, which scholars typically pinpoint as the start of Northern ghettos. This paper thus highlights the need for a revised scholarly understanding of American ghetto formation, taking into account the late 19th century, the experiences of Southern Black communities, and the impacts of federal public policy.

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Figure 1. Mark Finlay, “The Postbellum Transition from Agriculture to Industry,” in *Slavery and Freedom in Savannah* (University of Georgia Press, 2014), p. 189.

TOURISM IS ONE OF SAVANNAH, GEORGIA’S most profitable industries, raking in upwards of \$3 billion a year.¹ As the southernmost city of the Thirteen Colonies and one of few cities in the South to survive the Civil War unscathed, Savannah boasts a rich history — and warm, coastal weather — that draws tourists year-round. However, a visit to Savannah is strictly confined to the grid of colonial-era parklike squares in the downtown historic district. Wandering even just slightly outside of it will put a tourist in “the bad parts of town,” where one will find the visual markers of urban decay that

are anathema to tourism: graffiti, burglar bars, and derelict housing projects. Yet, these areas — the ghetto of Savannah — lie just steps beyond the historic district’s western edge, suggesting that they are as well-established and storied as the tourist-friendly cobblestone streets. The stark contrast that exists in Savannah between the commercialized historic district and the neighborhoods of generational oppression that exist side-by-side begs the question: how and why did this ghetto come to be?

The Black ghetto is a well-chronicled institution in urban American life. Perhaps the most distinguished scholarly analysis of Black life in an American ghetto is “Black Metropolis” by Saint Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, which explores the creation and conditions of the Chicago ghetto.² The authors place the ghetto’s origins during the interwar period, when thousands of Black workers were emigrating from the rural South in order to find work in Northern industrial cities in an event known as the Great Migration. The rising Black population stoked the white community’s racism, they explain, leading them to leverage legal mechanisms like restrictive covenants to maintain a strict residential separation between themselves and the encroaching Black community. Drake and Cayton, although only writing about one city’s ghetto, envision Chicago as the prototype for the Black urban experience across America, saying: “Understand Chicago’s Black Belt and you will understand the Black Belts of a dozen large American cities.”³ Their model of the ghetto as a Northern phenomenon brought about by the Great Migration and subsequently fortified through racist legal

1 “Savannah Chamber - Economic Trends Brochure 2022,” p. 49.

2 St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City*, Rev. and enl. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

3 Drake and Cayton, p. 12.

strategies has since become the standard narrative used to describe Black ghetto formation across America.

However, this normative understanding of the origin of the ghetto is too narrowly focused on the experiences and conditions of Black life in Northern cities in the mid-1900s, thereby obscuring how the core tenets of life in the ghetto have impacted Black communities across different regions of the country and for longer than previously thought. More recent scholarship has sought to expand the scope of the ghetto in terms of both geographical location and historical period. For example, one study argues that ghetto conditions were present in Northern industrial cities before the Great Migration, thus re-situating the origin of the ghetto temporally.⁴ With regard to location, another study argues that the post-Great Migration segregation of the once integrated and thriving Black community in Los Angeles qualifies as ghettoization,⁵ thus extending Drake and Cayton's narrative to cities on the West Coast.

Despite these revisions, there is still a dearth of scholarship addressing the ghetto experience of Southern cities. In fact, some scholars have argued, in line with the Drake-Cayton thesis, that Southern ghettos did not exist. Peter Marcuse best articulates this idea: "In the South in the urban centers, Blacks often lived in close proximity to whites," rather than in ghettos apart from whites.⁶ Marcuse says that because Southern Blacks largely worked as domestic servants, they "lived in inferior housing adjacent to the homes of their employers." Not only was having their servants close to them useful, Marcuse argues that whites believed that strict spatial segregation into separate neighborhoods was unnecessary, because "the racial etiquette of the South" – that is, the statutory segregation of public accommodations under Jim Crow – "was sufficient to maintain the relationships of subordination and domination."⁷ This view, that the South used Jim Crow laws to enforce racial hierarchies while the North used ghettoization to do so, is perhaps best summarized in an adage coined by John Egerton: "In the South, it doesn't matter how close Negroes get, as long as they don't get too high; in the North, it doesn't matter how high they get, as long as they don't get too close."⁸ Therefore, rather than re-evaluating Drake and Cayton's model of ghetto formation in light of how Southern ghettos might differ from their Northern counterparts, scholars have brushed aside the possibility of Southern ghettos and instead claimed that Jim Crow laws filled the same role.

In this paper, I will demonstrate that Marcuse's exten-

sion of the Drake-Cayton model fails to explain the reality of Black urban experiences across the South through a case study of the Savannah ghetto. While Marcuse was correct to note that white people in the South were preoccupied with reinforcing white supremacy after the demise of slavery, it would be incorrect to assume that what followed was residential integration in Southern cities or that the Jim Crow system replaced ghettoization. A close look at the history of Savannah reveals that there was a clearly defined Black ghetto – notably in the same areas where the ghetto lies today – and its formation took place during Reconstruction *before* the enactment of Jim Crow laws in the 1890s. Rather than being the result of legal mechanisms like restrictive covenants or zoning regulations, the Savannah ghetto emerged as the federal government repeatedly undermined freedpeople's attempts to build self-sufficiency and self-determination in three key realms: land ownership, labor rights, and education.

LAND OWNERSHIP

Freedpeople migrated to Savannah in two distinct waves, the first being on the coattails of the Union army. After having captured Atlanta, General William Sherman led Union forces to Savannah, a critical port city. The March to the Sea, as the campaign came to be known, required that the Union army march through the plantation-filled center of the state. For many of the slaves they encountered along the way, the army's presence was the fulfillment of a lifelong dream. One soldier recalled in his journal the moment when a slave spotted General Sherman and exclaimed: "I have seen the Great Messiah and the army of the Lord!"⁹ The slaves saw the liberating soldiers as "deliverers," one soldier noted, and he continued on to say that, "I have never seen a negro, old or young, male or female, that did not appear willing and even anxious to leave master and follow our army."¹⁰ When Savannah was captured on December 21, 1864, "as many as ten thousand runaway slaves" flooded into the city alongside the Union army.¹¹ This massive influx of freedpeople increased the city's population by nearly 50%, creating a massive shortage of supplies, jobs, and housing which had already become scarce during the war.

To make matters worse, the Union army was preparing to head north to capture Charleston before long, and would not be able to afford to feed and care for the mass of refugees if they followed behind them. Thus, General Sherman and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton held a meeting with twenty of the city's Black pastors to find a solution to the refugee crisis on

4 John R. Logan, Weiwei Zhang, and Miao David Chunyu, "Emergent Ghettos: Black Neighborhoods in New York and Chicago, 1880–1940," *American Journal of Sociology* 120, no. 4 (2015): 1055–94, <https://doi.org/10.1086/680680>.

5 Gregory Christopher Brown, James Diego Vigil, and Eric Robert Taylor, "The Ghettoization of Blacks in Los Angeles: The Emergence of Street Gangs," *Journal of African American Studies* 16, no. 2 (2012): 209–25.

6 Peter Marcuse, "Space Over Time: The Changing Position of the Black Ghetto in the United States," *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment* 13, no. 1 (1998): p. 9.
7 Marcuse, p. 10.

8 Richard Lloyd, "Urbanization and the Southern United States," *Annual Review of Sociology* 38 (2012): p. 50.

9 "Soldiers True: The Story of the One Hundred and Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteers and of Its Campaigns in the War for the Union 1861-1865 - Pennsylvania's Past History Collection - Penn State University Libraries' Digital Collections," p. 262.

10 Oscar L. Jackson and David Prentice Jackson, *The Colonel's Diary; Journals Kept Before and During the Civil War by the Late Colonel Oscar L. Jackson* (Sharon Pa., 1922), p. 164.

11 Jonathan M. Bryant, "'We Defy You!': Politics and Violence in Reconstruction Savannah," in *Slavery and Freedom in Savannah*, ed. Leslie M. Harris and Daina Ramey Berry (University of Georgia Press, 2014), p. 165.

January 12, 1865.¹² Their meeting, though, touched on more than just providing for the material needs of the freedpeople; the pastors took the opportunity to express to Sherman and Stanton what freedom truly meant to the newly freed slaves: self-sufficiency. All but one of the pastors attested to the fact that the freedpeople preferred to “live by [themselves],” rather than “scattered among the whites,” in order that they might escape the “prejudice against [them] in the South that will take years to get over.”¹³ Land ownership was at the heart of this notion of self-sufficiency, one pastor explained, because if freedpeople “could reap the fruit of [their] own labor” then they would be able to “soon maintain [themselves] and have something to spare.”¹⁴ Reverend Garrison Frazier, who had suffered as a slave for fifty-nine years, made the connection between land ownership and self-sufficiency unequivocally clear to Sherman and Stanton: “the way we can best take care of ourselves,” he said, “is to have land, and turn it and till it by our own labor.”¹⁵ Thus, the pastors argued that there was no better way to forge a Black community that was reliant on itself instead of Army rations than to help them secure land of their own.

Just four days after their meeting, General Sherman issued the audacious Special Field Order Number 15, which set aside 400,000 acres of confiscated rice plantations throughout the lowcountry of Georgia and South Carolina for the freedpeople and infamously promised a forty-acre plot of land and a mule to each family that settled there.¹⁶ In the order, Sherman strongly endorses the freedpeople’s desire for self-sufficiency by declaring that, “No white person whatever . . . will be permitted to reside; and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will be left to the freedpeople themselves.” The order was met with an enthusiastic response from the freedpeople. Reverend Ulysses Houston, one of the pastors who had met with Sherman and Stanton, excitedly led a group of 1,000 Black refugees out of Savannah to settle some of this land on nearby Skidaway Island.¹⁷ In just a matter of months, General Rufus Saxton reported that roughly ten thousand families had done the same, and that “negro communities grew up; the government was carried on, churches and schools were established and roads made.”¹⁸ By setting aside the 400,000 acres for the freedpeople, Sherman gave to them a gift that seemed almost too good to be true: an escape from the South’s white supremacy and a chance to live as a self-sufficient, self-determining community.

As the war came to a close, though, it became clear that Sherman’s promise was, in fact, too good to be true. In March of 1865, Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands – commonly known as the Freedmen’s Bureau – to lead the federal government’s response to emancipation. As the nascent agency was tasked with “the supervision and management of all abandoned lands, and the control of subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel states,” the 400,000 acres set aside by Sherman fell under its purview.¹⁹ Soon after this jurisdictional change, President Andrew Johnson effectively began reversing Sherman’s order by pardoning white landowners and restoring their right to own property – including the land that had been given to the freedpeople. The white landowners, once forbidden from stepping foot on their old plantations, quickly returned with a vengeance. Reverend T. G. Campbell, who later served in the Georgia General Assembly, describes in his autobiography how the newly returned white landowners treated the freedpeople: “The schools . . . on the Islands were broken up, and the people driven off. . . . Rebels . . . would waylay them and beat them, telling them that they would have them back when the Yankees left the State.”²⁰ The Freedmen’s Bureau, which was in charge of mediating disputes on this land, was too new and under-resourced to subdue the antagonistic white landowners, and thus did virtually nothing to protect the communities that had been built by the freedpeople. In fact, General Oliver Howard, the Freedmen’s Bureau Commissioner for the Savannah region, penned a circular letter directing his deputies to dispel the “erroneous and injurious” rumors among the freedpeople that the land would ever be turned over to them.²¹ He not only said that they would never own the land promised to them but even went so far as to suggest that the freedpeople should return to serving their former masters, saying they ought to “look to the property holders for employment.” By shamelessly breaking their land promises, President Johnson and the Freedmen’s Bureau turned their backs on the very people who relied on the federal government’s protection – leaving the Black communities in the lowcountry in shambles.

The freedpeople, left essentially defenseless to white encroaches as the government reneged on its commitment to Black land ownership, fled back to Savannah and “crowded into growing slums.”²² It was at this point, as freedmen poured back into the city, that the ghetto of Savannah first

12 “Minutes of an Interview Between Colored Ministers and Church Officers at Savannah with the Secretary of War and Major-Gen. Sherman,” *New York Daily Tribune* (New York, N.Y.), Feb. 13, 1865. <http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/savmtg.htm>.

13 “Minutes of an Interview,” *New York Daily Tribune*.

14 “Minutes of an Interview,” *New York Daily Tribune*.

15 “Minutes of an Interview,” *New York Daily Tribune*.

16 William Sherman, “Special Field Order, No. 15,” Jan. 16, 1865. <http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/sfo15.htm>.

17 Henry Louis Gates, “The Truth Behind ‘40 Acres and a Mule,’” *The African Americans: Many Rivers to Cross*, Jan. 6, 2013. <https://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history/the-truth-behind-40-acres-and-a-mule/>.

18 Walter L. Fleming, “Forty Acres and a Mule,” *The North American Review* 182, no. 594 (1906): p. 725-726.

19 “The Freedmen’s Bureau Act.” *Congress of the United States*, Mar. 3, 1865. <http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/fbact.htm>.

20 Tunis Campbell, “Sufferings of the Rev. T. G. Campbell and His Family, in Georgia.” <https://digital.library.cornell.edu/catalog/may891202>. p. 8.

21 Oliver Howard, “Circular Letter” (National Museum of African American History and Culture, November 11, 1865), Records of the Field Offices for the State of Georgia, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1872. p. 72.

22 Bryant, p. 166.

truly materialized. The freedpeople of Savannah were no longer roaming refugees excitedly following the Union army, nor were they temporary squatters waiting for land grants or some other solution to be negotiated by the city's Black leaders. After President Johnson reversed General Sherman's promise of land ownership and the Freedmen's Bureau proved too weak to protect or advocate for the Black settlements, it became clear that the creation of a self-sufficient, self-determining community of freedpeople living on their own land separate from the prejudices of white society was no longer an option. The freedpeople, congregated in slums on the western end of the city, would have to make it in Savannah.

LABOR

Yet, the freedpeople who made their way to Savannah on the coattails of the Union army were not the only freedpeople who found themselves in the emerging Savannah ghetto. A second wave of Black immigration into the city ebbed and flowed throughout the late 1860s as rural Black workers escaped exploitative labor contracts. Indeed, the development of the Savannah ghetto was shaped by the interplay between white attempts at controlling Black labor and Black endeavors for economic autonomy. The Freedmen's Bureau sat at the crosshairs of these opposing headwinds and had the chance to protect Black labor rights, but ultimately failed to do so. In response, many Black workers fled the countryside and headed to the Savannah ghetto.

By the time the dust had settled at the close of the Civil War, the Southern economy had been utterly ruined: hundreds of thousands of working-age men had perished, railroad lines were destroyed, and many major economic hubs had been burned to the ground by Union forces. Still, the most calamitous effect of the war on the Southern economy was by far emancipation. At the heart of the South's plantation-based agricultural economy was the guaranteed free labor of enslaved Black workers, who not only performed the agricultural tasks – that is, the plowing, the planting, and the harvesting – but did so at such a low cost that the system remained profitable.²³ Emancipation threatened to turn this system on its head: truly freeing the slaves would have transformed the guaranteed source of cheap labor into a free market in which Black workers could negotiate for higher wages and better benefits, if they decided to remain in the agricultural industry at all. In the eyes of the rural freedpeople, this was an opportunity to turn their agricultural expertise into a self-sufficient, honest career. In the eyes of white landowners, however, this was an imminent threat to how they made their own living, and it became critical that they prevent

freedpeople from actually exercising economic autonomy. As one scholar put it: “The dominant theme in the planters' lives became the search for a substitute for slavery.”²⁴

Accordingly, white landowners turned to their allies in the state legislature. In the early days of Reconstruction, before Radical Republicans in Congress took over and began more closely scrutinizing the actions of Southern Democrats, the Georgia General Assembly was filled with ex-Confederates who were interested in maintaining the antebellum status quo. Following the example of other Southern states, in early 1866 they enacted discriminatory laws known as the Black Codes, which featured “forced labor and police laws to get the freedmen back to the field and under control.”²⁵ Vagrancy laws forbidding homelessness were the most impactful aspect of these laws, because under them any Black worker who left his or her plantation was at risk of being arrested and sentenced to years of unpaid labor in Georgia's peonage system.²⁶ Thus, despite their emancipation at the hands of the federal government, Black workers were facing the onset of an institution that revived slavery in every sense but the name at the state level.

This emerging legal apparatus for re-establishing slavery exacerbated the already dire situation of the rural freedpeople. For the 73% of freedpeople in the South who lived in rural areas,²⁷ the only available industry was agriculture on white-owned plantations that could no longer afford the freedpeople's labor unless they were treated like slaves. Faced with having to now pay for labor, one planter wrote to the Freedmen's Bureau in Georgia asking if he should send his Black workers to the city, saying:

“I will have no use for all the balance of the negroes. ... I ask what I shall do with this host of men, women & their children. I dislike to see them starve & yet it is utterly impossible to feed them ... these persons cannot get employment with so many children connected with each family.”²⁸

The Acting Assistant Commissioner replied with dismay:

“I cannot give an order nor my consent to your sending the surplus people ... where there is not enough shelter for white people even. Suppose you and all the planters throughout the country send their freed people to the cities, how are the white people in the cities to live – to say nothing of the freed people.”

This interaction highlights the second aspect of the problem: there were not enough resources to adequately care for an

23 Slave labor was, of course, performed for free. However, I describe slave labor here as being done at a “low cost” instead of for free because plantation owners did incur costs to house and feed their chattel. Recognizing these overhead costs is critical to fully understanding the economics of the agricultural industry.

24 Pete Daniel, “The Metamorphosis of Slavery, 1865-1900,” *The Journal of American History* 66, no. 1 (1979): 88–99, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1894675>, p. 91.

25 C. Vann Woodward, *American Counterpoint: Slavery and Racism in the North-South Dialogue* (Oxford [Oxfordshire]; New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 252.

26 Daniel, p. 89.

27 Marcuse, p. 9.

28 “Georgia Planter to the Georgia Freedmen's Bureau Acting Assistant Commissioner, and the Latter's Reply,” in *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867: Series 3, Volume 2: Land and Labor, 1866-1867* (University of North Carolina Press, 2013), p. 178.

influx of more Black refugees into the city, especially after the efforts to situate the first wave of refugees outside of Savannah had failed. Indeed, the records for the Savannah subdistrict of the Freedmen's Bureau are filled with entreaties from commissioners to their agents that, in light of great scarcity, they use more discretion while dispersing aid.²⁹ Furthermore, given that the Freedmen's Bureau was unable to house or feed them if they moved to the cities, these workers risked prosecution and hard labor sentences under Georgia's strict vagrancy laws. Thus, rural Black workers were stuck between a rock and a hard place: they could either essentially remain in slavery, or move to cities like Savannah where starvation or peonage awaited them.

Beyond these trying logistical hurdles, their situation was further complicated by the pervasiveness of white supremacist rhetoric that derided the value of Black labor. White media, almost invariably, described freedpeople as a group that was unwilling to work and preferred "to subsist in idleness upon the bounty of the federal government."³⁰ Edward Anderson, the Mayor of Savannah, stated that, "Negroes are regarded by us as children,"³¹ demonstrating just how little confidence white elites had in the ability of the freedpeople to make decisions about their own labor. Indeed, many believed that Black workers needed the guidance of white landowners, or they would fall victim to their own inherent laziness. William Barbee, an author and white cotton planter from Mississippi, exemplified this line of thought in his book:

"How do freedmen work? ... When left solely to themselves, they ... sink down into idleness, filth, disease, and death. ... On the other hand, ... wherever the negro has been controlled, put to work, ... and has had the superintendence of a competent white man, he does well; the nearer he has been made to approach his old position of a slave, the better he has labored, and we believe it will always be so."³²

While this sort of white supremacy might be expected from Southern elites who had built fortunes on enslaved labor, even the Freedmen's Bureau was susceptible to this thinking. Superintendent Davis Tillson echoed the claim that freedpeople were work-averse in his first published circular: "In many instances freed people are leaving their employers without ... just provocation, and ... are living, in many cases,

in idleness, vice, and poverty."³³ This idea was further present in nearly all of the directives regarding aid distribution, which typically included language disavowing vagrancy and highlighting the importance of ensuring that "the freedpeople are not sustained in idleness."³⁴ By overlooking the obvious environmental factors that contributed to the squalid condition of the freedpeople, this rhetoric implied that they were inherently unable to become self-sufficient. Thus, the situation of the newly-emancipated workers was complicated not only by hostile legislation, financial trouble within the plantation system, and urban resource shortages, but also by the atmosphere of white supremacy that denigrated their work ethics.

Tasked with the mission "to provide relief and help the freedpeople become self-sufficient," the Freedmen's Bureau was the agency responsible for providing them rations, operating Black hospitals, overseeing land grants, and – most importantly – supervising the changing labor market.³⁵ The agency was concerned about the dire situation of the rural Black workers, particularly in light of the legislature's and the landowners' attempts at reinstating slavery. Assistant Commissioner Murray Hoag went as far as to include in one of his reports, "A great injustice is being perpetrated upon all poor people, most of whom are freedmen, by the state laws regulating labor."³⁶ Yet, the agency was also cognizant of the fragile state of the economy and the extent to which a truly free Black workforce would further destabilize it. In response to this conundrum, Commissioner Oliver Howard devised a strategy that he believed would help the freedpeople raise their standing while simultaneously avoiding economic disaster: labor contracts.³⁷ The system was, in theory, mutually beneficial for the employers and employees: agents of the Freedmen's Bureau would negotiate year-long contracts with white landowners on behalf of the freedpeople, which guaranteed a workforce for the landowners and favorable wages and benefits for the Black workers.

In reality, though, the contract system was detrimental to the goal of Black self-sufficiency because the freedpeople were consistently short-changed by the agents negotiating on their behalf. One Savannah-area Assistant Commissioner reported that the freedpeople, frustrated with the broken promises of land ownership, began "to demand conditions, unreasonable and totally beyond the reach of the planters to give,"³⁸ but an analysis of the contracts they were negotiating

29 Caleb Sibley, "Circular Letter" (National Museum of African American History and Culture, March 28, 1867), Records of the Field Offices for the State of Georgia, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1872.

30 C. Mildred Thompson, "The Freedmen's Bureau in Georgia in 1865-6: An Instrument of Reconstruction," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (1921): p. 43.

31 Bryant, p. 172.

32 William Barbee, "The Cotton Question," *Metropolitan Record and NY Vindicator* (New York), 1866. p. 103-104.

33 Davis Tillis, "Circular No. 1" (National Museum of African American History and Culture, July 13, 1865), Records of the Field Offices for the State of Georgia, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1872.

34 Sibley.

35 Richard Fleischman, Thomas Tyson, and David Oldroyd, "The U.S. Freedmen's Bureau in Post-Civil War Reconstruction," *The Accounting Historians Journal* 41, no. 2 (2014): p. 79.

36 Murray Hoag, "Report of Sub. Assistant Commissioner of Subdistrict of Savannah, GA" (National Museum of African American History and Culture, August 1874), Records of the Field Offices for the State of Georgia, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1872.

37 Thompson, p. 45-46.

38 O.M. Screven, "Monthly Report" (National Museum of African American History and Culture, January 31, 1866), Records of the Field Offices for the State of Georgia, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1872.

presents a much different picture. For example, one of the Georgia contracts binding forty-six freedpeople to a year of work beginning daily at sunrise and ending at sundown lacked a stipulated wage, allowed for just one sick day a year, and forbade them to leave the plantation.³⁹ The working conditions negotiated in the contracts were essentially a reproduction of slavery.

Even worse, the contract system quickly became nonconsensual. Davis Tillson, the Superintendent of the Freedmen's Bureau, became increasingly concerned by the sustained hesitancy of the freedpeople to enter into such agreements. Fearing an impending worker shortage, he granted federal agents a sweeping new power:

"Freedpeople have the right to select their own employers, but if they continue to neglect or refuse to make contracts, ... officers and agents of the Bureau will have the right, and it shall be their duty, to make contracts for them. ... Contracts so made shall be as binding on both parties as though made with the full consent of the freed people."⁴⁰

By threatening to non-consensually bind Black workers into contracts, the Freedmen's Bureau pressured the freedpeople into accepting contracts with lower wages, fewer benefits, and less favorable conditions. Tillson's circular did not stop there, though; in it, he also forbade "entic[ing] laborers to leave their employers before the expiration of their contracts, either by offering higher wages or other inducements."⁴¹ This was catastrophic to the economic fortunes of the freedpeople, as it prevented the creation of a free labor market. Because Black workers were forbidden from exploring different employment opportunities while under contract and lacked the financial means to go any substantial length of time without a source of income, they would have no choice at the expiration of one contract but to accept the same working conditions under the same employer for the following year. Thus, not only did the Freedmen's Bureau's contract system result in working conditions akin to slavery, it also created a cyclical economic powerlessness among Black workers that mirrored the institution of slavery throughout the rural regions of Georgia.

Consequently, the freedpeople's dream of achieving self-sufficiency and self-determination within the rural agricultural industry had been slashed. Lacking trust in the white landowners to value their labor and lacking trust in the Freedmen's Bureau to protect them, many freedpeople across middle and southern Georgia began deserting their plan-

tations and heading for Savannah. This phenomenon was reported by one officer in the Bureau's Savannah subdistrict who wrote that, "The freedmen generally lack confidence in their former masters and express a preference to work for strangers rather than for them, and I doubt not that many of them will on this account change their homes."⁴² This new labor-induced wave of Black immigrants "crowded into ill-ventilated huts" and "lived in unhealthy basements in the badly-drained areas"⁴³ on the western outskirts of Savannah, in the emerging ghetto that the initial Black refugees had founded. This wave of Black immigration was massive: compared to that of 1860, the Black population of Savannah in 1870 had increased by roughly 65%, and Black people made up nearly half of the city's population.⁴⁴ The ghetto, where this rapid population growth was contained, was the direct result of the Freedmen's Bureau's failure to not only secure land for the freedpeople, but also to protect their labor rights. Finding that self-sufficiency and self-determination could be attained neither in the 400,000 acres of the lowcountry nor in the rural agricultural industry, freedpeople flocked to the ghetto of Savannah for a new beginning.

EDUCATION

In the ghetto, however, the Black migrants still fell prey to abusive labor conditions, this time at the hands of Savannah's burgeoning industrial sector. Faced with massive war debts and – despite the efforts of the legislature and white landowners – a far less profitable agricultural system, it became clear that economic recovery would require investments in manufacturing across the state. As one of the few Southern cities that had not been leveled by the Union forces, Savannah was on the front lines of this economic transition. Once the Ogeechee Canal, the Central of Georgia Railroad, and the Savannah Florida and Western Railroad reopened on the western side of the city, sawmills began "springing up as if by magic."⁴⁵ Before long, Savannah had a vibrant industrial sector, including "cotton presses, machine shops, foundries, ... a locomotive works, a large textile mill, a carriage factory, ... a baking powder manufacturer, ... two soap factories ... and the largest rosin works in the world."⁴⁶ Indeed, the city had become an undeniable hub of Southern business.

While Savannah's industrial boom brought great wealth to the white business owners, it reinforced the poor standard of living of the Black ghetto. Spatially, these polluting factories were built adjacent to their Black workforce in the emerging ghettos on the western edge of the city, which magnified their already-lamentable sanitation and living conditions. Economically, Black workers were paid

39 "Contract between a Georgia Planter and Georgia Freedpeople," Jul. 8, 1865, <http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/McIntosh.html>.

40 Thompson, p. 45.

41 Thompson, p. 46.

42 Screven.

43 John W. Blassingame, "Before the Ghetto: The Making of the Black Community in Savannah, Georgia, 1865-1880," *Journal of Social History* 6, no. 4 (1973): p. 469.

44 Bryant, p. 167.

45 Mark Finlay, "The Postbellum Transition from Agriculture to Industry," in *Slavery and Freedom in Savannah* (University of Georgia Press, 2014), p. 189.

46 Finlay, p. 190.

nearly half of the standard wage of white workers,⁴⁷ further contributing to their financial powerlessness. The growth of industry, then, threatened the hopes of the Black community that in Savannah they might attain the promises of emancipation: freedom from the control of white employers and societal self-determination. Indeed, despite the number of “Black-owned groceries, saloons, restaurants, and billiard parlors”⁴⁸ that dotted the streets of the ghetto, a majority of Black labor remained under the thumb of white factory owners. Reverend E.K. Love, a pastor at the First African Baptist Church of Savannah, warned that education was the only hope for ameliorating, and ultimately escaping, their poor economic situation and the detestable conditions of the ghetto. He preached to his congregation that, “We must encourage our people to get an education, or be content with our woeful fate.”⁴⁹ If true freedom would ever materialize for the Black community in Savannah, he believed it would begin in the schoolhouse.

Reverend Love, though, was not the first Black leader in Savannah to recognize the crucial role that education could play in empowering those in the ghetto. The same group of Black pastors who expressed the importance of self-determination to General Sherman and Secretary Stanton during the Union occupation were busy organizing education for the freedpeople at the same time. They founded the Savannah Educational Association (SEA), a “strong, collective effort on the part of the city’s Black citizens” whose purpose was to establish schools for Black children taught by Black teachers.⁵⁰ The SEA was an immediate success: within just a few months, the newly-founded Bryan Free School was instructing 500 Black students, tuition-free, in the building of a former slave mart “whose platforms, occupied a few days before by [slaves] for the auction, became crowded with children of the same class learning to read.”⁵¹ Located on the western edge of town where the arriving waves of uneducated former slaves were clustering, the SEA’s Bryan Free School was a shining manifestation of the Black community’s desire to overcome white prejudice and achieve self-sufficiency through education.

The Freedmen’s Bureau was also engaged in furthering Black education, as the agency was mandated to “take cognizance of all that is being done to educate refugees and freedmen, secure proper protections to schools and teachers, [and] promote method and efficiency.”⁵² Reverend John

Alvord, the General Superintendent of Education, believed that the Freedmen’s Bureau should play only a supporting role and let the freedpeople lead their own educational efforts. To that effect, he framed the job of Freedmen’s Bureau agents as merely “cutting broader channels for the strong current of . . . education,” which was, “legitimately the work of the [freed] people.”⁵³ Beyond diligently monitoring the development and performance of Black schools, the Freedmen’s Bureau’s most impactful function in cutting these broad channels for Black education was procuring the funding that financed school construction and teacher salaries. They did so in two key ways: first, by allotting grants from their own funds, and second, by coordinating with Northern benevolent societies interested in supporting Black education.

In Savannah, the main Northern organization that the Freedmen’s Bureau worked with was the American Missionary Association (AMA). The AMA, founded in New York in 1846, was a wealthy organization of ardent abolitionists that sent droves of teachers from the Northeast to establish schools for freedpeople across the South.⁵⁴ Despite their dedication to promoting Black education, the AMA was adamantly opposed to allowing Black teachers to run the schools they funded, which caused major disagreements with the freedpeople they sought to serve. Reverend S.W. Magill, the AMA’s representative in Savannah, said of the city’s teachers, “now however good men they may be, they know nothing about educating.”⁵⁵ This point more so reflects Magill’s own ingrained white supremacy than it does the quality of Black educators in Savannah, given that Superintendent Alvord reported that “the classification, grading and discipline of the schools . . . are for the most part satisfactory”⁵⁶ and “pronounced himself delighted with the pupils’ progress.”⁵⁷ Magill’s views were certainly also influenced by the AMA’s missionary purpose; the instructors they sent to the South were expected to not only teach the freedpeople math, reading, and writing, but also to “espouse New England values: Republicanism, Puritan values, and Congregational churches.”⁵⁸ Thus, even though the Northern white instructors might have been better educated and better fit to teach than the Southern Black instructors, the Black community rejected the ideological mission of the AMA. Feeling that the AMA was undermining their efforts to “determine the educational needs of their community without white assistance,” the freedpeople overwhelmingly “mis-

47 Finlay, p. 190.

48 John N. Ingham, “Building Businesses, Creating Communities: Residential Segregation and the Growth of African American Business in Southern Cities, 1880-1915,” *The Business History Review* 77, no. 4 (2003): p. 652, <https://doi.org/10.2307/30041232>.

49 Bobby J. Donaldson, “The Fighting Has Not Been in Vain: African American Intellectuals in Jim Crow Savannah,” in *Slavery and Freedom in Savannah*, ed. Leslie M. Harris and Daina Ramey Berry (University of Georgia Press, 2014), 185-212, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt175743m.16>. p. 196.

50 Jacqueline Jones, *Soldiers of Light and Love: Northern Teachers and Georgia Blacks, 1865-1873*, The Fred W. Morrison Series in Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). p. 60.

51 John Watson Alvord, *Fifth Semi-Annual Report on Schools for Freedmen: January 1, 1868* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1868), <http://archive.org/details/fifthsemiannualroalvo>. p. 5.

52 Fleischman, p. 93.

53 Alvord, p. 5.

54 “History of the American Missionary Association: Forty Years of Missionary Labor” (The American Missionary Association, 1886). p. 8-10.

55 Jones, p. 53.

56 Alvord, p. 28.

57 Jones, p. 57.

58 Donald L. Grant and Jonathan Grant, *The Way It Was in the South: The Black Experience in Georgia* (Secaucus, N.J.: Carol Pub. Group, 1993). p. 223-224.

trusted, resented, and lost confidence in” the AMA.⁵⁹ In their eyes, education was about empowering the Black community, not absorbing Northern white culture.

Yet, despite the SEA’s record of achievement and the Black community’s vocal disdain for the AMA, the Freedmen’s Bureau consistently overlooked the funding requests of the SEA. When the Bryan Free School was founded, the SEA raised nearly \$1,000 to support it, but the high attendance rate was rapidly exhausting the tuition-free school’s seed money. When they turned to the Freedmen’s Bureau for financial support, they were met with great disappointment. Regardless of the Superintendent’s stated belief that Black education should be a matter handled by the Black community, the local Freedmen’s Bureau denied the SEA’s requests for financial help and instead granted land and money to the construction of the Beach Institute, an AMA-led school that charged a tuition fee. As soon as the Beach Institute was opened in 1867, the Freedmen’s Bureau Superintendent of Education for Georgia penned a circular announcing that his office “will not be able ... to extend pecuniary aid to any schools, except those already established and now under the patronage of this Bureau.”⁶⁰ Because the only school for freedpeople in Savannah being supported by the Freedmen’s Bureau was the AMA-backed Beach Institute, this new regulation made it impossible for the SEA to secure federal funding. In consequence, the only available source of funding left to the SEA was that of the AMA, which they could not accept without welcoming white teachers and forfeiting their dream of Black-led education for the freedpeople. This impact was purposeful; in fact, the circular goes on to instruct the Black community to submit to the AMA’s control: “In order to secure good schools and thorough instruction, the colored people should cooperate with ... the benevolent societies which have been organized for the especial work of giving to their children sound mental and moral training.”⁶¹ Unwilling to compromise on their principles, the SEA again rejected the AMA’s demands, descended into financial insolvency, and was forced to close the Bryan Free School.

With the demise of the SEA, the Black community’s hope of free, high-quality Black-led education for the freedpeople in the ghetto was crushed. Regardless of the Freedmen’s Bureau patronizing advice, “that the colored people ... waste less ... for tobacco and other useless and injurious articles, and thus ... spend more for ... the education of their children,”⁶² a majority of the families in the Savannah ghetto were making paltry wages in the city’s exploitative factories and therefore could not have afforded to send their

children to the AMA’s Beach Institute even if they had wanted to. This dearth of education for the children of the ghetto persisted for multiple years, until 1872 when a number of Black pastors petitioned the Savannah’s Board of Education to rent the Beach Institute from the AMA and re-establish it as a public school for Black children.⁶³ Two years later, when the AMA found itself in hard financial times of its own, the city of Savannah made history by opening the first Black public schools in the state.⁶⁴ However, these schools regrettably also pioneered what would become a legacy of underfunded ghetto schools that extended through the Civil Rights Era and persists even today. Segregated public schools systematically and purposefully offered a dismally low quality of education, far below that of their white counterparts.⁶⁵ In fact, the condition of the city-run public schools in Savannah was so poor that in 1879, the AMA reassumed charge of the Beach Institute for a short time, “in order to secure a higher grade of instruction than the public school authorities thought it wise for them to furnish.”⁶⁶ Hence, the Freedmen’s Bureau strangulation of the SEA left Black children in Savannah with no affordable option for education, stranding them in a failing public education system that offered them very little hope of bettering their economic position and escaping the ghetto. Indeed, by once again stifling the Black community’s attempt at fostering self-sufficiency and self-determination, the Freedmen’s Bureau’s failure to support Black education cemented the boundaries of the ghetto.

CONCLUSION

Many of the neighborhoods that are labeled “sketchy” and “high-crime” in modern-day Savannah are the same areas of the city that freedpeople poured into when General Sherman captured the city in December of 1864. Despite the enactment of federal protections for civil rights, the emergence of fair housing laws, and the rise of Black officials to city and county-wide elected positions, the ghetto of Savannah remains in much the same spot it did over a century and a half ago. The cyclical low economic outcomes and pernicious self-hatred that scholars describe as defining features of life in the ghetto have therefore been entrenched for just as long. To understand how and why the ghetto of Savannah emerged in the first place, and thus to ultimately begin solving these issues, it is critical that scholars look beyond the dominant narrative of American ghetto formation.

Based on the Black experience in Northern industrial cities after the Great Migration, the Drake-Cayton model of ghetto formation emphasizes the role that legal mechanisms

59 Hilary Green, “The Beach Institute and the American Missionary Association,” in *Slavery and Freedom in Savannah* (University of Georgia Press, 2014).

60 G.L. Eberhart, “Circular Letter” (National Museum of African American History and Culture, May 10, 1867), Records of the Field Offices for the State of Georgia, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1872.

61 Eberhart.

62 Eberhart.

63 “Education of Colored Children,” *Morning News Steam-Power Press*, (Savannah: 1872).

64 Richard Wright, *A Brief Historical Sketch of Negro Education in Georgia* (Savannah: Robinson Printing House, 1894). p. 17.

65 Russell Brooker, “The Education of Black Children in the Jim Crow South,” *America’s Black Holocaust Museum*, Sept. 12, 2012, <https://www.abhmuseum.org/education-for-blacks-in-the-jim-crow-south/>.

66 G.F. Richings, *Evidences of Progress Among Colored People* (Philadelphia, 1902). p. 84.

like restrictive covenants and zoning laws played in limiting the dispersal of a city's Black population. In applying this theory to cities across the South, scholars have concluded that Southern Black communities cannot be considered ghettos because the Jim Crow laws of the South enforced *social* separation of white and Black populations rather than the sort of residential spatial separation that formed ghettos in the North. The history of the ghetto of Savannah, however, proves that Black people in the South were living in the poor, cramped, and powerless conditions that define a ghetto decades before Jim Crow laws were even enacted. Indeed, the emergence of the ghetto of Savannah was not the result of specific legal mechanisms leveraged by whites to keep Black people out of their neighborhoods, but rather it was the result of the Freedmen's Bureau's consistent failures to support self-sufficiency and self-determination among the Black community.

In spite of the agency's mandate to assist the freedpeople in securing the promises of emancipation, the Freedmen's Bureau stranded the Black community of Savannah in the ghetto by repeatedly enfeebling their efforts to establish economic autonomy for themselves. In the immediate wake of the war, the Freedmen's Bureau stood by as white landowners terrorized the Black refugees who claimed their forty acres and a mule, leaving them no choice but to return to the crowded western outskirts of Savannah. Instead of forcefully advocating for the labor rights of rural Black plantation workers, the agents of the Freedmen's Bureau decided that the fragile economy was more important and bound freed-

people into labor contracts that mirrored slavery. Countless rural workers fled this Bureau-approved reinstatement of slavery and headed to Savannah, where they crammed into the burgeoning ghetto and found work in the city's new factories. Fearful that this industrial sector would shackle Black workers in a new form of labor exploitation, Black leaders recognized that the freedpeople would need an education in order to exercise economic power and accordingly founded the Savannah Educational Association to establish Black-run schools. The Freedmen's Bureau, instead of supporting this endeavor to supply freedpeople with free education, barred the organization from receiving federal funds unless they let white teachers run their schools. Thus, essentially every venture undertaken by the freedpeople of Savannah to actualize their freedom was undermined by the actions of the Freedmen's Bureau, leaving them stuck in the cyclical hardship of the ghetto.

Taking this history into account, it is clear that the established narrative of American ghetto formation is inadequate for explaining the urban experience of Black people in the South, and consequently obscures how the roots of today's ghettos extend as far as to the failures of the Freedmen's Bureau in the 1860s. Moving forward, scholars should further explore the relevant regional and city-specific factors that contributed to ghettoization, particularly in cities across the South. Avoiding the use of the traditional one-size-fits-all narrative of American ghetto formation will more accurately inform our understanding of the conditions of the ghetto, and how they plague cities like Savannah still to this day. 🏛️

The Making of Female Martyrs in the Age of Revolutions

Women were major actors in the Age of Revolutions (1775 to 1848), especially because the period opened a window of opportunity for women to expand their roles to political and militaristic ones. This included participating in boycotts and rallies, acting as spies, and even engaging in combat. However, their increased involvement in society brought about a backlash as patriarchal structures sought to limit their gains. This larger trend is manifest in the making of female martyrs – particularly in the United States, Haiti, and Colombia. This was a process that included manipulating these women’s deaths into narratives that matched the goals of the revolutionary effort. Three figures will be analyzed to understand this trend – Jane McCrea, Sanité Bélair, and Policarpa Salavarrieta. McCrea, a colonial woman who was killed in the crossfires of a revolutionary battle, would become a helpless victim of British-employed Native American scalpers used to rally moderates to the patriot’s cause and later, pioneers to settle the American West. Bélair, the first female Haitian Lieutenant executed by the French after a failed military action, would be exalted for her bravery, reflecting nationalist and pan-African objectives. Salavarrieta, a Colombian spy executed by the Spanish, would be feminized to serve as a model for other revolutionary women: patriotic, yet demure and stoic. First, their individual cases will be presented, followed by an analysis of the public reactions to these three women’s martyrdom. These reactions will then be synthesized to understand how the patriarchal backlash in the American, Haitian, and Columbian contexts compares and differs based on their specific socio-political context. Analysis of these women’s stories ultimately leads to the conclusion that women martyrs in the Age of Revolutions were mythologized by revolutionaries to advance the political and social goals of these revolutions.

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INTRODUCTION

Articles, books, festivals, coinage, and even a soap opera—these methods have been used to honor the revolutionary martyrs Jane McCrea, Sanité Bélair, and Policarpa Salavarrieta from the date of their deaths to the present. These mediums highlight their contributions to their respective countries, both real and imagined. But beyond these methods, how were these women’s legacies constructed, and why? By consulting primary sources such as newspaper articles, paintings, and first-person accounts, alongside secondary sources related to women’s contributions throughout the North American, Haitian, and Colombian revolutions, some preliminary answers to these questions will be explored throughout this paper.

The extent of the historiography on these women varies. McCrea has the most robust scholarship behind her. She has been analyzed as a piece of propaganda for the revolutionary movement (Ederton’s “The Murder of Jane McCrea: The Tragedy of an American Tableau D’Histoire” and “Engel’s Our Battle Cry Will Be: Remember Jenny McCrea!”), and as a piece of propaganda against Native Americans to encourage Western settlement of the frontier (Sheardy’s “The White Woman and the Native Male Body in Vanderlyn’s Death of

Jane McCrea,” and Namias’ *White Captives: Gender and Ethnicity on the American Frontier*). Conversely, Bélair is almost the exact opposite. The pieces that cover her do so in a biographical context, characterizing her as a celebrated revolutionary and empowering figure for other women. This is the case for books, *50 Personalidades Negras Revolucionárias* (Karina Barbosa dos Santos, Lhazia Morena) and *Martyred Lieutenant Sanite Belair* (Phillip Tucker). Similarly, Salavarrieta also has limited scholarship about her, and that which exists paints her story within a larger context of propaganda and building national identity in Colombia, particularly with Prada’s “La Pola, allegory of the nation: memories and silences in the representations of Policarpa Salavarrieta” and Martínez-Martin’s “The Noble and Gentle Hero. The Centenary of La Pola, Tunja (1917).” Although previous analysis consider how McCrea and Salavarrieta were constructed as propaganda in their respective revolutions, it does not do so through a gendered lens. Furthermore, these women have not been thought of in context together. This article thus adds to the scholarship by considering how the mythologizing of these women was impacted not only by nationalistic goals but also by patriarchal ones presenting their stories in an international context.

It is first key to understand the individual cases of

McCrea, Bélair, and Salavarrieta, considering the strengths and limitations of the scholarship on each of these women, and their respective contributions to their revolutionary movements. It will then be considered how revolutionaries turned the deaths of these women into propaganda to advance specific political goals. Finally, the experiences of these women and the mythology that developed about them will be read within the context of shifting gender roles during the Age of Revolutions. Likewise, this analysis delivers the following conclusion: women martyrs in the Age of Revolutions – particularly Jane McCrea (United States), Sanité Bélair (Haiti), and Policarpa Salavarrieta (Colombia) – were mythologized by revolutionaries to advance the political and social goals of these revolutions, and they are an example of patriarchal backlash to the expanding role of women in this time period.

CONTRIBUTIONS & AFTERMATHS OF THEIR DEATHS

Jane McCrea

Jane McCrea was a colonial woman in the revolutionary period, living in Saratoga, New York in the late eighteenth century.¹ McCrea would become engaged to her neighbor David Jones, whose family were royalists. Eventually, Jones would join the British army. However, her brother was a revolutionary, putting McCrea in the middle of the revolutionary debate.² Unlike Bélair and Salavarrieta, McCrea was not explicitly involved in the revolutionary movement of her time. There is no definitive historical evidence to determine if she was personally a loyalist or patriot, which is made more complicated as people close in her life found themselves on either side of the debate. Despite this, her story is worth mentioning, as her contributions to the revolutionary movement in death grew in outsize proportion to the contributions she made in life, offering an interesting contrast to Bélair and Salavarrieta who explicitly chose to be a part of their respective movements.

While a wealth of primary sources exist about McCrea, they do not focus on her life and are almost entirely newspaper articles, pamphlets, and paintings constructed in the aftermath of her death and throughout the early Independence period. Therefore, these sources are extremely influenced by the political motivations of their authors to mythologize McCrea in ways that would advance their goals. They tell us much more about the mythologizing of McCrea than McCrea's actual life, thoughts, or contributions to the revolutionary movement (if any existed).

In July of 1777, McCrea was shot and killed, likely by friendly fire, during a series of skirmishes between British

auxiliaries and rebel militiamen. Although accounts vary, McCrea is said to have been on her way to visit her fiancé, who was a British officer,³ at the time of her death. McCrea's death coincided with a moment in the North American Revolution when patriot forces were struggling to maintain the manpower necessary to combat the British, creating a need to persuade moderates to the revolutionary cause.⁴ To accomplish this, patriots painted British actions as objectionably deplorable through McCrea's death, uniting the moderate and patriot forces against a common enemy. As reports of McCrea's death populated American newspapers, her story warped to fit American needs. In an August 1777 article by the *Boston Independent Chronicle*, she was referred to as a "harmless, helpless female" who was taken from her home by Native "Devils" who killed her in "cold blood," rather than in crossfire.⁵ Gruesome details of her death were emphasized as well, with multiple articles describing McCrea as being scalped. One clipping paints McCrea's death as thus:

"In 1777, during the expedition of Gen. Burgoyne, two Indian chiefs were employed to bring Miss Mc'Crea to a place of safety... Quarreling about the reward, one of them killed her, tore off her scalp, and carried it to her lover."⁶

Similarly to the *Boston Chronicle's* description of the Native American men as killing her in "cold blood," this account describes them as having a lack of empathy. They are motivated only by financial gain and quickly turn to extreme violence when that is threatened. The clipping also describes the Natives as being employed by the British, playing on fears that proliferated amongst colonists regarding the employment of Indians by the British.⁷ What initially had been a relatively commonplace story of a woman caught in the cross-fire of a revolutionary battle became a mythology of the revolution. This mythology painted British forces to be merciless and violent in their treatment towards an innocent, helpless young American woman, even allying with Indian "savages" to bring about her death. Thus, McCrea became a martyr for the revolutionary cause, used to rally American troops and American society in general against the British. Revolutionaries would later credit the American victory at Saratoga against General Burgoyne's troops to her death – although most modern historians do not believe McCrea's death led to this victory.

Sanité Bélair

Bélair was a young free woman of color during the rev-

1 Jeremy Engels, J., & Greg Goodale, "Our Battle Cry Will Be: Remember Jenny McCrea!" A Précis on the Rhetoric of Revenge." *American Quarterly*, 61, no. 1, (2009): 95-96. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734977>.

2 BENSON J. LOSSING, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PHILIP SCHYLER., 1873, http://archive.org/details/bub_gb_ErMonE_7absC.

3 Robert Sheardy Jr., "The White Woman and the Native Male Body in Vanderlyn's Death of Jane McCrea," *Journal of American Culture* 22, no. 1 (1999): 93, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-734X.1999.00093.x>.

4 Jeremy Engels and Greg Goodale, "Our Battle Cry Will Be: Remember Jenny McCrea!" A Précis on the Rhetoric of Revenge," *American Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (2009): 98.

5 Engels and Goodale, 97-102.

6 The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs: Print Collection, The New York Public Library. "Jane McCrea." New York Public Library Digital Collections. Accessed January 19, 2024. <https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/23da7be0-c583-012f-b32e-58d385a7bc34>.

7 Samuel Y. Edgerton, "The Murder of Jane McCrea: The Tragedy of an American Tableau d'Histoire," *The Art Bulletin* 47, no. 4 (1965): 483, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3048306>.

olution in Haiti, with some accounts describing her as mixed race and others describing her as having complete African ancestry. In her late teens, she married Charles Bélair, a nephew to Toussaint L'Ouverture,⁸ who would climb up the insurrection's ranks and later would be considered a potential successor to L'Ouverture. Alongside her husband, Bélair was thoroughly engaged in the revolution. Notably, the Bélairs are credited with starting a slave rebellion in L'Artibonite, during the Haitian Revolution from 1794 to 1802, eventually earning Sanité the title of Lieutenant, the first Haitian woman known to do so.⁹ The height of her involvement occurred just before her death in 1802. In February of that year, the Leclerc Expedition took place, in which Victor-Emmanuel Leclerc, brother-in-law of Napoleon Bonaparte, arrived with large numbers of French troops with orders to reinstate slavery. L'Ouverture directed his forces against Leclerc for three months, but in May of 1802 L'Ouverture surrendered, with Leclerc sending him to France for execution in early June.¹⁰ A poorly constructed rebellion led by the Bélairs caused their capture by the French and execution by firing squad in 1802. Initially, Bélair was to be hanged, as death by firing squad was reserved only for soldiers. Bélair, as a woman, was not considered one. However, Bélair is said to have argued with the executioners, leveraging her rank as Lieutenant to secure her execution by firing squad.¹¹

Unfortunately, limited primary source documentation exists in Haiti from this period, and even fewer about Sanité Bélair's contributions to the revolutionary movement and reactions to this. This is largely due to the high illiteracy rates amongst the Black population of Haiti: Toussaint L'Ouverture himself was an illiterate man who was previously enslaved. This requires us to instead rely on secondary sources from after the revolutionary period to glean how her martyrdom was used by Haitian leadership. Before discussing what can be learned through these accounts, it is important to understand their context and limitations. The earliest source was written fifty years after Bélair's death, and the latest source over one hundred years after her death. As such, we cannot conclude how revolutionaries specifically used her death during the revolution or in the immediate post-revolutionary period for their own gains. Additionally, none of these sources intended to reveal women's contributions to the revolution. Joseph Saint-Remy's 1853 biography, *Mémoires du*

Général Toussaint-L'Ouverture, and CLR James's 1938 *Black Jacobins* both focus strongly on the role of Toussaint L'Ouverture in the revolution, and J.N. Leger's 1907 *Haiti, Her History and Her Detractors* focuses on a general overview of Haitian history. They therefore spend less than a paragraph collectively describing Sanité Bélair and her contributions to the revolution, which dramatically reduces the conclusions we can make about how Bélair's martyrdom was used by radicals during the revolutionary period. Despite these limitations, what can be determined is how Bélair's death was conceptualized in the Independence Period by Haitian intellectuals. Bélair's death was powerful enough to survive in oral history throughout the revolution and the unsteady attempts to rebuild a nation until it could be committed to written word in 1850. This provides a snapshot into the mythology of Bélair, and where it stood by the Independence Period.

From these accounts, Bélair's person and death are constructed as brave and influential. In Saint-Remy's biography, Bélair is described as going to her death with "courage... [that] astonished even her executioners."¹² In Leger's work, Bélair is described as "[dying] bravely; considering the attempt to blindfold her an insult to her courage, she boldly presented her breast to receive the fatal shot."¹³ James describes something similar, proclaiming that "his wife [Sanité Bélair died] facing the firing-squad and refusing to have her eyes bound."¹⁴ These Haitian historians also depicted Bélair as having a strong influence over her husband throughout the revolutionary movement. Leger credits her for inciting her husband to "[take] up arms in the mountains of Verrettes... [as] Commander-in-Chief of the Indigenes."¹⁵ And in James' book,¹⁶ Bélair is described as particularly hateful towards whites, "[encouraging her husband] to treat them harshly."¹⁷

Policarpa Salavarrieta

Salavarrieta is known to have been born into a poor Creole family living in the capital of Colombia. She was employed as a seamstress, while also working in an illegal aguardiente distillation.¹⁸ She was a strong sympathizer to the independence movement, eventually playing a role by providing information and assistance to the patriot underground, first in Guaduas and then in Bogota.¹⁹ In 1817, she planned to undermine royalists in the Sante Fe Garrison in hopes of turning them into republicans. During this cam-

8 Toussaint L'Ouverture was the leader of the Haitian Revolution from 1791 to 1802.

9 Tucker Phillip, "Martyred Lieutenant Sanité Bélair," accessed December 18, 2023, <https://www.abebooks.com/9780359413034/Martyred-Lieutenant-Sanite-C3%A9-B%C3%A9clair-Tucker-035941303X/plp>.

10 Johnhenry Gonzalez, *Maroon Nation: A History of Revolutionary Haiti* (Yale University Press, 2019), 70, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvhrzczdn>.

11 Tucker, Phillip Thomas. Martyred Lieutenant Sanité Bélair, 156.

12 Joseph Saint-Rémy, "Vie de Toussaint-L'Ouverture," online text, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, accessed December 18, 2023, <https://www.loc.gov/item/14003387/>.

13 Jacques Nicolas Léger, *Haiti, Her History and Her Detractors* / by J.N. Léger. New York: The Neale Pub. Co., 1907, 129.

14 C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins*, by C. L. R. James (London, 1967) 352.

15 Léger, 142.

16 This book was written in 1938, but the particular copy I used for this paper was published in 1963.

17 C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins*, 257.

18 Rebecca Earle, "Rape and the Anxious Republic: Revolutionary Colombia, 1810-1830," in *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America* (New York, USA: Duke University Press, 2020), 127-46, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822380238-007>.

19 Bushnell. "Salavarrieta, Policarpa (1795-1817)." In *Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture*, 5:672, n.d.

paign, she was caught and executed.²⁰

The primary and secondary sources for Salavarrieta are limited, and those that are available are in Spanish.²¹ This limits the resources available to analyze the propaganda around her death. Of the available sources, the author will be using translations of primary sources analyzed by other historians. This includes “Rape and the Anxious Republic,” an article by social historian Rebecca Earle, which discusses the use of rape mythology to advance the goals of Latin American revolutionaries. This is a particularly robust source written through the lens of gender and oppression, which well informs the goals of this paper and provides context to how Salavarrieta’s martyrdom was constructed by revolutionaries. Also used is an 1891 biography of Salavarrieta by Eduardo Calcaño, a Venezuelan professor and author. Finally, paintings of Policarpa Salavarrieta by artists of the 1850s are used for analysis. However, it is unclear the audience of these paintings or the exact dates of publication.

After her death, Salavarrieta’s execution was used by revolutionaries as an example of how a woman could acceptably devote herself to the revolutionary cause in alliance with gender norms. To construct this narrative, depictions of her death focused on her beautiful physical appearance and her quiet resilience. Eyewitness accounts of Jose Hilario Lopez and Jose Maria Caballero “enunciated a Policarpa with white complexion, good-looking, dressed in a blue dress, with a white shawl and a Cuban-style wicker hat.”²² Eduardo Calcaño’s biography of Salavarrieta, written in the eighteenth century, described her as “an elegant girl in bold customs, with a beautiful, honest, soft, and demure word and condition.” During her execution, she is “serene [and] undaunted, [stunning] her executioners.”²³ Paintings of Salavarrieta that emerged in the 1850s would depict her in a very feminine nature. Epifanio Garay Caicedo’s “Portrait of Policarpa Salavarrieta, heroine of the independence of Colombia, known as La Pola” emphasizes Salavarrieta’s beauty. She sits in a dress and shawl inside a home, illuminated at the center of the painting with her hair falling in soft waves around her face. Her dress, actions, and expression in the painting are far removed from her revolutionary behavior. The only reference to something revolutionary is a soldier who appears darkened in the doorway, contrasting starkly with Salavarrieta’s bright complexion. Another nineteenth-century painting of Salavarrieta titled “Policarpa Salavarrieta. Called ‘The Pola’” shows her on the way to her execution. Her face is cast demurely to the ground, her hand over her breast as she is led by a priest and soldier to her death. Again,

her complexion is milky and bright, her hair depicted in soft styled black curls, and she wears a pretty blue gown free of grime or tears. Salavarrieta does not resist the priest or soldier, who looks at her softly. A caption on the side of the paintings reads,

“Sacrificed by the Spanish in this square, her memory remains eternal among us and her fame resonates...”²⁴

Across all these sources is an emphasis on Salavarrieta’s physical appearance. They seek to feminize her to whitewash from her more “masculine” actions, such as engaging in subterfuge for the revolutionary movement and resisting her execution.

MYTHOLOGIZING

The sections above focus on examining the contributions these women made to their respective revolutionary movements, the primary sources available for analysis in each case, and their deaths and immediate aftermaths. But how were the mythologies of these three women built, and for what ends?

Jane McCrea

In revolutionary and post-revolutionary America, Jane McCrea’s death was constructed into a myth of a helpless female martyr who died at the hands of the British and Native Americans, which served revolutionary purposes to unite American colonists against the British and engage in a colonial project against the Native Americans. The relevance of the McCrea mythology would continue in the post-Revolutionary years, where it was deployed to build national identity and to other Native American communities. The story of her death was manipulated to emphasize its tragedy in the years post-revolution by falsely identifying her and her family members as patriot sympathizers. In newspaper accounts of her death, McCrea became a patriot who was avenged by a patriot brother, instead of a woman without clear affiliations in the revolution who was avenged by her British fiancé.²⁵ Other accounts, such as an excerpt from *Silliman’s Tour* in 1821, named her husband as an “American refugee,” creating sympathy for McCrea’s martyrdom through a different angle.²⁶ The tragedy of McCrea’s death was also exaggerated in paintings of the incident, such as Vanderlyn’s “The Death of Jane McCrea,” where he depicts “Jane’s lover in blue, suggesting he was in the service of the colonial army” rather than a revolutionary soldier.²⁷ Changing Jane’s affiliation from a British sympathizer to an American patriot served purposes to build a national identity, as McCrea became someone other new American

20 Rebecca Earle, “Rape and the Anxious Republic: Revolutionary Colombia, 1810–1830,” in *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America* (New York, USA: Duke University Press, 2020), 127–46, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822380238-007>.

21 The author does not speak Spanish.

22 Prada, “La Pola, Allegory of the Nation: Memories and Silences in the Representations of Policarpa Salavarrieta,” 133–69. University of Rosario, n.d.

23 Eduardo Calcaño, *Policarpa Salavarrieta: monólogo en verso* [Policarpa Salavarrieta: monologue in verse], Tip. “El Cojo,” 1891.

24 “Policarpa Salavarrieta Marches to Her Execution - Unknown,” Google Arts & Culture, accessed January 20, 2024, <https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/policarpa-salavarrieta-marches-to-her-execution-unknown/RwHXX-5g5JMjw>.

25 Engels and Goodale, “Our Battle Cry Will Be,” 99.

26 “Washington Gazette,” August 29, 1821.

27 Sheardy Jr., “The White Woman and the Native Male Body in Vanderlyn’s Death of Jane McCrea,” 94.

citizens could identify with. McCrea's martyrdom became duly focused on both the cruelty of the British in McCrea's murder, and the sacrifice of an American woman and her family to the revolutionary cause, likely inspiring others to identify further with the McCrea myth and adopt an identity of "American."

Beyond this, McCrea's martyrdom was also used to evoke disgust towards Native men and was in part used to help justify colonial expansion on Native lands in the years post-Revolution. Although earlier accounts from newspapers also referred to the Natives who killed McCrea as savages, we can see the impact of this even further in later accounts. Henry Bryan Hall and Luigi Schiavonetti's print, "Murder of Jane McCrea," highlights the physical strength and violence of two Native men as they murder Jane McCrea.²⁸ The men's backs face the viewer, exposing strong muscles across their legs, backs, and arms. A long dagger is held by one man and an axe by the other. Their faces are barely visible, dehumanizing the men in the process. In contrast, Jane McCrea's full face is shown looking up at her attackers with confusion and fear. She raises her arm above her face, her only defense to shield herself. Her clothing and body are soft, without the angular muscles of the Native men. Natives are thus depicted in a light that implies they will take advantage of those who are unprepared to defend themselves. This serves two purposes: one, to vilify Indigenous people and justify colonial aggression towards them, and two, to highlight the barbarity of Native culture in a way that "others" the group and depict their culture as inferior. Both these factors served to justify colonial expansion. Paintings, newsletters, and oral histories of McCrea which highlighted the antithesis between her and Native peoples infiltrated the public consciousness, as demonstrated by a letter of a widow to General George Washington in the *Spooner's Vermont Journal*. In this letter, the widow describes the "tortures...[inflicted] by barbarous Indians upon the lovely Miss McCrea."²⁹ Here, we can see the McCrea mythology achieving its goal to inspire self-identification of new American citizens with McCrea and against Native peoples, as the woman uses positive language such as "lovely" to describe McCrea, and negative language to describe the Mohawk people, such as "barbarous." However, it is worth noting there is little other primary and secondary source documentation that demonstrates popular reactions to the McCrea myth, for example, through diary entries, personal correspondence, and other sources that might give historians a window into how the average person thought about McCrea in the revolutionary period. Overall, McCrea's martyrdom served revolutionary purposes that changed over time. Initially, it supported the American Revolutionary's

goals to unite with moderates in the fight against the British, and it would later serve to unite a white American identity against Native peoples.

Sanité Bélair

In contrast to McCrea, Bélair's martyrdom characterizes her as uniquely valiant and gives her a degree of agency in her story. This characterization advanced different political and social goals. In describing her death, historians reflecting upon Bélair describe her as courageous and indignant to the French colonizers bringing about her death. She stood up for what she believed was her right to be executed by firing squad and to not be blindfolded, which the authors seem to endorse as a strong choice. This is evident in the language they use. Leger describes her action to "[present] her breast to receive the fatal shot" as courageous. Here, one can understand this description of Sanité potentially being used to inspire pride in the Haitian people. Even in the face of injustice by a colonial power, Bélair, and to a larger extent the people of Haiti, would not back down, instead choosing to act with dignity. This is considered even more convincing in light of the context authors Leger and James wrote. Leger's work was translated into English to "give the Americans the means of forming an impartial opinion on Haiti for themselves" and challenge international stereotypes of Haitians as superstitious and barbarous.³⁰ James's work was written in the broader context of the pan-African movement, of which he was a key player.³¹ Depicting Bélair in such positive terms aligns with these contexts, as her courage and honorable nature challenge negative Haitian stereotypes, and could have inspired pride across those of African-descent during the pan-African movement.

Despite this positive characterization, these accounts could also be read as a warning against Bélair's influence over her husband, playing on misogynistic themes of women leading men astray. Leger states that she was the reason her husband moved forward with the rebellion in Verrettes, which was the rebellion that led to their capture and death. This implicitly places blame on Bélair for the couple's fate. Additionally, James depicts Bélair as encouraging her husband to treat white people harshly. In both these instances, Bélair's influence over her husband resulted in erroneous and violent outcomes: a fatal flaw in battle, and aggression towards another racial group. This could be understood as a broader warning about the dangers that arise when women gain influence in political and military spheres. While this string of misogyny operated differently than McCrea's – McCrea is utterly helpless, and Bélair exerts too much control – they served similar ends to limit women's position in

28 Henry Bryan Hall and Luigi Schiavonetti, *Murder of Jane McCrea, 1825*, Print, 1825, The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs: Print Collection, The New York Public Library Digital Collections, <https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/76d91550-c60a-012f-fba3-58d385a7bc34>.

29 "Copy of a Letter Said to Have Been Written to General Washington," accessed September 23, 2023, <https://infoweb-newsbank-com.libproxy.berkeley.edu/apps/readex/doc?p=EANX-&docref=image/v2%3A110118175DBBC28%40EANX-10F3321AB01908B8%402374232-10F3321ABB43E000%400-10F3321BA0266860%40Copy%252Bof%252Ba%252BLetter%252B-Said%252Bto%252BHave%252BBeen%252BWritten%252Bto%252BGeneral%252BWashington%25252C%252Bby%252Bthe%252BWidow%252Bof%252Ba%252BLate%252BAmerican%252BOfficer>.

30 Leger, 14.

31 Christian Høgsberg, "CLR James and the Black Jacobins • International Socialism," *International Socialism: A Quarterly Review of Socialist History*, no. 126 (April 23, 2010), <https://isj.org.uk/clr-james-and-the-black-jacobins/>.

society. However, because these authors speak on Bélair and her influence over her husband so briefly, it is difficult to discern entirely what their beliefs on her outsized influence are. It is possible James might not have considered Bélair's feelings towards whites to be necessarily negative, and might instead have viewed them as a reasonable reaction to decades of oppression and maltreatment by white people. The author does not use enough definitive language to determine whether this is the case. Overall, Bélair's death was used by post-revolutionary Haitian historians both to bolster pride in the Haitian people amidst a hostile international context and can also be understood as a warning against outsized female influence in the political sphere.

Policarpa Salavarrieta

When considering the Spanish-American context, revolutionaries constructed Salavarrieta's martyrdom to encourage female revolutionaries to adhere to traditional gender roles but also rallied people in a common revolutionary myth. Common to the depictions of Salavarrieta is an emphasis on her femininity, both her body and her personality. She is beautiful, elegant, demure, and serene. This parallels McCrea's case as both women's traditionally feminine qualities, particularly related to their bodies in paintings, were emphasized. This turns attention away from the more daring, traditionally masculine aspects of Salavarrieta's story, such as her work subverting royalists in the patriot resistance. In her death, she is also constructed as someone willing to sacrifice herself for the revolutionary cause, stoically accepting her fate in the end rather than acting out in an over-emotional manner. This mythology, however, contrasts with what other eyewitness accounts of her death describe: Salavarrieta railing against her executioners until her final moments.³² This opens the possibility that Salavarrieta's narrative was changed to align her with what was deemed acceptable behavior for women in Spanish America. The construction of Salavarrieta's martyrdom can be understood to depict an example of what Spanish-American women should embody in revolutionary movements. Women should be engaged in revolutionary causes, but not in a way that steps outside gender norms. They should be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for the cause, but not in a way that draws attention to themselves. They should face death calmly and with docility. Despite the myth's focus on feminine gender norms, Salavarrieta's narrative was deeply impactful for all of revolutionary Colombia. Her sacrifice was celebrated for years after Colombian independence in a series of holidays that honored martyrs of the cause. She was included in the decade-long

centennial celebration of the Colombian Revolution in Bogota.³³ Therefore, Salavarrieta's narrative was also used to invoke national pride. She inspired Colombians across gender lines due to her sacrifice and heroic efforts in the face of colonial power. This parallels Bélair who was similarly exalted for her sacrifice. Both Salavarrieta and Bélair eventually made their way onto stamps and money bills of their respective countries. However, Bélair was allowed to keep the more masculine aspects of her story, whereas Salavarrieta's were feminized. Colombian revolutionaries constructed a narrative of Salavarrieta's martyrdom that emphasized traditionally feminine characteristics to offer an example of an acceptable female revolutionary and galvanize Colombia's revolutionary forces.

RECONSTRUCTING WOMEN'S ROLES

When thinking about these case studies comparatively and within the context of women's roles in revolutionary movements, parallels can be drawn between these mythologies; all three were in part constructed to limit the martyr's agency and extinguish the threat of women's expanding roles in the American, Colombian, and Haitian revolution.

Common to these three revolutions was a broader context of women becoming more actively involved in the political sphere. In America, women were significantly involved in the revolution and arguably held a stronger influence during this period than had been possible in the pre-revolutionary period and in Europe. Women served "in political demonstrations and riots, sometimes on the sidelines as spectators to major events, sometimes as worshipers or mourners or exhorters," and were especially key to economic boycotts as the main shoppers for their households.³⁴ In Haiti, women of color provided vital support as agricultural workers, carried ammunition and cannons, committed espionage, and even "took a direct part in combat" throughout the revolution.³⁵ In Colombia and Latin America, women generally played diverse roles as seamstresses, nurses, philanthropists, cooks, reinforcements, and also physically fought and led troops during the revolutionary period. A sizable number of women in Colombia put themselves on the front lines whereupon "at least 48 women were executed, 119 were arrested and exiled, and 15 sentenced to hard labor" during Colombian independence wars.³⁶ In the American, Haitian, and Colombian contexts, women's roles expanded to take on more traditionally masculine ones, thus increasing the power and influence they had. Instead of embracing this advancement and welcoming women into post-revolutionary societies, the mythologies constructed of these women sought to diminish women's

32 Rebecca Earle, "Rape and the Anxious Republic: Revolutionary Colombia, 1810–1830." In *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America*, 127–46. New York, USA: Duke University Press, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822380238-007>.

33 Abel Fernando Martín and Andrés Cascante, "La Noble y Gentil Prócer. El Centenario de La Pola, Tunja (1917)." *HISTORELo* 12 (October 1, 2020): 117–48, <https://doi.org/10.15446/historelo.v12n25.83180>.

34 Alfred F. Young and Gregory Nobles, "Writing Women into the Revolution," in *Whose American Revolution Was It?: Historians Interpret the Founding* (New York University Press, 2020), 240, <https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814789124.001.0001>.

35 Philippe Girard, "Rebelle with a Cause: Women in the Haitian War of Independence, 1802–04," *Gender & History* 21, no. 1 (2009): 60–85, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0424.2009.01535.x>.

36 "Women and the Spanish-American Wars of Independence: An Overview - Claire Brewster, 2005," accessed September 23, 2023, <https://journals-sagepub-com.libproxy.berkeley.edu/doi/10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400200>.

contributions to these revolutionary causes and ensure they remained in traditional places in the home post-revolution, reflecting anxieties around women's participation in revolutionary movements.

In the American and Colombian contexts, this backlash is evident in how McCrea and Salavarieta are victims of gendered stereotypes that limit their agency in their stories. For McCrea, her dependency on men is emphasized throughout her mythology. McCrea does not fight back against her executioners – she is doomed from the start once she is captured by the British-employed Natives. As described by Sheardy, this “[reinforces] the notion that women, even heroines, are helpless without the protection of a civilized man.”³⁷ The McCrea myth was an example of cultural attempts to enforce American women's dependency on men, dampening women's heightened influence during the revolutionary period. This parallels the Latin American case with Slavarieta. As discussed before, Salavarieta's feminine qualities were emphasized to distract from aspects of her story that did not fit into traditional feminine roles. Her agency is also reduced, as her mythology depicts her as not fighting back against her executioners, although eyewitness accounts say otherwise. Salavarieta was not the only woman to have her agency limited within the context of the revolution. Other efforts to limit women's newfound power during the revolution are clear in the construction of rape mythologies that depicted women as weak victims of aggressive Spaniards.³⁸ Throughout the late eighteenth century, republican leaders began to accuse royalists of raping innocent widows and virgins, which Earle describes as “an anxious response to increased female mobilization.”³⁹ These mythologies did not exist in a vacuum, and shortly after independence was achieved in the United States and Colombia, legal structures emerged to reinforce women's lowly status. In the United States, this was established through the practice of *coverture*, which “transferred a woman's civic identity to her husband at marriage.”⁴⁰ In a court case post-revolution, *Martin v. Massachusetts*, *coverture* was upheld and strengthened despite ideological threats to it during the revolution, as it was determined that although women were citizens of the nation, they were not guaranteed full rights under the law nor could be held to the same legal expectation as men. Within the Colombian context, anxieties around women's roles would also become manifest in a “legal system that endorsed the economic, social, and physical subordination of women to men,” a clear comparison to the

system of *coverture* that developed in America.⁴¹

With the mythology of Bélair's death in Haiti, the backlash to women's participation in the revolution is slightly more complicated. First, she is commended for her heroism and allowed to perform masculine roles in her mythology, a stark contrast to McCrea and Salavarieta. Haitian historians still praise her for her indignity towards French colonists who wanted to hang her rather than execute her, and do not diminish her status as Lieutenant in the revolution. This is likely because in Haiti there was already a cultural precedent for women's involvement in political realms and rebellions. In West Africa, where many enslaved people from Haiti hailed from, there was a tradition of women serving in combat, demonstrating a pre-colonial precedent for women's involvement in militant efforts.⁴² Furthermore, women often played important roles in slave resistance pre-revolution. Enslaved women have been cited as demonstrating “arguably deeper resistance to Europeans than men,” with domestic servants in particular being cited as difficult.⁴³ Women engaged in acts of rebellion such as suicide, abortion, infanticide, marronage, and refusal to comply with poor working conditions, such as working at night.⁴⁴ Therefore, historians writing about Bélair in post-revolutionary Haiti could have understood Bélair as a part of this legacy, and the roles she took in the revolution not as masculine ones but appropriate for women too. At the same time, Bélair is implicitly criticized for her influence over her husband, including her encouragement of the rebellion that eventually led to their capture, coupled with her influence over his attitudes towards whites. While early Haitian historians' praise for Bélair's actions reflected Haiti's cultural past, their critique of Bélair's outsized influence reflected Haiti's present. As Mimi Sheller has expertly traced in “Sword-Bearing Citizens: Militarism and Manhood in Nineteenth-Century Haiti,” the constitutional and legal framework of the Haitian state was one predicated on masculinity. Women were not allowed to be citizens and thus were not guaranteed the rights bestowed upon their male counterparts in the post-revolutionary period. This development, according to Sheller, is a result of women's strong economic roles in Haitian society which allowed them a degree of financial independence, which was ultimately seen as threatening to men's power.⁴⁵ An additional explanation can be found in Haiti's international standing post-independence. Haiti stood as a nation of former slaves, one that had beaten an elite European power, thus undermining all ideas around ra-

37 Robert Sheardy Jr., “The White Woman and the Native Male Body in Vanderlyn's Death of Jane McCrea,” *Journal of American Culture* 22, no. 1 (1999): 93–100, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-734X.1999.00093.x>.

38 Rebecca Earle, “Rape and the Anxious Republic: Revolutionary Colombia, 1810–1830,” in *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America* (New York, USA: Duke University Press, 2020), 127–46, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822380238-007>.

39 Rebecca Earle, “Rape and the Anxious Republic: Revolutionary Colombia, 1810–1830.”

40 Linda K. Kerber, “The Paradox of Women's Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin vs. Massachusetts, 1805,” *The American Historical Review* 97, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 349–78, <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/97.2.349>.

41 “Women and the Spanish-American Wars of Independence: An Overview - Claire Brewster, 2005,” accessed September 23, 2023, <https://journals-sagepub-com.libproxy.berkeley.edu/doi/10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400200>.

42 Philippe Girard, “Rebels with a Cause: Women in the Haitian War of Independence, 1802–04,” *Gender & History* 21, no. 1 (2009): 60–85, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0424.2009.01535.x>.

43 Jayne Boisvert, “Colonial Hell and Female Slave Resistance in Saint-Domingue,” *Journal of Haitian Studies* 7, no. 1 (2001): 61–76.

44 Jayne Boisvert, “Colonial Hell and Female Slave Resistance in Saint-Domingue,” *Journal of Haitian Studies* 7, no. 1 (2001): 61–76.

45 Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/berkeley-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1075079>.

cial superiority and white supremacy that were integral to the colonial projects of the nineteenth century. Perhaps to gain some acceptability, it was pressured to adopt some ideologies of its former oppressor. These two truths – that Haitians had a history in which women were praised for playing important roles in rebellious movements, and Haitians were moving towards more misogynistic ideas about women's place in societies – appear to have influenced the mythology of Bélair. She was allowed to have some power and agency, but only to the extent that it was not threatening to the men around her. Bélair's mythology both teaches about, and is a product of, the complex attitudes towards Haitian women in the post-revolutionary period, a much more nuanced case than that of McCrea or Salavarrieta.

CONCLUSION

Considering female martyrdom and its use by revolutionaries and nationalists as an analytical framework reveals rich insights into themes of propaganda, national identity, women's roles in revolutionary movements, and more. In the McCrea

case, her martyrdom was used by revolutionaries to construct a mythology of a helpless woman killed by particularly cruel British and Indian forces, which served to unite revolutionaries against these groups and construct women as dependent on men. In the Bélair case, her execution was used to inspire national pride but also warn against the dangers of women who were too influential. In the Salavarrieta case, her death was used to highlight what an acceptable female role might be in a revolutionary movement by constructing her actions in accordance with gender roles. These cases all exist in a larger context of women's increased involvement in the public sphere during the age of revolutions, and these cases can reveal a larger anxiety about this increased involvement and women's future roles in these societies. These three cases also demonstrate the power and agency women carved out for themselves in patriarchal societies during the age of revolutions. Despite the backlash women experienced for their increased involvement in the post-revolutionary periods, it is a testament to their power that their contributions remain in the historical record, and continue to impact the modern world. 🏛️

The “Poet’s Corner”

Women and Classical Reception in Colonial Maryland

“Once Cupid on a Summer’s Day,
To Chloe’s Garden went his way,
When he had pillag’d all her House,
And made a general Rendevout,
Anatomiz’d her Heart and Liver,
And played the Devil with her Quiver,
Stole all the Blessings of the coup’d lofe,
Her Patches, Pains, and Biller douz,
Resolv’d to Store and Stock himself,
With fragrant spoil and Virgin pelf,
He travers’d all her Flowery-beds,
And pluck’d her Blew’s, her Whites, and Reds,
Left not one single Pink or Dazy,
With full intent to set her crazy”¹

Theocritus’ Cupid Wounded is one of many classical works of poetry that became popular in British colonial North America. This and other poems were frequently reprinted in newspapers meant for a wide audience. These poems have largely been forgotten, but their popularity illustrates the influential nature of classical works in the colonial United States. This suggests the importance of examining the reception and transmission of the classical tradition among colonial Americans, including understanding who was responsible for bringing the classics to early Americans and why that mattered.

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THE MARYLAND GAZETTE, THE FIRST newspaper published south of Pennsylvania and the seventh to attain regular publication in English America,² showcased a certain “culture of classicism”³ from the paper’s founding in 1727 until its final issue in 1839.⁴ Indeed, next to Christianity, classicism was the central intellectual project in eighteenth-century America.⁵ This culture was not confined to academic institutions. It permeated many areas of American life, blending seamlessly into politics, literature, and art. Although a culture of classicism was an indispensable hallmark of a “gentlemen’s culture,” colonial Americans of every stripe drew inspiration from the classics: they studied, read, discussed, and wrote about the classics. For eighteenth-century Anglo-Americans, the world of the ancient Mediterranean was safely exotic: “both whimsical and serious, fantastical and yet deeply familiar.”⁶ Colonial Americans could use their classical canon to console, justify, and validate the emotions they experienced as the Revolutionary era approached. Indeed, the classics,

“unmoored in time, accessible to anyone who could read a pamphlet or hear a poem,” allowed early Americans to form intellectual and emotional relationships with the narratives and heroes of antiquity, while also providing a paradigm through which they could make sense of their changing world.⁷ Even early American women, who were denied access to higher education until the second half of the nineteenth century, maintained a practice of looking back on antiquity. Indeed, classical motifs, images, and heroes were so common that they formed an integral part of the vocabulary of educated women in the eighteenth century.⁸ In the middle of the eighteenth century, opportunities for female classical reading expanded rapidly as British polite culture permeated the colonies through a tide of newspapers, magazines, and books.⁹ This paper explores that theme by focusing on one newspaper: the *Maryland Gazette*. The *Gazette* was printed in the mid-eighteenth century by Jonas Green, and upon his death by his widow, Anne Catharine Green. Anne Green did not

1 Theocritus, “Cupid Wounded.” *Maryland Gazette* (1727-1775). Mary 20, 1929. Archives of Maryland Online. “Cupid Wounded,” a translation of Greek pastoral poet Theocritus’ *Idyll* 19, was published in a May 1729 copy of the *Maryland Gazette* by William Parks. Likely a copy of a translation of Latin translations of the early Greek, “Cupid Wounded” told the tale of a Cupid who walked into a garden and was stung by a bee. Cupid cries to his mother, and she tells him that he cannot be upset by a mere sting when he inflicts such great harm upon other people. See Hutton, James. “Cupid and the Bee.” *PMLA* 56, no. 4 (1941): 1036–58 for notes on the translation of *Cupid Wounded* (*Idyll* 19) from antiquity to the modern.

2 Parks’ *Gazette* followed the typical colonial model, meaning it was divided into two parts: the first section contained new items and essay-material that was often reprinted from foreign publications or other American newspapers and the second included advertisements – legal notices, real estate offerings, slave sales, even lists of merchandise (Martin Schultz and Herman R. Lantz, “Occupational Pursuits of Free Women in Early America: An Examination of Eighteenth-Century Newspapers,” *Sociological Forum* 3, no. 1 (1988), 92).

3 I borrow this terminology from Caroline Winterer’s *The Culture of Classicism*.

4 Wroth, L. C. *Typhothetae of Baltimore*. (1922). *A history of printing in Colonial Maryland, 1686-1776*. [Baltimore]: Typhothetae of Baltimore: 69.

5 Caroline Winterer, *The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life, 1780-1910* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 1.

6 Francesca Langer, *On the Utility of Antiquity In Early America*, 2018, 35.

7 Langer, 35.

8 Langer, 3.

9 Although the most successful urban papers had only a few thousand paying subscribers, actual readership was far greater than the rate of circulation. White literacy rates in British North America were quite high by the end of the eighteenth century, and newspapers reached even illiterate audiences. Taverns, coffeehouses, and neighborhood organizations provided communal copies to be passed around or read aloud at public gatherings (Langer, 3).

have the option of learning the print trade through a formal apprenticeship, nor did she have wealthy patrons to subsidize her training. Rather, she learned the trade by observing and by actively participating in her part within a printing family. When she became a widow, Green gained an independence she never enjoyed as a wife. She used her new status to make several important changes to the *Maryland Gazette*, including standardizing the embellishment of the initial letter in each issue, giving space to all parties in local controversies, and providing national and foreign news. But Anne Green's most important innovation was introducing a new section to each issue of the *Gazette* called "Poet's Corner," in which she published works of literature with classical motifs and themes.

By taking control of the *Gazette* when her husband died and by using her power as editor to publish the "Poet's Corner," Green subverted colonial gender norms by enabling women's engagement with the classics, a traditionally masculine intellectual space. In fact, Green helped redefine what it meant for a woman to be a 'good' and 'productive' member of society. By continuing to run the *Gazette*, she proved that a woman could succeed in a position of power and influence. By using her power to help bolster a culture of classicism in Maryland, she provided everyday Marylanders, including women, a space in which they could enjoy some of the cultural power normally reserved for gentlemen.

AMERICA'S CULTURE OF CLASSICISM

Well into the nineteenth century, the Greco-Roman past represented the pinnacle of art, literature, and science according to the British intellectual community.¹⁰ They considered an interest in the history, the culture, and the languages of classical antiquity a high-culture endeavor. By 1750, that same world of classical antiquity became meaningful to a growing number of early Americans.¹¹ Although they did not produce any great classical scholars, or otherwise make important contributions to classical scholarship, early Americans plundered the classics for the advantage of their own lives and the American good.¹² Instead of theorizing or seeking a strict and logical arrangement of ideas, colonial Americans took from the past whatever was most relevant to their own concerns and "transmuted the material into their own languages."¹³ Therefore, it is not surprising that eighteenth-century early Americans were principally interested in prose authors—especially moralists and historians—for their practical value and promotion of moral and political wisdom.¹⁴ Indeed, for elite colonial men, Greek and Latin were the passwords for

admission into colleges in early America. Although a university might hope students would eventually be conversant in classical history, antiquities, and mythology, professors believed those achievements rested firmly on a foundation of linguistic skill.¹⁵ By 1746, three colleges had been founded in the American colonies—William and Mary, Yale College, and the College of New Jersey. All were uniform in their classical curriculum and their classically based admission requirements: formal education was based on a strict curriculum that stressed Latin, Greek, and Hebrew.^{16,17}

This stress on linguistic skill is clear in Francis Glass's 1835 *Washington Vita*, a biography written in Latin on George Washington. Glass compares Washington's life to that of the Roman Statesman Cincinnatus, who infamously returned back to his farm [or pasture] following his military leadership. Glass's work is a testament to the lasting influence of antiquity on the early republic and in the colonial era, especially with respect to how early Americans viewed the Founders; it also exemplifies the importance of knowing Latin and Greek prose. Glass knew the languages so well that he could compose an entire biography in another language and "pour out a stream of classical knowledge, as clear, sparkling, and copious as ever flowed from the fountains of inspiration in the early days of the Muses."¹⁸ After mastering the language, all classics students went on to read the same books and authors: Cato's *Distichs*, Aesop's *Fables*, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and *Tristia*, Cicero's orations, letters, and *De Officiis*, Virgil's *Aeneid*, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, and the works of Florus, Horace, Terrence, and Isocrates.¹⁹ This list stayed essentially the same throughout the eighteenth century. It reveals that the goal of classical education in eighteenth-century America was to impart a very specific set of moral truths, and shows students how to live their public lives according to those values. Thus, for the educated elite, the acquisition of classical learning could act as an adornment that they proudly showed off for all to see. This emphasis on the moral and ethical aspects of classical literature is also evident in how early American scholars approached their translations of works of antiquity. A prime example of this is John Dryden's *The Works of Virgil*, translated in 1697. In his introduction, Dryden admits "some things too I have omitted, and sometimes have added my own." He goes on to explain that "adding his own" typically meant cleaning up Virgil's language and replacing it so that the writing appealed to the polite society of Dryden's day, since the language of the Epics was not always "pure."²⁰ According to Dryden, these were not substantive changes, because he claimed, with-

10 Caroline Winterer, *The Mirror of Antiquity: American Women and the Classical Tradition, 1750-1900*, (Cornell University Press, 2009), 2.

11 Eran Shalev, *Rome Reborn on Western Shores: Historical Imagination and the Creation of the American Republic*, (University Press of Virginia, 2009), 10.

12 Meyer Reinhold, *Classick Pages: Classical Reading of Eighteenth Century Americans*, (Interbank NC, 1975), 1.

13 Richard M. Gummere, *The American Colonial Mind and the Classical Tradition: Essays in Comparative Culture*, (Greenwood Press, 1985), viii.

14 Reinhold, 3.

15 Winterer, *The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life, 1780-1910*, 33.

16 Winterer, *The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life, 1780-1910*, 12.

17 Shalev, 11.

18 Francis Glass, "Washingtonii Vita," Introduction. Translated by J.N. Reynolds, (Perseus Digital Library, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1842).

19 Reinhold, 4.

20 Virgil. *The Works of Virgil: Containing His Pastorals, Georgics and Aeneis*. Translated into English Verse by Mr. Dryden. in Three Volumes. Translated by John Dryden, J. and R. Tonson, 1763

out any real evidence, that it was likely that Virgil only used "impolite" language because Virgil was living in a different time.²¹ Thus, Dryden could effectively rewrite Virgil to better suit the social norms of the eighteenth and late-seventeenth centuries, yet claim he was producing a faithful translation.

One can even look to early American English to Latin dictionaries to understand how classical education was geared toward imparting a moral language and set of behaviors and speech to an educated elite so they could adorn themselves with it in public. One well-known example is the 1806 copy of *The Philadelphia Vocabulary, English and Latin*, which includes what it described as the most important, basic, and "primitive" Latin words.²² The *Vocabulary* begins with words related to the elements and then proceeds to plants, insects, and four-footed beasts. The end of the *Vocabulary* discusses words related to buildings, judicial matters, and time.²³ Thus, the structure of the *Vocabulary* suggests that students must master practical matters before they are ready to tackle philosophical ones. Yet, despite its highly aristocratic origins, the neoclassicism of colonial America was a versatile and creative mode of expression that was also available to those outside of the political elite via new English translations of the classics. These translations meant that one did not need to master Latin or Greek in order to gain access to the classics. The increasing popularity and accessibility of the classics occurred in the context of rising commercialism and new consumer culture. The cultural aspirations of the middle class were supported by the proliferation of print and expansion of the classics into the public square, which exposed "numerous middling Americans across the colonies to more and spheres of knowledge that were traditionally out of their cultural reach," including "the world of antiquity."²⁴ Suddenly not only the elite but also the masses were using the classics for guidance in the affairs of daily life.²⁵

Therefore, a classical education proved useful to many walks of life, not just the path of the educated elite. Early American libraries reveal this change. Initially, their collection of classical works focused on theological topics that appealed only to scholars and the clergy, who at that time needed an extensive education before they could preach. Then, beginning in 1730, the libraries' collections took a secular and practical turn, as they expanded to include moral writings and historical works.²⁶ For instance, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, the biography of Socrates written by Socrates'

student, Xenophon, appeared in many libraries for the first time after 1730. Edward Bysshe, the first English translator of the work, promoted the *Memorabilia* by claiming that it could provide moral instruction.²⁷ Soon classical materials consistently made up 10 to 12 percent of library catalogs.²⁸

The classics were also available to early Americans who either did not have access to libraries or did not have enough formal education to tackle the actual texts, via references to the classics that were soon commonplace in many aspects of American culture. Latin inscriptions filled graveyards, newspaper articles were full of references from antiquity, and the vocabulary of the colonial period reveals many words were closer to their Latin derivation than they are today.²⁹ It was common for Americans to fortify an idea or an argument with a "snapper" from Latin, which even those who never had any formal training in ancient languages could understand.³⁰ Especially during the latter-eighteenth century, evidence abounds for an American cult of antiquity: "the ubiquitous classical quotations; the common use of classical pseudonyms; the revival of classical place names; the constant adducing of classical parallels; even the frequent use of classical names for slaves in southern states."³¹

WOMEN AND THE CLASSICAL TRADITION

Amidst this eighteenth-century world, where the rich history and language of the classics are beginning to feed the imaginations of masses of Americans, Dutch-born widow cum-*Maryland Gazette* editor in chief Anne Catharine Green burst onto the scene.³² Mother to 14 children, there is no doubt much of Green's life was taken up with the domestic duties of raising and caring for her family. Tragically, only half of these children survived to adulthood, leaving Green in the unenviable position of nursing some children while burying others, including a particularly dark period between 1765 and 1767 when smallpox decimated her family.³³ But Green was not alone in these struggles and experiences. Indeed, Green's status as a woman, a mother, a widow, and a resident of the colonial Chesapeake, were all of political and social significance, and heavily influenced her approach to her role as the Editor. Amongst the different roles she played, Green's status as a woman is the one that, on the surface, would have seemed the most limiting. In colonial America, women were considered physically and morally weak. Marital, familial, and communal order "all hinged on God's sanction of male

21 Virgil.

22 James Greenwood, *The Philadelphia Vocabulary, English and Latin: Put into a New Method, Proper to Acquaint the Learner with Things as Well as Pure Latin Words: For the Use of Schools*. (M. Carey, 1806).

23 Greenwood.

24 Shalev, 11.

25 Reinhold, 11.

26 Reinhold, 8.

27 Reinhold, 65.

28 Shalev, 1.

29 Gummere, 11.

30 Gummere, 17.

31 Reinhold, 2.

32 Martha J. King, "The Printer and the Painter: Portraying Print Culture in an Age of Revolution," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 109, no. 5 (2021), 69.

33 King, 69.

superiority; so, too, did concepts of political authority and the strength of a nation newly embarked on mercantile and imperial ventures overseas.³⁴ Gender was also the basis of male political authority. Sixteenth and seventeenth-century early Americans believed that the classic authors and philosophers they revered shared this sentiment. For example, in Ancient Rome, women were forbidden from bringing a case to the court on behalf of someone else; that was a responsibility and privilege reserved for men.³⁵ Although over a millennium apart, the social stereotypes of women and their roles that Anne Green was up against permeated both the worlds of Ancient Rome and colonial America.³⁶

Although women in eighteenth-century America had very little political power, Anne Green did play the one public role that women were encouraged to play: the mother. As life expectancies in the colonies gradually rose, including for children, there was a new appreciation for the positive capacities of children.³⁷ Childhood was considered a distinctive and important period in a person's life, and mothers were tasked with using that time to develop in their children honest, classical republican virtues such as self-reliance and control.³⁸ The establishment of a secure sense of gender identity in children was also a major part of this role. A well-ordered family depended on a clear understanding of sex roles, and a well-ordered society depended on well-ordered families.³⁹ Likewise, women had a specific role to play in their households, a role that also had an important public dimension: to raise virtuous children who would be an asset to the community. Green certainly understood this role, and gladly played it. Green also had a very keen understanding of the importance of her role as the wife of a printer. By the eighteenth century, wives were expected to be paragons of both domesticity and femininity. One advice manual from that period put it this way: "Orderly households and harmonious communities resulted from the labors of industrious good wives."⁴⁰ Therefore, to Green, being a "good wife" meant putting her full efforts toward the *Gazette*, by both fulfilling her domestic duties – such as keeping the household in order and teaching their children correct republican virtues – and fulfilling her duties as a printer's wife. Her understanding of the "printer's wife" translated into helping her husband succeed at publishing a paper which, by the mid-eighteenth century, was dependent on both local and distant readers. Green was expected to contribute to the family printing business the way many other printers' wives did, which was often

through marketing activities, but sometimes through some contribution to printing work.⁴¹

In 1767, Green's husband Jonas died, leaving her to raise their surviving six children, while also carrying out the continued publication of the *Maryland Gazette*.⁴² As a widow, Green assumed control over her household dependents for the first time. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, over half to two-thirds of married men in Chesapeake society named their wives as the sole executors of their state.⁴³ Widows could buy and sell property, sue and be sued in court, act as executors of a state, sign and receive documents, and initiate legal and commercial transactions in their own name.⁴⁴ These laws were put in place to ensure widow's subsistence, not to foster their autonomy. However, for a widow, the death of a husband "created the potential and opportunity for the transformation of gender and power relations."⁴⁵ Whereas a married woman's legal identity was subsumed under her husband's, widows had the freedom to act for themselves in public. For Green, widowhood gave her the freedom and power to print the *Gazette*, create new, attractive features like the "Poet's Corner," and choose the types of poems, news, and materials to be published. Whereas Green's identity as a "good wife" was primarily associated with domestic labor, her identity as a widow was primarily associated with being a "good printer." In this role, Green assumed a measure of public authority that she could not have realized under her husband as a wife, nor on her own as an unmarried woman. A portrait of Green completed in 1769 illustrates Green's transformation ("Anne Catharine Hoof Green," by Charles Willson Peale). There is no husband in this picture; no children; no household setting. There are no feminine symbols of flowers, no classical motifs associated with women, and no local landscape. Instead, it is a formal portrait of Green on her own, holding a copy of the *Gazette* in her left hand, which represents her as its printer. This portrait emphasizes the public-facing aspects of Green's identity, not the private, domestic side. In it, Green is no longer a Maryland wife or matriarch. Instead, she is a widow and a printer. She is a female businesswoman with a job that affords her an important place in Maryland's public life and economy.

Although Green took on a public role when her husband died, that did not mean that she escaped a world in which the boundaries of her life were marked by gender norms that were reinforced by the classical tradition that was so important to colonial American culture. In the classical

34 Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia*, (University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 14.

35 J. Kamp, "Patriarchy and Gender Law in Ancient Rome and Colonial America", (*Iowa Historical Review* 8(1), 2020), 44.

36 Kamp, 43.

37 Daniel Blake Smith, *Inside the Great House: Planter Family Life in Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake Society*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 10.

38 Smith, 49.

39 Smith, 55.

40 Brown, 26.

41 Brown, 24.

42 King, 62.

43 Smith, 237.

44 King, 72.

45 King, 72.



Figure 1. Portrait of Anne Catharine Green (1769)⁴⁶

tradition, women were not supposed to engage actively in the civic sphere. The skills required in political life – eloquent speech, rhetorical skill, familiarity with the orators of ancient Greece and Rome – were imagined as “fundamentally masculine skills.”⁴⁷ At one time, these qualities were only attainable to elite men who had access to an institutional classical education. However, by the mid-eighteenth century, women like Green and other members of society who had no way of learning the classics were now beginning “to immerse themselves in the wondrous literary and material vestiges of classical antiquity.”⁴⁸ Opportunities for female classical reading expanded rapidly in the middle decades of the eighteenth century as works of British polite culture “permeated the colonies” through “a swelling tide of newspapers, magazines, and books.”⁴⁹ As women read these works, the classical motif

and images they contained became an important part of the ideological vocabulary of elite early American women. Four classical texts that became popular at this time had a particularly heavy influence on eighteenth-century ideas about the role of women: Charles Rollin’s *Ancient History* (1730–8), Alexander Pope’s translations of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and François Fenelon’s *The Adventures of Telemachus*.⁵⁰ These books were about the Graeco-Roman past but were written in a modern vernacular, which made them accessible to a wide audience. All of these texts lent themselves to the project of cultivating female ‘goodliness’ and exploring the scope and limits of women’s possibilities for action.⁵¹ Women read these books in order to train themselves in the gendered role of classics: a woman’s conversation should be ornamental, but not too instructive; she should take an interest in her male companion’s conversation, but not surpass his understanding of the subject.⁵²

While these developments offer a glimpse into Green’s eighteenth-century worldview, they do not tell the full story of the colonial reception of the classics. Specifically, colonial women interacted with the classics by appropriating classical themes and motifs in their own writing. For example, Ann Eliza Bleecker (1752–1783), the wife of a well-to-do printer, wrote a number of essays and poems with classical themes, including “On Reading Dryden’s *Virgil*,” “A Short Pastoral Dialogue” and “A Pastoral Dialogue.” Bleecker consoled herself by reading Theocritus and Virgil (much like the 1727 *Cupid Wounded* poem), and then produced her own poems which were inspired by those but took place in a truly local setting. In her short pastoral poem, Bleecker writes “Here the berries bend the vine, Lucid grapes at distance shine; Here the velvet peach, and there, Apples, and the pendant pear.”⁵³ Similarly, Anne Bradstreet (1612–1672) wrote a number of poems based on Greco-Roman history, including the *Roman Monarchy*, which chronicled the life of the Roman Empire.⁵⁴ Bradstreet’s poems are based on cases from ancient history and mythology, but she personalized them to incorporate the temporal and spatial boundaries of the colonial Puritan world.⁵⁵

A GOOD WOMAN PRINTER

In 1767, Green’s husband died, and she took over the publication of the *Gazette*. She was in a position to do this be-

46 Charles Wilson Peale, “Anne Catharine Hoof Green.” 1769. Oil on Canvas. Stretcher: 91.4 x 71.1 x 2.5cm (36 x 28 x 1”), Frame: 108 x 87.6 x 6.4cm (42 1/2 x 34 1/2 x 2 1/2”), Washington DC, National Portrait Gallery: https://npg.si.edu/object/npg_NPG.91.152.

47 Winterer, *The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life, 1780–1910*: 22.

48 Shalev, 12.

49 Winterer, *The Mirror of Antiquity: American Women and the Classical Tradition, 1750–1900*: 14.

50 Winterer, 26.

51 Winterer, 27.

52 Winterer, 15.

53 A pastoral poem features an idealized country life and the landscape those poems take place in. (Anna Eliza Bleecker). The posthumous works of Ann Eliza Bleecker, in prose and verse. To which is added, a collection of essays, prose and poetical, by Margaretta V. Faugetes, *A Short Pastoral Dialogue*, (New York: T. and J. Swords, no. 27, William-Street., 1793; Ann Arbor: Text Creation Partnership, 2011).

54 Anne Bradstreet, *The tenth muse lately sprung up in America or severall poems, compiled with great variety of wit and learning, full of delight. Wherein especially is contained a pastoral discourse and description of the four elements, constitutions, ages of man, seasons of the year. Together with an exact epitomie of the four monarchies, viz. The Assyrian, Persian, Grecian, Roman. Also a dialogue between Old England and New, concerning the late troubles. With divers other pleasant and serious poems. By a gentlewoman in those parts*, (London: Stephen Botwell, 1650; Ann Arbor: Text Creation Partnership, 2011).

55 Gummere, 150.

cause while he was alive, Green had obtained training and experience similar to that offered in printing apprenticeships by closely observing her husband and by doing her duty as a good wife to help his business succeed.⁵⁶ This meant that the rhythms and demands of the printing business dictated Green's daily life, which she organized around the needs of the paper. Along with her domestic duties, she juggled meeting deadlines, kept track of contracts and supplies, and gathered news. Like other colonial printers' wives, Green was also in charge of keeping business accounts. For example, she knew of her husband's difficulty collecting from subscribers and his appeals before the colonial legislature for printing contracts.

Green combined the practical skills she had learned working alongside her husband with the social capital she enjoyed as a well-connected member of Maryland society to ensure her economic survival after her husband's death.⁵⁷ With six children and other household duties to take care of, Green had to cultivate subscribers and curry the "continued and much-needed support of the Maryland General Assembly." She accomplished this by "drawing on her personal connections in an interlinked society" and by exploiting the "implicit gendered motif of benevolence toward widows and orphans."⁵⁸ Green did not, however, merely perform the role of editor the same way her husband had performed the role. Prior to his death, Jonas Green focused the *Gazette's* attention on covering business activity and politics.⁵⁹ When Anne Green took the helm, she continued to follow the economic and political news stories that her husband had covered; however, she also began to include coverage of literary topics that her husband ignored.⁶⁰ One historian writing in the early twentieth century wrote that while "a less aggressive woman would have been content to seek the chimney corner, [Green] undertook the support of her children and the accomplishment of important tasks in the public service."⁶¹

Indeed, while Green's first concern when she became editor of the *Gazette* was to solicit the continued patronage of her husband's friends and customers, Green also introduced several important innovations to the *Gazette*. Toward that end, one of the first things Green did when she took over the job of editor was to make a public appeal for help:

"I Presume to address You, For you Countenance to Myself and numerous Family, left, without your Favour, almost destitute of Support, by the Decease of

my Husband, who long, and, I have the Satisfaction to say, faithfully served You in the Business of provincial printer; and, I flatter myself, that, with your kind Indulgence and Encouragement, Myself, and Son, will be enabled to continue it on the same Footing ... I am willing to hope, that the Pains taken by my late Husband, to oblige his very extensive Acquaintance, and the character he deservedly bore, of an honest, benevolent Man, will recommend to your Regard,

Your grateful and faithful humble Servant,

A.C. Green"⁶²

However, she soon began to introduce her own business practices. For example, she expanded beyond the paper and published an annual almanac, an occasional political pamphlet, and one or two satirical pieces.⁶³ Green also directed her typesetters to embellish the first letter in each issue of the *Gazette*, which formed a visual branding that set her paper apart. But most importantly, Green created "Poet's Corner," publishing pieces on classical literature, religion, and the like. Besides her government and newspaper publications, Green printed Elie Valette's *Deputy Commissary's Guide*, a choice volume where appeared the engraved title-page by Thomas Sparrow of Annapolis, which "has been referred to here as the best-known example of that engraver's work."⁶⁴ Furthermore, Green printed *The Charter and Bye-Laws of the City of Annapolis*, a fifty-two-page volume, which "for typographical nicety could hardly have been surpassed by the best of her contemporaries in the colonies."⁶⁵

Green did not leave records to explain why she chose these specific innovations, but the decision to print more diverse materials and include new columns covering a broader array of topics in the *Gazette* showed that she was a keen observer of the changing landscape of print journalism in the later decades of the eighteenth century. Whereas in earlier periods newspapers were oriented toward farmers, merchants, and shippers, by the end of the eighteenth century, newspapers reflected advances in science and culture to appeal to a growing educated population. Newspapers experimented with many different types of new content, including columns about inventions and experiments, literary sections, and theatrical announcements.⁶⁶ Some late-eighteenth-century newspapers even appealed to young adults by including advice

56 King, 70, and S. Henry, *Exception to the Female Model: Colonial Printer Mary Crouch*, (*Journalism Quarterly*, 1985), 727.

57 Martin Schultz and Herman R. Lantz, "Occupational Pursuits of Free Women in Early America: An Examination of eighteenth-Century Newspapers," *Sociological Forum* 3, no. 1 (1988), 99.

58 King, 72.

59 Wroth, *A history of printing in Colonial Maryland, 1686-1776*, 80.

60 Wroth, 90.

61 Wroth, 90.

62 Maryland Gazette (1727-1775) in Wroth, 90.

63 Wroth, 91.

64 Wroth, 91.

65 Wroth, 91.

66 Schultz and Lantz, 93.

about dating, romantic poetry, and even ads for courtship.⁶⁷ Green observed these trends, and knew that to stay relevant, the *Gazette* had to adopt some of them.

Green also understood that the *Gazette* could level the playing field between the elite members of society and the marginalized members of society by making printed materials available to the public that had previously only been available to wealthy, educated gentlemen. By the 1770s printed matter had become cheaper and more available, which allowed printers to expose Americans to a new abundance of materials, including the classics and other works of literature. This new access to literature could erase differences in political and social status.⁶⁸ At the same time newspapers became available to anyone who could read or hear a reading of a newspaper, forward-thinking newspaper editors like Anne Green made sure that newspapers abounded with classical quotations, tags, pseudonyms, histories, parallels, and parables.⁶⁹ Even papers that explicitly declared themselves as catering to a "plain" audience include a remarkable number of classical references. For readers without an elite classical education, colonial newspapers could provide accessible summaries of important myths, along with quotations, advice, and moral lessons gleaned from heroic classical figures.⁷⁰ Green also tapped into another late-eighteenth-century newspaper trend: making women a primary audience. For the first time in American history, much of the literature, poetry, and social news of the papers centered on the interests of women. However, most editors believed that the news directed at a female audience should not serve a Revolutionary purpose. Instead, it aimed to reinforce colonial gender norms.⁷¹ Virtue for women, according to colonial newspapers, was based not only on the superiority of the man but the woman's role of subservience to meet a man's needs. And virtue, not any physical characteristic, made women beautiful to men, as an Annapolis poet stated in a 1745 edition of the *Maryland Gazette*:

"Then ye Fair, let Virtue be your aim,
since she with never fading Ornaments
Embellish can your Charms; since she can feed
Love's lambent Flame, when Beauty frail decays,
And yields her Trophies to relentless Time.
By Decency and Virtue still adorn'd,
Tho' Age brings Wrinkles, and impairs the Bloom
Of Youth, your pristine Beauties shall survive
Still in the Lover's Eye, and still command
The first Affection, and sincere Esteem."⁷²

Similarly, the *New York Journal* wrote that "Women of Quality should apply themselves to letters because of their Husbands," and not for their own gain.⁷³ Green rejected the narrative that when women gained access to literature that was once only the province of educated men, it would not – and should not – disrupt the balance of power between men and women in colonial America. Instead, she created the "Poet's Corner" not to subscribe to colonial gender norms, but to democratize access to the classics and encourage women to use their new knowledge of the classics to gain their advantage. Green was unique in this endeavor. There were other woman printers—Dinah Nuthead, widowed in 1695 who printed the *Maryland Press*, Sarah Goddard, who grew up with elite status and printed starting in 1766 the *Providence Gazette*, or even Mary Wilkinson, who was printing the *Charleston Gazette* by 1780—yet none of them produced any feature section like the "Poet's Corner." As a printer of one of the most popular colonial Chesapeake newspapers, Green published the *Gazette* with the knowledge that she would give thousands of Americans the chance to interact with the classics, to understand their motifs, to memorize their parables, and even to learn moral lessons. She also understood that knowledge of the classics brought with it cultural capital, and that women and other marginalized groups could use this cultural capital to re-imagine their public roles and shift the power dynamics that had controlled colonial life.

THE POET'S CORNER, MORAL TALES, AND THE PASTORAL

Green chose to publish poems with classical themes because she knew that the men who enjoyed the most powerful positions in society believed that knowledge of the classics proved that one belonged in polite society. Thus, Green's "Poet's Corner" gave her a widened audience, namely women but also other marginalized members of society, a powerful new way to gain cultural capital and put themselves on equal footing with the educated elite. Green was also careful to choose classical poems with moral and ethical themes because eighteenth-century readers were principally interested in the prose of moralists and historians for their practical value in promoting moral and political wisdom.⁷⁴ In a December 19, 1771 edition, for example, Green printed a small Latin phrase, "*Mors mortis morti mortem nisi morte dedisset, Aeterna Vitae janua clausa foret*," roughly translating to, "Unless the Death of Death (Christ) had given death to death by his own death, the gate of eternal life would have been closed."⁷⁵ Or, in a November 12, 1771 print, "Julia" hides nameless beauties that even a nymph

67 Schultz and Lantz, 93.

68 Michael Warner, *The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America*, (Harvard University Press, 2010), 139.

69 Shalev, 12.

70 Langer, 8.

71 David A. Copeland, "Virtuous and Vicious: The Dual Portrayal of Women in Colonial Newspapers," (*American Periodicals* 5, 1995), 79.

72 *Maryland Gazette* (1727-1775). December 24, 1745. Archives of Maryland Online.

73 "Mr. Zenger," *New-York Weekly Journal* (New York, New York), no. LXXX, May 19, 1735, 1, *Readex: America's Historical Newspapers*.

74 Reinhold, 3.

75 "Poet's Corner", December 19, 1771.

might wish for, with budding charms that dim the dazzling rays of the sun.⁷⁶ “Delia” in a March 26, 1772 Poet’s Corner brings a “Gift the Gods impart, the richest Teasure of the heart, the Fruit of virt’ous Love!”⁷⁷ Finally, in an October 7, 1773 edition, the poet writes to a “lady with a pair of gloves” whose beauty is unimaginable and conquers wherever she goes.⁷⁸ In choosing to publish these particular poems, which featured female lead characters, Green highlights the ability of women to embody all of the characteristics that eighteenth-century early American men admired.

Green also published a number of translated poems written in antiquity. On May 21, 1772, Green republished Anacreon’s *Ode III* (Anacreon was a Greek lyric poet known for his drinking songs and erotic poems).⁷⁹ Similarly, on September 3, 1772, Green published a poem that “requested some profound scholar” to explain its “metrical soliloquy.”⁸⁰ In it, the poet writes in Latin verse, specifically “quantum meruit,” a Latin phrase meaning “what one has earned.” In the poem, “what one has earned” is tied to tobacco – Maryland’s economic backbone.⁸¹ The latter of these poems explicitly called out to fellow Marylanders, encouraging them to engage with classical text and language. Green published these poems because she wanted her readers to do as the poem said: engage with classical texts and languages. Doing so would give the readers access to public spaces that had previously been closed to them.

Green chose to publish pastoral poems for the same reason she chose to publish moral and ethical poems: these were the poems that eighteenth-century political and social elites valued the most. Thus, these were the poems that women and other marginalized groups needed to learn to gain admittance to polite society. The pastoral poems Green featured in “Poet’s Corner” invoked a golden age of simplicity, morality, and ease and contrasted the past with the present as well as the country with the city.⁸² In this way, they were similar to *Cupid Wounded*, which William Parks published in 1729. The difference between Green and Park is that when Park printed *Cupid Wounded* in his newspaper, he knew the paper had a limited viewership that catered to the elite man interested in politics. Green, on the other hand, used her power as editor to open up participation with the classics to a broad, popular audience. In doing so, Green chose to challenge gender norms and specifically the idea that some poems and literature were only meant to be consumed by men. Similarly, by successfully running the *Gazette* Green challenged the gender norm that women could not succeed in powerful positions. By expanding Maryland’s culture of classicism, Green pro-

vided everyday Marylanders a space in which they could enjoy a cultural and intellectual power normally reserved for elite men.

AFTERWORD

Green passed away in 1775, at the start of the American Revolution. Although her work in printing the “Poet’s Corner” did not directly correlate with any revolutionary causes, unprecedented levels of engagement in late-eighteenth-century America with the culture of classicism, a culture inspired and democratized by people like Green, provided the foundations for revolutionaries to express and make sense of their understanding of time and history. The classics made Ancient Greece and Rome a touchpoint throughout the Revolution. Forging an emotional relationship with the narratives and heroes of antiquity provided consolation, justification, and validation for the Revolution.⁸³ American revolutionaries also looked to the classics to help provide a legal and philosophical justification for their actions. They understood the Revolution, for better or worse, as the latest link in a succession of republics that had unfolded through time.⁸⁴ The colonists imagined themselves as the “senatorial oligarchy of the late Roman Republic, protecting the nation from the threat of mob rule by the populist demagogue Julius Caesar.”⁸⁵ If the purpose of neoclassicism at the beginning of the eighteenth century was one of morals and Christian doctrine, by the end of the century it had undergone a dramatic transformation. The rise of print culture helped to make the classical canon more accessible to non-elite audiences, giving it the potential to be turned to new political purposes. 🏛️

76 “Poet’s Corner”, November 12, 1771.

77 “Poet’s Corner”, March 26, 1772.

78 “Poet’s Corner”, October 7, 1773.

79 “Poet’s Corner”, May 21, 1772.

80 “Poet’s Corner”, September 3, 1772.

81 “Poet’s Corner”, September 3, 1772.

82 Joshua Crandall, “The Great Measur’d by the Less: The Ethnological Turn in Eighteenth-century Pastoral,” (ELH 81, no. 3, 2014), 955.

83 Shalev, 4.

84 Shalev, 74.

85 Langer, 5.

Gender Ideals in Mesoamerica

A Case of Cultural Contact and Collision

*Gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context [and] time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context.*¹

*The above description of gender, as defined by the United Nations in 2011, classifies gender as a social construct and highlights that the roles and ideals prescribed upon males and females differ based on region and time. Therefore, gender as a tool for historical analysis must be understood in these terms. Gender-based historical analysis extends beyond the study of women's history. It explores the complex role that gender perceptions and ideologies play within specific societies and eras. Within this framework of gender, this study dissects the prevailing gender ideologies within Nahua society and culture during the sixteenth century, particularly examining their intersection with Early Modern Spanish norms. This essay will examine the contrasting yet strikingly similar perspectives on gender during a century defined by "conquest" and colonial contact between Spaniards and indigenous Central Mexico.*²

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AN EVALUATION OF GENDER IDEOLOGIES, in both Spanish and Nahua cultures, reveals intriguing similarities alongside profound differences. However, these disparities were not simply points of divergence between two different cultures from two different regions of the world. The disparities played a significant role in shaping the interaction between the two groups, in that they helped to establish a fundamental miscommunication between them. This misinterpretation played a crucial role in the phenomenon of 'othering,' a process that not only found institutional support within Spanish colonialism but also significantly shaped the Nahua perception of the Spanish 'other.'

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODS

A popular stereotype in the early scholarship on colonial Mesoamerica was that indigenous women were "without history."³ A collection of essays by various Latin American historians published in 1997 was one of the earliest to challenge that stereotype by uncovering the voices of everyday indigenous women and giving them agency. Lisa Sousa, who

contributed to this volume, continued to object to this stereotype twenty years later in her 2017 monograph, *The Woman Who Turned into a Jaguar, and Other Narratives of Native Women in Archives of Colonial Mexico*. Sousa's work is crucial to the scholarship on gender in Mesoamerica. Having studied under Lockhart, she follows the New Philology method of analyzing indigenous language sources.⁴ Through the use of these sources, she seeks "to contribute to Mesoamerican women's history by considering indigenous women from across the social spectrum – from commoners to elites – especially in rural communities where most indigenous people lived in this period."⁵ Sousa seeks not only to emphasize indigenous women's agency and shed light on their history which has been largely overlooked, but also she "show[s] how understanding indigenous women's history is vital to our understanding of the early modern Atlantic World."⁶ Her work highlights the role of the household in gender relations in central Mexico and analyzes the gender binary. Sousa argues that the gender binary is not something that exists naturally, but is instead "imposed through roles, rituals, and behavior as a way to order and streamline the

1 "OSAGI Gender Mainstreaming - Concepts and Definitions," United Nations, accessed February 18, 2024, <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsanddefinitions.htm>.

2 The use of scare quotes here is to denote that the term "conquest" is perhaps not the best terminology to use in regard to the event because it implies a lack of indigenous agency and an all-consuming Spanish might that diminishes the complexities of the Spanish-Aztec war. Furthermore, Nahua is a broad term for many indigenous groups who lived in Central Mexico, spoke Nahuatl, and shared similar cultural tendencies but did not necessarily share a common identity and were often at war with one another.

3 Susan Schroeder, Stephanie Gail Wood, and Robert Stephen Haskett, *Indian Women of Early Mexico* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 3.

4 The New Philology school of thought is often attributed to James Lockhart's *The Nahuas After the Conquest*. It refers to the prioritization of indigenous language sources as opposed to European sources in the study of Central America and the "conquest."

5 Lisa Sousa, *The Woman Who Turned Into a Jaguar, and Other Narratives of Native Women in Archives of Colonial Mexico* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2017), 3.

6 Sousa, 4.

more complex realities of gender ambiguity, instability of the body, and variation in personal traits.⁷⁷ This imposing framework of gender is crucial to understanding not only the gender ideologies of both Early Modern Spain and pre-Hispanic Nahua society separately, but also how Spanish gender ideologies were imposed on the Nahua during the later colonial period, and vice versa. Furthermore, this work continues Sousa's endeavors to incorporate women's and gender history into the historical study of the early modern Atlantic world. It does this by making the claim that one cannot truly understand the contact between the Spanish and the Nahua without acknowledging the fundamental miscommunication between the two groups that contributed to the conflict.

The "conquest" was a period of time from 1519 to 1521 when Mesoamerican society was at war with the Spanish. Linda Kerber asserts that "societies at war are societies engaged in a renegotiation of gender relations, usually in such a way as to emphasize and sometimes redefine the meaning of masculinity."⁸ Therefore, by Kerber's definition, Nahua society during the early sixteenth century was a society "in a renegotiation of gender relations." Furthermore, Kerber stresses that "an ideology that makes enormous pains to *exclude* women is, by that very fact, an ideology that is interactive *with* women."⁹ Therefore, this study will dissect the gender ideologies of the Nahua by analyzing both what it includes and what it excludes. Similarly to Kerber, Susan Kellogg argues that "in responding to the forces of change, whether resisting or embracing them or seeking to control the rate and impact of change, women became creators of change and have served as transformative agents."¹⁰ Therefore, despite the popular portrayal of the male-dominated "conquest of Mexico," women and gender played a significant role during the Spanish invasion and early colonization of Mesoamerica simply by existing during a time of great change and reacting to that change.

Scholarship on the role of gender in pre-Hispanic Mesoamerican societies and the "conquest" emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2001, Rosemary Joyce explored "the ways that sexual difference affected the formation of political power in pre-Hispanic Mesoamerica."¹¹ However, the typical view of gender as a "cultural expression of biological sex" limits gender to a binary of male and female, or masculine and feminine.¹² Joyce analyzes the concept of gender as something that is performed, fluid, and not necessarily

correlating with one's biological sex at birth. Like Joyce, this study aims to delve into the performative and fluid nature of gender roles within Nahua culture, transcending binary constructs imposed by colonial perspectives. In addition to exploring prevailing gender ideologies within Nahua society during the sixteenth century, this paper will analyze gender ideologies through a lens of power. Furthermore, Sousa's work seeks to "push at the limits of [pre-Columbian Mesoamerica]'s strangeness from Europe" rather than highlight the similarities between the two societies by analyzing the lives of indigenous men and women through the concepts of gender and power.¹³ In a similar fashion, this study aims to analyze Nahua gender ideologies as depicted in two colonial codices by distinguishing indigenous concepts from colonial and European influences.

Gender hierarchy, complementarity, and parallelism are all anthropological frameworks for understanding and studying gender relations within a given society. Gender complementarity and parallelism both posit "a system in which a society is divided into gender-specific but equivalent spheres, one for men and one for women."¹⁴ Gender complementarity frames these two distinct spheres as interdependent, while gender parallelism describes them as mutually exclusive spheres. Gender hierarchy, on the other hand, suggests that the two genders are ranked or unequal, "structured around one dominant gender (in this case, males), and that the roles of the other gender, females, are defined positionally in relation to those of men."¹⁵ Susan Kellogg, who traces the performance of gender and sexual identity among Mesoamerican and Andean women from the pre-Hispanic period to the present, presents an interesting discussion on how militarism and Spanish contact factored into the shift from "gender complementarity" to "more ingrained forms of hierarchy."¹⁶ Miranda Stockett, on the other hand, contests these frameworks, arguing that "models such as gender hierarchy and complementarity have been strongly impacted upon by processes of conquest and colonization, which may render them inappropriate frameworks for investigating ancient studies."¹⁷ She argues that these frameworks are all concepts that are "rooted in Western understandings of the sexual division of labor."¹⁸ Therefore, Stockett questions the accuracy of these frameworks for analyzing the gender ideologies and practices of Mesoamericans. She argues that they rely on a strictly binary

7 Sousa, 4.

8 Linda K. Kerber, "'I Have Don...Much to Carrey on the Warr': Women and the Shaping of Republican Ideology After the American Revolution," *Journal of Women's History* 1, no. 3 (1990), 234.

9 Kerber, 234.

10 Susan Kellogg, *Weaving the Past: A History of Latin America's Indigenous Women from the Prehispanic Period to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3.

11 Rosemary A. Joyce, *Gender and Power in Prehispanic Mesoamerica* (Texas: University of Texas Press, 2001), 1.

12 Miranda K. Stockett, "On the Importance of Difference: Re-Envisioning Sex and Gender in Ancient Mesoamerica," *World Archaeology* 37, no. 4, (2005), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40025092>, 567.

13 Joyce, 1.

14 Karen V. Powers, *Women in the Crucible of Conquest: The Gendered Genesis of Spanish American Society, 1500-1600* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 10.

15 Stockett, 567.

16 Kellogg, 17.

17 Stockett, 566.

18 Stockett, 556.

interpretation of gender, which she theorizes was not held by pre-Hispanic Mesoamerican society, and suggests that such interpretations emerged due to colonization and the imposition and influence of Spanish ideals. In this way, Stockett follows Joyce's methods of further distinguishing Mesoamerican society from its European counterpart, aiming to comprehend the nuances within the former. This study also complies with the idea that the Nahua operated under a different system of social and cultural norms and rules than that of Early Modern Spain and thus cannot fully be understood within frameworks designed to understand colonial and colonizing societies. Moreover, the framework of gendered spheres is often not strictly representative of the actual everyday lives and realities of people, as men and women often cross over into the other's sphere, as will be discussed later in the essay. However, these frameworks are useful for this study because they help to provide a general outline of the broader gender ideologies of both early modern Spain and the Nahua.

Karen Powers proposes that "the sixteenth century witnessed the collision not only of two vastly different cultures, but also two cultures that had vastly different gender systems and gender ideologies."¹⁹ This "collision" becomes all the more significant when applied to James Lockhart's concept of "Double Mistaken Identity." Double Mistaken Identity, as described by Lockhart, is a mode of cross-cultural interaction "whereby each side takes it that a given form or concept is essentially one already known to it, operating in much the same manner as in its own tradition, and hardly takes cognizance of the other side's interpretation."²⁰ In other words, it is the idea that when two different groups of people meet, they tend to assume that the other group operates according to the same societal norms and rules as their own. By applying this concept to the clash of gender ideologies and practices between the Nahua and the Spanish, we can view the "conquest" as more than merely a military battle where men dominated Spanish-Indigenous interaction.

Building off of these ideas of cultural collision and mistaken identity, this paper explores how the gender ideologies and structures of early modern Spain compare to those of the pre-Hispanic Nahua. I then move on to analyze how these pre-contact differences affected how the two groups interacted with and viewed each other during and after the conquest in the sixteenth century. This work builds on previous scholarship surrounding gender ideology and its role within sixteenth-century Mesoamerica in two ways: first, it provides an examination of the similarities and differences between pre-Hispanic Nahua and early modern Spanish gender ideals through an analysis of Spanish legal code and two colonial

codices; second, it applies historian James Lockhart's conception of "Double Mistaken Identity" to the clash of gender ideologies and practices between the Nahua and the Spanish in order to understand the miscommunication between the two groups.

THE GENDER IDEALS OF EARLY MODERN SPAIN

A cross-cultural comparison necessitates familiarity with the dominant gender ideologies of each society prior to contact. The gender ideals of Early Modern Spain worked within a binary and were highly influenced by the Catholic Church.²¹ *Las Siete Partidas*, a legal and moral code that was compiled in Medieval Spain, illustrates the gender hierarchy that was promoted by the Catholic Church during the late Medieval and Early Modern periods in Spain, and later in the Americas. The *Partidas* clearly establishes men as superior to women within the law, with women being defined in relation to men. For example, in the introduction to the fourth *Partida* on the topic of marriage and betrothals, the code is succinctly laid out in this way:

Moreover, He [God] honored man greatly by giving him all creatures which He made for his service. And in addition to all this, He showed him especially great distinction by creating a woman whom He gave him as a companion and by whom he might have descendants; and He established them both in Paradise in marriage, and promulgated it as a law between them, that while their bodies were different according to nature, they should be one, so far as love was concerned, so that they could not be divided, preserving faithfulness to one another; and, besides, that from this affection offspring might be born, by which the world might be peopled, and He Himself praised and served.²²

The definition of a woman as "a companion" given to a man so that "he might have descendants" indicates the system of gender hierarchy that was enforced and promoted by the Spanish Crown through the Catholic Church. The *Partidas*, though rarely referring to women directly (or when it does, calling women "naturally greedy and avaricious"), establishes a certain set of ordained gender roles and ideals where the role of women is subservient to that of men.²³ According to Robert Burns, there are "only ten entries under 'Women,' six of which are exclusionary" within the *Partidas*.²⁴ It could be argued that the use of the term "man" in the legal code is inclusive of all subjects of the Crown. However, the use of the word "man" in this way is indicative of a society that views participation in the public sphere and engagement with the

19 Powers, 2.

20 James Lockhart, *The Nahuas After the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 445.

21 The Early Modern Period in Europe is the time period from the start of the 15th century through the end of the 18th century.

22 Samuel Parsons Scott, *Las Siete Partidas, Volume 4: Family, Commerce, and the Sea: The Worlds of Women and Merchants (Partidas IV and V)*, ed. Robert I. Burns, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 877, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fj4pz>.

23 Scott and *Partidas*, 932.

24 Scott and *Partidas*, xii.

legal code as inherently masculine. In this way, the use of gendered terminology that is exclusive of women in the legal doctrine set a precedent that women did not have a place within the public sphere. The “enclosure” of women within the domestic sphere was a way in which the sexual purity of women, another highly gendered conception, was “protected” by men.²⁵ The designation of women to the domestic sphere and men to the public sphere was not, however, a form of gender complementarity or parallelism. The domestic sphere, while being dubbed feminine and the “womanly” sphere, was still subject to male authority in early modern Spain. The delegation of women to the domestic sphere created a system that excluded women from the public sphere, but it did not hold in the reverse. In other words, men were not excluded from the domestic sphere. In fact, men were meant to rule over the home and were responsible for the nurture and upbringing of any children past the age of three.²⁶ The legal code designated both the practical and legal responsibility of raising children to men, rather than women, stating clearly that “a person appointed to the guardian of minors should be neither dumb, deaf, nor destitute of understanding, nor a spendthrift of *his* property, nor of bad morals. The party should be over twenty-five years of age, *a man and not a woman*.”²⁷ Therefore, early modern Spain can be viewed through the lens of gender hierarchy.

This exclusion of women from the public sphere was based on the highly gendered concept of honor, which revolved around military and economic success for men and sexual purity and chastity for women.²⁸ The *Siete Partidas* exhibits how ideas surrounding sex and shame were exceedingly gendered, remarking that “when he receives the [sexual] embrace the man derives pleasure from it and is happy, and the woman is ashamed.”²⁹ The idea that female expression was shameful helped to enforce the ideal of women being virginal until marriage and chaste within marriage. Thus, the sexually charged language and ideals of the Spanish Golden Age “regularly enacted the violence, shame, and death that rewarded women who overstepped the bounds of their appropriately secluded roles.”³⁰ Within Spanish society, there was an “emphasis on the importance of women’s chastity combined with the idea that women could not remain chaste without active male supervision.”³¹ This focus on controlling women’s bodies and “innately promiscuous sexual natures” within

the dominant Spanish Catholic culture manifested itself in certain social institutions and legal designations intended to “protect” women and keep them out of the public sphere.³² The social institution of marriage was the dominant method to enforce this isolation and protection of women that was endorsed by both the Church and the state, “but women could also be safely enclosed within convents or in the homes and families of their fathers and brothers.”³³ Furthermore, the social and legal status of a woman was “based on her sexual relationship to men or the lack of one.”³⁴ Women in Spanish colonial society were “divided into estates – *doncellas* [unmarried virgins], married women, *solteras* [unmarried women who have had sexual relations with men], widows, and religious [unmarried celibate women who have devoted themselves to the Church].”³⁵

Despite the seemingly rigid ideals surrounding gender roles and expectations, the reality of life in Early Modern Spain often did not adhere strictly to the dominant gender ideologies.³⁶ However, these dominant beliefs and expectations, while being evident within official laws and endorsements of the Church and state, were not always adhered to. For example, Grace Coolidge argues that “regardless of formal ideas of honor, shame, and enclosure that might surround them, this society was not economically or politically stable enough to function with only half of the adults participating.”³⁷ Therefore, while officially women working in the public sphere was deemed wrong or even “immoral,” it did occur within communities, where the economic conditions made women’s contributions necessary. In this way, gender ideals and class realities were often at odds with one another. Furthermore, the institution of prostitution (the epitome of the Spanish conception of the wanton public woman) was not only supported by the Spanish Crown and the Catholic Church but deemed a “necessary evil.”³⁸ This does not imply that “public women” were approved of or held to an ideal. However, the Crown’s acceptance of prostitution is an indication that the gender ideals of Early Modern Spain did not always align with the lived reality of Spanish people. Despite the sometimes-contradictory nature of ideals and reality, the Spanish entered into all of their interactions with the indigenous people of the Americas with their own pre-established set of gender ideals that they held to be universally applicable and unchanging.

25 Powers, 124.

26 Scott, *Las Siete Partidas*, 973.

27 Burns, “Underworlds, partida 6, title 16, law 4, p. 1285”, quoted in Grace E. Coolidge, *Guardianship, Gender, and Nobility in Early Modern Spain* (Farnham: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 7.

28 Powers, 123.

29 Scott, 932.

30 Coolidge, *Guardianship, Gender, and Nobility*, 7; The Spanish Golden Age was during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, referring to the height of Spanish colonial power.

31 Grace E. Coolidge, *Guardianship, Gender, and Nobility in Early Modern Spain* (Farnham: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 6.

32 The use of scare quotes here is meant to emphasize that these ideas about the inherent sexual nature of women are concepts and ideals that were held within Spanish Catholic culture and not based in biological fact or evidence.

33 Coolidge, 6.

34 Powers, 123.

35 Powers, 123.

36 Gender ideology refers to a “society’s beliefs and expectations regarding appropriate behavior for culturally recognized categories of gender.” See Stockett, “On the Importance of Difference,” 567.

37 Coolidge, 7-8.

38 Powers, 136.

COLONIAL CODICES: WHAT DO THEY TELL US ABOUT NAHUA CONCEPTIONS OF GENDER?

Codices are a traditional way of recording knowledge using pictorial writing. They were originally screen folds made on deer skin or amate paper. During the colonial period, Catholic missionaries in Mesoamerica incorporated this system of inscription into European formats and adapted it to alphabetic writing as a way to record the history and culture of different indigenous nations. Relying heavily on the aid of indigenous peoples, Catholic friars and missionaries in Mesoamerica compiled codices in order to document the practices, beliefs, and culture of indigenous people, so that they could better minister to them. In this way, codices provide a lens into the culture of certain indigenous groups during the early period of Spanish colonialism.

The *Florentine Codex*, compiled and edited by Fray Bernardino de Sahagún with the help of indigenous elders from towns in central Mexico and Nahua students and alumni of the College of Santa Cruz Tlateloco in 1577, provides insights into Nahua culture and beliefs from the perspective of the Nahua elite. Sahagún compiled the answers from questionnaires given to the Nahua elders that were recorded in the Nahua's pictorial writing. Then, with the help of the Nahua students, he converted the Nahua spoken language into a phonetically-based written language using Latin letters. The original *Florentine Codex* was published with two columns of text on each page (sometimes accompanied by images produced by Nahuas): the written Nahuatl and Sahagún's Spanish translation.³⁹ The *Florentine Codex* is a 12-volume work that covers different aspects of Nahua society. Book 10 is titled "The People," or more specifically "The tenth book which treateth of the general history, in which are told the different virtues and vices which were of the body and of the soul, whosoever practiced them."⁴⁰ This description of the "virtues and vices" reveals Nahua's gender ideals. The *Florentine Codex* provides descriptions and Nahua pictorial renderings of "good" and "bad" men and women, thus offering insights into the gender roles and ideals the Nahua people espoused and condemned at the time. It is important to note that the *Florentine Codex* was created sixty years post-contact and compiled and translated by a Spanish missionary. Therefore, it is in essence a colonial document subject to Spanish influence, evidenced by the overlay of Christian morality and discourse throughout the text. Despite the influence of Spanish colonialism, the *Florentine Codex* remains an extremely insightful source into pre-Hispanic Nahua culture as experienced by Nahua people due to the indigenous elders and students who helped to compile its contents.

Aside from missionary purposes, colonial codices were often also created to be sent to the King as a way for him to gain insight into his new "acquisition" and for indigenous peoples to tell their own official histories. While the genesis of the *Codex Mendoza* is unclear, it can most likely be dated to 1547.⁴¹ The codex is arranged in three parts with the third part describing "the life from year to year" of the Nahua. Part III "fulfilled an important social function by conveying religion, history, and culture in story form to the public at large."⁴² The prevailing belief among historians is that the *Codex Mendoza* was created by Nahua *tlacuilos* (painter-scribes), at the behest of the first Viceroy of New Spain, Don Antonio de Mendoza, for whom it was named.⁴³ However, recent scholarship suggests that the *Codex Mendoza* was "an indigenous elite commission that, aligned with the project of defense of the indigenous peoples of the New World, was sent to Spain to garner favor for the status of the natives of New Spain as sovereign, civilized, humane people."⁴⁴ According to both theories surrounding the patrons of the codex, it was created to be sent to King Charles V of Spain along with a comprehensive description of the native pictographic elements written in Spanish. This description was recorded by a priest who was familiar with Nahuatl, and the images were explained to him by Nahua individuals. However, the *Codex Mendoza* never made it to the king once the document arrived in Europe.

The *Codex Mendoza*, written approximately thirty years before the *Florentine Codex*, also offers an indigenous account of Nahua gender ideals embedded within a depiction of Nahua culture and society.⁴⁵ However, the *Codex Mendoza* was created and put together by *tlacuilos*, who were artisans and commoners, and thus provided an indigenous commoner perspective. The *Florentine Codex* is more representative of the Nahua elite's perspective, having been based on questionnaires answered by Nahua elders, who held a privileged position in Nahua society. Although both codices were written for a Spanish audience, and therefore should be viewed, in part, as colonial documents, the comparison and analysis of the two codices allows for the examination of Nahua gender ideals and cultural norms across rank and class lines. Moreover, the differences in the origin of the two codices provide a way for historians to attempt to separate indigenous narratives and ideals from Spanish colonial influence. The *Florentine Codex* was compiled in an attempt to understand Nahua culture and perspective. In contrast, the *Codex Mendoza* was created as a way for the indigenous to garner favor from the Spanish Crown. Consequently, the *Florentine Codex*, while having been created later than the *Codex Mendoza* and by a Spanish missionary, could be more

39 "General History of the Things of New Spain by Fray Bernardino De Sahagún: The Florentine Codex." The Library of Congress, accessed March 13, 2023, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2021667837/>.

40 Bernardino de Sahagún, *Florentine Codex: Book 10 - The People*, trans. Charles E. Dibble and Anderson, Arthur J. O., vol. 11 (Santa Fe, NM: The school of American research, 1961); This edition of the Florentine Codex was the first to be translated to English from the original Nahuatl, rather than from Sahagún's Spanish translation.

41 Frances F. Berdan and Patricia Rieff Anawalt, *The Codex Mendoza*, vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992).

42 *Codex Mendoza: Aztec Manuscript*, 12.

43 *Codex Mendoza: Aztec Manuscript*, 11.

44 Jorge Gomez Tejada, "Making the Codex Mendoza, Constructing the Codex Mendoza: A Reconsideration of a Sixteenth-Century Mexican Manuscript," PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 2013, 269.

45 I am making use of a four-volume interpretation, analysis, and translation of the Codex Mendoza that includes detailed descriptions of the images and was published in 1992 by Berdan and Anawalt to help with my analysis of the gender ideals expressed in the Codex.

indicative of the true gender ideals of the Nahua. Because the *Codex Mendoza* was created to pander to a Spanish audience, it is likely that the *tlacuilos* portrayed Nahua gender ideals as more in line with Spanish gender ideals than they actually were.

PRE-HISPANIC NAHUA GENDER IDEOLOGIES

The onset of the Postclassic period in Mesoamerica, marked by indigenous imperial expansion and conquest, witnessed a gradual transition from the gender fluidity of the Formative and Classic periods to the implementation of a more rigid gender binary and prescribed gender roles relating to class and status. However, evidence of the tradition of gender fluidity is still seen through the examination of early Formative figurines and within the Nahua pantheon of deities. Specifically, in the Valley of Mexico, at the archaeological site of Tlatilco, more than 120 human figurines were found in ancient Nahua burial sites.⁴⁶ Joyce provides this interpretation of the gendered presentation of these figurines:

About 30 percent of the Tlatilco figurines avoid distinctive depictions of sexual characteristics in favor of generalized features. These figurines are often classified automatically as female because they are nude and lack male genitalia. But they may better be understood as media for presenting an aspect of human identity that is independent of sharply marked dichotomous sexes, a sexually neutral human image.⁴⁷

If these figurines are taken as a representation of a gender and sexually-neutral person, then it could be evidence that Nahua society in the early Formative period held a conception of gender that did not adhere to a strict gender binary. The Tlatilco figurines might be a representation of a person who did not identify as either male or female.⁴⁸ Another interpretation could suggest that these figurines represent individuals who abstained from sexual relations or children who had not yet reached sexual maturity. Nonetheless, regardless of the specific interpretation, the presence of these figurines indicates that Nahua society possessed a conception of gender neutrality that diverged from a rigid binary framework. Furthermore, this conception of gender fluidity and the nonadherence to a strict gender binary did not disappear altogether with the development of more gendered roles and the emergence of a system of gender complementarity. The conception of gender fluidity and the ability to transgress one's biological sex are elements that can be seen to have carried over into the

Postclassic period by way of the Nahua pantheon. Joyce examines how the founding deity of the Aztecs “invoked either with the gender-neutral title of Ometeotl or with the masculinized and feminized pairings of Ometecuhtli and Omecihuatl, can be seen as a continuation of the condition of the human child, with its multiple-gender potential, into maturity.”⁴⁹ Ometeotl was not the only Nahua deity to embody this conception of gender fluidity and a multiple-gender capacity. In fact, there were other Nahua deities that cyclically changed from male to female, and Joyce argues that “this multiple-gender capacity is one aspect of the ability of Mesoamerican deities to encompass different potentials that in humans had to be separated to maintain order.”⁵⁰ This argument further emphasizes Nahua's nuanced understanding of gender identity, which transcended strict binary classifications.

Such fluidity in Nahua gender concepts contrasts sharply with the more rigid polarity prominent in Spanish society. Nevertheless, archaeological evidence and the codices clearly show that more binary gender roles took root in Nahua society by the early 1500s.⁵¹ The Postclassic period in Mesoamerica began roughly around the year 900 CE and was marked by war and empire-building. The Mexica were a Nahua indigenous group that came to dominate the Aztec Empire in the fourteenth century and was centered around their capital city, Tenochtitlan, in the Valley of Mexico. Kellogg asserts that “war and military values permeated Mexica culture, and they became what might be called a ‘martialized polity’... [and] these martial values would shape gender roles, though not determine them completely.”⁵² Like the Spanish, the Mexica upheld war and military success as a masculine practice. The *Florentine Codex* praises the “Brave Man” and the “Valiant Man” as “an eagle [or] ocelot warrior, scarred, painted courageous, brave, resolute” and “one who excels others - a victor, a conqueror, a taker of captives.”⁵³ This emphasis and glorification of the masculine warrior is present in both the *Florentine Codex* and the *Codex Mendoza*, indicating that militancy was deemed a masculine role and a highly positive trait from both an elite and commoner perspective. The *Codex Mendoza* illustrates how, from birth, gender roles were pushed onto Nahua children through the differences in parenting and child-rearing techniques applied to boys and girls. Soon after birth, baby boys were presented with emblems of war, while baby girls were presented with symbols of the home and work (including the broom, spindle, and workbasket).⁵⁴ However, unlike in Spanish culture, the Nahua held up the role of women in equal respect to the role of men, with “the

46 Joyce, 29.

47 Joyce, 29.

48 This is commonly referred to today as non-binary, which describes a person who does not identify as either male or female.

49 Joyce, 177-178.

50 Joyce, 178.

51 One further indication of a less polar conception of gender among the early Nahua is that the Nahuatl language, while having words denoting “woman” and “man,” has no grammatical gender. See Lockhart's *Nahuas* (603 n18).

52 Kellogg, 22.

53 De Sahagún, *Florentine Codex: Book 10*, 23.

54 *Codex Mendoza: Aztec Manuscript*, 70.

most privileged Mexica afterlife [going] to men who died in battle, as well as women who died in childbirth.”⁵⁵ Moreover, Powers argues that the broom, a symbol of female work, “was both a defensive and offensive weapon...associated with a man’s sword.”⁵⁶ Women’s place in the home was not designed to enclose them within the domestic sphere in the same way it was within Spanish society. The idea of the domestic role as feminine as presented in the *Codex Mendoza* may be indicative of the Nahua conforming to colonial norms for the sake of a Spanish audience, or perhaps of the actual gender practices of the Nahua at the time. Female infants being presented with a work basket and oriented toward the household likely aligned with the Nahua feminine role, yet the codex presented it in such a way that it could also be interpreted by a Spanish audience as conforming to their ideals.

With the development of a more binary conception of gender and formal gender roles, the Nahua gradually became a society based on a system of gender complementarity and parallelism. Unlike Western culture, where the gender division was based on the public/private divide, there was a “general lack of clearly drawn polarities, seen above all in the disinclination to distinguish systematically between private and public” within Nahua culture.⁵⁷ Both the *Florentine Codex* and the *Codex Mendoza* offer a plethora of evidence of women having roles and being active in what we consider the public sphere. The *Codex Mendoza* shows three female litigants alongside male litigants in a Nahua court petitioning before four male judges.⁵⁸ The depiction of only male judges is perhaps indicative of the Nahua scribes appealing to their Spanish audience. There were also female judges and leaders at local levels, “called *chuatepixqui* which in Nahuatl, the language of the Aztec, means ‘female person in charge of the people.’”⁵⁹ However, these ‘female persons in charge of the people’ were most likely just in charge of the women while “male officials called *tiachcahuan* and *telpochtlatoque*... judged young men who misbehaved.”⁶⁰ This division of responsibility is evidence of a gender-parallel society in which the two ascribed genders, based on sex, held equal roles organized hierarchically within their individual spheres.

In a perfect gender-parallel society, there would exist two equal but distinct gendered roles at every level of governance. However, this ideal was not actualized within the Nahua political structure because “gender parallelism of

imperial organization does not...imply gender equality.”⁶¹ However, despite the lack of documented female Nahua rulers at the highest levels of governance, “there are also clues that high officials and their wives shared responsibilities.”⁶² Furthermore, the *Florentine Codex* classifies two different types of good noblewomen, the *cioatecutl* and the *tlatocacioatl*, as one who “governs, leads, provides for one, arranges well, administers peacefully” and “a woman ruler, governor, leader—a provider, an administrator.”⁶³ The fact that the *Florentine Codex* provides evidence of female rulers, while the *Codex Mendoza* does not, could be due to differences in class. Elites and nobles were more likely to be defined as leaders, and this description was not constrained to only men, in the same way as in Spain. Whatever the level of equality within the gender roles of the Nahua, one fact is that, unlike in Spain, women were not excluded from the public sphere. In fact, it was deemed the female function to be the “spokesperson and petitioner for the nuclear family.”⁶⁴ It is important to note that in Early Modern Spain, women had legal personality according to *Las Siete Partidas*, in that they could “sue their husbands for annulment and divorce, to claim mismanagement of their dowries or the property they brought into marriage in civil court, and to charge husbands in criminal courts with *sevicia*, or excessive physical abuse.”⁶⁵ However, Nahua women as the “spokesperson and petitioner for the nuclear family” were able to participate extensively more in what we deem the “public sphere” because their legal personhood was tied to their role in the household rather than their sexual relationship with a man.

Within the home and family, Nahua men and women were ascribed similar roles as well. The *Codex Mendoza* depicts both mothers and fathers playing an active role in the parenting of their children, with the father charged with raising the sons and the mother with raising the daughters.⁶⁶ Both the father and the great-grandmother are deemed the “source of lineage” by the *Florentine Codex*, indicating that some sense of parallelism and complementarity existed in the gender dynamics of the family structure.⁶⁷ While the “good mature woman” was deemed “a woman of the home,” she was not confined to the home in the same manner as women were in Early Modern Spain.⁶⁸ This difference is most likely because women’s sexuality was not a taboo subject for the Nahua the same way it was for the Spanish. Powers states that “in Aztec society, the sexual act was associated with joy, and both men

55 Kellogg, 23.

56 Powers, 26.

57 Lockhart, 440.

58 *Codex Mendoza: Aztec Manuscript*, 108.

59 Powers, 21.

60 Kellogg, 26.

61 Powers, 21.

62 Kellogg, 27.

63 De Sahagún, *Florentine Codex: Book 10*, 46.

64 Lockhart, 87.

65 Bianca Premo, “Before the Law: Women’s Petitions in the Eighteenth-Century Spanish Empire,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 53, no. 2 (2011), doi:10.1017/S0010417511000053, 270.

66 *Codex Mendoza: Aztec Manuscript*, 78.

67 De Sahagún, *Florentine Codex: Book 10*, 1 & 5.

68 De Sahagún, *Florentine Codex: Book 10*, 12.

and women were expected to derive pleasure from it.”⁶⁹ Because there was not a prominent ideological “need” to control women’s sexuality, it was more acceptable for women to be active outside of the home. (This lack of ideological control over sexuality is not to say that the Nahua did not recognize certain sexual transgressions.) Men and women who were dedicated to religious service were expected to abstain from sexual relations and faced punishment if they didn’t.⁷⁰ Adultery was another such transgression that the Nahua determined to be punishable by death.⁷¹ It is also interesting to note that for the Nahua “adultery was, by its very legal definition, a female affair, since there had to be a married woman involved in order for the relationship to be considered adulterous.”⁷² This observation serves as an example of certain inequalities in the dominant narrative surrounding sexuality for men and women. The *Florentine Codex* portrays “evil women” with varying levels of sexual promiscuity, while men labeled “perverse” are criticized for being “feminine” or “womanish.”⁷³ These depictions reflect Spanish influence on the Codex’s interpretation, yet they also indicate shared gender ideologies between the Nahua and the Spanish regarding sexuality. However, significant differences persist. Within Nahua society, gender dynamics suggest a mix of parallelism and complementarity in parental roles, alongside discrepancies in the treatment of adultery, highlighting the interplay of Spanish and indigenous beliefs on gender ideologies.

COLONIAL COLLISION AND “DOUBLE MISTAKEN IDENTITY”

The narrative of the conquest is often limited to the battle for Tenochtitlan in 1521 when Hernán Cortés and his Spanish army, along with a multitude of indigenous allies, including the Tlaxcala (a Nahuatl-speaking group), attacked the city in the heart of the valley of Mexico and killed the Mexica ruler, Montezuma. The “Conquest of Mexico” is a narrative of military conquest with the key players being mostly men.⁷⁴ However, women played a variety of key roles in the conflict, and because of the clash of gender ideologies between the Spanish and the Nahua, there were often miscommunications or misunderstandings that led to both groups viewing each other as an alien “other.” The most prominent of these women who played key roles in the conflict was Malinche, or Malintzin, who (presumably under dubious conditions) acted as a translator for Cortés beginning in 1519. However, while to the Nahua, the role Malintzin played as a translator may have seemed normal and indicative of women’s role as petitioner and spokesperson, it was considered by the Spanish in a radically different manner because they viewed women in a radically different manner. Kellogg proposes that “images of the conquest are themselves gendered, not only because

Iberian conquerors brought to the Americas a masculine sensibility that connected sexuality and conquest but also because indigenous participation in the conquests is symbolized most often not by the indigenous male translators, who were actually more numerous during and after the conquest, but by the female translator for Cortés, Malintzin.”⁷⁵ To the Spanish and to Cortés, Malintzin symbolized a feminized population that was supposed to be subjugated and inferior to the Spanish.

The military clash between the Spanish and the Nahua was not the most significant aspect of the “conquest,” from the Nahua perspective. The Nahua of central Mexico were an imperial war society themselves. Similar to the Roman or German principalities in Europe, the term Nahua was a broad cultural term. It encompassed many different indigenous groups who lived in Central Mexico, spoke Nahuatl, and shared similar cultural tendencies. However, these groups did not necessarily share a common identity and were often at war with one another. Hence, when the Spanish invaded Mesoamerica in 1519 and began forming alliances with the Maya and other coastal indigenous groups, the Nahua simply saw them as potential allies or adversaries in conflict. The Spanish, despite also coming from a culture of conquest, had a very different view of the relationship that they sought to form with the Nahua. Imperialism and conquest were very gendered ideas in Spain, in the sense that the male conquistadors were conquering virgin lands and “civilizing feminized natives.” However, both groups were, at least at the beginning of contact, working under the assumption that they were playing by the same “rules.” This is Lockhart’s theory of Double Mistaken Identity; both groups had their own idea of how the world worked, how people were supposed to act, how war was conducted, and for the purposes of this paper what gender roles and practices were “natural” and acceptable. The initial mistaken identity on both sides of the conflict is something that contributed significantly to the “othering” of the Nahua by the Spanish, as well as the “othering” of the Spanish by the Nahua. Because of the unequal power dynamic that developed between the Spanish and the Nahua during colonialism, the “othering” of the Nahua at an institutional level rightfully garners more attention from historians. However, there did exist a wariness on the part of the Nahua towards the Spanish, due to this idea that they were the “other” because they didn’t have the same cultural system and beliefs as the Nahua.

CONCLUSION

A comparison between the gender ideals of Early Modern Spain and the pre-Hispanic Nahua is crucial to grasp the

69 Powers, 27.

70 Codex Mendoza: Aztec Manuscript, 95.

71 Codex Mendoza: Aztec Manuscript, 117.

72 Powers, 31.

73 De Sahagún, *Florentine Codex*: Book 10, 37-8 & 55-7.

74 See Note 2 for explanation on the use of scare quotes.

75 Kellogg, 73.

cultural collision of the “conquest.” While the gender ideals of Early Modern Spain are often easier to determine due to the abundance of preserved primary documents available to historians, to uncover the cultural ideologies and practices of the pre-Hispanic Nahua, uncovering the cultural ideologies and practices of the pre-Hispanic Nahua necessitates reliance on anthropological studies based on archaeological findings or primary documents influenced by Spanish colonialism. To assess the extent of colonial influence within the *Florentine Codex* and *Codex Mendoza*, a foundational understanding of the dominant gender ideologies in Early Modern Spain is essential. For example, the emphasis on “vices and virtues” within the *Florentine Codex* is indicative of the influence of the Catholic missionary who compiled and translated the document. Through a comparative analysis of the two codices alongside Spanish cultural norms and anthropological research, one can uncover the gender ideals of the pre-Hispanic Nahua. Elements of a Nahua system of gender parallelism and complementarity, as opposed to the Spanish system of gender hierarchy, can be seen within the documents. The gender binary was less polar and rigid for the Nahua than it was in Spain, but there existed a gender binary that clearly described gender roles and ideals within

the indigenous culture, nonetheless.

There were enough similarities between the Nahua and Spanish, in regard to ideas about gender, that when the two cultures initially collided, there was a sense of double mistaken identity. Both groups saw in the other something that they could interpret as evidence of commonality, whether that be Cortés’ use of a female translator or Nahua women being symbolized by tools of the household. However, as these misunderstandings and miscommunications were encountered and became clear, the Spaniards began to use the differences to justify the institutionalized “othering” and degradation of the indigenous groups.

The historiography of the “conquest” has largely focused on the male-dominated military aspects of contact, but examining it as a cultural collision of fundamentally different gender ideologies and systems adds another layer to the complex narrative surrounding “conquest” and colonial contact. This is not to say that the Nahua and the Spanish held completely opposing gender ideals and ideas about gender roles, but they were significantly different. Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge these pre-contact differences and how they affected the interaction and mindset of both the Nahua and the Spanish. 🏰

Purgatory and Possession

The Unique Mysticism of Afro-Latina Mystics Úrsula de Jesús and Rosa Maria Egipcíaca

This article examines Afro-Latina mystics Úrsula de Jesús (1604–1668) and Rosa Maria Egipcíaca (1719–1771), contrasting their writings, exorcisms, and visions with those of white European mystics and nuns. Through an investigation of Úrsula’s diary and Inquisition records of Rosa’s trial for witchcraft, this paper argues that their lived experiences of racialization and perceptions of womanhood and strength impacted how they expressed their mystical Catholic faith. Central to their mysticism was their unique approach to suffering, a crucial aspect of Catholic mysticism.

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INTRODUCTION

In Minas Gerais, Brazil, onlookers watched in shock and horror as Rosa Maria Egipcíaca was exorcized by a priest – her body thrashing and contorting, foaming at the mouth, and gnashing her teeth.¹ After disturbing the liturgical service with her possession, she was sent to prison for eight days. Her crime, witchcraft, and sorcery, a reoccurring accusations that led her to be questioned by the holy tribunal office in Lisbon, Portugal.

Almost a century earlier at the convent of Santa Clara in Lima, Peru, Úrsula de Jesús wrote in her diary asking God the following question: “Why do I have to be the one to work excessively long hours?”² She was a *donada* which was a “religious servant who took informal vows” who was typically a “free or freed woman of African or Indian descent.”³ In the convent as a *donada*, not a nun who professed formal vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience in a cloistered setting, Úrsula lived and wrote about her conversations with souls in purgatory and the religious and racial inequality she experienced from the other nuns. Themes of betrayal, devotion, and power were present throughout Úrsula and Rosa’s lives. Collectively, their records give insight into the turbulent life of Afro-Latina mystics in colonial Latin America.

This article focuses on the lives of two Afro-Latina mystics, Úrsula de Jesús from Peru (1604–1668) and Rosa Maria Egipcíaca from Brazil (1719–1771), exploring how they expressed their ideas and beliefs on race, gender, class, and religion amidst colonial Latin America. Although Rosa and Úrsula expressed typical experiences of mystical suffering, such as fasting and extreme piety, their life of enslavement

as Black women in colonial Latin America shaped their mystical practices through their experiences of guilt, torture, betrayal, devotion, and power.⁴ This article argues that Úrsula and Rosa’s expression of mysticism was shaped by their lived experiences that were tied to their Blackness and womanhood. Unlike white European mystics and nuns whose suffering was often self-imposed, such as fasting, to signify devotion, Úrsula and Rosa endured additional tribulations that stemmed from their racialization. Their enslavement and subsequent mistreatment, especially by white nuns and male religious figures, deeply affected their mystic visions and experiences. This effect is evident in their visions and the power they reclaimed for themselves throughout their life.

MYSTICISM IN COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA

Catholic mysticism is characterized by ecstatic experiences, visions, and an emphasis on one’s intense devotion to God. The history of Women mystics within Europe during the Medieval period has been studied extensively by historians such as Caroline Walker Bynum in *Holy Feast and Holy Fast* and *Jesus as Mother*. Bynum paved the way for scholarship on these women, arguing for their significance in the history of mysticism, religious expression, and devotion.⁵ Bynum argues that for mystics “purgatory [...] simply was suffering [...] thus suffering on Earth could replace suffering later, and by suffering one could redeem others as well as oneself.”⁶ Suffering is central to mystic’s lives as they suffer in grueling ways, such as wearing uncomfortable clothes, intense fasting, and even self-mutilation. These performances were intended

1 Luiz Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca: Uma santa Africana no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Editors, 1993).

2 Úrsula de Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory: The Spiritual Diary of a Seventeenth-Century Afro-Peruvian Mystic*, ed. tran. Nancy E. van Deusen (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004).

3 Nancy E. van Deusen, “The Lord Walks among the Pots and Pans: Religious Servants of Colonial Lima.” In *Africans to Spanish America: Expanding the Diaspora*, edited by Sherwin K. Bryant, Rachel Sarah O’Toole, and Ben Vinson (University of Illinois Press, 2012), 136–137.

4 See extensive scholarship on mystical suffering and typical mystical practices, such as fasting, extreme piety, self-mortification, and more from historians such as Miri Rubin’s *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Barbara Newman’s *From Virile Woman to Woman Christ: Studies in Medieval Religion and Literature* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); and the work of Katherine M. Kimball in “Cultivating Christlikeness in and through Suffering: St. Bonaventure’s ‘The Tree of Life’ and ‘The Mystical Vine’” (Regent College, 2018).

5 Caroline Bynum Walker, *Jesus As Mother: Studies In the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), and Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

6 Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast*.

to demonstrate their piety and devotion to God through personal suffering and sacrifice. Through these forms of suffering, they attempt to emulate Christ's suffering on the Cross. These mystical women, as evident in their *vitas/vidas* (life stories written either by themselves and/or with their confessor) and letters, placed special importance on the body, healing, and food as a way to express their devotion to God.

Through the colonial conquest of the Americas in the Early Modern period, this form of religious devotion expressed by European women was also taken up by women in convents and lay women within Latin America. Prominent mystics in Latin America such as Rose of Lima have been studied by historians like Frank Graziano, who argue for her importance in the history of mysticism.⁷ In comparison to scholarship on Rose, less scholarly attention has been given to other mystics, particularly those of African descent. Even more so, there are limited studies on the impact of racialization, in combination with religious and colonial authority, on the expression and extent of mystical faith and devotion.

Born into slavery in Peru in 1604, Úrsula de Jesús worked for numerous families, and after a near-death experience at a well, she devoted her life to religion.⁸ A nun purchased her freedom, and she joined the Santa Clara convent in Lima as a *donada*. Joining a convent as a *donada* was for Úrsula, like other "free Afro-Peruvians and *parda*, *mulata*, and *morena* women of African descent [...] their best option, because all religious orders prohibited them from professing as nuns of either the highest-ranked black veil or the lower-status white veil."⁹ A nun and a *donada* are thus inherently separate titles, roles, and duties because of race. In the convent, she received visions often pertaining to purgatory and communicated with dead souls. In 1650, she started a diary of her life in the convent and her mystical experiences, which opened a window into Úrsula's life as an Afro-Peruvian mystic. She wrote about the following topics: unequal treatment in convent life, why God must make her work and suffer so intensely in comparison to others, her communications with tortured souls in purgatory, and the discrimination she continued to face although she was freed.

Until Luiz Mott published his account of the life of Rosa Maria Egipcíaca, an Afro-Brazilian mystic, her history was mostly undocumented.¹⁰ From Mott's biography of Rosa's life which is based on his use of sources located in Brazil and Inquisitorial records, it is revealed that she was born in Costa da Mina (near Lagos in Nigeria), but was captured and forced into slavery where she was taken to Rio de Janeiro in 1725 at six years old. From there, she went through different owners and was eventually forced into prostitution in Minas Gerais.

It was there that she started to receive her mystical visions, in which she was claimed to have been tortured by demons until she was exorcized by Padre Francisco Conçalves Lopes, who had also purchased her. After accusations of witchcraft against her, Rosa and Padre Francisco went to Rio de Janeiro and the Franciscan friars there encouraged her to express and use her mystical abilities. Padre Francisco and Rosa were arrested in 1763, on accusations of witchcraft and sorcery, and their trials with the Lisbon Inquisitors in Portugal happened soon after. It is within these records that Rosa's mystical visions, journeys, accomplishments, and possessions are recorded, including her own voice adamantly insisting that her visions and experiences were true and real.

MYSTICAL SUFFERING, PURGATORY, GUILT, AND EXORCISM

Many women do not leave their own records. Their history, if it is recorded, is often written and told by others, predominantly men. For religious women and especially mystics, their lives are found within Inquisitorial documents produced under humiliating questioning, or within *vitas/vidas*, which are life stories often dictated by these women with the final wording left to the male clerk or confessor writing their story. Rarely are there documents left by women mystics from their own hand. Úrsula not only leaves behind a document that tells her own history, but it is also an incredibly personal source: a diary.

Within Úrsula's diary, she voiced her issues with the nuns, her theological views, and recorded her many visions of purgatory. Historian Erin Rowe's extensive study of Black saints argues that "neither of these traditional elements [physical illness and ascetic practices] appear with any frequency in Úrsula's diary."¹¹ Why these traditional elements of suffering do not appear frequently in her diary is significant to understanding the ways racialization and religious and colonial authority transformed mystical suffering, and can be done so through contextualizing Úrsula's life and diary within colonial Latin America. The racism and inequality Úrsula experienced at the hands of the white nuns at the convent affected the extent to which she could express her mystical forms of suffering. Thus, the moments that she takes part in mystical suffering are crucial to understanding how she modified the Catholic faith to fit her life as a *donada*, and should be analyzed as an example of her unique form of mystical suffering. Úrsula followed typical self-inflicted suffering and denied her corporeal body by

"wearing a hair shirt and fasting when her spirit guides told her to, even when she felt weak and frail [...] In

7 Frank Graziano, *Wounds of Love: The Mystical Marriage of Saint Rose of Lima* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

8 The main source for Úrsula's life comes from her diary which has been translated from Spanish to English by historian Nancy E. van Deusen, including her own analysis of the mystic's life. Úrsula de Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory: The Spiritual Diary of a Seventeenth-Century Afro-Peruvian Mystic*, ed. tran. Nancy E. van Deusen, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004).

9 Van Deusen, "The Lord Walks among the Pots and Pans: Religious Servants of Colonial Lima," 136.

10 Along with the inquisitorial records of Rosa's trials, Mott's biography of Rosa's life based on sources found only in Brazil and the trials are the main sources for Rosa's life. See Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca: Uma santa Africana no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Editors, 1993).

11 Chapter 6 "The practice of humility and spiritual authority in the lives of black holy women" for further analysis on Úrsula's humility, contentions with white nuns, and interactions with other Black women that go beyond the scope of this paper. See Erin Rowe, *Black Saints in Early Modern Global Catholicism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 215, doi:10.1017/9781108367578.

the infirmary she cared for the most contagious and physically repulsive patients, volunteered to wash the infected clothing, and cleaned the sewer.”¹²

Medieval mystics such as “Catherine of Siena drank pus, Catherine of Genoa ate lice, and Angela of Foligno drank the water with which the sores of lepers had been bathed” as a way to demonstrate their relationship with Christ and others, specifically in the way “the medieval notion of the imitation of Christ involved a fusion with the suffering physicality of Christ.”¹³ A core practice of mystics is through the *vita apostolica* – the imitation of Christ and the apostles, specifically, Christ’s suffering on the cross – and they do this through performing these extreme physical forms of austerity and self-mortification of which they suffer. As Úrsula suffered through fasting “even when she felt weak and frail” and helped the sickest, she followed in these mystical traditions of suffering, and imitation of Christ through physical suffering.

Purgatory was a central part of Úrsula’s visions, as seen in her diary which recounts her visions of enslaved peoples in purgatory who asked for her help. During this period of history, for Catholics in general, suffering more on Earth meant less time in purgatory, and mystics could suffer in ways that emulated and revered Christ’s suffering on the cross, “suffering in purgatory or hell was purely personal, while earthly suffering could be undertaken on behalf of another.”¹⁴ This suffering “on behalf of another” Historian Dyan Elliott calls “vicarious suffering” which Úrsula and other visionaries experience “in their astral travels [where] they pondered purgatory’s exact location, ‘viewed’ its fiery cavities, witnessed the Earth behave like a large cavernous mouth that engulfed sinful victims, ‘sensed’ murky lakes and gorges, and beheld the most bizarre flora and fauna.”¹⁵ A Medieval mystic, Catherine of Siena (Italy, 1337-1380), “saw her suffering (which included her painful and growing inability to eat) as service [...] she agreed to continue living only because the Virgin Mary promised that God would free souls from purgatory because of her pain.”¹⁶ Catherine of Siena’s connection to purgatory emphasized forms of fasting and bodily mortification as a way to free specific souls, like her father, from purgatory. Úrsula, however, saw and conversed with souls through her visions of purgatory. Many of the dead souls that asked for her help were Black and Afro-Peruvians. One soul told her “*You did such dangerous and extremely difficult tasks, all for God. It will be seen then how good it is for us, and how grateful He is.*”¹⁷ The soul acknowledged that Úrsula’s labor, which was arduous and dangerous, was in fact spiritual labor and suffering that she devoted to and did for God, not

for the nuns at the convent. God would then view that work as ‘good’ for ‘us,’ who were the dead souls. Meaning, the souls would directly spend less time in purgatory because God deemed Úrsula’s spiritual labor as ‘good’ and He is ‘grateful’ for her effort. In return, He would have mercy upon those souls who were enslaved and of African descent. Another dead soul was a former enslaved woman who dressed as a saint/priestess and “assured Úrsula that blacks and donadas went to heaven, a concern that a white visionary would not have.”¹⁸ Seeing a Black woman dressed as a saint or priestess must have filled Úrsula with the confidence that her soul could be seen as equal in purgatory, and even regarded high enough as a saint or priestess. Úrsula was blessed with the ability to save dead souls and ease their suffering in purgatory as well as ease her own conscience in the temporal world, yet she continued to suffer from the horrifying visions she experienced and the difficult conversations she had with dead souls about their suffering.

Fasting was an extremely common form of mystical suffering as through it the suffering the mystic experienced would be a way for them to imitate Christ’s suffering on the Cross. One Medieval Flemish mystic named “Lutgard, at the Virgin Mary’s command, undertook three fasts of seven years each (on bread and beer) in order to relieve souls in purgatory and to quiet Christ’s anger over heresy.”¹⁹ This mystic suffered through fasting in order to help souls in purgatory. Unlike Lutgard however, Úrsula was already receiving souls in purgatory through visions, she did not need to fast or to be commanded to – it was something already bestowed (or burdened) upon her. Burdened in the sense that she suffered from witnessing the atrocities in purgatory, which are quite different from the self-inflicted punishment and suffering done on oneself in order to demonstrate both humility and servitude to God. Úrsula also disclosed freely and openly with the other nuns about her visions.²⁰ The disclosure of these visions suggests that Úrsula did not know that they could easily be misconstrued to seem as if she was possessed by a demon (mystical suffering has been suspected, particularly by the Inquisition, for this reason). Her honesty in telling the other nuns also suggests that she may have thought that having these visions or experiences might be common for the other nuns. As Elliott argues, suffering is “essential to salvation and divinely willed. Moreover, temporal and earthly suffering, the best of all possible sufferings, is presented as a positive opportunity.”²¹ Visions of souls in purgatory is not something every mystic could have, the ability to help these souls who wait in agony for judgment was a positive and privileged opportunity

12 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 52.

13 Dreyer, “Medieval Women Mystics: Weird or Wonderful?,” 14-16.

14 Dyan Elliott, *Proving Woman: Female Spirituality and Inquisitional Culture in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 79.

15 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 39.

16 Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast*, 171.

17 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 87.

18 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 58.

19 Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast*, 121.

20 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 5.

21 Elliott, *Proving Woman*, 81.

that is regarded highly in the eyes of God. The rarity of this privilege and Úrsula's intermediary role in saving dead souls in purgatory gained her some respect amongst the other nuns at the convent and amongst Black women in Lima. Úrsula was involved in this tradition started by Medieval European women about saving dead souls in purgatory, however, "unlike many seventeenth-century mystics sanctioned by religious communities and ecclesiastical authorities, Úrsula was a Black woman who had experienced the deep wounds of human bondage and inequality."²² In a way, Úrsula lived a life of purgatory on Earth where instead of being bound by divine measures, she was bound and limited by racial inequality.

Úrsula grappled with the notion that the time one suffers in Purgatory is correlated to one's sins and the soul's value, understanding that her soul and body would not be perceived as equal until judged in the afterlife. In one vision, Úrsula conversed with Saint Francis asking him for consolation,

*'What is this? They say that the profession of donadas has no value?'
The saint replied, There is a difference because the nuns are white and of the Spanish nation, but with respect to the soul all is one: Whoever does more, is worth more.*²³

In Úrsula's vision, Saint Francis told her that all souls are one therefore equal. This may be true in the eyes of God who will judge them after death, but what about their life on Earth? The assurance of "*whoever does more is worth more*" was supposed to make Úrsula not detest her work for the nuns, work that she did more of. Saint Francis reassured her that because she did more work, she was worth more; her soul was worth more and would be favored when she is judged in purgatory. However, this provides little consolation to Úrsula as she lived through this day-to-day abundance of unfair work and suffering because she was a *donada*. Furthermore, his response doesn't directly say that the profession of a *donada* has value, only that on Earth she cannot become a nun because she is not white or of Spanish descent. "They" in this conversation is referring to the nuns who "did not even see them [*donadas*] as 'exalted' [maids]."²⁴ This treatment from the other nuns and belief that they see her as without value and not even an "exalted maid" could have caused Úrsula to feel insecure about the salvation of her soul, the importance of her life, and even resent the nuns for saying such things. This conversation and issue about race and the role of the *donada* are something that would not appear in other mystics' questions and prayers, a worry that white mystics would not experience. Of course, white mystics can come from poor backgrounds and could be treated worse by the other nuns by performing

more work and labor, but they would not experience this because of their race.

It is because Úrsula was Black and a *donada* that she suffered more than the other nuns, at their own hands. She did not want to do this labor that she, and not the other nuns, were made to do. Úrsula's suffering "stemmed from her misery over the exhausting and often demeaning work she performed at the convent" which is a direct result of the "exhausting and demeaning work" the white nuns at the convent didn't perform.²⁵ Rather, for the other nuns, this kind of work was a form of suffering that proved their devotion to God where "many called themselves 'slaves' as they dedicated their lives to the service of Christ or Mary."²⁶ The nuns did not perform this labor because they had enslaved people and servants to do it for them, such as a *criada*, or an "exalted maid" a *donada*.²⁷ If they did perform this what they deemed spiritual labor, they called themselves "slaves." Úrsula had been a slave and although "freed," she continued to perform grueling work for the nuns, and voiced these struggles she experienced to the spiritual voices she communicated with,

*The following Saturday, I was up to my ears with cooking and other things, desiring only to be in the mountains where there are no people. I turned to God and said that were it not for Him, I would not do this. The voices responded that the Son of God was quite well off in paradise, but still He came and suffered for our sake [on the cross].*²⁸

Many male hermits who practiced eremitic monasticism had the privilege to go out on their own and practice devotion to God through prayer and silence, such as Saint Anthony of Egypt, who lived on a mountain, or even ascetic mystics, like Saint Mary of Egypt, who withdrew from society to the desert. They all had the privilege of retreating from the sinful corporeal world and fleeing to "*the mountains where there are no people*" where they could devote their life to solitary contemplation and devotion. Úrsula did not have the privilege to do this as her life as a *donada* was restricted to the convent and to the demanding labor she was expected and forced to do for the community and other nuns. Initially, this work would not be seen as a form of devotional suffering, but menial labor. Úrsula suffered more than the nuns because she was a *donada*, and she viewed her labor for the nuns as "her most acute form of torture, because she did not believe it defined her essence as a spiritual being."²⁹ Although this labor did not define "her essence as a spiritual being," she was still able to view it as spiritual work because "*were it not for Him [God], I would not do this.*" She acknowledged that she must perform this labor since she is a *donada*, but at the same time transformed what would have simply been labor into spiritual suffering by

22 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 7.

23 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 55. Note from author: any in-text italics indicate Úrsula's own writing.

24 Van Deusen, "The Lord Walks among the Pots and Pans: Religious Servants of Colonial Lima," 137.

25 Rowe, *Black Saints in Early Modern Global Catholicism*, 215.

26 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 52.

27 Van Deusen, "The Lord Walks among the Pots and Pans: Religious Servants of Colonial Lima," 137.

28 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 53.

29 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 53.

attributing and devoting her work to God. She was subjected to the commands and orders of the nuns, but dedicated and devoted her life and service to God. White nuns and mystics suffer through menial, labor-intensive tasks for the glory of God, while Úrsula suffered through this unending work for the nuns, and only did so for God. Suffering in the name of God is done so through service to others, and suffering is thought of as service. For both Catherine of Siena, Catherine of Genoa, and other Medieval mystics outlined by Bynum, service for them was done more through their healing of others and extreme fasting, rather than performing physical labor or service, “Food is the filth and horror of suffering, through which one also joins God and serves one’s fellow creatures.”³⁰ Úrsula did heal patients, the sickest of all, and she fasted. However, Úrsula’s form of suffering through service was different from white mystics as she performed physical labor. As a religious servant, she was expected to serve the nuns at the convent and suffered because of this grueling service. She suffered in several ways – through the physical labor itself, and through the knowledge that she did this for the nuns who would not do it for themselves. Even though she temporally served the nuns, she was able to persist and find hope through the menial labor because she dedicated all her labor to God. She performed this dedication with the belief that since she had suffered extensively through her life on Earth, He will favor her when she is judged in the afterlife as she had devoted her life to Him. Both Rosa and Úrsula experienced guilt from their past lives which they try to amend through their pious lifestyles and service to others, however, this service to others is extensive more so in comparison to European mystics because Rosa and Úrsula were expected to serve others.

Rosa Maria Egipcíaca’s suffering was rooted in exorcisms, possessions, and the guilt she felt from her lascivious early life. This guilt manifested in mystical visions of Christ and offerings to the poor. Rosa had visions of herself as both mother to infant Christ and as His bride which may have resulted from her “frustrated maternal feelings, since the documentation does not contain any allusion to her having mothered a child herself.”³¹ A common mystical experience was to illustrate their divine relationship to Christ in the earthly manner of marriage. The ability to express the depth of their devotion to Christ through the form of a marriage had significance as marriage itself became a holy sacrament. Through her ecstatic experience, mystic Catherine of Siena experienced a marriage to Christ with the Virgin Mary as their priest,

The Mother of God took in her holy hand the right hand of Catharine in order to present it to her Son, asking Him to deign to espouse her in Faith. The

Saviour consented to it with love, and offered her a golden ring, set with four precious stones, in the centre of which blazed a magnificent diamond. He placed it himself on Catharine’s finger, saying to her – “I, thy Creator and Redeemer, espouse thee in Faith [...]” The vision disappeared, and the ring remained on the finger of Catharine. She saw it, but it was invisible to others!³²

Rosa experienced similar emotional devotion to Christ as His bride, but the view of herself as mother to Christ is less common as that position is often left to the Virgin Mary. These visions of herself as mother may be a manifestation of “frustrated maternal feelings,” but certainly they were rooted in the guilt and other complex emotions she experienced in her early life as she was forced into slavery and prostitution. To combat this guilt, she may spiritually become a virgin with God’s grace, and by directly imitating the Virgin Mary and caring for infant Christ as His mother. These visions expressed her guilt and suffering, and Christ accepted all parts of her by taking her as His bride. The life of a mystic is filled with passion and strength to share her views with a society and Church against her, especially for Rosa who battled demons through possession, and the emotional battles she faced within herself that are quelled and alleviated by God’s forgiveness and acceptance.

Rosa’s guilt was further manifested in visions about throwing away her gold and wealth accumulated from a life of lasciviousness. The relinquishment of wealth and earthly belongings is a way to demonstrate piety and live as Christ and the apostles did. This relinquishment for Rosa, however, is quite different as her visions were tied to her life as a prostitute, and to her priest, confessor, and owner. Her priest, Padre Francisco Conçalves Lopes, appears to not have supported her mystical experiences as he “told her to throw away such visions, praying the Creed. However, she, confused by this happening, distributed to the most needy people the gold that she had and the clothes she used, acquiring everything by guild and earning with a lascivious life.”³³ For Rosa, the persistence from her priest to “throw away such visions” of relinquishing her wealth may suggest that he had ulterior motives for being with Rosa. If she opposed a monetary gain from these public possessions, he could not exploit her as crowds flocked to her exorcisms and brought with them donations for the church.

Rosa’s demonic possessions were viewed as sacred because epileptic seizures and other symptoms of possession, “either of the forces of good or evil spirit,” were all signs of being ill from a sacred disease.³⁴ Thus, the mental and bodily torture she received from being possessed by demons was only one part of her suffering. Her possession was eventually

³⁰ Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast*, 183.

³¹ Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 91.

³² Raymond of Capu and E. Cartier, *Life of Saint Catharine of Sienna*, See First Part Chapter XI, 57-58.

³³ Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 70.

³⁴ Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 53.

proven to be sacred through Trials by Fire where she was put under different tests that intended to burn and harm her, but did not because of her demonic possession. She was exorcized several times, all over Brazil, by her priest who accompanied her until their final trial in Lisbon. Rosa physically suffered from these possessions, the exorcisms, and arrests for her accusations of sorcery because of this possession. Rosa also suffered from being on public display during her exorcisms. These exorcisms persisted where

no matter how frequent and numerous the exorcisms were, Lucifer never left the body of this eccentric creature. Or rather – perhaps the opposite: the creature never let her familiar spirit go away, because, without him and his devilry, Rosa would lose the lure that guaranteed her so many devotees wherever Lucifer teased her.³⁵

Another explanation for the persistence of her possessions may be because of her exorcist, “Certainly the exorcist’s purse was filled more and more with the rich alms of the most fearful miners.”³⁶ Minas Gerais, meaning general mines, was a mining region of Brazil filled with enslaved miners brought to mine “Gold [which] was discovered in 1698 and in 1729 diamonds were discovered [...] by 1800, however, the richest gold sources had been used up.”³⁷ Rosa was forced into prostitution in Minas Gerais during the discovery of diamonds and other minerals and, certainly, her possessions and exorcisms frightened the “most fearful miners” who donated alms out of fear. Exorcism as a public display and a means to make a profit was not uncommon. A case from sixteenth-century France details a woman who claimed to have been possessed by a male demon who allowed her to be outspoken and behave in ways that only men were privileged to as she didn’t have any control over herself and actions. Although she may have had some sort of autonomy from this male demon, she was paraded and exorcized throughout France, controlled by her father who accrued wealth from her public exorcisms.³⁸ Pade Francisco performing these exorcisms as profit would have been taking advantage of the trust Rosa placed in him to exorcise her and release her from the constant torturing and suffering of demonic possession. Rosa’s exorcisms could have been similar to the woman in France – a frightening spectacle to onlookers in Brazil,

Let us imagine the astonishment and terror of the devotees, farmers and miners for the most part, free and

slaves, who filled the chapel of São Sebastio, witnessing such frightening revelations from a black woman who said she was possessed by a legion of seven devils, threatening with terrible punishments all the prosperous gold region!³⁹

Her outbursts during mass and other Catholic processions may have been caused by these devils that tormented her, or perhaps she did not let the devils leave so that she could gain more power. This attainment of power from possessions does occur for some mystics,

Though, because of her prominent role in the scandalous Loudun affair and her subsequent cult following, Jeanne des Anges remained far too controversial to ever be canonized, the recognition she gained through her stigmata and her own rewriting of herself as mystic allowed her to remain a prioress of a prosperous convent throughout her lifetime, to become a frequently consulted authority on spiritual matters, and to maintain numerous relations with those in power.⁴⁰

Jeanne des Anges (France, 1602-1665) had been possessed by a demon that marked her forehead with a cross when leaving her body. An image of this cross was published, and “publicly memorialized the prioress’s transformation from demoniac to mystic.”⁴¹ Rosa’s possession was quite different. Considering the immense suffering she experienced from the public exorcisms and the several arrests for witchcraft, it is unlikely her possession and exorcisms helped her to gain notoriety. She was able to attain devotion and reverence amongst her followers, but at the same time was constantly targeted and attacked by the Inquisition and religious authorities, and at one point, she was publicly beaten with whippings so fierce they left part of her paralyzed. Other mystics are possessed and exorcized, but few with such a difficult relationship with their confessor and with public whippings and beatings. The difference is Rosa’s status as a Black woman, owned by her confessor, did not permit her the ability to already attain the secure position as a prioress, to then turn her possession into mystical. In fact, Rosa’s priest, at their final Inquisitional trial, denounced her visionary abilities entirely.

The disingenuity of Rosa’s exorcist culminated in their trial in Lisbon where in 1763, Padre Francisco Gonçalves Lopes was accused and sentenced for “complicity in hoaxes, blasphemies, witchcraft, and sorcery” and Rosa Maria Egipcíaca was accused and sentenced for “complicity in deceit,

35 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 65.

36 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 66.

37 Amílcar Martins Filho and Roberto B. Martins, “Slavery in a Nonexport Economy: Nineteenth-Century Minas Gerais Revisited,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 3 (1983), doi:10.1215/00182168-63.3.537.

38 Anita M. Walker and Edmund H. Dickerman, “‘A Woman under the Influence’: A Case of Alleged Possession in Sixteenth-Century France,” *The Eighteenth Century* 22 (1991).

39 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 88.

40 Katherine Dauge-Roth, “Demonic Marks, Divine Stigmata: The Female Body Inscribed,” in *Signing the Body*, 73–120. 1st ed. (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2020), 105–106.

41 Dauge-Roth, 85.

witchcraft, and sorcery.”⁴² The last session of her questioning occurred on June 4th, 1765 where the documents were signed by the inquisitor and Rosa, who was sent to jail. The records refer to her ‘positions, functions, and activities’ as “cativa” or captive and “escrava” or slave of Padre Francisco.⁴³ She wasn’t thought of as a mystic or a holy woman by the Inquisitors, but rather a slave and tried as a “false visionary (*embusteira*).”⁴⁴ It is unclear what Rosa and Padre Francisco’s relationship was specifically – whether they were companions, lovers, or something else, they had been close for years. These titles place her only in relation to Padre Francisco as another Afro-Brazilian woman owned by a Portuguese priest. Her reduction to a captive or slave removes her incredible involvement in helping other Afro-Brazilian women and her spiritual guidance to others. Padre Francisco not only abandoned her, but also denounced her visionary abilities and mystical faith, a part of her so integral to her identity. While Padre Francisco and Rosa had been companions for years, throughout their trial he turned on her, saying that she deceived him. Perhaps it was easier for her confessor, priest, and friend to denounce her and save himself than continue supporting the mystic as he had for years. Despite this, Rosa adamantly and ardently confessed throughout the trial that what she had experienced as a mystic was true and real.

The harsh reality for mystics who didn’t have the safety and support of a priest and confessor is clear in Rosa’s case. An analysis of colonial holy women suggests that “some religious women, nuns included, were convicted as *ilusas*, or falsely religious, but their prosecution often had to do with the colonial authorities perceiving them as a threat to the social order rather than as a threat to Christian practices alone. Lower-class, urban women were especially susceptible to the charge.”⁴⁵ It is because of this threat to ‘Christian practices’ and the ‘social order’ felt by colonial authorities that the author concludes Rosa’s Inquisitional trials are expected, “Living the extremes defined by Catholic discourse as holy and diabolical, it is not surprising that in 1763, Rosa was sent to Lisbon to be prosecuted by the Portuguese Inquisition.”⁴⁶ Given that she had established a place of holy refuge for former prostitutes who were mostly mixed race or Black, amassed a following of other Afro-Brazilians, and even created a text of her mystical visions, the first written by a Black woman in Brazil, she appeared as a powerful holy guide to

others, directly undermining the role of spiritual authorities. While Rosa did have some support from Franciscan friars while in Brazil, she did not have enough support to keep her safe from male religious authorities. To gain the kind of endorsement needed to survive the Inquisition trials and even attain publication of a *vita* or text is incredibly difficult for any mystic or holy woman. Spanish mystic Teresa of Avila’s *vita* was published shortly after her death, and for “centuries, as quarreling cooled among Christians, it gradually gained recognition outside Catholic circles, even in the secular world, as one of the most extraordinary autobiographies ever penned, and as one of the world’s greatest religious books.”⁴⁷ Compared to Rosa’s one mystical text and a number of letters, few copies remain of either.⁴⁸ Whether they were destroyed or lost to time, it is a testament to the difficulty and reality of attaining awareness and remembrance of her life and work. Aside from her writings, Rosa can be found throughout the Inquisitional records with her signature – askew, at times shaky, and firmly pressed into the pages.⁴⁹

STRENGTH, POWER, AND WOMANHOOD

Some prominent religious figures led sinful lives before they found faith, such as Saint Mary of Egypt or Saint Mary Magdalene. Rather than by choice or circumstance, Rosa was a slave forced into prostitution where “she was exploited as a prostitute to generate income for her owner and herself. As part of her slave status in Brazil, she had to secure her own sustenance, shelter and survival.”⁵⁰ It was under Dona Ana Garçês de Morais that she was exploited as a prostitute, who was the second owner she had after her first abusive owner raped her at 14. Rosa felt guilty because she had been a prostitute where “devotion to the Eleven Thousand Virgins was supposed to serve as a kind of retroactive antidote to the dissolute life before conversion.”⁵¹ Although she did not choose to become a prostitute, she still felt guilty about it. Rosa experienced visions where she revered virgins, an attempt to give reparations for the guilt she felt of her past life. To find comfort and quell this guilt, she positioned herself with other saints who had similar lives to hers, of which Mott argues her name originated: Rosa Maria Egipcíaca da Vera Cruz, or Mary of Egypt. Mary of Egypt was not a prostitute but led a “sinful” life by choice, and the guilt she felt from it remained with her while she roamed Egypt as an ascetic mystic. By “im-

42 National Archive of Torre do Tombo, *Processo do Padre Francisco Gonçalves Lopes e de Rosa Maria Egipcíaca (Process of Father Francisco Gonçalves Lopes and of Rosa Maria Egipcíaca)*, Holy Office Tribunal, Lisbon Inquisition, proc. 2901.

43 Reference to Rosa as “cativa” within National Archive of Torre do Tombo, *Processo de Rosa Maria Egipcíaca (Process of Rosa Maria Egipcíaca)*, Holy Office Tribunal, Lisbon Inquisition, proc. 9065. & reference to Rosa as “escrava” within National Archive of Torre do Tombo, *Processo do Padre Francisco Gonçalves Lopes e de Rosa Maria Egipcíaca (Process of Father Francisco Gonçalves Lopes and of Rosa Maria Egipcíaca)*, Holy Office Tribunal, Lisbon Inquisition, proc. 2901.

44 Van Deusen, “The Lord Walks among the Pots and Pans: Religious Servants of Colonial Lima,” 139.

45 Katherine J. McKnight, “Colonial Religiosity: Nuns, Heretics, and Witches,” in *A Companion to Latin American Literature and Culture*, Sarah Castro-Klaren (Ed.), (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2022), 175, doi:10.1002/9781119692591.ch10.

46 McKnight, 174.

47 Carlos Eire, *The Life of Saint Teresa of Avila: A Biography* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), xii.

48 A manuscript by Rosa of 250 pages entitled *Sacred Theology of the Love of the God of Light Shining in the Pilgrim Souls*.

49 National Archive of Torre do Tombo, *Processo de Rosa Maria Egipcíaca (Process of Rosa Maria Egipcíaca)*, Holy Office Tribunal, Lisbon Inquisition, proc. 9065. Rosa’s signatures found as “Roza M” on pages 27, 33, 38, 44, 48, and page 88 as “Roza Maria Egíciaca.”

50 Per the doctoral dissertation by Spaulding, Rachel. “The Word and The Flesh: The Transformation of Female Slave Subject to Mystic Agent through Performance in the Texts of Úrsula de Jesus, Theresa (Chicaba) de Santo Domingo and Rosa Maria Egipcíaca.” UNM Digital Repository; University of New Mexico, 2015; 289.

51 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 69.

itating the Saint of Egypt after her conversion,” Rosa was not rejecting nor denying this part of her; she instead chose to identify with another woman who had experiences similar to hers.⁵² The strength to overcome the guilt, humiliation, and shame from her past life was enormous, and not something most mystics had to overcome. In fact, many came from privileged backgrounds where their dowries supported their lives at the convent, and their educated backgrounds allowed them to write letters and *vitas*, which would later be used to record their lives and histories. These large dowries also ensured that they didn’t have to perform such grueling labor at the convent, with that labor instead falling upon the shoulders of poorer nuns, and in places like Lima, Peru, upon the servants and *donadas*.

Historically, women-only spaces have been seen as suspicious, particularly by men who do not have control over their space and work. In regards to the historiography of this research, Women mystics are part of these spaces and often create new and different interpretations of the Catholic faith that diverge from orthodox beliefs and practices. For Rosa, “By 1753, she had become quite literate, crafting letters with her own pen and composing her own manuscript with the approval and support of her spiritual confessor, Frei Agostinho de São Jose.”⁵³ In addition to manuscripts and letters, Rosa wrote and created prayers for her devotees such as the “Rosary of the Faith” which she “sent quantities of these rosaries and handwritten explanatory leaflets for her devotees to adopt and disseminate in Minas Gerais.”⁵⁴ Through the creation of manuscripts and devotional pieces, by her own hand, for her numerous devotees, Rosa undermined the influence of Catholic authority from her own scriptural interpretations learned through divine guidance and knowledge from visions. She took control of her faith into her own hands through her writing, and put it in the hands of others with the devotional pieces she crafted. For instance,

In addition to novenas and other forms of vocal prayer – rosaries, seasons, wreaths, etc. – generally composed of a certain variable number of Our Fathers, Hail Mary’s and Gloria Patri, Mother Rosa, following the example of other saints, invented new modalities of prayer, notably the “Rosary of Santana” and the “Devotion to the Most Holy Hearts.”⁵⁵

The cult of Santana or Saint Anne, mother of the Virgin Mary and grandmother of Jesus, was prominent in Brazil and “devotion to Santana spread across all classes, including

among the slaves who, in American exile, wanted to restore, at least in the afterlife, their lost ancestry [...] Our Africana becomes a great devotee and one of the main propagandists of her cult and power.”⁵⁶ ‘Their lost ancestry’ is in reference to the family and ancestry lost as they became enslaved through Portuguese conquest. There is an ancestral popularity of the cult of Saint Anne in areas of Portuguese-ruled Africa where she had many devotees, “among them [was] Queen Jinga (17th century) who [...] used to pay her [Saint Anne] great worship on the day of her namesake.”⁵⁷ Rosa, as a devotee of the Saint Anne cult, and propagator of it, was able to give other enslaved people a way to take control over their own destinies and fates through the devotion to a cult widely revered in Portuguese-ruled Africa; but rather than organized by a Portuguese priest, they followed an enslaved woman – Rosa. European mystics also follow this tradition of creating new writings and interpretations of the Bible – it is one of the distinctions of a mystic and why throughout history they are targeted by authority because their power as women directly undermines it.⁵⁸ Differently though, Rosa was uncloistered, not forced to stay at a convent or monastery, because enslaved women were not allowed to take these formal vows and enter the convent as a nun (similar to Lima, Peru). This, however, gave her an advantage as being uncloistered she could travel throughout Brazil and personally share her manuscripts with other enslaved people. In a way, she took on the role of a male friar who aimed to spread the Word of God. Through this she became a *beata*, “or a woman affiliated with a third order of the regular clergy,” and as she gained power was targeted as an enslaved woman sharing her faith with others.⁵⁹ The fact she was arrested and seen as a threat only shows that she had gained enough power and support to undermine the Portuguese missionary authority. In these ways, Rosa was asserting herself as a powerful religious figure in Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro through the formation of new prayers, rosaries, and as a leader of the cult of Saint Anne. Moreover, she was uniting her African past with her knowledge of Christianity to preach, teach, and reach her devotees throughout Brazil, many of them being enslaved people and disadvantaged women.

Through this powerful role, she was following the example of other saints who taught and created liturgical content, however, how she learned and expressed this content was different. Rosa knew the cult of Saint Anne well, “a devotion learned and encouraged by her owner, Dona Ana Garçês who, following the custom of the time, probably celebrated her name day with novena, triduum, and some

52 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 176-177.

53 Spaulding, “The Word and The Flesh,” 286.

54 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 497.

55 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 495.

56 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 504.

57 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 501.

58 An example of scriptural writing and interpretations includes German Medieval mystic Hildegard of Bingen whose letters such as “Letter to Bernard of Clairvaux,” in *The Letters of Hildegard of Bingen*, Joseph L. Baird and Radd K. Ehrman eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and book *Scivias*, Columba Hart and Jane Bishop eds., (New York: Paulist Press, 1990) have been studied intensively by historians such as Elizabeth Dreyer’s “Medieval Women Mystics: Weird or Wonderful?” in *Passionate Spirituality: Hildegard of Bingen and Hadewijch of Brabant* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2005).

59 Van Deusen, “The Lord Walks among the Pots and Pans: Religious Servants of Colonial Lima,” 139.

profane festivity.”⁶⁰ Her tumultuous early life of enslavement and prostitution influenced her mysticism, which resulted in her own practice of mysticism that was tied to her lived experiences and shared with her followers whose lives were similar to her own. Further contrary to other saints or mystics,

Rosa’s Afro-Catholic practices were acceptable and even tolerated up to the point to which her practices went beyond intercultural references and conflated symbology that was typical for the African and Afro-descendant population. In Rosa’s case, her popularity grew to a point in which many of her followers referred to her as Santa Rosa, or Madre Rosa and, especially, within the *Recolhimento*, she was also known as “Abelha Mestra” or, Queen Bee.⁶¹

The fact her views and practices were at some point unacceptable and not tolerated suggests the heavy influence her African heritage had on the formation of her faith. Her own interpretations and practices show this blend of faiths as she molded them to her own lived experiences and circumstances. Some of her practices almost have a Protestant undertone as “Rosa would often convey to her confessors various divine messages, reversing the roles of the spiritual hierarchy, with her, and not the priests, being the intermediary between God and creatures.”⁶² She may have known some of these Protestant beliefs such as the Lutheran emphasis on one’s personal relationship with Christ rather than the necessary intermediary of the priest, but these views may have simply been her own – formed from her varied experiences with faith and divine knowledge through mystical encounters. Also significant is that her followers referred to her as “Santa/Saint Rosa” or “Madre/Mother Rosa.” It was not uncommon for a prominent religious figure to already be revered as a saint or especially holy, like Saint Teresa of Avila, since canonization (process of becoming a saint) does not occur till after death, at times taking centuries for one to be officially recognized as a saint. However, it was uncommon for a *beata*, lay religious woman, to have such a powerful title, especially that of Mother which is left to the highest position a religious woman can have. This, combined with “Rosa’s adoption of such a pompous and unusual name [Rosa Maria Egipcíaca da Vera Cruz]” suggests not only others’ high regard of Rosa as a powerful leader, but that she also viewed herself this same way through a name that was as complex and long as one of royalty.⁶³

Úrsula also exercised her power, for her through her physical strength and view of femininity. Typical Catholic

doctrine at the time “did not fit with Úrsula’s notion of the female body and femaleness. Unlike contemporary ‘privileged’ white visionaries, Úrsula did not actively seek to define herself as passive and fragile, because her notion of her female body (and womanhood) never subscribed fully to this dominant model.”⁶⁴ Not even contemporary but also Medieval visionaries fit this model including Catherine of Siena who “abhorred her own flesh, condemning it as a ‘dung heap’” and “associated Christ’s physicality with the female body, underlining thereby both her capacity for assimilation to Christ [through fasting and bodily mortification] and her capacity, like his, for service.”⁶⁵ The female body being passive, weak, and fragile was to Catherine similar to Christ’s whose flesh and humanity came from the Virgin Mary. Thus, for Catherine, women were able to emulate and imitate Christ’s service and suffering because they both have weak female bodies. Úrsula’s view of spiritual labor, suffering, and the female body were incredibly different. For Úrsula, she needed to be strong to endure the labor-intensive life at the convent and endure the spiritual labor she performed for Christ. Thus,

this corporeal ‘identity’ of the strong female laborer (whose body was not her own) contrasted with contemporary hagiographic ‘ideals’ of spiritual femininity that sought to efface the beauty and sensuality of the physical. Úrsula could abandon the worldly practice of adorning her body with silken garb, but she required her strength and vitality to survive.⁶⁶

Úrsula, like the other nuns and mystics, abandoned earthly pleasures and material goods which were expected of devout women. Although she abandoned these items, she refused to follow the typical weak feminine model because her life was not the same as those women. She rejected the image of the weak female body because she was not weak, her work required her to be strong and she depended on her body to perform work for the nuns, to help tortured souls in purgatory, and still have the strength to devote her life to God.

Like Rosa, Úrsula was also a role model and figure for her devotees and other women of color in Lima. Not long after Úrsula died, “the *parda* (a woman of African descent) Francisca de la Cruz, who had served the convent for twenty years, petitioned the abbess to become a *donada* ‘following the example of the Mother, Úrsula de Christo.’”⁶⁷ Both Rosa and Úrsula are called Mother which is incredibly significant. Their devout lives impacted the women around them who looked up to them as an example of who they wanted to be, and viewed them as powerful leaders who managed to carve a

60 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 505.

61 Spaulding, “The Word and The Flesh,” 292.

62 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 73.

63 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 63.

64 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 52.

65 Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast*, 175-178.

66 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 52.

67 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 6.

place for themselves in a society that limited their role in and expression of faith. Lima, Peru provided “a locus for gifted lay and religious women of color to gain notoriety, independent from their female patrons,” however, this expression was limited because the women of color were targeted by the Inquisition more frequently.⁶⁸ The culture and view of women of color’s spirituality in Lima was unique as it allowed these women to become *donadas*, *beatas*, and explore their faith in a way where they could eventually distinguish themselves. At the same time, the power of the Inquisitorial authorities is apparent not only in Peru, but also in Brazil where the “religious clergy colluded with civil authorities and Rosa was publicly beaten, which left her right side paralyzed.”⁶⁹

Despite the obstacles facing Úrsula and Rosa, and other women of color, they persisted in creating a place for themselves and other women to express their faith. For Rosa, her devotees included a creole woman who together “in a society so marked by machismo and misogyny, two women, an African captive and a creole, took the private place of the priest, becoming preachers of the Word of God themselves.”⁷⁰ Not only did Rosa outwardly express her own beliefs and share them with others, but also her “testimonies reveal religious imagery that fuses baroque, Catholic religious worship with Afro-religious cosmology: she incorporates Brazilian Yorùbá imagery and Afro-religious possession practice into her overtly Catholic worship.”⁷¹ Her journey that started in Costa da Mina and ended in Portugal all shaped her mystical faith including her visions of guilt, her creation of prayers and rosaries, and helped her become a prominent, admired, and respected figure. For Úrsula, despite her apprehensions about the sanctity of her soul and the assurance of her salvation, “she envisioned an egalitarian world where God privileged goodness, while still acknowledging the incongruities of racialized existence in colonial society.”⁷² Compared to white nuns and religious women that they encountered throughout their lives and prominent European mystics throughout history, Rosa and Úrsula’s environment and relations with others influenced their mystical devotion resulting in the formation of visions related to guilt, purgatory, and suffering. The body a mystic occupies matters where Rosa and Úrsula inflicted suffering on themselves as a form of religious mystical devotion, and experienced and lived with additional forms of suffering that resulted from their life of enslavement and status as Black women. While acknowledging the suffering and guilt they themselves felt, they were able to live devout lives and positively impact the lives of others.

CONCLUSION

Úrsula de Jesús and Rosa Maria Egipcíaca were two Afro-Latina mystics that navigated and made a place for themselves in colonial Latin America. Through Úrsula’s diary and Rosa’s

biography and Inquisitional records, they are connected because of their relation to purgatory, demons, guilt, torture, womanhood, and most of all suffering. The suffering they experienced differed from that of European women, thereby giving difference in expression of mysticism and faith. These women, because of their race, gender, and social status were born into suffering. They experienced in their normal daily lives a kind of suffering that was not out of a desire to prove their devotion and love to God – it was a suffering that was man-made and enforced through colonial authority, a suffering that stemmed from the religious conquest and expansion of the Portuguese and Spanish colonizers. It was a suffering they were forced to endure so that they may later receive the forgiveness and blessing of Christ. They transformed their suffering as a way to prove their devotion and religiosity through donations to the poor and unrelenting work and service to others, and without choice they suffered because of the racism and discrimination they experienced throughout their lives.

This article presents the different ways Úrsula de Jesús and Rosa Maria Egipcíaca chose to suffer as a way to prove their devotion and religiosity, and argues how their forced suffering from colonial life influenced their mystical practices, relationships with others, and perception of themselves. This made their mystical practices different from those of European women of which much historical effort and time has been spent. Úrsula’s continued religious devotion despite mystical tortures of purgatory and unrelenting physical labor, and Rosa’s persistence in the authenticity of her visions in the face of Inquisitional trials and exorcisms allowed them to become admired, strong, and respected figures of their followers and those close to them. This, and their powerful representation of femininity and womanhood, suggests their place among other renowned mystics, martyrs, and saints whose physical and mental tortures and suffering proved their religious devotion. 🏰

68 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 18.

69 Spaulding, “The Word and The Flesh,” 285.

70 Mott, *Rosa Egipcíaca*, 88.

71 Spaulding, “The Word and The Flesh,” 282.

72 Jesús, *The Souls of Purgatory*, 58.

“My First Effort to Understand the Full Arc of American History”

Faculty Interview: Dr. Jefferson Cowie



MUTHONI KAMAU
SAM SCHULMAN

JEFFERSON COWIE IS A REVERED LABOR historian and professor. His most recent work, *Freedom's Dominion: A Saga of White Resistance to Federal Power*, released in 2022, covers a wide-ranging set of topics from land grabs in Jacksonian America to the mid-century rise of George Wallace. *Freedom's Dominion* recently won Cowie the 2023 Pulitzer Prize for History. The board does not alert its nominees, so the award was a complete surprise to him. On a nondescript day in spring 2023, Cowie was bombarded with congratulatory messages until he finally asked a friend what he won. “A lifetime supply of Dunkin Donuts,” his friend teased. When Cowie found out he had won the Pulitzer, he was excited since it was his “first effort to understand the full arc of American history.”

He carried a relaxed demeanor as we entered his office for the interview. His office held a similar nonchalance: the room was lit only by the natural light pouring through the window, a few posters hung by his desk, a comfortable couch sat in the corner for students, and the bookshelves lining the walls seemed to embrace the space — some books still spilled onto the ground. “I think I gave away about 400 books,” Cowie said after I asked if he’d reorganized his books since I had last seen his office as a junior. I frequented his classes, immediately fascinated by a world of labor and social history that I felt was opening up to me all at once. Sam is much the same, as an avid lover of labor history and a mentee of Cowie’s. As supporters of Cowie’s work, we were eager to see how *Freedom's Dominion* came to be, why Professor Cowie chose this new terrain, how his work connects to contemporary events, and what he’s working on next.

Cowie had long thought about freedom and was often puzzled by its elusive meaning. “I’d always been intrigued with this idea of freedom and that what I understood to be freedom wasn’t what other people [understood]. So, what’s going on here? What are the different uses of freedom? We have this American creed called freedom, but we don’t all mean the same thing.”

Cowie’s definition of freedom takes a much grimmer approach than what dominates the American psyche. Taking a microscope to Barbour County, Alabama, *Freedom's Dominion*

narrates a tale of freedom tied up in domination, violence, and political suppression. What we once imagined to be hand in hand with democracy feels warring with it by the end of the book.

With such a grand topic, Cowie limited his geographical scope to keep himself honest. “You can write a national story about almost anything and say whatever you want ... So I wanted to narrow it down to a person, a place, an idea — something that would force me to stay focused on the conflicted notion of freedom.” Luckily, he stumbled upon the county on a family trip and was immediately intrigued. Later, he found out that George Wallace, a frequent character in Cowie’s writing and research, was from the county. “It was fate,” Cowie said.

The book views Barbour County through Madison’s “compound republic,” examining the tensions between state, local, and federal power. In doing so, *Freedom's Dominion* avoids getting bogged down in the minutia of local history and instead feels dynamic and relevant. Cowie’s disciplined writing process — writing 1000 words a day and committing himself to “short chapters, short ideas” — also aids its structure.

Still, journeying into the Deep South meant finally confronting the ever-looming legacy of race and his former naivete about the subject. Cowie reflected that “class has been kind of the center theme of everything I’ve looked at, I’ve taught, I’ve politically been engaged with ... There was a time when I thought, if we take care of economic inequality, a lot of the racial issues will take care of themselves. Two things can be true: I think class is the untold script of American history, but race is the obstacle to getting access to a broader idea of class politics. So I wanted to shift gears and look at race on its own. There’s still plenty of political economy in [the book] ... But, race becomes its own thing, has its own lifespan, its own power within this narrative that can’t be subsumed simply into class. And I wanted to deal with that.”

Freedom's Dominion asserts that freedom has long been centered around domination. Borrowing from Orlando Patterson, Cowie sees freedom in the American consciousness as not just bound in personal sovereignty, but sovereign-

ty over others. Attempts by the federal government to mediate the protection of oppressed groups bore frequent conflict over 'federal tyranny.' Over time, cries for freedom from federal authority have become doublespeak for advocating local white sovereignty. Thus, racialized anti-statism was born, the unruly child of federalism, the founders' fears of centralized power, and a political economy built on settler colonialism and chattel slavery.

Within our federalist system, local and state governments have become the locus of unchecked power. Cowie sees these fights against federal power as endemic to American politics. The weaponization of freedom persists today with the Right's fierce insistence on local autonomy, often to the detriment of vulnerable groups. "My biggest fear for this is that if fascism ever comes to America, and it's not out of the question, it will march under the banner of freedom. Which is a strange, almost oxymoronic way to think."

Cowie conceded that the federal government is often "clay-footed" and a bit of a lousy hero in defending democracy. "Are we talking to a labor historian or Reagan?" Sam jokes. Even so, Cowie believes "it's what we have ... the democratic rights and freedom of all people depends upon enlarged federal power that includes the capacity to coerce those who are championing the freedom to oppress." He argues that the political enfranchisement and protection of oppressed groups is often in lockstep with their ability to garner federal support and intervention.

If the United States' history of dispossession and slavery has metastasized within our conception of freedom — what do we do with it in our political discourse? Is there a way that our conception of political rights can be unbound from our history or does freedom have an inseparable relationship with domination? Freedom has at once been wielded by Confederates and abolitionists, segregationists and civil rights activists. For better or worse, freedom is often the language we use to understand and identify oppression.

Freedom will remain rhetorically and conceptually important, but maybe battling over the meaning of freedom is not worth it. "I think we should focus on the questions of democracy: being in the public sphere, backing the right to vote, building institutions that some might regard as an incursion and supporting those," Cowie asserted. Listening to Cowie, it seems that democracy is a more uncomfortable, disciplined practice than freedom as we've used it. "Freedom is about your ability to secede, to leave, to get out, to jump ship. Democracy requires that you stay put, that you back institutions, [and] that there are authorities who can make people behave properly."

"I think I am naive enough about people to believe that if democracy functioned, everything else would take care of itself. I actually think what we see now is democracy not functioning. I mean look at abortion rights: if it goes to a proposition level, it passes in some of the most conservative states like

Kansas. But, if it goes through this anti-democratic system, [with] gerrymandering, [disenfranchisement], [and a] racialized history ... by the time on the other end, its outcomes are inherently against the will of the majority," said Cowie. Of course, disentangling our democratic institutions from their anti-democratic histories and fostering citizens who see their liberties as inseparable from the enfranchisement of others is a perennial struggle. But that is for another day.

While we had his ear, we asked him to provide context for the past year's Hot Labor Summer and his view of where energy for militant labor unions might lead. He was less than optimistic about future gains. Despite a highly publicized year, unions have not seen an increase in density, suggesting that they are still far from increasing their power in the economy. "All the militancy in the world isn't going to work unless there's federal laws that support organizing. And unfortunately, labor law reform has been a failed project under ... every single Democrat."

Labor unions need federal support and institutional reform to solidify gains, but significant labor reform has been elusive for decades. While likely not a watershed moment for labor reform, the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act could potentially ease labor's challenges to organize and bargain.

All hope isn't lost, though. Cowie noted that "the great breakthrough in organizing was the creation of the CIO (Congress of Industrialized Organizations) in 1935 and that was because of the National Labor Relations Act. [But the NLRA] didn't just come out of nowhere." The National Industrial Recovery Act led to a massive strike the following year, culminating in the NIRA being overruled and the NLRA's passage. "It's a product of a lot of struggle, raised expectations, betrayed expectations, and then it cracks through."

"So, it's all part of a kind of great chain of causation. You just don't always know when it's going to break open." Mounting pressure from labor and United Auto Workers' President Shawn Fain's call for a 2028 general strike may help catalyze lasting reform.

In wrapping up, Cowie touched on his current projects which include a history of the United States and a short history of punk rock. Coming off the heels of a major award, Cowie is "interested in experimentation." In returning to literature that deeply affected him in his youth, he felt re-inspired by magical realism and Latin American writers like Eduardo Galeano. His new work still considers some themes of *Freedom's Dominion* but with a more playful, lyrical style. Cowie wants to write with a closer eye on how we think about the past — all of our lucid, amnesiac, and hallucinatory impulses included. "[It] is an attempt to kind of reconsider memory, reconsider the living past, and reconsider the lost past and how those all fit together."

We look forward to reading his sprawling social history sometime soon. 📖

Pests, Pestilence, and Persistence in the Modern Jazira

Faculty Interview: Dr. Samuel Dolbee



CLAIRE CHEN

DR. SAMUEL DOLBEE, VANDERBILT ASSISTANT PROFESSOR of History and D. Family's Dean's Faculty Fellow in Studies of the Middle East, understands that the locust has largely disappeared from the modern reader's imagination. A locust can hardly be expected among aspiring indoor pests, while new treatment regimens can manage their wild counterparts, especially in the developed world.

But Dolbee knows that these insects would have plagued the imagination not so long ago – what would you do, he poses, if you were a farmer in the 20th century and saw a swarm of locusts on the horizon? Dolbee sees locusts as “awe inspiring” and “truly apocalyptic,” and it is through the lens of their compound eyes that his 2023 book *Locusts of Power* traces the history of the Jazira region of the Ottoman Empire as profound geopolitical changes remake the Middle East.

The discovery of these insects as a critical juncture in environmental history started out as a stroke of good fortune. Dolbee reminisces, “When I was learning Ottoman Turkish, I would go to the archives. The catalogs are all digitized and they're searchable. Every so often I would just search strange animal names to see what popped up, and there's thousands of documents related to locusts. After getting fresh eyes, I saw that the locusts could be a kind of structure through which to tell those stories.”

Dolbee summarizes these stories as ones of “environment, borders, and moving people.” He has been writing about them for a long time – the book in question started out as a dissertation – and over the years, what remains clear is his dedication to illuminating the marginalized spaces in our collective history.

At the time, the Ottoman Empire was a “vast geography with many different languages and many, many different communities.” The Jazira region was a far-flung and politically inconvenient afterthought, and from the perspective of Ottoman officials, it contained not much more than sand and Bedouin nomads. It was a desert, a simplistic description that belies the true complexity of the environment: “In the late 19th century,” he notes, “to call a place a desert is to suggest that it should be something else, that it's a wasteland. But more specifically, it's a wasted land.

Someone has made it this way. With the Jazira, they say, look at all these ruins of ancient civilizations.”

Dolbee begins *Locusts of Power* by tracing how ecology became the mechanism through which this “wasted land” could be transformed. Key is the idea that land could become cultivable. Ottoman officials saw in the Jazira the potential to grow wheat and cotton and for the “challenging” nomadic peoples who inhabited that space to be transformed into respectable agriculturalists. As Dolbee puts it, “This is exactly the time that the Ottoman Empire is trying to use provinces and provincial boundaries as a way to exert more control. This is at the time of the Tanzimat – these late Ottoman reforms aimed at centralizing authority, clarifying whose responsibility is what and who can be where.”

Yet locusts found the ability to “wedge their way” into those demarcations. Locusts were certainly not beholden to man-made borders. They also transcended hierarchies of social order, frustrating the Ottoman dream of agricultural transformation – one that was intimately tied to Ottoman assertions of power. Dolbee wryly notes, “If you are raising sheep and camels, locusts might not be the most welcome appearance on the horizon, but you have a little more flexibility than if you're growing crops.”

The locust reveals that carefully delineated Ottoman boundaries could be transcended. Dolbee summarizes, “It's environmental history that explores how the simplification of ecosystems for human control also often has unintended consequences.” To be clear, he explains, locusts are not “secretly influencing human life” in some grand conspiracy. Dolbee also cautions against geographic determinism – “writing about the non-human is a way to get at the human,” he explains. However, it is through the locust that the marginal spaces of humanity can be examined and articulated.

One striking example is with the defining injustice of the late Ottoman empire: the Armenian genocide. Dolbee explains that the campaign of deportations and mass murders were intimately tied with the space of the Jazira, noting, “Armenians are sent to the Jazira in the genocide in part because of this idea that the Jazira is an empty space in which they will die. But of course the desert isn't empty, and

precisely because of that, and their own courageous actions, some people are able to survive.”

Armenians found survival in the nomadic communities that the Ottoman empire sought to domesticate. Dolbee says that one of the most striking sources he reviewed was a logbook of an Armenian orphanage. He explains, “Each entry would have the name, the hometown, maybe the father’s name, of these orphans. And then a four-sentence biography would describe the most horrific things you can imagine.” Yet he noticed an unusual detail: “On the faces of women, you sometimes see these tattoos, which are commonly used in Bedouin communities in the desert.”

Armenians occupied a marginal space in these encounters with nomadic communities; they were indentured laborers and family members, assimilated into a foreign community through desperate circumstances that nevertheless enabled their survival. In building these accounts, Dolbee takes note of the courageous scholarship of Khatchig Mouradian, Vahé Tachjian, Elyse Semerdjian, and many more in making these histories known. As for his work, he notes, “I see myself as telling these stories in deference to their power, but also in relation to so much labor of many different kinds.”

Dolbee explains, “In *Locusts of Power*, I mention this agronomist, Hovhannes Doumanian. In the fall, I had the great fortune to meet his son, who’s still alive, and who I learned had actually translated the memoir of his father. That’s how I got to have access to it – his labor and care and concern.”

Doumanian’s story is particularly touching. Dolbee explains, “Doumanian was an Armenian who was able to conceal his identity during the deportations of the genocide and then ended up working as a locust exterminator in the Jazira during World War I, which is to say, in the midst of the

genocide. He is charged with killing locusts at the same time as Armenians are being killed.”

Here, locusts are a powerful metaphor through which the greatest of human tragedies is processed. Dolbee recounts Ottoman officials debating the culling of an entire people like one would with a particularly persistent pest. He traces swarms of troops tearing apart families and the unwanted camaraderie of crushing locusts underfoot as deportees trekked through the Jazira, seeing themselves in those insects scheduled to be exterminated.

As for Doumanian, Dolbee says: “In some cases, he’s able to save people.”

In the final section of *Locusts of Power*, the Jazira is on a precipice. The Ottoman Empire has collapsed; locusts are eliminated; the Jazira is now a fertile breadbasket partitioned between Iraq, Syria, and modern Turkey. But Dolbee doesn’t believe that the Jazira’s story ends now. For example: “It seems like locusts are gone,” he says, “but you never know when they could pop back up.”

More recently, he notes, “We have the emergence of ISIS in this region. We have U.S. occupation of various parts of this region. We have Turkish occupation of various parts of this region. It remains a question of how people will figure out how to survive with these new kinds of interventions and also with the bill coming due for all of the ways that the environment has been exploited.”

As a result, *Locusts of Power* is not just the story of ecological transformation of the wilderness into a cultivated space. It is the story of how the future of the region continues to be shaped by forces that we might not have considered and the limitations of our own abilities. In his, locusts are a poignant metaphor – for those forces and limitations, and in the possibility of continued survival in the most difficult of circumstances. 🏠

Depicting the Environment of Manchuria

Faculty Interview: Dr. Ruth Rogaski



PHILIPS HE

GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY ARE INHERENTLY INTERTWINED. When we look into the history of a particular region, we inevitably consider the land and its influence on the activities of its inhabitants. In her new book *Knowing Manchuria: Environments, the Senses, and Natural Knowledge on an Asian Borderland* (2022), Professor Ruth Rogaski emphasizes the importance of the environment of Manchuria to the historical events of the region.

As the Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies at Vanderbilt University, Rogaski specializes in the history of science, medicine, and the environment in China. She previously wrote the book *Hygienic Modernity: Meaning of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (2004), which looks at the important role hygiene played in shaping Chinese modernity. She initially went to college as a pre-med student but became more interested in Chinese language and culture. Rogaski studied at Peking University as an exchange student in the 1980s, when China was still in the preliminary phase of opening up and had few foreigners. Since then, she has frequently visited and lived in China, traveling around extensively and exploring the terrains. Her experience living in China and her expertise in the Chinese environment are on full display in *Knowing Manchuria*.

On a chilly Friday afternoon, I got onto Zoom for my conversation with Rogaski. Though we were unable to talk in person, Rogaski was eager to share her exploration of the Manchurian environment. Explaining how she became interested in Manchuria, Rogaski describes that while researching for her first book, she heard that “the infrastructure of public health in New China emerged as a reaction to the use of germ warfare by the United States against the Chinese people. And as I was interviewing, I was trying to hide the fact that I was really surprised that I had never heard of this before.”

Once she began to research the event that took place in Manchuria, Rogaski found the reports from the investigations Chinese scientists conducted into the germ warfare allegations. But, “the bibliographies of these scientific reports, all the scientific literature that the Chinese scientists were using to understand what the indigenous flora

and fauna of Manchuria was scientific research that had been conducted by foreigners for the most part. So just how these scientists got to Manchuria, what they were doing in Manchuria, and how they tried to make sense of Manchuria became a real obsession for me.” The beauty of history lies in the interconnectedness of different topics and events. A fascinating conversation about germ warfare could spark a newfound interest in Manchuria, and there is always plenty of depth and breadth to a topic for historians to research and write about.

The book’s eight chapters each tell a different story about how the Manchuria residents interacted with the environment in an area that was influenced by different cultures and was the battleground for great powers for centuries. While traveling, Rogaski attempted to “imagine where places are on this little black and white thing that’s flat,” and her goal was to “take that flat map and make it come alive.” As she designs the book “as a portrait of a place,” Rogaski attempts to “give readers a more vivid sense of the expanse of the place, the different natural environments of the place.” And in order to do that, she felt she needed to “talk about several different places throughout the book.” As opposed to the single narrative most other historical works stick to, Rogaski’s work emphasizes space and diversity, thus creating a genuine image of Manchuria.

Though each chapter discusses a different place, Rogaski believes “there is still a chronology. I look at one place during, for example, the eighteenth century. I look at another place during the 1930s. So, it’s not really a seamless chronology. There is a narrative arc, but I was more interested in the locale as opposed to time.” Rogaski’s approach emphasizes the interactions between humans and the land they reside on. “I feel that the terrain influences human activity. And so I like to get a sense of the ground first before I think about what humans are doing on the ground.”

What sets this book apart from others is the field excursions Rogaski took during her research. While writing the chapter about *Changbaishan* (*Baekdusan* in Korean), the sacred mountain on the border between China and North Korea, Rogaski had “read lots of documents about how difficult this

mountain was to find, and lots of myths about the mountain being able to hide itself, basically, and only reveal itself to worthy people.”

Initially, she thought the descriptions were strange, but after taking a cab to the *Changbaishan* region, Rogaski “was surprised that I couldn’t see the mountain even though I was really close to it.” She later realized that “it was because of the terrain, the lay of the land, the gradual incline of the land in the approach to the mountain and the density of the forests, and also that the mountain has a low profile” that made humans unable to find the mountain. Thus, “traveling to the place and experiencing the terrain helped me better understand what I saw in my documents.” Traveling to a remote area at a time when transportation was relatively underdeveloped was a huge challenge, but it helped Rogaski gain new insight into the landscape and environment that documents cannot provide.

The impact of imperialism is an important theme in Rogaski’s book. In the chapter about the Russian botanist Karl Maximowicz, who went on an expedition to Manchuria, Rogaski points out that he came “at almost the same time that the Russian Empire is claiming hundreds of thousands of square miles of Qing territory above the Amur River.” According to Rogaski, the botanist’s connections to the imperial power of Russia means that he “created knowledge about the plants of the region and erased the local knowledge, the indigenous knowledge, and tried to extract the plants themselves from their deep connections with human beings in that place, which many scholars before me have observed as part of the imperially sponsored science.” By characterizing the plants with a Western technique and incorporating them into a global information system, Maximowicz undermined their connections to the local culture like how imperialism

deprives people of their connections to the cultural heritage.

Besides the Russians, the Japanese also looked to include Manchuria in their empire. It invaded Manchuria in 1931 and established the puppet government of Manchukuo. Rogaski argues that “by the time we get to the Japanese Empire, these imperial proclivities toward expansion also overlap with a very intense type of extraction and exploitation of natural resources, that’s part of modernity, part of capitalism.” Political and economic aspects of imperialism go hand in hand to provide maximum benefits for the state. Rogaski is also curious about “what are the local people themselves thinking and how do they interact with or, resist or avoid, or work with the imperial presence that’s coming from the outside.” These people likely considered how their actions would impact the environment to prevent the exploitation of natural resources that they rely on for a living.

When asked about the main message of the book, Rogaski denies wanting to “make any intervention” politically or going into any great debate. Instead, her intent is simply that people should “pay more attention to nature the next time they go for a walk,” and she wants people to “feel a connection to these observers of the past and feel a connection to the place. So it’s really perhaps less analytical and more experiential.”

Though this may disappoint people who think the writings of historians should make ground-breaking points, Rogaski’s main message is easily intelligible, and everyone can follow her advice no matter their background. At a time when we are becoming increasingly restricted to the indoors, Rogaski’s advice helps us appreciate our spiritual connection to nature and achieve peace of mind. In effect, this recognition moves us away from all the commotion within cities and the pressure that comes with it. 🏠

The Maps of Gujarat: Navigating a New Digital Frontier

Faculty Interview: Dr. Samira Sheikh



■ CLAIRE CHEN

DR. SAMIRA SHEIKH, VANDERBILT ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR of History, was “work-crastinating” as a Ph.D. student at Oxford when historian of Islamic science Dr. Emilie Savage-Smith sent her photocopies of a mysterious map. The map was inscribed in the Gujarati language, Sheikh recalls, and featured star-based navigational directions. Sheikh’s findings on what would end up being called the St. John’s Manuscript marked the start of an enduring enthusiasm for maps.

Such a relationship took time to develop. “I thought of maps as these rather boring objects that only a few people really understand or see,” Sheikh reminisces. But now, she realizes that maps matter: “I’ve increasingly come to understand mapping as a universal propensity that we all have,” she says. “It needs to be taken seriously both as technology of politics but also technology of selfhood. We all identify ourselves by our place in the world.”

Sheikh is particularly interested in pre-colonial Indian maps. Like today’s maps, they convey information about the physical landscape, but the characteristics that they deem important differ dramatically from what the modern reader might imagine. Sheikh explains, “Most of our modern maps are based on this notion that nation-state boundaries are hard boundaries, whereas we know they’re not. They’re just lines that human beings decided to draw on maps.” Modern maps do not just center the property of nation-state communities: on a more granular level, they also center the claims of individual property owners. “In maps of a city,” Sheikh says, “when you really zoom in, you’ll see the boundaries of every lot.”

In contrast, the maps that she examines are centered around natural geological features. These maps may feature stars and waterways like the St. John’s Manuscript; they may include wind patterns or wildlife cycles. This sort of knowledge is what Sheikh calls “embodied knowledge.” She notes, “Nowadays, we find technological replacements for this type of knowledge rather than inculcating those skills ourselves. That connects to also the embodied knowledge – knowledge that you might have in your mind, that you grew up through.”

“Mapping,” Sheikh says, “is fascinating because it’s a combination of the two. The map that you see on paper is only going to be a fraction of the information that you might otherwise culturally possess.”

Sheikh believes that diverse ways of conceptualizing the environment are crucial for understanding the spaces that communities inhabit. But as she explains, “The more I studied them, the more I realized that this sort of mapping still exists. It’s just not given any value as technology. It’s seen as informal technology or seen as the technology of less advanced peoples.”

As a result, Sheikh has begun work on a new project: a digital platform of a comprehensive and interactive interface of South Asian maps to be hosted by the Vanderbilt Library.

“There is currently no extant scholarly digital platform dedicated to South Asian maps,” Sheikh says. Maps also provide important insights for scholars and users alike: “Maps are very much part of the way we all live our lives,” she says. “The digital format also gives more credence to the idea of maps as a legitimate way of understanding the space around you.”

The maps that Sheikh plans to feature have their own unique histories. Sheikh’s work has centered in the Gujarat region of western India and is entangled in the mapmaking history of South Asia. She explains, “It’s a region that has a long and very indented coastline, and so it has a very large number of ports, and some of those ports go back to the Indus Valley Civilization – about 2500 BCE. So this is a coastline that’s been constantly in communication with the Middle East and East Africa from a very ancient period.”

As a result, Gujarat hosts many seafaring communities that have relied on proprietary maps in their voyages across the Indian Ocean region. Over time, these technologies have been intertwined with the communities themselves. Sheikh explains, “One of the really fascinating things about South Asia is that the practice of endogamy – of the practice of communities marrying within their own caste or family groups – has meant that there are sometimes communities that have very long histories of the preservation of technologies, of proprietary or familial technologies. Many of those groups



Figure 1. Sadanand Vyas, “Map of Gujarat,” British Library Additional MS. 8956.fol.2, ca. 1780.

that had certain kinds of technologies in the 18th century might still be in the possession of those knowledges today.”

Today, these maps are finally being opened to the public. Sheikh explains, “The communities that practiced these occupations often tended to keep those maps very secret because that was the knowledge that their competitors could use. In the case of seafarers from the region of Gujarat, they did not want to give up their maps or to share their maps, and it’s only after GPS happened that some of these maps have started coming on the market.”

That gives historians like Sheikh a prime opportunity to study these maps. She is particularly excited for her platform to feature the histories and knowledge of the communities represented in these maps. “I’ve been in touch with anthropologists who have worked in some of these communities,” she says. Sheikh is also eager to encourage broader user access. She notes, “The barriers to entry in the digital humanities have been reduced a lot in the last few years. I want this website to be available both for high-tech users as well as low-tech users: you should be able to use it whether it’s on your phone or on a very high-powered computer.”

Sheikh is eager to encourage diverse communities

to interact with this modern approach to scholarship. The project itself is open-access by design. “All the scholarship and the metadata associated with that scholarship will be freely downloadable,” she says. “I think that it’s a very exciting prospect to think about: how I can translate my scholarship and that of my colleagues into something that’s much more accessible than your traditional books and articles.”

In fact, mapping itself has great potential to enhance conventional domains of scholarly knowledge. “The histories of mapping can be a very fruitful way of approaching the history of religion, the history of the environment, the history of any number of things. It becomes a fundamental way to think about the practice of doing history.”

“So what does that mean for a historian?” Sheikh poses. She believes that visual mediums like maps represent a new avenue of practicing history: “It means taking visual materials more seriously. It means taking the spatial relations represented in visual materials more seriously. It means trying to understand what those visual materials might tell you about hierarchy, about cost, about access – it tells you about the sacralization of physical properties might be superseded by technologies of profit.”

Writing for Social Change

Faculty Interview:

Dr. Paul A. Kramer



■ WILLIAM LEDESMA

WHEN YOU PICK UP A BOOK or article—whether that be history, fiction, or the news—did you get swept up and propelled through the curiosity engine of the words on the page? To the point where you forget about the writer who strenuously crafted that ride, sentence by sentence? How do writers create this seamless reading experience?

Writing, especially about historical events, has always intrigued Paul A. Kramer, Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University. At Vanderbilt, Professor Kramer focuses on modern U. S. and global histories through the lenses of race, migration, transnationalism, and empire. His first, prize-winning book investigated the United States' colonization of the Philippines: *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (2006).

Alongside his passion for historical research, Kramer has long been fascinated by vivid non-fiction writing that galvanizes people into action for the public good, in the past and present. Over the last fifteen years, even as he continues to produce myriad academic works, he has published deeply researched, public-facing essays in venues like the *New Yorker*, *Slate*, the *New York Times*, *Foreign Affairs*, and the *New Republic*. To hone his craft, he apprenticed himself to some of the country's leading experts in non-fiction writing, most notably Mark Kramer (no relation) and Roy Peter Clark.

Kramer explores the art of social change writing, and helps Vanderbilt students develop their writing, thinking, research skills, and curiosity about society in his course "Writing for Social Change," which is listed under History and American Studies. It was here where I first encountered what Kramer calls "social reporting"—a term he coined to encompass a broad assortment of writing aimed at challenging societal wrongs through factual investigation, narrative technique, and engaged voicing.

One bright, blustery morning, I sit down with Kramer outside The Well, a wood-sided coffee house perched on a corner of Nashville's legendary Music Row. Over a cappuccino—Kramer is a regular here—he shares his insights into the ways that lively, engaging writing can promote positive social change. He spells out his idea of social reporting, stressing the ways it can forge new political and ethical relationships between the author, the reader, and the people being written about. His definition is that social reporting is about "the uses of narrative to cultivate new kinds of ethical and political relationships between the reader, the author, and the people that are being written about."

Among other tasks, social reporting exposes readers to troubling phenomena in society they weren't aware of, and may need to be. But it's also, he says, about crafting an experience for readers in which they may feel things they wouldn't have otherwise felt, including emotions that are unfamiliar or unsettling. As Kramer relates, when practiced well, social reporting can do two things: "first, it can help readers see the social world in new and sometimes startling ways, especially when it comes to unjust power relations in society they had previously glossed over; and second, it can cultivate egalitarian relationships between writer, reader, and subject."

"A well-crafted work of social reporting," he says, "can stir us to outrage, or help us recognize our complicity, or weave ties of solidarity between ourselves as readers and the people being written about." Here he invokes 20th-century theologian Martin Buber and his famous distinction between two different kinds of relationships between ourselves and others. There is "I-It," in which we either relate to the world as separate from us; an objectified "It" that we use or experience. And then there is "I-Thou," in which we engage the world through a sense of intimate relatedness and inseparability; for Buber, these latter relationships ascend to a sacred practice. At its best, Kramer observes, social reporting seeks to depict "I-Thou" relationships with its readers and subjects.

In many cases, social reporting can dislodge places where our public discourse is stuck. Our way of discussing and debating social themes can become mired in thoughtless, stereotypical images and storylines, with opponents effectively speaking past and above each other. Here social reporting can play an essential role, advancing new arguments, or even just introducing new narratives and concepts from which new framings can emerge. "Sometimes the existing discourse is so toxic, tangled, and inescapable," he says, "that you need a new story that can break open possibilities for new forms of argument."

While social reporting doesn't shy away from taking up a point of view, Kramer thinks its arguments shouldn't overtake the reader's sense of a larger world. "It's a sign of good writing about society that there's a sense of texture and complexity that doesn't align with the argument the author may be making," he says. "If that's not there, if everything lines up neatly, it's a sign that the author is cooking the books."

While social reporting has many positive accomplishments to its name, Kramer emphasizes that it

also carries risks, especially where the author belongs to more powerful and privileged groups, presumes readers that share a similar position, and writes about people experiencing domination or exploitation. Social reporting can focus on narrow, easily legible aspects of their experience in order to trigger pity in readers; think of ads that ask Global North readers to sponsor an impoverished child in the Global South. These are feelings many readers want, says Kramer, because they are hierarchical, and because experiencing them convinces readers they are good, caring people.

One of the most helpful concepts I took away from Kramer's writing course was the "ladder of abstraction." Created by Japanese linguist S.I. Hayakawa, the ladder is a way of envisioning the different ways that language works in the mind. At the bottom of the ladder, we find the concrete, sensory descriptors of the world: things we can smell, taste, touch, see, and hear. At the ladder's top, we find abstractions, meanings, and concepts.

"A good piece of writing moves up and down the ladder in a way that is seamless, effortless and invisible," Kramer says. "What I love about the concept is that it attends to different things readers are looking for, and for which writers are responsible: crafting a palpable world that readers can move through, and also a sense of what things in that world might mean."

When it comes to selecting details for the descriptors at the bottom of the ladder, Kramer says "you want the details to be expressive and evocative, something readers can bring quickly to mind, but also surprising and mysterious. You want to invite the reader to participate intellectually in the making of the text and the world the text is describing."

While he draws intensely on writing experts' theories, Kramer also enjoys testing, challenging, and revising them—and the ladder of abstraction does not escape his scrutiny. "The ladder metaphor conveys that everything at the top is abstract, and everything at the bottom is concrete and self-evident," he says. "But the everyday ways we carve up and

make sense of the physical world around us involve the use of names, categories and concepts that carry subtle, profound meanings. The ladder metaphor's stark divisions make this harder to see."

When it comes to an illustrative text that reveals social reporting's strengths, Kramer turns to Rachel Carson's 1962 *Silent Spring*, an exposé of the devastating effects of synthetic pesticides like DDT. Carson's deeply researched book, written in a style that can be lyrical and harrowing, played a significant role in the birth of the environmental movement, and the founding of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Carson's expertise as a biological researcher and her gifts as a crafter of prose were indispensable to *Silent Spring's* success; so, too, was the book's broader context. "There are all of these things that amplified *Silent Spring's* impact that have less to do with the text itself, and more to do with the institutional context that surrounded it."

For example, excerpts of Carson's work were first published in the *New Yorker*, one of the era's most prestigious American magazines, and the book was widely reviewed, discussed, and debated in the era's burgeoning middle-brow cultural outlets. The book's timing, published during the liberal Kennedy administration, meant that it could spark publicized hearings that investigated the chemical industry and the toxic implications of its products.

As we finish our coffees—he's got a class to prepare, and I've got my history readings to do—Kramer tells me that while authors like Carson inform us and illuminate our world, they can inspire those who come after them to keep going. "Part of the role of a book is to carry a baton, and pass it on to some future set of readers and writers," he says.

His hope is that, in whatever small way, his class might encourage students to venture out into overly familiar worlds, see them anew, and bear witness to the problems and challenges that social reporting has historically done so much to reveal. Certainly, his course encourages his students to critically take on this field of writing. 🏠

